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ABSTRACT 
Martin Francis Kyeyune 
The Relative Information Content of Complementary and Supplementary Narrative 
Commentary in UK Interim Reports 
The main objective of the research is to investigate the relative information content of 
complementary and supplementary narrative commentaries in UK interim reports.  The study 
also examines the relative importance of complementary and supplementary narrative 
attributes.  The subsidiary objective of the study is to investigate incremental information 
content of complementary and supplementary narratives.  The study used 309 interim reports 
of 103 companies for the years 2005 to 2007.  The returns used were daily market adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns ±5 days around the announcement of interim reports.  The 
disclosure index method was used to capture complementary and supplementary information 
using disclosure variety (number of information items) and disclosure depth set of attributes 
(good news, amounts and comparison of current with past performance, reasons for 
performance and forward-looking).  The control variables included financial performance 
measures of dividend yield, earnings per share and total assets.  Event studies based multiple 
regression models were used to measure information content.   
The findings in respect of the main objective indicate that supplementary narratives had higher 
but insignificant information content than complementary narratives for the model based on 
disclosure variety.  However, when disclosure depth is used, complementary narratives have 
higher and significant relative information content than supplementary narratives.  The results 
also show that complementary good news, complementary amounts and comparisons of 
current with past performance and complementary reasons for performance were associated 
with returns unlike their respective counterparts in supplementary narratives.  Both 
complementary and supplementary forward-looking attributes were not associated with 
returns.  The results of the subsidiary objective suggest that the disclosure variety model 
combining complementary and supplementary narratives when compared with the disclosure 
variety model having supplementary narratives does not have a significant difference.  All 
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other incremental information content comparisons based on either disclosure variety or 
disclosure depth had significant differences.  This study has a number of research and policy 
implications, especially after the 2007 subprime financial crisis. 
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API Abnormal Performance Index 
APT Asset Pricing Theorem 
ASB  Accounting Standards Board 
ASC Accounting Standards Committee 
ASSC Accounting Standards Steering Committee 
BCCI Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
BoT Board of Trade 
CAC  Complementary Amounts and Comparison Attribute 
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model 
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CAR  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
CCAB Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies 
CFW Complementary Forward-looking Attribute 
CGD Complementary Good News Attribute 
CII Complementary Number of Information Items Attribute 
COM  Complementary Information Item 
CRE Complementary Reason for Performance Attribute 
CVaR Conditional Value at Risk 
CXS Interactive Variable between Complementary and Supplementary 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
DTR Disclosure and Transparency Rules 
D-W Statistic Durbin-Watson Statistic 
EEC European Economic Community 
EMH Efficient Market Hypothesis 
EoS End of Sequence 
EPS Earnings per Share 
EU AMD European Union Accounts Modernisation Directive 
EU European Union 
F – ratio/F-statistic Fisher statistic 
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board 
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FRC Financial Reporting Council 
FRS Financial Reporting Standards 
FSA Financial Services Authority 
FT30 Financial Times Index for Top 30 LSE  
FTSE All-Share   FTSE Index for All LSE Listed Companies  
FTSE Small-Cap FTSE Index for Non-FTSE350 LSE Listed Companies  
FTSE Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange  
FTSE100  FTSE Index for Top 100  
FTSE250 FTSE Index for the Next Top 250 LSE Listed Companies after 
FTSE100 Companies 
FTSE350 FTSE Index Combining FTSE100 and FTSE250 Companies 
FVE Fundamental Valuation Efficiency 
GAA Global Accounting Alliance Limited 
GAAP  Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
HMSO Her Majesty‟s Stationery Office 
HPS LSE Historic Price Service 
I/B/E/S Institutional Brokers' Estimate System 
IAE Information Arbitrage Efficiency 
IAS International Accounting Standards 
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
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IASC International Accounting Standards Committee 
ICAEW Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
ICAI Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ireland 
ICAS Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland 
ICB Industry Classification Benchmark 
IES Interim Earnings per Share 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
IM Market Adjusted Returns Model or Index Model 
IRH Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis 
ITA Firm Size by way of Total Assets 
KALPHA  Macro for computing Krippendorff‟s Alpha Reliability Estimate 
KPI Key Performance Indicators 
LIFFE London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange 
LSE London Stock Exchange 
MAR Mean Adjusted Returns Model 
MC Market for Capital 
MD&A  Management Discussion and Analysis  
MI Market for Information 
ML Market for Lemons  
MM Market Model 
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MPT Modern Portfolio Theory 
MR Market for Regulation 
n/a Not Applicable 
NYSE  New York Stock Exchange 
OFR Operating and Financial Review 
OLS  Ordinary Least Square 
ORH  Over Reaction Hypothesis 
PMPT Post Modern Portfolio Theory 
PWC PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
R
2
 Squared Multiple Correlation 
RCE Regulation Change Effect 
RNS London Stock Exchange Regulatory News Services  
S&P500 Standard and Poor‟s 500 Index 
SAC  Supplementary Amounts and Comparison Attribute 
SbS Step-by-Step 
SCPE Standardised Cumulative Prediction Error 
SEC  United States of America Securities and Exchange Commission 
SFW Supplementary Forward -looking Attribute 
SGD Supplementary Good News Attribute 
SII Supplementary Number of Information Items Attribute  
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SPDR Standard and Poor‟s 500 Depository Receipt 
SPSS  Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
SRE Supplementary Reason for Performance Attribute 
SSAP  Statements of Standard Accounting Practice 
SSAP Statement of Standard Accountancy Practice 
SUP  Supplementary Information Item 
TIDM Tradable Instrument Display Mnemonic 
T-statistic/T-test Test-Statistic 
UIH  Uncertain Information Hypothesis 
UK United Kingdom 
UKGAAP UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
URM Unadjusted Returns Model 
US United States of America 
VaR Value at Risk  
VIF Variance Inflation Factor 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
1.1 Introduction 
Extant empirical evidence suggests that narrative information is useful for share pricing.  For 
example, Amir and Lev (1996) found that on a stand-alone basis, financial statements 
information (earnings, book values and cash flows) is not useful for share valuation.  
However, narrative information (such as market growth and penetration) is highly relevant.  
Kanto and Schadewitz (2003) suggested that firms disclosing extensively provide firm-
specific information but low disclosures compel investors to use less relevant market level 
information.  They also found that investors perceived companies that provided more 
narratives as less risky but shareholders increased their risk premium for firms with less 
information.  This reflects that the companies with more disclosures tend to reduce 
information asymmetry resulting from the agency relationship between investors and the 
management.  Further, Lundholm and Myers (2002), show that disclosures beyond the 
financial statements are important for prediction of future earnings. Finally, Abrahamson and 
Amir (1996) provide evidence that narratives (in the president‟s letter) are used in share 
pricing because the interaction of narratives with financial statements makes the information 
useful to investors.   
The preceding empirical evidence implies that narratives are incrementally (above financial 
statements) useful in share pricing decisions.  Prior literature (e.g. Abrahamson and Amir 
1996; Collins and Kothari 1989; Schadewitz et al. 2002) has provided reasons for this.  First, 
narratives have the potential to inform shareholders on aspects influencing performance that 
cannot be expressed in financial statements figures.  Second, figures fail to provide all 
necessary information for corporate valuation.  For instance, Ball (1992) and Ball and Bartov 
(1996) found that the underlying value of earnings was not accurately captured by the market 
participants when a company did not provide earnings specific narrative, leading to under- or 
over-reaction by financial statements users.  In a related manner, Barberis et al (1998) suggest 
that people pay attention to both subjective strengths and statistical weights of evidence. 
Third, compared to other internal sources of information, the narratives serve as a source of 
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information for unsophisticated users because they explain financial statements in an oratory 
rather than technical language (Clatworthy and Jones 2003).  Narratives ensure adequate 
understanding of performance through flexibility in corporate reporting by providing soft 
information behind and beyond the figures (Abrahamson and Amir 1996; Botosan 1997).  
Lastly, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) argued that narratives 
are better sources of information about companies compared to external sources, as they are 
produced by managers involved in the day-to-day business affairs (AICPA 1994). 
The evidence above on usefulness of narratives and subsequent response of regulatory and 
accounting bodies in ensuring sufficient disclosures led to proliferation of narratives in the 
United Kingdom (UK).  For example, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) issued the 
Operating and Financial Review (OFR) in 1993 and revised it in 2003.  The government‟s 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) responded by making the OFR mandatory for all 
listed and large UK companies (DTI 2002,  2004) effective in 2005.  Although the OFR was 
made voluntary in 2006, it remains a statement of best practice and was replaced by the 
European Union Accounts Modernisation Directive (EU AMD) requiring a business review.  
The business review includes an analysis of both financial and non-financial key performance 
indicators, environmental and employee matters.  The Companies Act 2006 incorporated the 
requirements of the directive in UK company law.  
There are suggestions that this increase and shift in legislation resulted into growing size of 
financial reports.  For example, Deloitte (2006a) found that annual reports of the top 350 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) listed firms (FTSE350) increased in size from an average of 61 
pages in 1996 to 108 pages in 2005.  In the same reports, the narratives section increased from 
49% to 59%.  In another survey, Deloitte (2006b) found that pages in annual reports of the top 
100 LSE listed firms (FTSE100) increased from an average of 45 in 1996 to 85 in 2006.  The 
finding was attributed to frequent changes in legislation causing uncertainty regarding 
disclosures.  PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC 2007a) also documents in its survey that 
FTSE350 companies‟ annual reports for the year 2007 had more pages compared to 2006.  
The survey recommended that business managers should concentrate on quality rather than 
quantity of information to sustain usefulness.  In academic research, Beattie et al (2008) 
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demonstrate that annual report pages increased from 26 pages in 1965 to 75 pages in 2004.  
They also attributed the increase to regulatory shifts and suggested that increased voluntary 
narrative information was a way of minimising litigation.  
The increased volume of narratives disclosed leads to various undesirable consequences which 
include cost of disclosure outweighing benefits (Elliott and Jacobson 1994) and information 
overload (PwC 2007b; The Virtuous Circle 2006).  When information costs outweigh the 
benefit, such information cannot be useful (ASB 1999).  Information overload also means that 
the information ceases to be useful because the users cannot process all the information 
efficiently.  The existence of these problems means that companies need to make choices 
about which narrative information to disclose depending on the relative usefulness.  
To enhance the relevance of disclosures, the Reporting Standard 1 by ASB (2005; 2006) 
recommended that narratives should complement as well as supplement financial statements. 
The Standard referred to complementary narrative information as useful financial and non-
financial information about the business and its performance that is not reported in the financial 
statements (emphasis added) but which the directors judge might be relevant to the members‟ 
evaluation of the past results and assessment of future prospects.  The Standard further defines 
supplementary narrative information as additional explanations of amounts recorded in the 
financial statements (emphasis added) and explain the conditions and events that shaped the 
information contained in the financial statements.  Given that ASB (2005; 2006) 
recommended that narratives should complement as well as supplement financial statements, it 
is both important and timely to investigate the relative information content of complementary 
and supplementary narrative commentary.  It is important because accounting regulators and 
company management need to know which type of narrative information is more important to 
the users so that this can be reflected in the amount of each type of narrative information 
disclosed.  The investigation is timely because recent debates are now focusing on how to 
reduce rather than expand the volume of narrative information disclosed, for example, the 
Global Accounting Alliance Limited (GAA 2009) and the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of Scotland (ICAS 2010).  The GAA (2009) suggests that there is a natural tendency to add 
further elements of disclosure when there is a problem but there is no mechanism on the other 
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side of the equation to get rid of stuff which no one needs anymore. Similarly,  ICAS (2010) 
argues that a few would disagree with the view that many UK corporate reports have become a 
lengthy exercise in regulatory compliance but fail to communicate a compelling account of 
how the business has performed. In other words, they are not obviously decision useful.  
Knowledge of the relative usefulness of the complementary and supplementary narrative 
information will be important for regulators should they decide to advise on the elimination of 
some narrative information currently required on the grounds of relative usefulness. 
In turn, ensuring information usefulness of narratives reduces the information asymmetry that 
arises from agency relationship between the investors and firm management.  With reference 
to Fama‟s (1970) efficient market hypothesis (EMH), reducing asymmetry arguably increases 
the potential of the investors to incorporate information in the security prices in an accurate 
and timely manner.  In other words, the situation of reduced asymmetry increases market 
efficiency.   
1.2 Research Objectives 
In line with the above introduction, the main objective of the research is to investigate the 
relative information content of complementary and supplementary narrative commentaries in 
UK interim reports.  Complementary and supplementary narrative commentaries are measured 
using the disclosure index methodology and the measurement is based on either disclosure 
variety or disclosure depth.  Auxiliary to the main objective, the study examines the relative 
importance of complementary and supplementary narrative attributes under disclosure depth.  
These attributes are good news, amounts and comparisons of current with past performance, 
reasons for performance and forward-looking disclosures. 
The subsidiary objective of the study is to investigate whether a model incorporating both 
complementary and supplementary narratives has more explanatory power compared to 
models incorporating complementary and supplementary narratives individually.  
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1.3 Summary Research Methodology and Methods 
The research objectives are investigated through positivist approach where quantitative 
methods are used to measure dependant and independent variables as well as information 
content. 
The sample used in this study consists of 103 companies randomly selected from a sampling 
frame of 136 firms.  The sampling frame met three conditions.  First, the companies must be 
listed on the LSE.  Second, they must be consistently constituents of FTSE350 index during 
the period 2005 to 2007, inclusive.  Third, they must be non-financial services sector 
companies.  For all 103 firms, interim reports for 2005, 2006 and 2007 are used to arrive at a 
sample of 309 firm years.   
The event study technique is used to measure information content of complementary and 
supplementary narratives.  The dependent variable used is the daily market adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the window ±5 days around the announcement day for 
interim results.   
The main independent variables investigated are the extent of disclosure of complementary 
and supplementary information.  The disclosure index methodology applied in prior studies 
(e.g. Beattie and Thomson 2007; Kanto and Schadewitz 2000; Tauringana and Mangena 2006; 
Wallace and Nasser 1995) was used to measure the extent of complementary and 
supplementary disclosure.  Extent of complementary and supplementary disclosure is 
measured by either disclosure variety or disclosure depth techniques.  Disclosure variety is a 
dichotomous technique for measuring disclosures that awards a single score for presence of an 
information item without regard to repetitions.  Therefore, the attributes under disclosure 
variety are complementary [supplementary] number of information items (CII [SII]).  
Disclosure depth is a technique that recognises various disclosure attributes and repetition of 
disclosure items and attributes.  The disclosure depth attributes considered are complementary 
[supplementary] good news (CGD [SGD]), amounts and comparisons of current with past 
performance (CAC [SAC]), reasons for performance (CRE [SRE]) and forward-looking 
disclosures (CFW [SFW]).  The narrative commentary examined includes all disclosures in 
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interim reports, excluding IFRS financial statements, notes to the financial statements and 
audit reviews.  Financial statements variables that have been found to have information 
content are incorporated in the models of information content as control variables.  They 
include annual dividend yield (ADY) (e.g. Fama and French 1988; Kothari and Shanken 
1997), interim earnings per share (IES) (e.g. Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2009; Lennox and 
Park 2006) and interim total assets (ITA) (e.g. Campbell et al. 2001; Grullon and Michaely 
2004).   
The study used multiple linear regression analysis to examine information content in line with 
the objectives stated in section 1.2 above through various models. 
Four models are used for the main objective.  Each model considers information content of 
complementary and supplementary narratives individually, where two are grouped under 
disclosure variety and two under disclosure depth.  To estimate relative information content, 
the complementary narratives models are compared with those for supplementary narratives 
for the highest significant coefficients.  The adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted R
2
) 
establishes relative information content of complementary and supplementary narratives in 
pursuit of the main objective.  Significance of relative information content is concluded from 
the results of the Hotelling‟s t-statistic and Steiger‟s Z-statistic.  The relative usefulness of 
disclosure attributes under disclosure depth is based on the multiple regression test-statistics 
(t-statistic), where the coefficients and significance for the variables representing 
complementary attributes are compared to those of the counterpart supplementary attributes.  
The mathematical presentation of the notion of relative information content is presented 
below.   
 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 
  
>
=
<
 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
  
The above expression states that information content of complementary narratives is either 
greater or less than or equal to the information content of supplementary narratives.  
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For relative information content of complementary and supplementary narratives based on 
disclosure variety, results of the models below are compared.   
1. Information Content of Complementary Narratives based on Disclosure Variety 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
2. Information Content of Supplementary Narratives based on Disclosure Variety 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
For relative information content of complementary and supplementary narratives and 
attributes based on disclosure depth, the results of the models below are compared. 
3. Information Content of Complementary Narrative based on Disclosure Depth 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
4. Information Content of Supplementary Narrative based on Disclosure Depth 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
For the subsidiary objective of the study, models combining complementary and 
supplementary sets of attributes are considered.  The purpose is to establish whether the 
models combining complementary and supplementary narratives have higher information 
content than the models that consider complementary and supplementary narratives 
individually.  The significance of incremental information content is based on the F-statistics.  
The mathematical expression for incremental information content is provided below. 
Expression 1: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
    
≥
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 
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Expression2: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
    
≥
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 
 
   
The first expression is read as information content of complementary and supplementary 
narratives is either equal or greater than information content of complementary narratives.  
The second expression shows that information content of complementary and supplementary 
narratives is either equal or greater than the information content of supplementary narratives.  
There are two information content models combining complementary and supplementary 
narratives.  The first is based on disclosure variety and the second is based on disclosure 
depth.   
5. Model Combining Complementary and Supplementary Narratives based on Disclosure 
Variety 
  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
6. Model Combining Complementary and Supplementary Narratives based on Disclosure 
Depth 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑆𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
1.4 Main Findings 
The findings in respect of the main objective are that neither complementary nor 
supplementary narratives have significant information content in the pre-event period for both 
disclosure variety and disclosure depth.  In the post-event period, the results showed that 
supplementary narratives had higher relative information content than complementary 
narratives for the models based on disclosure variety but the difference is not significant.  
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However, when disclosure depth is used, complementary narratives have higher relative 
information content than supplementary narratives and resultant difference is significant.   
As an auxiliary to the main objective, under disclosure depth, there was no difference in the 
information content of complementary and supplementary narratives attributes in the pre-event 
period.  In the post-event period, complementary good news, complementary amounts and 
comparisons of current with past performance and complementary reasons for performance 
were associated with returns unlike their respective counterparts in supplementary narratives.  
Both complementary and supplementary forward-looking attributes were not associated with 
returns; therefore, their relative usefulness to returns was not different. 
For subsidiary objective, the pre-event results show that under either disclosure variety or 
depth, the model combining complementary and supplementary narratives is not associated 
with returns, similar to the models that consider complementary and supplementary narratives 
individually.  The post-event period the disclosure variety model combining both 
complementary and supplementary narratives has slightly higher information content 
compared to the models that consider the two narrative types individually.  However, the 
incremental information content is only significant when the model combining complementary 
and supplementary narratives is compared with that for complementary narrative.  The 
disclosure depth model combining both narrative types has a significant improvement in 
information content compared to both models that consider complementary and supplementary 
narratives individually.  In addition, the model combining both complementary and 
supplementary narratives based on disclosure depth is the best predictor of returns. 
1.5 Contribution of the Research 
The study contributes to extant literature in a number of ways.  Firstly, the study is the first to 
provide empirical evidence of the relative and incremental information content of 
complementary and supplementary narrative information.  Despite a number of standard-
setting and regulatory bodies (e.g. ASB 2005; 2006; FRC 2009; IASB 2009) stating that 
narrative information should complement as well as supplement financial statements, no study 
had investigated the usefulness of these types of narratives to investors.  For example, in the 
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UK, only Firth (1984), Schleicher and Walker (1999) and Schleicher et al (2007) previously 
investigated the information content of narrative information.  Firth (1984) considered 
disclosure variety and risk explanations, while Schleicher et al (2007) was concerned with 
performance explanations and forward-looking attributions.  Secondly, the current study also 
makes a contribution because most existing studies on narrative information content in the UK 
used the annual report (e.g. Firth 1984; Schleicher et al. 2007; Schleicher and Walker 1999).  
As a result, the UK interim reports narratives remain largely unexamined for information 
content.  Thirdly, the study also contributes by investigating the information content of 
complementary and supplementary information quality attributes.  Only a few studies have 
previously investigated the information content of quality attributes.  For example Firth (1984) 
considered disclosure variety and risk explanations, while Schleicher et al (2007) was 
concerned with performance explanations and forward-looking attributions.  In Schleicher and 
Walker (1999) attributed examined included disclosure variety, past and future performance.  
The current study therefore contributes by investigating quality attributes of quantified 
narratives and volume that have not been investigated before.   
Finally, another contribution of the research is in terms of the method used.  From a disclosure 
extent perspective, studies (e.g.  Beattie et al. 2004; Beattie and Thomson 2007) recommend 
that disclosure extent measurement through content analysis should be in-depth, considering 
repetitions and where possible manual.  In their review of past research, few studies employed 
the procedure.  Therefore, they argued that past disclosure studies on financial reports use 
disclosure variety measurement schemes that rarely capture various disclosure attributes as 
well as repetitions.  Deriving from this, narrative information content information content 
studies have the same problem.  In this study, relative and incremental information content is 
based on both disclosure variety and depth measurement techniques.  The results are testimony 
that schemes do not yield similar results of information content despite both measures being 
used in research as alternative disclosure extent techniques.  The results show that the 
disclosure depth technique is a better technique to capture useful attributes of narrative 
disclosures compared to disclosure variety. 
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1.6 Organisation of the Research 
The rest of the research is organised as follows:  Chapter 2  reviews interim reporting practice 
in the UK, with particular reference to listed companies.  The areas covered include the 
evolution and regulation of UK interim reporting.  Lastly, the chapter describes the structure 
and content of a typical interim report in the UK.  A review of empirical literature on 
information content of narratives is in chapter 3.  Information content literature is reviewed 
according to the information quality attributes.  These attributes are presence of an information 
item, volume of disclosure, good and bad news, amount, comparison of current with past 
performance, reason for performance and forward-looking disclosures.  The chapter concludes 
with a summary and conclusion. 
In Chapter 4, the focus is the usefulness of interim reports.  A number of issues are examined, 
including the role of interim reporting, justification of investors as prime users of the reports 
as well as the reasons for their use of the reports.  Empirical usefulness of interim reports is 
also discussed in two dimensions, perceived and actual.  The chapter includes a discussion on 
the unique features distinguishing interim from annual reports.  Chapter 5 synthesises 
evolutionary accounting theories to economic market mechanisms within the investment 
decision-making context.  The accounting theories are mainly proprietary and entity concepts 
differentiated by agency.  The economic market mechanism conceptualised are two.  The first 
is the mainstream mechanism that assumes perfection and homogeneity.  The second is the 
heterodox mechanism presuming imperfections, failures and heterogeneity.  Thereafter, the 
markets in the two streams that explain accounting disclosures‟ influence on investor decisions 
are identified and described.  For the mainstream, there is the market for capital (MC) while 
under heterodox mechanism, the market for information (MI) and that for regulation (MR) 
prevail.  In Chapter 6, the theories under the three markets are considered.  The main concept 
under MC is the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).  In MI, the theories include Uncertain 
Information Hypothesis (UIH), Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis (IRH), and Market for 
Lemons (ML), Signalling Theory and Incomplete Contracting.  Theories in MR include Public 
Interest Theory and Capture Theory. 
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Chapter 7 develops the hypotheses to test for relative and incremental information content of 
complementary and supplementary narratives.  The six key hypotheses are developed from the 
information quality attributes discussed under the literature review chapter and their rationale 
is sought from the theories in Chapters 5 and 6.  One hypothesis represents complementary 
and supplementary information in general and five hypotheses represent the complementary 
and supplementary quality attributes.  In Chapter 8, attention turns to the explanation of the 
methodology and methods used to examine information content of complementary and 
supplementary narratives in line with the hypotheses formed in Chapter 7.  The discussion 
includes the explanation on the use of event studies technique in the thesis, description of the 
sample and measurement of returns.  In addition, measurement for the predictors is discussed 
that include complementary and supplementary attributes of disclosure variety and depth as 
well as control variables (dividend yield, earnings per share and total assets).  Chapter 9 
presents the results for the tests of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 7.  The tests carried out 
are in line with the multiple regressions models for relative and incremental information 
content and sensitivity tests.  Lastly, Chapter 10 summarises the thesis.  The aspects 
considered are objectives, background of the research, methodology and methods and results.  
Research implications, limitations and opportunities for further research are also explained. 
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2 INTERIM REPORTING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter recounts the evolution of interim reporting practice and regulation in the UK.  
This evolution assists in understanding how and why interim reporting developed in the UK.  
Given that the study examines information content, the analysis is limited to listed companies.  
The chapter is organised as follows.  The next section presents the evolution of interim reporting, 
followed by an examination of the regulatory and standard-setting guidance on UK interim 
reporting narratives.  Thereafter, the regulatory guidance for auditor involvement is discussed.  
Finally, there is a summary and concluding remark.   
2.2 Early Interim Reporting Practices in the UK 
In the UK, interim reporting regulation was first evidenced in the Regulation of Railways Act 
(1868) requiring British railway companies to publish financial reports twice yearly 
(Carruthers and Espeland 1991). However, this is contrary to Holmes (1971) who suggest that 
Imperial Chemical Industries was the first among the top 100 UK companies to publish an 
interim report in 1955 and Maingot (1983) who indicates that UK had no regulation 
compelling managers to publish interim reports until 1964.  The requirement to publish 
interim reports by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 1964 was compelled by the need to 
protect investors‟ capital and confidence.  Atrill (1986) suggested that LSE thought interim 
reports were a viable disclosure medium for investors since the annual reporting interval was 
too long for market functioning.  The LSE required listed companies to publish interim reports 
because there was no such provision in company law.  Various scholars (e.g. Gordon and Gray 
1984; Maingot 1983) acknowledged that disregarding interim reports in UK company law 
probably resulted from the tendency to emphasise voluntary reporting.  Although UK 
company law did not require interim reporting, the European Union laws emphasised the need 
for interim reporting for listed companies.  In EU (1982), the directive 82/121/EEC was issued 
mandating all listed companies on official exchanges in member countries to publish half-
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yearly reports in acceptable press or gazette.  UK responded by issuing Statutory Instrument 
No. 716 of 1984 by Her Majesty‟s Stationery Office (HMSO) which became operative 
effective 1
st
 January 1985.  The LSE became the implementing authority for the directive.  
2.3 Regulatory and Standard-Setting Guidance on UK Interim 
Reporting 
2.3.1 Combined Code 
In brief, the Combined Code required all listed companies to publish half-yearly reports, 
including balance sheet and cash flow information based on guidelines by FSA and ASB.  The 
reason for interim reporting was openness to shareholders in a fair manner that minimises 
insider dealing.  Half-yearly reports also arguably served as an update to investors on the 
progress of the company; however, quarterly reports were deemed unsuitable as they 
undermine the importance of informal announcements and are costly.     
2.3.2 London Stock Exchange 
Mangena (2004a) found no substantial changes in LSE requirements for interim reporting 
since the first guidelines issued in 1960s.  In the decade starting 1970, LSE only required 
publication of interim earnings per share.  Later, an amendment required disclosure of certain 
interim current cost information but the condition was repealed due to complications of 
inflationary accounting.  In 1984 a detailed mandatory interim reporting regulation for all 
listed came into force through the directive 82/121/EEC in EU (1982).  The directive 
considered that for the development of a genuine and liquid European Community capital 
market to take place, there was need to protect investors through a regular flow of information 
from the listed firms about performance and activities.  The provisions of the directive 
required that the reports should be published within four months from the end of reporting 
period and if there was any audit involvement, the audit report was to be published in full.  
Information required in the interim reports included profits and losses, activities of the 
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business and an explanatory note thereto.  Specific figures required were net turnover, profit 
and loss before and after tax deductions, declared and paid dividends and comparative figures 
the corresponding period in the preceding financial year.  Explanatory notes were to include 
useful information that assisted investors to assess the trend of the activities and profitability 
and reasons for the deviation between current figures and those of the corresponding previous 
financial year.  Forward-looking disclosures in the foreseeable period were also recommended 
for interim reporting.  If there was audit involvement, the audit report and qualifications were 
required to be disclosed in full.  In addition to this directive, requirements in LSE (1999) 
mandated that UK companies that provided an audit review should have observed APB 
guidelines.     
In the FSA (2009), the prevailing guidelines for listing on the LSE require three sections in the 
interim reporting: the financial statements, the management report and the statement of 
directors‟ responsibilities.  FSA (2009) refers to “The Handbook” in which listing regulatory 
matters are compiled.  It was first established in 2001 and undergoes review on a continuous 
basis.  The financial statements must be in accordance with International Accounting Standard 
(IAS) 34 or at the minimum, they should contain a balance sheet, profit and loss account and 
explanatory notes.  Other disclosures include an audit review or report if the interim report has 
been audited or viewed; and where there is no audit involvement, the report should disclose 
the status.  A last requirement is the statement of directors‟ responsibilities whilst issuing 
interim reports.   
In reference to reporting frequency, FSA (2009) requires that it is mandatory for UK listed 
companies to provide half yearly reports.  However, any company that provides quarterly 
reports either in fulfilment of regulations on another exchange where the firm is cross-listed or 
as a personal initiative doe not contravene the interim reporting requirements in the UK. 
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2.3.3 ASB Statement on Interim Reports 1997 
To enhance interim reporting practice in the UK, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW) published a consultative paper,  (ICAEW 1993), which offered 
a detailed reporting framework (Davies et al. 1999).  A further progress in the interim 
reporting environment was ASB‟s appointment of a team comprised of the LSE, finance 
directors of large companies and senior partners in audit organisations to assist in drafting a 
standard for interim reporting (Mangena 2004a). The resultant was the Statements on Interim 
Reports in ASB (1997) being the first detailed guidance meant specifically for interim 
reporting in the UK.  The report was based on ICAEW‟s (1993) recommendations and the 
consultative discussions in ASB‟s (1996); thereby incorporating most of the previous 
developments and conceptions regarding interim reporting in the UK.   
Contrary to the recommendation in Cadbury (1992) requiring enactment of mandatory interim 
reporting guidelines, ASB (1997) stated that the statement was to be regarded as best practice 
guidance having a persuasive role.  This disappointed investment analysts and professional 
accounting firms whose responses to the consultative discussions in ASB (1996) indicated that 
they preferred mandatory rather voluntary interim reporting.  They argued that, as a listing 
requirement, Financial Services Authority (FSA) should ensure that all listed companies 
issued interim reports.  Scholars too (e.g. Bagshaw 1999, 2000) considered the position 
adopted by ASB as detrimental to the interest of investors. Managers still had no instrument 
mandating them disclose information of specific nature in interim reports. 
2.3.4 ASB Statement on Half Yearly Financial Reports 2007 
As of the time of this thesis, ASB (2007a) is the most recent interim reporting guideline that 
replaces ASB (1997) in order to harmonise interim reporting best practices with the mandatory 
requirements in FSA (2009) termed as Disclosures Rules and Transparency Rules (DTR) as 
well as IAS 34.  The statement provides guidance to companies that are required or voluntarily 
choose to prepare interim reports, other than those required to apply IAS 34 by DTR.  FSA 
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(2009) mandates the use of ASB (2007a) on condition that whilst applying the statement, the 
concept of “true and fair” account of affairs is maintained.   
As stated above, like its predecessor, ASB (1997), ASB (2007a) is voluntary rather than 
mandatory. The only exclusion is the requirement that a listed company provides a true and 
fair state of affairs by applying the guidelines of the statement.  The conceptual basis of the 
statement remained similar to that in ASB (1997) that the objective was to guide investors 
make informed assessment at a half-yearly stage to counter the long annual reporting interval.  
The statement also theorised that half-yearly reports provide essential disclosures in the 
continuing process of operating, financing and investing activities.   
2.3.5 EU Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) and Directive 
2007/14/EC 
In addition to substituting national standards with IFRS in EU (2002), the EU further issued 
another directive in EU (2004) termed as the Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC to provide 
more comprehensive guidelines for interim reporting with the view of enhancing usefulness of 
the reports.    The directive in EU (2004) considered that timelier and reliable disclosures 
about performance require more frequent reporting.  Companies issuing quarterly financial 
reports were exempted from the directive because they already fulfilled the minimum 
requirement of semi-annual reporting.  In Article 5, the EU (2004) requires that the interim 
report should have a condensed set of financial statement and an interim management report.  
Further, where the interim report has been audited or reviewed, the respective reports are to be 
attached.  If the interim report is not audited this should be stated.  The directive also requires 
inclusion of a responsibility statement in the interim report.  In comparison with earlier 
directives, the distinctive new feature introduced by this directive is the responsibility 
statement. 
Another directive, 2007/14/EC in EU (2007) provides detailed rules on implementation of the 
directive 2004/109/EC in order to provide high-level investor protection, enhance market 
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efficiency and unify interim reporting practices in member states.  Directive 2007/14/EC 
further stipulates  minimum content of the interim reports to avoid misleading disclosures on 
assets, liabilities, financial position and profit and loss.  The directive also gives guidance on 
its implementation to ensure that interim disclosures are transparent to the investor in a 
manner that allows regular flow of information about performance and is comparable to the 
preceding year‟s performance.   
2.3.6 Companies Act 2006 
The UK company law, prior to the Companies Act (2006), had no provision for interim 
reporting.  Interim reporting provisions in the Companies Act (2006) part 23 are spelled out 
under Chapter 2, Section 838.  Prior to distribution, the accounts are required to be properly 
prepared in accordance with prevailing International Accounting Standards, in this case IAS 1 
and 34, and the balance sheet signed off.  The section also requires usage of English as the 
reporting language and interim report must have been delivered to the Registrar.  Although the 
Act has provisions for interim reports, it recognises that the reports are not statutory 
(Companies Act 2006: Part 15, Chapter 10, Sections 441 and 447).  The minimal requirements 
in the Companies Act 2006 mean that much of the guidance for interim reporting is provided 
for in ASB (1997; 2007a), EU (2004; 2007) and FSA (2009). 
2.4 Mandatory and Recommended Disclosure Items in UK 
Interim Reports  
The above section has examined developments shaping UK interim reporting in various 
aspects such as regulation, standard setting and professional practice.  Based on such evidence, 
this section aims at identifying the disclosures recommended.  Given that most items are 
repetitive, rather than discussion each regulator‟s or standard setter‟s contribution, a side-by-
side tabular approach is used.  Such an approach, whilst recognising the timeline of gradual 
development of interim reporting disclosures, provides a cross-sectional comparison of the 
respective references.     
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2.4.1 Financial Statements Information Items  
The prevailing requirements for interim reporting during the study period (2005 to 2007) are 
provided under IAS 34 that recognises four main interim financial statements.  These include 
the balance sheet, income statement, statement of changes in shareholders equity, cash flow 
statement.  Using IAS 34 as a benchmark, below are comparative tables showing items 
required or recommended for disclosure in interim financial statements.  
From Table 1, the most recommended interim financial reports are the income statement and 
balance sheet.  All regulations after the year 2000 consistently require the two statements.  The 
cash flow statement and the statement of changes in equity are required by IFRS/ IAS, ASB 
(1997; 2007a) and Companies Act (2006).  FSA (2008) and EU (2004; 2007), which are 
mainly concerned with disclosures of listed companies, do not require the cash flow statement 
and the statement of changes in equity. 
Table 1 Sections of Financial Statements in UK Interim Reports  
Required or Recommended 
Financial Statements 
Regulation and Standard Setting 
A* B* C D E F* G H I J** K 
Income statement            
Balance sheet            
Cash flow statement            
Statement of changes in 
equity 
           
A = IFRS/ IAS; B = IFRS/ IAS; C = FSA (2008); D = EU (2004) and  (2007); E = ASB (1997; 2007a); F= 
Companies Act (2006); G = LSE (1999); H = Cadbury (1992); I = EU (1982); J = LSE before EU (1982); K = 
Regulation of Railways Act (1868).  Denotes that the respective regulation required the item to be disclosed; 
otherwise, the item was not required.  * Financial disclosures recommended for first time adoption, effective 1
st
 
January 2005.  The statements are based on IAS 34 and IFRS 1 and required reconciliation with previous local 
GAAP as well as IAS 32 and IAS 39 (PwC 2005).  The Companies Act (2006), Sections 838, 395-397 and 414 subjects 
the recommendations for interim reporting to IAS guidelines.  Impliedly, the Act recommends all statements required by IFRS 
and IAS.  ** In reference to the discussion in (Mangena 2004a) 
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Table 2 below shows the items required in the income statement.     
Table 2 Interim Income Statement Information Items 
Required or Recommended Disclosures 
Regulation and Standard Setting 
A* B* C D E F G H** 
Sales         
Cost of sales         
Gross profit         
Other operating income         
Selling and marketing costs         
Administrative expenses         
Other operating expenses         
Operating profit         
Finance costs – net         
Share of profit of associates         
Profit before income tax         
Income tax expense         
Profit from continuing operations         
Profit from discontinued operations         
Extra ordinary items         
Profit for the period         
Profit attributable to equity holders         
Profit attributable to minority interest         
Basic earnings per share         
Diluted earnings per share         
Dividend         
A = IFRS & IAS; B = IFRS & IAS; C = FSA (2008) and EU(2004; 2007); D = ASB  (2007a); E = LSE (1999); F =  
Cadbury (1992); G = EU (1982); H = LSE before EU (1982).   Denotes that the respective regulation required the 
item to be disclosed; otherwise, the item was not required.  * Financial disclosures recommended for first time 
adoption, effective 1
st
 January 2005.  The statements are based on IAS 34 and IFRS 1 and required reconciliation 
with previous local GAAP as well as IAS 32 and IAS 39 (PwC 2005).  The Companies Act (2006), Sections 838, 
395-397 and 414 subjects the recommendations for interim reporting to IAS guidelines.  Impliedly, the Act 
recommends all statements required by IFRS and IAS.  ** In reference to the discussion in (Mangena 2004a) 
IFRS first time adoption (column A) and the condensed IFRS statements (column B) offer the 
most comprehensive list of income statement disclosures.  Most regulations recommend the 
disclosure of sales, profit before income tax, income tax expense, profit after tax and basic 
earnings per share. 
 45 
 
Table 3 below relates to items in the balance sheet.   
Table 3 Interim Balance Sheet Information Items 
Required or Recommended Disclosures 
Regulation and Standard Setting 
A
*
 B
*
 C D E F G H** 
Assets         
Non-current assets         
Property, plant & equipment         
Tangible and intangible assets         
Goodwill         
Intangible assets         
Investment in associates         
Investments in other companies         
Deferred income tax assets         
Other non-current assets         
Available-for-sale assets         
Derivative financial instruments         
Financial receivables         
Current assets         
Inventories         
Current financial assets         
Financial receivables         
Trade and other receivables         
Available-for-sale financial assets         
Derivative financial instruments         
Short-term securities         
Financial assets at fair value         
Cash and cash equivalents         
Total Assets         
Liabilities         
Current liabilities         
Trade and other payables         
Current income tax liabilities         
Borrowings         
Derivative financial instruments         
Provisions and other liabilities         
Liabilities classified as held for sale         
Non-current liabilities         
Borrowings         
Derivative financial instruments         
Deferred income tax liability         
Retirement benefit obligations         
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Required or Recommended Disclosures 
Regulation and Standard Setting 
A
*
 B
*
 C D E F G H** 
Provisions and other liabilities         
Other non-current liabilities         
Total Liabilities         
Equity         
Capital and reserves attributable to equity 
holders 
        
Share capital         
Reserves         
Treasury shares         
Fair value and other reserves         
Cumulative translation adjustment         
Retained earnings         
Minority Interest         
Total Equity         
Total liabilities and equity         
A = IFRS & IAS; B = IFRS & IAS; C = FSA (2008) and EU (2004; 2007); D = ASB (2007a); E = LSE (1999); F = Cadbury 
(1992); G = EU (1982); H = LSE before EU (1982).   Denotes that the respective regulation required the item to be 
disclosed; otherwise, the item was not required.  * Financial disclosures recommended for first time adoption, 
effective 1
st
 January 2005.  The statements are based on IAS 34 and IFRS 1 and required reconciliation with 
previous local GAAP as well as IAS 32 and IAS 39 (PwC 2005).  The Companies Act (2006), Sections 838, 395-
397 and 414 subjects the recommendations for interim reporting to IAS guidelines.  Impliedly, the Act 
recommends all statements required by IFRS and IAS.  ** In reference to the discussion in (Mangena 2004a). 
 
The interim balance sheet items are provided by regulations or standards taking effect after 
2004.  Apart from IAS34 and IAS1, the recommendations by other regulations only require 
disclosure of the subtotals of assets, liabilities and equity.     
In Table 4, the items required for the interim cash flow statement are identified.  Like the 
balance sheet, the cash flow statement items are recognised mostly by regulations taking effect 
from 2004.  These regulations are the IFRS provisions for the first time adoption and 
condensed interim financial statements as well as ASB (2007a). 
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Table 4 Interim Cash Flow Statement Information Items 
Required or Recommended Disclosures 
Regulation and Standard Setting 
A
*
 B
*
 C D E F G H** 
Cash flow from operating activities         
Cash generated from operations         
Interest paid         
Income tax paid         
Continuing operations         
Discontinued operations         
Net cash generated from (used in) operating 
activities 
        
Cash flow from investing activities         
Acquisition of subsidiaries, net of cash acquired         
Purchases of property, plant and equipment         
Proceeds from sale of property, plant and 
equipment 
        
Purchases of intangible assets         
Purchases of available-for-sale financial assets         
Proceeds from sale of available-for-sale financial 
assets 
        
Proceeds from sales of investments in other 
companies 
        
Purchase of short term securities         
Loans granted to related parties         
Loan repayments received from related parties         
Interest received         
Dividends received         
Other investing net cash flows         
Discontinued operations         
Net cash generated from (used in) investing 
activities 
        
Cash flows from financing activities         
Proceeds from borrowings         
Repayments from borrowings         
Dividends paid to shareholders         
Dividends paid to minority interests         
Dividends paid         
Issue of convertible bonds         
Other net financing cash flows         
Purchase of treasury shares         
Discontinued operations         
Net cash generated from (used in ) financing 
activities 
        
Net increase (decrease) in cash and bank 
overdrafts 
        
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Required or Recommended Disclosures 
Regulation and Standard Setting 
A
*
 B
*
 C D E F G H** 
Cash and bank overdrafts at the beginning of the 
period 
        
Exchange gains (losses) on cash and bank 
overdrafts 
        
Cash and bank overdrafts at the end of the period         
A = IFRS & IAS; B = IFRS & IAS; C = FSA (2008) and EU (2004; 2007); D = ASB (2007a); E = LSE (1999); F = Cadbury 
(1992); G = EU (1982); H = LSE before EU (1982).   Denotes that the respective regulation required the item to be 
disclosed; otherwise, the item was not required.  * Financial disclosures recommended for first time adoption, 
effective 1
st
 January 2005.  The statements are based on IAS 34 and IFRS 1 and required reconciliation with 
previous local GAAP as well as IAS 32 and IAS 39 (PwC 2005).  The Companies Act (2006), Sections 838, 395-
397 and 414 subjects the recommendations for interim reporting to IAS guidelines.  Impliedly, the Act 
recommends all statements required by IFRS and IAS.  ** In reference to the discussion in (Mangena 2004a) 
 
 In Table 5, the main recommended disclosures for the statement of changes in shareholder‟s 
equity are net income and expenses recognised directly in equity and profit for the period.  
The statement of changes in equity, too, is recognised by IFRS and ASB (2007a). 
Table 5 Statement of Changes in Shareholder‟s Equity Information Items 
Required or Recommended Disclosures 
Regulation and Standard Setting 
A
*
 B
*
 C D E F G H** 
Fair value gains (losses), net of tax:         
Available for sales         
Cash flow hedges         
Currency translation adjustments         
Net income (expenses) recognised directly in 
equity 
        
Profit for the period         
Total recognised income for the period         
Employees share option scheme:         
Value of services provided         
Proceeds from shares issued         
Purchase of treasury shares         
Dividend         
Convertible bond - equity         
A = IFRS & IAS; B = IFRS & IAS; C = FSA (2008) and EU (2004; 2007); D = ASB (2007a); E = LSE (1999); F = Cadbury 
(1992); G = EU (1982); H = LSE before EU (1982) .   Denotes that the respective regulation required the item to be 
disclosed; otherwise, the item was not required.  * Financial disclosures recommended for first time adoption, 
effective 1
st
 January 2005.  The statements are based on IAS 34 and IFRS 1 and required reconciliation with 
previous local GAAP as well as IAS 32 and IAS 39 (PwC 2005).  The Companies Act (2006), Sections 838, 395-
397 and 414 subjects the recommendations for interim reporting to IAS guidelines.  Impliedly, the Act 
recommends all statements required by IFRS and IAS.  ** In reference to the discussion in (Mangena 2004a) 
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2.4.2 Other Disclosures Related to Interim Financial Statements  
Table 6 presents regulatory and standard-setting recommendations for disclosures that 
exclusively relate to financial statements.   
Table 6 Other Recommended Disclosures Related to Interim Financial Statements 
Regulation or Standard Different Section of interim report 
Notes to Financial Statements Audit involvement 
Regulation of Railways Act (1868)   
London Stock Exchange in 1964   
The ASC (1975) – The Corporate 
Report 
  
EU (1982) – Directive 82/121/EEC   
Cadbury (1992)   
Hampel (1998)   
Higgs (2003)   
Smith (2003)   
ASB (1997)   
IFRS & IAS – IAS 34   
FSA (2008)   
EU (2004)   
EU (2007)   
ASB (2007a)   
Companies Act (1985)   
Companies Act (1989)   
Companies Act (2006)   
Note::  denotes that the respective regulation required the item to be disclosed; otherwise, the item was not required. 
 
Most regulations recommend inclusion of an audit review in interim reports but they all 
concur that the decision is voluntary.  However, where firms have subjected the interim results 
to an audit involvement, most regulations (e.g. ASB 2007a; EU 2004, 2007; FSA 2008) 
require that the audit review report be published with interim reports.  The notes to financial 
statements are recommended by a few regulation and standards. 
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2.4.3 Required and Recommended Narrative Information 
Table 7 shows the recommended sections of the narrative commentary recommended for the 
interim reports.   
Table 7 Recommended Sections of the UK Interim Report other than Financial 
Statements 
Regulation or Standard 
Different Section of interim report narratives 
Narrative 
Commentaries 
Summary 
Financial 
Information 
Statement of 
Directors 
Responsibilities 
Regulation of Railways Act (1868)    
The ASC (1975) – The Corporate Report    
EU (1982) – Directive 82/121/EEC    
Cadbury (1992)    
Hampel (1998)    
Higgs (2003)    
Smith (2003)    
ASB (1997)    
IFRS & IAS – IAS 34    
FSA (2008)    
EU (2004)    
EU (2007)    
ASB (2007a)    
Companies Act (1985)    
Companies Act (1989)    
Companies Act (2006)    
:  denotes that the respective regulation required the item to be disclosed; otherwise, the item was not required. 
 
The summary financial information is the oldest section as it the only narrative section 
recommended by the Regulation of Railways Act (1868) and the LSE in 1964.  The most 
recent part is the statement of directors‟ responsibilities recommended only after 2004 by ASB 
(2007a), EU (2004) and FSA (2008).  The most widely recommended parts are narrative 
commentary and summary financial information.  Most provisions by regulators and standard 
setters recommend the presentation of the summary financial information to be in a tabular 
form. 
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2.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, interim reporting in UK is discussed.  Among the observations was that there 
are conflicting suggestions regarding the first evidence of interim reporting.  While the first 
interim reports were from the US in early 1900, UK‟s first interim reports are suggested to 
have been published in the 1950s.  However, there is proof of regulation for interim reporting 
in the UK in the 1860s.  Another observation is interim reporting is largely justified on the 
premise of providing updated information to facilitate shareholders‟ investment decisions 
given that the annual reporting interval is was too long to leave investors without information.  
Based on this rationale, most regulation and standards in the UK affirm that interim reporting 
should be mandatory to all listed companies.  In reference to the disclosures therein, a typical 
interim report, based on prevailing regulations and standards between 2005 and 2007 for listed 
companies, comprises of the four IFRS financial statements, a management commentary, a 
statement of directors‟ responsibilities, footnotes to the financial statements and a voluntary 
audit review.  Although the IFRS financial statements have mandatory guidelines for the 
information items therein, the management commentary information items were mainly 
voluntary; the regulations and standards remaining as best practices.  Other characteristics 
include that the mandatory UK interim reporting frequency is bi-annual; however, quarterly 
reporting is also acceptable.   
The regulatory evolution on UK interim reporting has been wide-ranging, influenced by US, 
EU and UK reporting practices.  Although, the UK has largely adopted EU directives within 
the period study, the tripartite nature is demonstrated in the variety of reporting practices in the 
UK such as flexible inclusion of audit review, adaptation of a business review or the OFR and 
reporting frequency.  Noticeable, within the period study 2005 – 2007 there is rampant change 
in regulation.  For financial statements, there was only one significant change of replacing UK 
GAAP with IAS/ IFRS by EU (2002), effective since 1
st
 January 2005.  The narratives section 
of the UK interim report, however faced various changes to include ASB (2007a) as well as 
EU (2004; EU 2007) on interim reporting; ASB (2005; 2006) and (EU 2003).  Also through its 
handbook, (FSA 2008), the FSA regularly amends disclosures and transparency rules as well 
as listing rules that affect the interim reporting practices of UK listed companies.  
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
There is an extensive body of research examining the usefulness of financial reports narratives 
information in on market returns.  There are two main approaches employed in the literature.  
One stream studies the relationship between share prices and disclosure themes.  For example, 
Abrahamson and Amir (1996) investigated the information content of the presidents‟ letter, 
Bryan (1997) analysed the usefulness of the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) 
and Kanto and Schadewitz (2000) are concerned with the relative relevance of topics in 
narratives such as management overview, investments and finance, financial statements 
narratives and financial analysis.  Other studies investigated whether information items 
disclosure quality attributes are useful to share pricing.  For example, Schleicher et al (2007), 
on forward-looking disclosures, volume of narratives (Schadewitz et al,(2002), Baginski et al 
(2000) on causal attributions or performance explanations, and Francis et al (2002) on 
amounts in narratives, good and bad news, future and present attributions.  This current study 
considers both dimensions using complementary and supplementary narrative commentaries 
information in interim reports as themes.  The quality attributes for both complementary and 
supplementary narrative commentaries are disclosure variety and depth.  Disclosure variety is 
concerned with presence or variety of disclosure items.  Disclosure depth has various 
attributes that include: (1) rhetoric toning that measures the goodness or badness of 
disclosures, (2) estimating disclosure volume, (3) quantification that assesses the disclosure 
extent of amounts or enumeration, (4) benchmarking concerned with comparing past with 
current performance, (5) explanatory, that is, disclosure of reasons for the performance and (6) 
prospective disclosures relating to forward-looking information.  Therefore, the objective of 
the chapter is to summarise studies that have investigated information content of narrative 
commentaries so that the potential contribution of the current research is clearly delineated.   
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows.  The next section presents an examination of 
disclosure studies with an objective of establishing the various quality attributes in narrative 
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reporting.  This is followed by a review of narrative information content literature categorised 
according to quality attributes.  A tabulation of the reviewed studies is then provided after 
which, a discussion on the literature follows.  Lastly, a conclusion and summary to the chapter 
is presented.     
3.2 Disclosure Quality Attributions 
Disclosure measurement literature has suggested various information attributes that are 
pertinent to investor needs.  Wallace and Nasser (1995) suggested that financial disclosure is 
an abstract phenomenon whose intensity and quality is not easily determined.  Regardless of 
this shortcoming, they propose a number properties affecting disclosure quality.  The features 
include: (1) adequacy for a defined purpose,  (2) informative – have an impact on share prices, 
(3) direction – good or bad, (4) timeliness, (5) understandable/ readable – effective 
communication with readers, (6) extent of relationship of the information with corporate risk, 
return and performance, and (7) comprehensiveness – no important information item is 
undisclosed.  Beattie et al (2004), while concurring with the complexity of defining quality in 
disclosures, the researchers provided a four dimensional structure for estimating quality.  Their 
first dimension is the topical classification, the second is a dichotomous descriptor: historic/ 
forward-looking.  The third and fourth are also dichotomous descriptors, that is, financial/ 
non-financial and quantitative/non-quantitative.  Beattie and Thomson (2007) extend 
disclosure quality estimation to consider volume.  They argue that though management may 
use the volume attribution for obfuscation, the same ascription may be used to add emphasis 
or ensure thorough presentation of the business performance and activities.  Other attributions 
in the study are factual and judgemental disclosures where the former are verifiable but the 
latter are unsubstantiated.  Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007), refer to attributions as strategies 
adopted by management to either impress or provide incremental information.  They identified 
seven strategies.  These include readability/ reading ease, rhetorical manipulation – inclination 
to good news in a persuasive manner and thematic strategy – inclination to good news by 
concealment of bad news.  Others are visual and structural strategy – use of visual effects such 
as arrangement and other visual effects, performance comparison – choice of benchmark 
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numbers, amounts strategy – choice of numbers discussed in narratives and performance 
attributions – explanation of performance.   
Table 8 compares the disclosure quality attributes for investment decision making 
recommended in the literature discussed above. 
Table 8 Summary of Studies on Disclosure Quality Attributions based on Usefulness of 
Disclosures 
Quality Attribution 
Standard, Regulation  or Study 
ASB 
(2005; 
2006) 
Wallace 
and 
Nasser 
(1995) 
Beattie et 
al (2004) 
Beattie 
and 
Thomson 
(2007) 
Merkl-
Davies 
and 
Brennan 
(2007) 
Purpose oriented      
Good or Bad News      
Informative to Share returns      
Timeliness      
Understandable/ Readable      
Performance Risk and Return      
Comprehensive      
Historical/ Past Comparison      
Forward-Looking      
Financial      
Non Financial      
Quantitative/ Amounts      
Non-quantitative/ Explanations      
Presence of a complementary 
item 
     
Presence of a supplementary 
item 
     
Repetitions / Volume      
Factual      
Judgemental      
Visual/ Structural Presentation      
 
The table above indicates that both ASB (2005, 2006) and a number of academic scholars 
recognise various information quality attributes.  The following sections will now review 
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extant literature on the findings of previous research on the information content of the above 
attributes that are relevant to this study.  The literature discussed relate to: presence of 
information items; volume of disclosure; good or bad news; the amount attribute; comparison 
with past performance attribute; reason for performance and forward-looking.   
3.3 Presence of Information Items  
Beattie and Thomson (2007) describe presence of information items as an attribute that 
verifies whether predetermined information item exist in the narratives.  In other words, the 
attribute is concerned with variety or breadth in disclosure.  Therefore, studies under this 
category either examine the usefulness of the presence of specified topics or information items 
in financial reports. 
Firth (1984), one of the pioneering studies of narratives information content in the UK 
suggested that provision of information beyond legislative requirements is motivated by 
management‟s perception that the disclosures are useful for assessing the risk-return 
relationship.  By arguing that relationship between risk and return is linear, the study further 
proposed that narratives should influence share returns.  Using monthly return estimates from 
the market-model and a forty-eight item weighted disclosure profile measuring extent of 
disclosure variety in annual reports, the results were contrary to expectations as risk, the proxy 
for usefulness, and variety in disclosure were insignificantly associated.  The result was 
claimed to be influenced methodologically where powerful financial statements variables in 
the model such as leverage and earnings beta might have subdued usefulness of narratives.  In 
Finland, Kanto and Schadewitz (2000) similarly used a weighted technique for importance of 
various disclosure items in interim reports‟ narratives by interviewing information 
stakeholders such as analysts, corporate executives and interest groups.  Unlike Firth (1984) 
who grouped all items in one disclosure profile, the study investigated relative information 
content of a range of themes.  Disclosure topics were regarded important for various reasons.  
Firstly, shareholders are in pursuit of effective corporate communication from managers rather 
than aggregated information (Kanto and Schadewitz 2000).  Secondly, listed firms are 
characterised by complex diverse business structures and disclosure themes ease the search for 
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value relevant information from the usually voluminous financial report narratives.  Further, 
due to the risk that managers may behave in a manner that is not in the best interest of the 
investors, presenting narratives according to topics was deemed necessary to facilitate a 
structured flow of events, transactions and performance, thereby reducing obscurity in 
disclosures.  Through the market model generated cumulative abnormal returns, analysis of 
financial statements components had a nearly instant and continued positive association with 
returns whilst the management overview had a delayed and negative relationship.  The result 
meant that investors use analytical information in narratives and are sceptical to base their 
decisions on broad overviews.  Another information topic investigated that Kanto and 
Schadewitz (2000) investigated but found no relationship with returns was narratives on 
financial statement in general possibly due to insufficiency of financial statements information 
if not accompanied by an analysis.    
Schleicher and Walker (1999) studied the relative relationship between share prices and 
various components of the UK Operational and Financial Review (OFR).  The components 
examined for usefulness are disclosure of OFR (DOFR), disclosure of Operating and Financial 
Projections (DOFP) and disclosure of Segmental Reporting (DSEG).  The components are 
assumed to assist investors anticipate earnings changes because they provide a better 
understanding of business nature, environment and risks.  Specifically, DOFR concentrates on 
the current year performance, DOFP relates to known events, trends and uncertainties in future 
periods whilst DSEG measures the comprehensiveness of discussions.  Disclosure 
measurement was dichotomous on the basis that a pilot scoring scheme established that 
weighted and unweighted scores had no influence on results.  The most significant result 
regarding disclosure relationship with share prices was the DOFR confirming that the 
conceptual framework in ASB (1993) that OFR aids investors to anticipate future cash flows.  
Bryan (1997) examined the association between various information items recommended by 
the Securities and Exchange (SEC) in SEC (1980) for disclosure namely the Management 
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A).  In SEC (1987), as discussed by Bryan (1997), numeric 
financial presentations and accompanying footnotes are considered insufficient in abetting 
investors to appraise the quality of earnings and the probability that past performance is 
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reflective of the future.  Therefore, the MD&A escalates relevance of financial reporting by 
providing extra information beyond the figures.  Information items of interest included selling 
price changes, sales volume changes, revenue change explanations, cost change explanations, 
liquidity position, planned capital expenditure and known future trends as favourable, 
unfavourable, neutral or missing.  OLS regression models showed that market adjusted returns 
were only associated with planned capital expenditures, possibly because other information 
items are disclosed in pre-annual report announcements.   
Rather than investigating information content of various narrative information items or 
themes, a large body research has concentrated on specific items or topics.  For example, 
Dumay and Tull (2007) found intellectual capital disclosures having an effect on cumulative 
abnormal share price returns.  Hammersley et al (2008) establish that another disclosure topic, 
internal controls, was informative to returns in the US.  In Warner et al (1988), a US based 
study, using event studies found daily returns insubstantially associated with management 
changes but monthly returns were negatively associated with top executive changes.  In 
Netherlands, Cools and Mirjam van Praag‟s (2007) find forced departures of executives 
informative to share prices.  In a UK study by Collet (2002), where redundancies and new jobs 
had respectively negative and positive value relevance,  the conclusion was that the nature of 
employment change disclosures determines the association with returns.  Other narrative 
topics or information items that are examined for information content include key performance 
indicators (e.g. Riley et al. 2003), product line segment disclosures (e.g. Aitken et al. 1994; 
Buhner and Moller 1985; Karpik and Riahi-Belkaoui 1994)and/ or geographical segment 
narratives (e.g. Boatsman et al. 1993; Conover and Wallace 1995; Herrmann 1996; Hope et al. 
2008; Thomas 2000).   Other narrative topics investigated for usefulness in literature are 
corporate social and environmental responsibility (e.g. Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Bansal and 
Clelland 2004; Freedman and Stagliano 1991; Herremans and Akathaporn 1993; Lorraine et 
al. 2004) as well as financial statement narratives (e.g. Baber et al. 2006; Francis et al. 2002).    
The studies above, with an exception of Firth (1984) who aggregated their disclosure variety 
index, portray that investors have dissimilar interest in the various disclosure items or topics.  
However, because studies have various research strategies, motivations and methodologies, it 
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is difficult to ascertain a generalisable profile of items that investors find useful.  Therefore, 
the plausible deduction from this evidence is that the presence of different information items 
or topics in financial reports is largely relevant to investors; despite instances of items or 
themes that investors find uninformative.   
3.4 Volume of Disclosure  
Studies under this section investigate the information content of the depth in disclosure.  Such 
depth reflects volume of disclosure which is mostly related to the repetitiveness of information 
items in financial reports (Beattie and Thomson 2007).   Disclosure extent literature considers 
the disclosure strategy as aimed at either adding emphasis (e.g. Beattie and Thomson 2007) or 
an impression management phenomenon (Clatworthy and Jones 2003).  There is scanty 
literature regarding information content of volume of disclosure.  One possible reason for this 
is that the diversity of disclosure coupled with capacious nature of narratives makes the 
analysis of this attribute labour intensive and hence, time consuming (Beattie et al. 2004).  The 
other possible reason for scant literature is the labour intensity nature of disclosure 
measurement putting into consideration the volume involved in collecting the data (e.g. 
Abrahamson and Amir 1996; Beattie et al. 2004).  As a result, a number of studies on the 
information content have used various proxies such as subjective ratings, number of pages, 
and number of words to estimate the usefulness in volume of disclosure, as discussed 
henceforward.  
Schadewitz et al (2002) investigated the usefulness of varying levels of voluntary disclosures 
in interim reports by way of cumulative abnormal returns.  One of the reasons for selecting 
voluntary information as the proxy for volume of narratives was that non-obligated disclosures 
reflect management‟s desire to communicate with investors.  The disclosure index scoring 
technique was applied to measure and classifying interim reports in three disclosure categories 
namely, disclosures-about-as expected, disclosures-lower-than-expected and disclosures-
higher-than-expected.  Share return reaction to the disclosures-about-as-expected group 
indicated absence of pre-announcement leakage in the Finnish Stock Exchange.  Share return 
reaction showed a one-day lag in response to disclosures-lower-than-expected suggested that 
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investor were in pursuit of more disclosure.  Lastly, the three-day extended delayed reaction to 
disclosures-greater-than-expected showed that investors required more time to apprehend the 
voluminous information.    
Henry (2006) used a keyword count to investigate whether verbal components accompanying 
earnings press releases improve prediction of market response to the releases.  The researcher 
conjectured that the relationship between topic specific word recurrences and market returns 
justifies whether increased direct firm-to-investor communications are relevant to 
shareholders.  The topic specific word frequency measures the nature and volume of operating 
information contextualised in disclosure themes.  Using tree-based algorithms, market reaction 
predictive ability increased proportionately to volume of verbal components accompanying 
earnings releases.  This result showed that numeric information is largely in the public domain 
by the time of announcement but narratives provide new information.  Further, unlike numbers 
that are rigid, different firms with similar numeric performance can exercise flexibility in 
narrative reporting.  Therefore, regardless of identical financial performance, firms differently 
inform their investors through disclosure on various aspects with varying degrees of emphasis.  
Although Henry‟s (2006) argument above for disclosure volume usefulness is reflective of 
management‟s willingness to communicate with investors, Abrahamson and Amir (1996) 
argued against the efficacy of voluminous narratives.  Using a similar content analysis 
approach of word counts to measure narratives, the study ignored positive statements because 
they are used for impression management and are normally ritualistic assertions with no value 
to investors.   
Healy et al (1999) used analyst disclosure ratings to investigate information content of 
disclosure volume.  The researchers theorised that disclosure volume aids in correcting 
misevaluation and amplifies both institutional interest and firm liquidity.  The assumption is 
that there are limited agency costs compelling investors to find disclosures credible and 
relevant for accurate firm valuation.  For example, Skinner (1994) asserts that in case of 
overvaluation, managers will voluntarily disclose more credible bad news to lower valuation 
in fear of litigation arising from overvaluation. However, for overvalued firms, Healy et al 
(1999) argues that the strategy of increased volume of good news for undervalued firms may 
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not be successful for correcting firm valuation because good news is largely envisaged as 
flawed. Amplification of institutional interest and liquidity arises from the ability of increased 
disclosure volume to reduce information asymmetries between firms and outside investors and 
amongst different investor classes as suggested in Kim and Verrecchia (1994).  The 
transparency thereby improves the efficiency of the market, which in turn exposes the firm to 
more institutional investors and liquidity (Healy et al. 1999).  Irrespective of these merits for 
increased disclosure volume, Healy et al (1999) critique the usefulness of the volume 
attribution on various aspects affecting investors‟ value.  Firstly, management may use volume 
to obscure or provide misleading information.  Secondly, voluminous disclosures may reduce 
shareholders‟ wealth either through revealing valuable information to competition or exposing 
the firm to legitimacy risks.  Analyst ratings in their study were considered a bona fide 
measure for disclosure volume as increases in the ratings reflected proportionate increase in 
disclosure volume.  As a weakness, the sample in Healy et al (1999) was biased to disclosure 
volume increasing firms because AIMR ratings analyse only firms augmenting disclosures but 
not disclosure volume reducing firms. 
Murray et al (2006) examined the information content of disclosure volume by using number 
of pages dedicated to the topic of interest (social and environmental disclosures). Their results 
suggest that disclosure volume was not useful.  Neither theoretical nor methodological reason 
was provided for the outcome.  However, disclosure literature (e.g. Beattie et al. 2004; Beattie 
and Thomson 2007) suggest that the number of pages as a proxy for volume is defective as it 
neither captures the context of the subjects nor does it take into account differences such as 
text and paper sizes and formats.  
Other studies that have considered the attribute of volume include Gelb and Zarowin (2002) 
and Lang and Lundholm (1993) who confirm information content using AIMR analyst ratings.  
Elsewhere, through keyword search as a measure for volume, Schleicher et al (2007) establish 
that the volume of forward-looking disclosures is informative to shareholders for loss-making 
but not profit making firms.  Cools and Mirjam van Praag (2007) count the number of 
announcements regarding top executive departures and find that simultaneous announcements 
about the topic affect share prices.  
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3.5 Good and Bad News 
Prior literature examines information content of good and bad news from two perspectives.  
One perspective investigates the usefulness of the toning that emphasises opportunistic 
disclosures and the other analyses information content of the strategy to suppress negative 
narrative commentaries (e.g. Abrahamson and Amir 1996; Davis et al. 2007; Henry 2006).  
Abrahamson and Amir (1996) regard positivism in narrative commentaries as a „sugar coat‟ 
and such disclosures have no value other than representing irrelevant and ritualism in 
disclosures. However, negativity dealt with more important matters about the firm and 
therefore possessed information content.  Using a ratio of negative words to total words in the 
presidents‟ letter and market-adjusted returns, the findings suggested that such disclosures 
were relevant in explaining both past and future performance of the firm.  Results also showed 
that bad news narratives were more important than financial statement performance measures.  
This affirmed the deficiency of financial statements information that whereas FASB (1978) 
conceptualised that the statements assist investors in timing, estimating and assessing the risk 
of the return on investment, their information is historical.   To correct the deficiency, softer 
information in form of narratives provides an insight into the future direction of the company.  
However, as noted above, the „sugar coated‟ positive narratives, besides the litigation risk 
attached to them, compels that substantial value in disclosures is inherent in the pessimistic 
tone.   
Lang and Lundholm (2000) took rather an impartial perspective and conjectured that managers 
disclose information either to reduce information asymmetry or exaggerate their share, 
depending on firms‟ disclosure culture and variations in economic conditions.  Disclosing to 
reduce information asymmetry was presupposed to be linked to change in economic condition 
of the company, whilst share hyping reflected intent to fool the market.  By classifying 
disclosures of 81 firms quoted on the NASDAQ as pessimistic, neutral or optimistic, stock 
return tests showed that optimistic disclosures were associated with share-hyping which was 
responded to by negative market reaction.  However, firms that increase their disclosure due to 
a positive change in economic conditions were rewarded by a positive share price return.  In 
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Schleicher et al (2007), the reaction to rhetoric toning in narratives was thought to be affected 
by the past financial performance of the firm.  It was therefore conceptualised that for loss-
making firms, bad disclosures about current performance are useful to investors in explaining 
the incidence of bad performance and good prospective disclosures to assure investors that the 
loss-making scenario is not perpetual.  In profit making firms, such narratives are not relevant 
as the profits are sufficient evidence of good performance and indicative of a good 
profitability outlook.   
Literature confirming information content of both opportunistic and pessimistic disclosures 
include Hoskin et al (1986), Lev and Penman (1990), Lundholm and Myers (2002), Lennox 
and Park (2006) and Anilowski et al (2007) in the US, and Collet (2002) in the UK.  In the 
US, usefulness of good but not bad news was found in Hutton et al (2003).  However, results 
in Baginski et al (2000) and Lee et al (2004) show that most bad attributions are informative.  
Dumay and Tull (2007) in Australia and Lakhal (2008) in France provide evidence that both 
good and bad disclosures are associated with share returns but not neutral statements, while 
Boo and Simnett (2002) in Australia find good news disclosures informative.  However, 
Lorraine et al (2004) found that neither good nor bad news disclosures are useful in the UK. 
3.6 Amount Attribution 
Within information content research, most studies (e.g. Hayn 1995; Kothari and Shanken 
1997; Livnat and Zarowin 1990; Ou and Penman 1989) have used amounts directly from 
statutory financial statements or accompanying notes.  It is possible that simplicity in 
extracting information from standardized financial statements and structured footnotes or in 
databases such as I/B/E/S or DataStream influences studies to consider amounts in the 
statements and footnotes rather than narratives.  To this, little research has examined the 
usefulness of quantification in narratives.     
Abrahamson and Amir (1996) are among the first to recognise the importance of the amount 
attribution.  Although not directly referring to amounts in narratives, they contrast the 
relevance of soft information (narrative commentaries) with hard information (financial 
statement amounts).  Hard disclosures preserve the reliability and objectivity of financial 
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information because the information can be audited, however, soft information may not be 
reliable but relevant for investment decision making.  Kasznik and Lev (1995) examined 
management‟s motivation to provide soft or hard disclosures and the respective influence to 
share returns.  They hypothesise that where unexpected earnings are extraordinary, 
management will disclose quantified (hard) information to close in on the expectation gap.  
This would in turn decrease investors‟ transaction costs, avoid large stock price fluctuations 
and shield analysts from embarrassment.  Otherwise, in cases where the expectation gap is 
relatively small, managers will be reluctant to provide hard forecast disclosures since the 
information can be ex-post verified and disparities thereof may lead to reputation damage or 
litigation.  In their findings based on 1988 to 1990 quarterly reports of 565 firms, poor 
performers with disappointing news provided more quantified information.  This confirmed 
that the nature of news influenced the disclosure strategy.  However, investors reacted 
negatively to such news with a possibility that they are sceptical about the short- and long-
term competitiveness or economic justification of the firm.    
Research in the US (e.g. Baber et al. 2006; Francis et al. 2002) regard the balance sheet and 
cash flow as discretionary explanatory disclosures in US quarterly reports, at the time.  Only 
the income statement was the statutory financial statement for interim reporting.  Given the 
voluntary nature of the two statements, they were regarded supplemental and the amounts they 
possessed were considered to expound information in the statutory income statement.  Francis 
et al (2002) investigated the usefulness of the rising concurrent income components, such as 
revenues and expenses.  They found that the supplemental amounts were informative to share 
returns.  A manual reading and coding technique was applied to estimate disclosure extent of 
quarterly releases of 30 firms for the period 1980 to 1999.  Income statement and balance 
sheet numbers had highest disclosure levels and had higher association to returns than the cash 
flow components.  The findings showed that the increases in elaborative amount disclosures 
beyond the mandatory financial statements numbers, especially those relating to income 
statement, were responded to by increased share returns.  The result was interpreted as 
evidence that the bottom-line income figures have less information to investors and therefore 
more figures explaining the final figures were required by shareholders.  Baber et al (2006) 
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rather argued that impression management is the underlying reason for the usefulness of the 
quantification attribute in the supplemental balance sheet and cash flow statement.  The 
amounts provide a justification of the earnings numbers thereby enhancing investors‟ 
confidence on the credibility of the disclosures and reducing suspicions of earnings 
management.  The association of the amounts in the discretionary supplemental quarterly 
balance sheet and cash flow statement with 3-day excessive returns confirmed this conjecture.     
Hutton et al (2003) opinionated that the usefulness of the quantification was that amounts in 
forecasting narratives provide performance targets against which investors may assess 
managerial performance.  The information may take the form of earnings components such as 
sales, margins, profits, effective tax rates.  Over-achieving or failure to meet the target may 
lead shareholders to be sceptical about credibility of either the forecasts or managerial ability.  
In light of this possibility, alike Kasznik and Lev (1995),  Hutton et al (2003) conceptualise 
that management is deterred from providing over pessimistic or over optimistic amounts as 
targets; thereby providing a more precise performance trend useful in share price estimation.   
Through a manual code for all forward-looking and explanatory statements accompanying 
earnings forecasts made by 147 firms, the results showed that non-quantified narratives were 
not informative likely due to vagueness.  On the other hand, forward-looking disclosures that 
had quantitative amounts were positively associated with returns because they were deemed 
credible.  The argument concurs with various studies such as Abrahamson and Amir (1996), 
Skinner (1994)  and Soffer et al (2000) ascertaining that quantified narratives reduce 
impression management because they are precise and can be verified ex posit.     
Although most of the studies reviewed above concerning the quantification attribution are 
based on quarterly announcements, supplemental financial statements and earnings forecasts, 
there is evidence regarding the information content of narrative commentaries.  For example, 
Berry et al (1998) used high level operating annual disclosures of the US petroleum industry 
firms to establish what amounts from revenue-based conversion method for oil and gas reserve 
valuation were more informative than numbers from the energy-based technique.  Likewise, 
Misund et al (2008) concur that amounts of high level operational narratives of annual reports 
for the international oil and gas industry are value relevant.  Amir and Lev (1996) also find 
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quantified non-financial high-level operational data disclosed in quarterly corporate and 
analyst reports was useful to share valuation.  They suggest that on standalone basis, financial 
information (earnings, cash flows and book values) are not relevant to share prices, however, 
if combined with non-financial quantified information, earnings contribute to explanation of 
the prices.  More evidence on the usefulness of the quantification attribution includes Lajili 
and Zeghal (2006) on human capital disclosures in US annual reports and Smith et al (1984) 
regarding foreign payments narratives in the 8K forms.  Various studies (e.g. Givoly et al. 
1999; Hope et al. 2008; Thomas 2000) confirmed that segment analysis of on sales and/or 
earnings amounts have information content because they stratify earnings and sales 
performance; however results by Boatsman et al (1993) do not find disclosure of segment 
amounts useful.     
3.7 Comparison of Current with Past Performance  
Narrative disclosure extent literature (e.g. Cassar 2001; Guillamon-Saorin 2006; Lewellen et 
al. 1996; Schrand and Walther 2000) principally assents that managers exercise a biased 
behaviour on selecting past numeric benchmarks against which current performance is 
weighted.  In a bid to impress investors, normally lowest past performance measures are 
selected to reflect exceptional current performance.  Divergently, information content mostly 
argues that the attribute of benchmarking provides incremental information on the 
performance trend of the company; opposing the suggestion that this disclosure strategy is 
mainly influenced by impression management. 
In Bryan (1997), the essence for the comparison attribution in narratives was derived from 
regulatory insistence on providing benchmarking disclosures in narratives.  The conceptual 
framework in SEC (1980) argued that financial statements were insufficient in estimating 
future performance from past results.  Specifically, the regulation required firms to disclose 
known trends in performance, liquidity and capital resources in narratives to counter for the 
shortfall in financial statements.  Regulatory emphasis was added in SEC (1989) requiring 
narrative disclosure for any material change in financial condition of the firms in a bid to 
protect investors.  Using 11-day share price returns and US annual report narratives, past 
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comparatives for selling price and sales volume was not useful for share valuation.  This result 
reflected that the disclosures were not news because firms have a tendency of disclosing 
similar information pre-annual reporting announcements.  In Schleicher and Walker (1999), 
the usefulness of benchmarking was investigated using narrative disclosures from a less 
regulated dataset.  At the time then, UK narratives followed guidelines of the OFR in ASB 
(1993) which were voluntary in nature.  Therefore, adoption of the recommendations showed 
that management perceived the disclosures relevant in assisting investment decisions rather 
than fulfilling legitimacy obligations.  Schleicher and Walker‟s (1999) disclosure profiling for 
past and current performance comparisons, showed that the disclosures are useful in 
anticipating future earnings; however, comparatively they are less powerful than future 
oriented disclosures.  Future oriented disclosures, unlike past performance comparisons, 
capture known trends and uncertainties relating to the period in which future earnings will be 
made, thereby explaining the expected earnings.  The finding confirmed that if benchmarking 
information is disclosed with intent to guide investors, such information is regarded credible 
and useful despite being historical. 
More confirmation on the usefulness of the comparison attribute on quantifiable data is in 
segment reporting.  Hope et al (2008) investigated the pricing and mispricing effects on 
disclosures of changes in domestic and foreign earnings.  The disclosures were hypothesised 
as an indication of improved reporting practices that reduce mispricing.  Further, such 
disclosures reduce the costs of gathering and processing private information by providing 
computed comparatives that investors use to assess periodic financial outcomes.  Regression 
tests showed that changes in domestic and foreign significantly affected market model annual 
abnormal returns.      
Research on usefulness of the attribute of comparison of current with past performance is 
extended to narrative disclosures that are non-quantifiable.  Riley et al (2003) argue that the 
seasonality effect in business, for example peak travel seasons as summer months, 
thanksgiving and Christmas in the airline industry, makes the comparison attribution in 
narratives relevant for share valuation.   The study further conjectured that whilst financial 
statements data is relevant to investors; performance comparisons of high-level operation 
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metrics posses more explanation regarding the changes in financial performance.  The findings 
showed that firm-specific disclosures on performance metric changes such as changes in 
customer satisfaction, revenue load factor, market share, ton-miles were significantly related 
to share prices returns.  Even disclosure of non firm-specific (macroeconomic) performance 
changes, such as hub changes, large airport changes and number of airport changes were 
associated with individual firms‟ returns. 
In Warner et al (1988), share price movements in the US did not immediately respond to 
changes in top management jobs such as chief executive officer, president or chairperson.  
However, Collet (2002) found an association between returns and disclosures of redundancies 
and new job openings in the UK.  The rationale underlying the result was that redundancies 
denoted an attempt to change cost base whilst new jobs announcements signified intent to 
position the firm to take advantage of revenue and earnings opportunities.     
Although findings are mixed on the relevance of the comparison attribution, two aspects are 
derivable from the literature on information content of the attribute for comparison of current 
with past performance in narratives.  Firstly, unlike some narrative disclosure extent studies 
that conjecture the ascription under impression management, studies of information content 
almost concur that the attribute incorporates credible information necessary for share 
valuation.  Instances of insignificant information content are influenced by presence of more 
informative attributes, as in Schleicher and Walker (1999).  Secondly, information content for 
the attribution has been examined in literature relating to both quantifiable and non-
quantifiable narratives.   
3.8 Reasons for Performance 
The Concept Release in SEC (1987)” encouraged performance explanations after recognising 
that at the time, narratives were substandard.  A follow up in SEC (1989) emphasised that 
material performance changes ought to be explained by providing information that is 
incremental to financial statements and footnotes for the benefit of investors.  Pursuant to this, 
Bryan (1997) investigated whether explanatory information in financial reports narratives of 
firms was useful to investors.  Among the attributes investigated were reasons for both 
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revenue and cost changes in 250 MD&As for the year 1990.  The insignificant results were 
thought to have been influenced by prior release of such information in announcements 
preceding the annual report.  In Finland, Schadewitz et al (2002) thoroughly read 573 interim 
reports of firms listed on the Helsinki Exchange and established that troubled firms were 
characterised by disclosing more information beyond expectations.  However, market reacted 
negatively to such information suggesting that an endeavour to provide excessive explanatory 
analysis of bad performance does not pay off.  Further, although investors may well be aware 
of the bad state of affairs through previous announcements, they wait until publication of the 
financial reports to confirm their suspicions and thereby react negatively on receiving the 
annual reports.  This finding is contrary to, Bryan (1997) who suggests that prior 
announcements make explanatory attributions in financial reports defunct.  In Schleicher, et al 
(2007), it was posited and confirmed in the results that in a loss making circumstances, 
investors do not envisage that loss making does not prevail indefinitely for ongoing firms.  
Since the current performance (losses) is not a good guide for the future performance 
potential, investors require an explanation to the losses and an assurance of future viability.  
For profit making firms, however, the good financial performance is evidence for the 
feasibility of the business; hence, further disclosures may not be relevant for the purpose. 
Further evidence on the usefulness of the causation attribution in Hutton et al (2003) suggests 
that managers enhance the credibility of earnings forecasts by providing further explanatory 
notes.  Such information may be qualitative or quantitative.  By classifying forecasts into good 
or bad news, their findings showed that the tendency to provide more quantitative (verifiable) 
explanations to good news forecasts enabled positive market reaction.  In contrast, qualitative 
(non-verifiable) explanation, including factors such as macro economic, industry level, firm-
specific, long/ short-term prospects and segmental information accompanying bad news 
forecasts had no impact to share returns because they are vague.  Conversely, Lee et al (2004) 
argue that investors find causal statements for bad news credible especially if bad performance 
is blamed on internalities since this action shows management‟s awareness of internal 
weaknesses and willingness to correct the situation.  However, in spite of the reliability 
investors attach to pessimistic disclosures, business managers tend to exercise bias when 
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explaining performance.  Bad attributions are blamed on externalities but good performance 
on internal activities.  The findings, based on a manually scored Likert scale annual report 
disclosures, found bad news causal attributions useful but good news explanations were not 
possibly due to impression management.  A comparable argument and finding is echoed in 
Abrahamson and Amir (1996) concerning relevance of disclosures in the president‟s letter in 
annual reports.   Similarly, in Staw et al (1983) management was presumed to have a 
defensive and self-enhancing attitude when explaining performance with intent to influence 
share returns and other managerial rewards.  In order to appease societal demands or 
expectations, self-justification is achieved through labelling poor performance causes as 
external factors, threats or uncertainties but good performance as internal strengths, 
opportunities to implicate any result (good or bad) as a rational response by management.  
Attributing bad outcomes to external factors but taking credit for good results infers that 
management pursues only value increasing activities and are only setback by externalities 
beyond their control.  This behaviour is conceptualised to result from day-to-day external 
reporting systems designed to foster a systematic, formal, consistent and sieved information 
flow that legitimises organisational actions rather than pursue optimal performance.  
Correlation results in Staw et al (1983) between the self-enhancing explanations (for good 
news) as well as defensive explanations (for bad news) with share price changes confirmed 
both information is considered credible and useful to shareholders.     
Alike  Lee et al (2004) and Staw et al (1983), the reasoning behind explaining earnings 
forecast in Baginski et al (2004) is based on agency.  Managers will link expected 
performance on internal actions or third party actions depending on the perceived investor 
image desired.  Good forecasts will be attributed to inward activities whilst bad forecasts to 
external attributions.  In respect to investors‟ opinion on causal disclosures, results based on a 
keyword search from 951 forecasts showed that the relationship with returns was predictable.  
In addition, disclosures of causal attributions were established to be influenced by a set of 
variables that proxy for cost and benefit where more narratives were provided for large firms, 
more regulated industries, bad news but less for longer-term forecasts.  In an earlier study, 
Baginski et al. (2000), the provision of more voluntary causal attributions for bad forecasts but 
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less for good news portrays management‟s fear for litigation against withholding information.  
Both Baginski et al (2004) and Baginski et al. (2000) argued that good (bad) news was 
attributed to internal (external) causes with an aim of maintaining investor confidence.  
Although an impression management character is in inherent in the causal attributions, 3-day 
market returns were significantly influenced by the disclosures.  This result was assumed to 
indicate that shareholders find the information credible.       
Warner et al (1988) perceived the importance for the causal attribution in disclosures relating 
to management changes from the intrinsic value investors draw from the reasons provided. 
Shareholders expect that management is well positioned to deliver good performance after a 
change and this opinion is confirmed from the reasons attached to the changes.  For example, 
forced departures may implicate poor performance whilst a new recruit may be explained as a 
positioning strategy for future opportunities.    
In conclusion, the provision of reasons for performance are largely informative to share price 
returns because they provide more information illuminating the circumstances in which 
performance was or will be achieved.  However, the voluntary nature and impracticality of 
verifying the disclosures presents a prospect for misuse by managers to egoistically tone the 
information for impression management.  It is thus prevalent for studies (e.g. Baginski et al. 
2000; Baginski et al. 2004; Lee et al. 2004; Staw et al. 1983) to conjecture that internal 
outcomes are fond of explaining good news but external factors are reasons for poor 
performance.  In addition, in some studies (e.g. Abrahamson and Amir 1996) investors are 
considered adequately enabled to distinguish noise from useful causal attribution disclosures.   
3.9 Forward-looking Attribute  
This is potentially the most discussed attribute of disclosure quality in information content 
research conceivably due to the high accord regulatory bodies attach to the ascription.  For 
example in the UK, ASB (1993; 2003; 2005; 2006) all agree that among other uses, narrative 
commentaries help members assess future prospects. Although the EU Accounts 
Modernisation Directive places less emphasis on forward-looking disclosure, an indication of 
future business developments is still required (Trucost 2006). 
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Schleicher and Walker (1999) examined the information content of the OFR following first 
ever issuance of a guideline for narrative reporting by ASB (1993).  The non-mandatory 
recommendations suggested that managers ought to discuss factors underlying operations and 
financial performance to provide a better understanding of the nature of the business, its 
environment and risks it faces.  In the process of doing so, investors would be able to evaluate 
the future prospects of the company more accurately.  In the study, forward-looking 
disclosures were specifically considered due to their capability in predicting future earnings 
changes.  Through a dichotomously scored disclosure index, the variable values for future 
oriented disclosure were significantly associated with future earnings changes as well as 
market returns, confirming the hypothesis.  Schleicher et al (2007) used computerised text-
search to score UK annual report narratives and regression analysis to estimate disclosure 
level of forecast information and its information content, respectively.  Still, even when an 
updated and bigger sample is applied compared to that in Schleicher and Walker (1999), 
future oriented information was useful to investors in instances of loss making firm.  The 
prospective attributions confirmed to investors that loss making was not perpetual and the 
outlook of the business is good.  The distinct feature in the study is that prospective 
disclosures in narratives of profit making firms were not relevant, implying that good 
profitability was confirmatory of the firm‟s future earnings potential.    
In Australia, both impression management and incremental information have been applied to 
explain the relationship between returns and forward-looking disclosures.  Boo and Simnett 
(2002) postulate two cost/benefit market scenarios that affect disclosure of forward looking 
information, the product market (competitive advantage) and financial market consideration 
(need for financing).  When firms are financially distressed (loss making), the domination for 
financing requirements over competitiveness risks will compel firms to provide good 
prospective disclosures to attract investors.  However, since the firms are loss making, there is 
a risk of management bias in providing forward-looking information.  The fear for 
management reputation subdues this incitement because future oriented disclosures can be 
verified ex post (Hoskin et al. 1986).  Boo and Simnett (2002) manually read annual reports of 
140 loss-making Australian Stock Exchange listed firms and classified management 
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prospective as optimistic or pessimistic.  Similar to Schleicher et al (2007), results showed that 
financially distressed firms that disclosed opportunistic prospective narratives were most 
likely to succeed.  Non-disclosing loss making firms were likely to fail, whilst the likelihood 
to fail was not different for firms having pessimistic or mixed prospective disclosures.  The 
findings, justifying the reliability of good prospective disclosures, were attributed to presence 
of an audit opinion as well as potential litigation and reputation costs of misleading 
disclosures.   
Lundholm and Myers (2002) use the AIMR scores for future oriented disclosures to estimate 
the extent to which prospective disclosures explain current share price returns. They argue that 
a firm can bring its future forward to the current period by revealing expected earnings 
changes.  Both cross-sectional regression and time-series analyses confirmed the hypothesis 
where increased disclosure scores were associated with greater share price returns.  To the 
contrary, Lang and Lundholm (2000) find mixed results for information content of changing 
disclosure patterns prior to equity offering firms on the NASDAQ exchange.  A disclosure 
index method was used to code various information items to include information relating to 
short-term and long-term future narratives, among other information types and attributions.  In 
the study, the contemplation was that firms use future oriented disclosures either as means of 
reducing information asymmetry or “hype the share”.  Based on the disclosure culture of the 
company, firms that maintained a constant reporting pattern were characterised by significant 
returns prior to the offering and minor declines post the offer consistent with the hypothesis of 
reducing asymmetry.  For significant disclosure increases prior to the offering, share prices 
considerably declined suggesting that there was an attempt to exaggerate the share value to 
which the market corrects itself by devaluation on issuance of the shares.  Kasznik and Lev 
(1995), also consider two motivations for providing future oriented narratives.  With the 
speculation that surprising investors with large unexpected future earnings may negatively 
influence share prices, managers weigh the risks to warn investors or not.  Where the 
unexpected performance was bad news, firms occasionally warned with highly hard 
(quantified information) to instil investor confidence.  Other variables that affect the 
propensity to provide more warnings were size of the surprise, existence of earlier prospective 
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disclosures, membership to the high tech industry and firm size.  For highly regulated firms, 
fewer warnings were provided.  Because of the negative impact that the warning was expected 
to cause, management provided cautionary note in situations where bad news were to prevail 
for a long future period but for temporal bad news such warnings were not widespread.  In 
turn, investors negatively and significantly reacted to the warnings due to doubt about the 
long-term competitiveness and economic viability of the firm.  It was concluded in the study 
that the adverse investor reaction to future oriented disclosures of warnings explained the low 
levels of disclosures relating to future bad news despite risks such as increased investors‟ 
transaction costs and litigation.   
Another dimension in Lev and Penman (1990) theorises that firms with good prospective news 
will disclose it to distinguish themselves from poorly performing firms.  Such a tendency is 
explained by the signalling or screening theories.  Although this is impression management, 
information content of such disclosures reflects that the information is verifiable, possibly ex-
post in audited financial results.  The alternative posit is that badly performing firms do not 
disclose to which investors interpret as a concealment of bad news hence react negatively.  A 
test the theory, the researchers manually read annual earnings forecasts for firms listed on 
NYSE and AMEX and compared the impact of the disclosures on the cumulative abnormal 
returns.  The results confirmed their hypothesis regarding intent for disclosure of forecast 
information but not nondisclosure, concluding that the strategy of not providing information 
does not necessarily mean concealment of bad news.  Noticeably, the findings in Lev and 
Penman (1990), to a certain extent, differ from Schleicher et al (2007) in UK who suggested 
that forecast information for good performing firms has no relevance to share price returns as 
the current performance is sufficient to attract investors. 
There are a number of other studies that find disclosures of future prospects informative.  For 
example, Hoskin et al (1986), through a regression analysis using two-day excessive returns 
and a dichotomously scored disclosure profile for all announcements made around the 
earnings announcement in the period 1979 to 1981.  The future attributions in narratives were 
regarded credible despite being voluntary.  Perhaps, in fear of subduing reputation, officers are 
compelled to provide credible and useful information.  Gelb and Zarowin (2002) used AIMR- 
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FAF disclosure scores and annual share price changes but still find that greater disclosures are 
associated with positive returns.  They suggest that primary objective of disclosures is to 
create certainty about future cash flows.  Therefore, the evidence of information content in 
enhanced disclosures affirms that the narratives lead to better prediction of the future.  Francis 
et al (2002) and Eiker et al (2000) subscribe to the ability of the forward-looking disclosures to 
inform on the future performance of the company.  Similarly, market tests by Baginski et al 
(2000) showed that auxiliary narratives to management forecasts were significantly related to 
three-day cumulative abnormal returns.  Investors considered the disclosures as credible 
conveyance of information from management thereby presenting a potentially useful extension 
of the financial reporting model.  Atiase et al (2005) propose that the usefulness of prospective 
narratives depends on the investors‟ perception regarding the information‟s relevance and 
reliability.  This value of prospective disclosures is deduced from its relationship with past 
performance as investors weigh it against the verifiable past information on performance. 
Largely, the evidence above articulates that forward-looking disclosures are useful to investor 
although there are instances where the attribution is subjected to impression management.  As 
an addendum to the credibility virtue in future-oriented disclosures Abrahamson and Amir 
(1996) argue that the attribution bridges the information gap by addressing the deviancy 
between the purpose of financial reporting (provide information to guide future investment 
decisions) and the kind of information financial statements contain (historical information).  
The studies also recognise that impression management in the forward-looking attribute of 
narratives is constrained by the likelihood litigation and reputation risks; hence augmenting 
the usefulness of the disclosures.       
3.10 Tabulated Summary of Previous Research 
Table 9 presents a summary of the studies reviewed.  The arrangement of the studies in the 
table is not according to attribution as it is clear in the discussion above that some studies use 
multiple attributions in investigating information content of narrative commentaries.  Overall, 
US research represents almost 70% of the studies reviewed, followed by UK, the rest of the 
studies from various mainland European countries and Australia.  The US studies concentrated 
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mainly on the annual report, quarterly reports and the various announcements, whilst in UK 
research used the annual reports and other types of announcements other than interim reports.  
No research was found using the UK interim reports.  Apart from US, it is only in Finland that 
there is evidence of information content of narratives using interim reports.  Other countries 
from which relevant literature was found include Australia, Netherlands, Germany and France. 
The commonly used mediums of disclosures used in the literature were press releases, 
quarterly earnings releases, US filing forms, annual reports and semi-annual interim reports.  
Only Finnish studies (e.g. Kanto and Schadewitz 2000; Schadewitz et al. 2002) investigate 
information content of narrative commentaries in semi-annual interim reports.   
Most studies base their research or reason their findings largely under incremental information 
or impression management.  Under these two main categorisation of theories, the notable ones 
used include information asymmetry and semi-strong market efficiency, or impression 
management, noticeably agency, litigation, intuition theory and weak-form efficiency.  UK 
studies (e.g. Collet 2004; Firth 1984; Schleicher et al. 2007; Schleicher and Walker 1999), 
mostly use incremental information theory by assuming semi-strong efficiency where 
disclosures are considered credible and informative of future cash flows.  However, in some 
UK studies (Collet 2002; Murray et al. 2006) impression management is used based on 
management disposition to self-serve and avoid expected penalty by investors arising from 
disclosures that may be deemed bad.  
 76 
 
Table 9 Summary of Studies on Information Content of Narrative Commentaries 
 
Study Country, 
Sample 
Size and 
Data 
Disclosure 
Medium 
and 
Narrative 
Types 
Content 
Analysis 
Type 
Theoretic 
Reason 
Information 
Content 
Measure 
Attributions of 
Disclosure 
Variables Confirmed  Variables not Confirmed 
Francis 
et al 
(2002) 
 US 
 426 
Firms on 
CRSP 
 1980 to 
1999 
 Quarterly 
reports 
 General 
narrative
s 
 Presence 
or Non 
Presence 
with 
repetitions 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Model 
CAR 
 Days (-1 to 1)   
 Market 
adjusted and 
size adjusted 
returns have 
similar results 
 Current Good 
News 
 Current Bad 
News 
 Future Good 
News 
 Future Bad 
News 
 Unexpected Earning 
 Presence of Income 
Statement 
 Presence of Cash flow 
Statement 
 Current Good News 
 Current Bad News 
 Future Good News 
 Future Bad News 
 Unexpected Sales 
 Presence of Balance Sheet 
 Number of Non-recurring earnings 
components in narratives 
  
Gelb 
and 
Zarowin 
(2002) 
 US 
 891 non-
bank 
firms 
 1890 to 
1993 
 AIMR-
FAF  
 Classify 
companies 
as high or 
low 
disclosure 
based on 
score 
coefficient 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Stock price 
change with 
dividend 
 Volume of 
Disclosure 
 Future 
Earnings 
Response 
Coefficient 
 Volume of Disclosure 
 Future Earnings 
Response Coefficient 
 Earnings Price Ratio 
 Future Price Change 
 Current Earnings Coefficient Ratio 
 Asset Growth 
 Market Capitalisation 
Hoskin 
et al 
(1986) 
 US 
 676 
firm-
years 
 1979 to 
1981  
 Annual 
Earnings 
News 
 Likert 
Scale 
(most 
negative to 
most 
positive on 
future cash 
flows) 
 Impression 
Management 
 Adjusted R2 
and F values 
 Market Model 
using 
Scholes-
William Beta 
 Days (0 to 1) 
 Good News 
 Bad News 
 Neutral 
 Dividend Change 
(Good) 
 Prospective Comments 
(Good and Bad) 
 Earnings Components 
 Prospective 
Operational Data 
 Detailed Itemised Earnings 
Components 
 Other Disclosures 
 Stock Splits 
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Study Sample Size 
and Data 
Disclosure 
Medium and 
Narrative 
Types 
Content Analysis 
Type 
Theoretic 
Reason 
Information 
Content 
Measure 
Attributions 
of Disclosure 
Variables Confirmed  Variables not 
Confirmed 
Henry 
(2006) 
 US 
 441 firms 
 2002 
 Earnings 
Press 
Releases 
 Computer-
Based  
Keyword Count 
using Synonym 
Sets 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Classification 
and 
Regression 
Trees 
 Binary 
Variable (+ve 
and –ve) 
market 
returns  
versus S&P 
500 returns 
 Days (0) 
 Topics 
disclosed 
 Disclosure 
Volume  
 Tone 
(Good/ Bad 
News) 
 Readability 
 Numerical 
Intensity 
 Variables with Prediction 
Success Rate over 57% 
(A) 
 Variables with 
Prediction Success 
Rate under 57% 
(B) 
 All under (B) and Nature 
of Operating Data 
 All above and All 
Attributions of 
Disclosure 
 Firm Data, Operating 
Data and All Attributes 
 Firm Data (Size, 
unexpected 
earnings, market 
performance, 
profitability, 
ownership and 
industry) 
 
Baginski 
et al 
(2000) 
 US 
 2,085 
earnings 
forecast 
reports 
 1983 to 
1986 
 Management 
Earnings 
Forecast for 
interim and 
annual 
results 
 Manual Content 
Analysis: 
Presence/ Non 
presence 
without 
repetitions 
 Causal 
Attribution:  
 Impression 
Management: 
(Asymmetric 
and Attribution 
Theory) 
 Incremental 
Information 
(Attribution 
Credibility) 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market 
Model CAR  
 Days (-1 to 1) 
 Explanation 
of Forecast 
 Internal 
Causal 
Explanation 
 External 
Causal 
Explanation 
 Unexpected Earnings 
 Bad News 
 Presence of Forecast 
Explanation 
 External Causal 
Explanation 
 Good News 
 Internal Causal 
Explanation 
Schadew
itz et al 
(2002) 
 Finland 
 Non-
financial 
firms 
 1985-1993 
 256 Interim 
Reports 
 Manual Content 
Analysis: 
Dichotomous 
and Likert Scale 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted  R2 
 Market 
Model CAR 
 Days (-1 to 5) 
 Variety in 
Disclosure: 
Volume 
 Disclosures about as 
expected for days (0 to 2) 
 Disclosures greater than 
expected for days (0 to 3) 
 Disclosures less 
than expected 
delayed by one day 
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Study Sample Size 
and Data 
Disclosure 
Medium 
and 
Narrative 
Types 
Content Analysis 
Type 
Theoretic Reason Information Content 
Measure 
Attributions of 
Disclosure 
Variables 
Confirmed  
Variables not 
Confirmed 
Kanto and 
Schadewitz 
(2000) 
 Finland 
 Non-
finance 
and non-
insurance 
firms  
 1985-1993 
 380 
Interim 
Reports 
 Disclosure 
Index: literature 
and interviews 
 Manual Content 
Analysis:  
Likert Scales 
 Impression 
Management: 
Agency 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Model CAR 
 Days (0 to 10) 
 Variety in 
Disclosures: 
Topical 
 
 Unexpected 
Earnings 
 Analysis of 
financial 
statements 
 Management 
Overview 
 Information in 
general in 
financial 
statements: all 
windows 
 Investments 
and Finance: 
all windows 
Healy et al 
(1999) 
 US 
 595 firms 
 1978-1991 
 AIMR 
Annual 
Reports on 
Firm 
Disclosure 
 AIMR Annual 
Disclosure 
Ratings 
 Incremental 
Information: 
credibility 
 Impression 
Management: 
Agency/ 
incredibility 
 Adjusted R2 
 Industry Adjusted 
Monthly Returns 
 Variety in 
Disclosure: 
 Volume 
 Topical 
 Good / Bad 
News 
 Volume of 
disclosure 
 Level of 
earnings 
 Earnings-
Growth 
(interaction) 
 Firm‟s Beta 
 Change in 
Earnings 
 Change in 
Earnings-
Growth 
(interaction) 
 Size (total 
assets) 
Lev and 
Penman 
(1990) 
 US 
 3,420 
annual 
earnings 
forecasts 
 1968-1975 
 
 Corporate 
Earnings 
Forecasts 
 Manual Content 
Analysis: 
Screening 
Forecasting 
from Non-
forecasting 
firms 
 Incremental 
Information: 
credibility 
 Impression 
Management: 
Agency/ 
concealment 
 Market Model CAR 
for Disclosing and 
Non-Disclosing 
Firms 
 Market Adjusted 
CAR 
 15 Monthly Returns 
 Days (-1 to 0)   
 Future News 
 Good News 
 Bad News 
 Quantified 
(Hard) 
forecasts 
 Qualitative 
(Soft) 
forecasts 
 Forecast 
disclosure 
generality 
increase share 
prices (Good 
News) 
 Bad News 
 Higher earning 
changes  
 Non-disclosure 
does not mean 
bad news 
 Size  
 Quantified or 
qualitative 
disclosures  
 Industry 
classification 
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Study Sample 
Size and 
Data 
Disclosure 
Medium and 
Narrative 
Types 
Content 
Analysis 
Type 
Theoretic Reason Information 
Content Measure 
Attributions 
of Disclosure 
Variables 
Confirmed  
Variables not Confirmed 
Kasznik 
and Lev 
(1995) 
 US 
 565 
firms 
 1988-
1990 
 Management 
Discretionar
y 
Disclosures 
prior to Final 
Results 
 Manual 
reading by 
classifying 
firms as 
good news 
or bad news 
firms 
 Impression 
Management 
(reputation and 
litigation) 
 Incremental 
Information 
(close in on 
expectation gap 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Adjusted 
Daily Returns 
 Days (-60 to 2) 
 Days: 5 around 
warning plus 5 
around earnings 
 Days (-2 to 2) 
 Future Good 
New 
 Future Bad 
News 
 Hard: 
Quantified 
 Soft: 
Qualitative 
 Good News Firms: 
 Earnings  
 Firm Size 
Bad News Firms:  
 Earnings 
 Interactive: 
Earnings and 
Quantified Future 
Disclosures 
 Good News Firms: 
 Quantified Future 
Disclosures 
 Interactive: Earnings 
and Quantified Future 
Disclosures 
Bad News Firms:  
 Quantified Future 
Disclosures 
 Firm Size 
Boo and 
Simnett 
(2002) 
 Australia 
 140 
firms 
 1990-
1991 
 Management 
Prospective 
Commentary 
(MPC) in 
Annual 
Report 
 Manual 
reading  
 Impression 
Management 
(reputation and 
litigation) 
 Incremental 
Information: 
credibility 
 Logistic 
Regression 
 MPC, Financial 
Ratios and Firm 
Size 
 Future Good 
News 
 Future Bad 
News 
 Future Good 
News 
 Current Ratio 
 Various Financial 
Performance Ratios 
Schleicher 
et al 
(2007) 
 UK 
 2446 
firm 
years 
 1996-
2002 
 Annual 
reports 
 Computer 
Based Key 
Word 
Search 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Annual Share 
Returns 
 Years (0 to 3) 
 Future 
performance 
 Volume of 
Future 
Disclosure 
 Forward looking 
narratives in loss 
making firms 
 Forward looking 
narratives in profit 
making firms 
Eiker et 
al. (2000) 
 US 
 112 
firms 
 1989 
 Annual 
reports 
 Manual 
Reading 
and Likert 
Scale 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Mean Adjusted  
 Days (-1 to 1) 
 Prospective 
Disclosure 
 Frequency 
 Prospective 
Disclosures 
 Change in Cash flow, 
Size, Exchange of 
Listing 
 80 
 
 
Study Sample 
Size and 
Data 
Disclosure Medium 
and Narrative 
Types 
Content Analysis 
Type 
Theoretic 
Reason 
Information 
Content Measure 
Attributions of 
Disclosure 
Variables 
Confirmed  
Variables not 
Confirmed 
Schleicher 
and Walker 
(1999) 
 UK 
 220 firm 
years 
 1964-
1996 
 Annual reports  Manual reading  Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Annual Monthly 
Price Relatives 
 Variety in 
Disclosure 
 Past, Current  
and Future 
Performance 
 Segment 
Analysis 
 Current/ Past 
Performance 
 Future 
Performance 
 Segment Analysis 
 
Lundholm 
and Myers 
(2002) 
 US 
 4478 
firm 
years 
 1980-
1994 
 AIMR Rankings 
based on annual 
reports 
 AIMR Annual 
Disclosure 
Ratings 
 Incremental 
Information: 
credible 
 Adjusted R2 
 Buy-and-hold 
12-month 
returns 
 Years (1 to 3) 
 Variety in 
Disclosure 
 Future 
Attribute 
 Good News 
 Bad News 
 Disclosure  
 Industry 
 Good/ Bad News 
 Loss Making 
 Beta 
 Firm Size 
 Firm‟s Growth 
 Earning‟s 
Persistence 
Abrahamson 
and Amir 
(1996) 
 US 
 1,325 
firms 
 1987-
1988 
 Annual report 
MD&A  
 Computerised 
Word (with 
Synonyms) 
Search 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Impression 
Management 
(good news, 
ritualism) 
 Adjusted  R2 
 Market Adjusted 
Monthly Returns 
 Risk Adjusted 
Monthly Returns 
 Year (0) 
 Bad News 
 Volume of 
Disclosure 
 Explanation 
of Future, 
Present or 
Past 
Performance  
 Changes in 
Earnings per 
Share, Earnings 
 Negativity in 
Disclosures 
 Size - Market 
Value  
 Systematic Beta 
 Book-to-
Market Ratio 
 
Bryan 
(1997) 
 US 
 250 firms 
 1990 
 Annual report 
MD&A (Form 10-
K) 
 Manual reading, 
Presence of 
disclosure items 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Adjusted 
Returns 
 Days (-5 to 5) 
 Days (6 to 256) 
 Variety in 
Disclosure 
 Good News 
 Neutral 
 Bad News 
 Future Capital 
Expenditures 
 Return on Assets 
 Financial 
Performance 
Changes, 
Future 
Liquidity and  
Known Trends 
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Size and 
Data 
Disclosure 
Medium and 
Narrative 
Types 
Content 
Analysis 
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Theoretic 
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Content Measure 
Attributions of 
Disclosure 
Variables Confirmed  Variables not 
Confirmed 
Firth 
(1984) 
 UK 
 100 firms 
 1977 
 Annual 
Reports 
Voluntary 
Narratives 
 Manual 
reading 
using 
Likert 
Scale 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Risk Measures 
 Market Model 
 Monthly Returns 
 Years: 1972-
1976 
 Variety in Disclosure 
 Importance to risk 
explanation 
 Leverage 
 Earnings Riskiness 
 Disclosure 
 Firm Size 
 Dividend Yield 
Garsombke 
(1979) 
 US 
 100 firms 
 1965 
 Annual 
reports 
 (Form 10-K) 
 Manual 
reading 
using 
Likert 
Scale 
 Incremental 
Information 
 R2 
 Risk Measures 
 Five Year 
Monthly Returns 
 Variety in Disclosures 
 Importance to investors 
 Dividend Pay Out 
 Leverage 
 Earnings Variability 
 Disclosure 
 Size (Total 
Assets) 
 Asset Growth 
Lee et al 
(2004) 
 US 
 14 firms 
 1975-
1995 
 Annual 
Reports 
 Manual 
Reading 
using 
Likert 
Scale 
 Incremental 
Information: 
credibility 
 Impression 
Management
: Self-
serving 
 Autoregressive 
error structures 
 Mixed Effect 
Modelling 
 Adjusted Share 
Price Change 
 Explanatory Attribute: 
 Internality 
 Controllability 
 Globality 
 Stability 
 Nature of News (Good / 
Bad) 
 Negative outcome: 
 Internality 
 Controllability 
 Globality 
 Short-term Influence 
 Negative 
outcome 
(Stability) 
 Positive outcome 
(Internality) 
 Controllability 
 Stability 
 Globality 
 
Staw et al 
(1983) 
 US 
 75 firms 
 1977 
 Shareholders 
Letter 
 Manual 
Reading 
 Impression 
Management 
 Self-
Justification 
 Correlation 
 Change in 
Annual Share 
Price 
 Years: 1976-
1977 
 Explanatory Attribute: 
Internality/ Externality 
 Past/ Future  
 Good/ Bad  
 Explicit/ Implicit 
 Self-Enhancing 
explanations  
 Defensive explanations 
(Negative outcomes 
attributed to external 
causes) 
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Study Sample Size 
and Data 
Disclosure 
Medium and 
Narrative 
Types 
Content 
Analysis Type 
Theoretic 
Reason 
Information 
Content 
Measure 
Attributions of 
Disclosure 
Variables Confirmed  Variables not 
Confirmed 
Davis et al 
(2007) 
 US 
 23,443 firm-
quarters 
 1988-2003 
 Quarterly 
Earnings Press 
Releases 
 Computerised 
Word Search: 
DICTION 5.0 
 Incremental 
Information: 
credibility 
 Adjusted R2 
 Size Adjusted 
Returns 
 Days (-1 to 1) 
 Good/ Bad News  Good/ Bad News 
 Unexpected Earnings 
 Profitability 
 Asset Turnover 
 Profit Margin 
 Book to Market Ratio 
 Earnings 
Surprise 
Lang and 
Lundholm 
(2000) 
 US 
 82 firms  
 1992 
 All Available 
public 
disclosures 18 
months before 
and after 
equity offering 
 Manual 
Reading 
 Incremental 
Information: 
credibility 
 Impression 
Management
: hyping 
shares 
 Adjusted R2 
 Continuously 
Compounded 
Returns 
 Days (-2 to 2) 
 Volume of all 
Disclosure 
 Performance 
Disclosures 
 Management 
Spins 
 Forward Looking 
 Others 
 Good/ Bad 
 All Disclosure 
 Performance Disclosures 
 Management Spins 
 Others 
 
 Forward 
Looking 
Schadewitz 
and Kanto 
(2002) 
 Finland 
 37 
interviews 
 1985-1993 
 Interim 
Reports 
 Interviewing 
and Likert 
Scale: 
importance 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Model 
 Days (0 to 10) 
 Volume of 
Disclosure by 
Presence of Item 
 Quality 
 High Volume of Disclosure 
 Perceived Quality 
 Voluntary Disclosure 
 Low Level 
of Disclosure 
Mangena 
(2004b) 
 UK 
 79 responses 
 2002 
 Interim 
Reports 
 Questionnaire 
and Likert 
Scale 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Rank Test 
 Kruskal Wallis 
 Perceived 
Importance of 
Items 
 Profit and Loss 
 Cash from operations 
 Management Commentary 
 Segment Information 
 Audit review 
 Accounting 
Policies 
 83 
 
Study Sample 
Size and 
Data 
Disclosure 
Medium 
and 
Narrative 
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Content 
Analysis Type 
Theoretic 
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Information Content 
Measure 
Attributions of 
Disclosure 
Variables Confirmed  Variables not 
Confirmed 
Berry et al 
(1998) 
 US 
 399 firm-
years 
 1990-1993 
 Annual 
Reports 
 Arthur 
Anderson 
Database for 
reserve 
quantities, 
and cost 
 Incremental 
Information: 
future cash 
flows 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Value of Equity 
 Annual Market Value 
 Amount  
 (high level 
operating data) 
 Past book share value  
 Earnings Per Share 
 Energy based reserve  
valuation  
 Current book 
value per share 
 Revenue based 
reserve 
valuation 
Amir and 
Lev (1996) 
 US 
 329 Firm 
quarters 
 1988-1993 
 Quarterly 
Reports 
and 
Analyst 
Reports 
 Manual 
Reading 
 Incremental 
Information: 
future cash 
flows 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Adjusted 
Returns 
 Days (0,1) 
 Amount  
 (high level 
operating data) 
 Growth Potential 
 Operating Success 
 Book Value of Equity 
 Earnings Per Share 
 
Misund et 
al.(2008) 
 Worldwide 
 1482 firm 
years 
 1992-2005 
 Annual 
Financial 
Reports 
 Extraction 
from J.S 
Herold 
Database 
 Impression 
Management: 
accrual 
measurement 
 Test Statistics and Wald 
x
2
 
 Market Value of Equity 
 Amount: 
 (for high level 
operating data) 
 Full Cost Valuation 
 Income 
 R&D Cost 
 Margin per BOE 
 Change in Reserves 
 Change in Oil Price 
 Operational Cash  
 Change in 
Income and 
Cash  
 Reserve 
Replacement 
Efficiency 
 Change in 
Production 
Riley et 
al.(2003) 
 US 
 10 firms 
 1988-1999 
 CSRP, 
Compust
at, 10-Ks, 
Annual 
Reports 
 Manual 
Reading 
 Information 
Content 
 Adjusted  R2 
 Market Adjusted Return 
 Quarterly Returns 
 Change (high 
level operating 
data) 
 Change in: 
 Revenue Load Factor 
 Ton Miles 
 Market Share 
 Customer Satisfaction 
 Earnings 
 Change in 
Earnings 
Lajili and 
Zeghal 
(2006) 
 US 
 1165 firms 
 1995-1999 
 Annual 
Reports 
 Extraction 
from 
Compustat 
 Incremental 
Information  
 Risk Adjusted CAPM  
 Years (1, 3 and 5) 
 Amount: 
 (for human 
capital) 
 Level of human capital 
 Firm Size 
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Narrative 
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Theoretic 
Reason 
Information Content 
Measure 
Attributions of 
Disclosure 
Variables Confirmed  Variables not 
Confirmed 
Dumay and 
Tull (2007) 
 Australia 
 220 firms 
 2004-2005 
 Corporate 
Publication 
 Manual 
and 
Computer 
Based - 
Minitab 
 Incremental 
Information 
 ANOVA 
 Tukey Pair wise 
 Z-statistics 
 Market Adjusted Returns 
 Days: (-3 to 5) 
 Good/ Bad/ 
Neutral 
 Presence of Item 
 (intellectual 
capital) 
 
 Good/ Bad  Presence of Items 
 Neutral 
Hammersley 
et al (2008) 
 US 
 358 items 
 2003-2005 
 Corporate 
filings 
 Manual 
reading 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Size-adjusted Returns 
 Day 0 
 Presence of Item 
 Badness 
 (internal controls) 
 Internal control 
strength 
 Auditability 
 Vagueness 
 Unexpected Earnings 
 Internal control  
weakness 
 Auditor finding 
weakness 
 Auditor Type 
 Other disclosures 
Smith et al 
(1984) 
 US 
 98 firms 
 1978 
 Form 8K  Manual 
Reading 
 Impression 
Management 
 Adjusted R2 
 Wilcoxon test 
 Mean Adjusted Returns 
 Days (-1 to 0) 
 Presence of Item 
 Amount 
 (foreign sensitive 
payments) 
 Amount  
Warner et al 
(1988) 
 US 
 269 firms 
 1962 
 Wall Street 
Journal 
articles 
 Manual 
Reading 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Logit Regression 
 Market Model 
 Market Adjusted Returns 
 Days (-59 to 30) 
 Changes in 
Management 
 Reason for Change 
 Changes in 
Management 
 Reason for Change 
 
Collet 
(2002) 
 UK 
 236 items 
 1998 
 Corporate 
Publication 
 Sequencer 
Word 
Search 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Impression 
Management 
 t-statistic 
 Market Adjusted  
 CAPM 
 Wilcoxon 
 Days (-30 to 30) 
 Bad News 
 Good News 
 Changes in 
Employment 
 Changes in 
Employment 
 Redundancies (Bad) 
 Job Openings (Good) 
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of 
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Confirmed  
Variables not Confirmed 
Cools and 
Mirjam van 
Praag (2007) 
 Netherlands 
 100 firms 
 1991 - 2000 
 Corporate 
Publications, 
Annual 
Reports 
 Manual 
Reading 
 Impression 
Management 
 t-values 
 Mean Returns 
 Market Model 
 Day (-10 to 1) 
 Volume of 
disclosure 
 Reason for 
Change 
 Forced 
Management 
Departures 
 
Aitken et al 
(1994) 
 Australia 
 33 firms 
 1982 
 Annual 
reports 
 Manual 
Reading 
 Incremental 
Information: 
earnings 
predictability 
 z-scores 
 Market Model 
 Mead Adjusted 
 Market Adjusted 
 Presence of 
Item 
 General Segment 
Disclosures 
  Segment Revenue 
and Earnings 
 Segment Revenue 
 Segment Earnings 
Buhner and 
Moller (1985) 
 Germany 
 24 firms 
 1967 - 1973 
 Annual 
reports 
 Manual 
reading 
 Incremental 
Information: 
risk-return/ 
EMH 
 Paired t-tests 
 Market Model, API 
 Week (-12 to 12) 
 Presence of 
Item 
 Divisionalisation 
decision in the 
long-term 
 Divisionalisation in the 
short-term  
Karpik and 
Riahi-
Belkaoui 
(1994) 
 US 
 44 firms 
 1974 
 Corporate 
Publications 
 Past 
Literature 
Data 
 Incremental 
Information 
 t-values 
 Market Model 
 Days (-15 to 15) 
 Presence of 
Item 
 Vertical Segment 
 Related Segments 
 Unrelated Segments 
Lobo et al 
(1998) 
 US 
 76 firms 
 1975 - 1978 
 Annual 
reports 
 I/B/E/S 
Database 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Parametric z 
 Wilcoxon z 
 Price Variability 
 Days (-2 to 2) 
 Presence of 
Item 
 Presence of line-
of-business 
disclosures 
 
Ettredge et al 
(2002) 
 US 
 563 firms 
 1996-1998 
 Corporate 
Filings 
 Compustat 
Database 
 Impression 
Management: 
litigation and 
competitivene
ss  
 Time series 
 Adjusted R2 
 Path Analysis 
 Days (-2 to 2) 
 Presence of 
Item 
 Line-of-business 
disclosures 
 Firm Size 
 Industry Type 
 Segments -  
Geographical and 
Product lines 
 Major Customer 
Conover and 
Wallace 
(1995) 
 US 
 230 firms 
 1982 
 Annual 
Reports 
 Manual 
reading 
 Incremental 
Information 
 
 Correlation 
 Multi Factor Market 
Model 
 Presence of 
Item 
 Number of 
Geographical 
Segments  
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of 
Disclosure 
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Hope et al 
(2008) 
 US 
 177 firms 
 1992-2004 
 Annual 
Reports 
 Compustat 
Database 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Model 
 Monthly 
Returns 
 Change in 
Amount 
 Changes in Domestic and 
Foreign Earnings 
 
Thomas 
(2000) 
 US 
 1,912 firm 
years 
 1984-1995 
 Form 10-K  Compustat 
Database 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Size Adjusted  
 5 yearly returns 
 Amount   Geographic Segment 
Earnings 
 
Boatsman 
et al (1993) 
 US 
 1,086 firm 
years 
 1985-1989 
 Annual 
Reports 
 Compustat 
Database 
 Manual 
reading 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Model 
 Days (-10 to 5) 
 Amount   Geographic 
Segment 
Earnings 
Givoly et al 
(1999) 
 US 
 3,710 firms 
 1978-1996 
 Annual 
Reports 
 Form 10-K 
 Compustat  Incremental 
Information 
 Impression 
Management 
 Adjusted R2 
 Annual Returns 
 12 months 
 Amount  Segment earnings 
 Segment Sales 
 Segment Industry 
Correlation 
 
Herremans 
and 
Akathaporn 
(1993) 
 US 
 76 firms 
 1982-1987 
 Fortune 
Annual Scores 
for Corporate 
Reputation 
 Fortune 
Database 
 Impression 
Management: 
public image 
and litigation 
 Comparative 
Analysis 
 CAPM 
 Annual Returns 
 Presence 
of item 
 Social Responsibility   
Freedman 
and Patten 
(2004) 
 US 
 122 firms 
 1988 
 Form 10-K  Manual 
Reading 
 Impression 
Management 
 Adjusted R2 
 Abnormal 
returns 
 Days (-1 to 1) 
 Presence 
of item 
 Level of Pollution 
 Extent of environment 
disclosures 
 Industry 
 Size 
 Litigation 
disclosures 
 
Al-
Tuwaijri et 
al (2004) 
 US 
 198 firms 
 1994 
 Form 10-K  Manual 
reading - 
Likert 
 Incremental 
Information: 
EMH 
 Adjusted R2 
 Industry 
Adjusted  
 Presence 
of Item 
 Amount 
 Evironmental 
Performance 
 Equity Ratios and Profit 
Margin 
 Earnings 
 Environmental 
Disclosures 
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Bansal and 
Clelland 
(2004) 
 US 
 100 firms 
 1990-1994 
 Corporate 
News 
Releases 
 Media 
Releases 
 Manual 
reading 
 Impression 
Management
: credibility 
and litigation 
 Adjusted R2 
 ANOVA 
 CAPM (beta) 
 Days (21 to 
160) 
 Presence of Item 
 Tone (good, bad, 
neutral) 
 Environmental Legitimacy 
 Disclosure of 
Environmental Liability 
 Firm Size 
 Profitability 
 Industry Membership 
 Leverage 
 Ratio of Fixed Assets to 
Total Assets 
Lorraine et al 
(2004) 
 UK 
 24 firms 
 1995-2000 
 Press 
Releases 
 Manual 
Reading 
 Incremental 
Information: 
source 
credibility 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Model 
 Days (-10 to 
10) 
 Presence of Item 
 Tone (good, bad) 
   Amount of fines 
 Tone of News (Good, 
Bad) 
 Industry Membership 
Murray et al 
(2006) 
 UK 
 100 firms 
 1988-1997 
 Annual 
Reports  
 CSEAR 
scores 
(Number 
of Pages) 
 Impression 
Management
: managerial 
disposition 
 Adjusted R2 
 Annual Total 
Returns 
 Presence of Item 
 Disclosure 
Volume: Pages 
 Size  Voluntary Disclosures 
 Social Environmental 
Disclosures 
Freedman 
and Stagliano 
(1991) 
 US 
 27 firms 
 1981 
 Form 10-
K 
 Annual 
Reading 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Model 
 Days (0 to 3) 
 Current Impact 
 Amount 
 Qualitative 
 Future Effect 
 Disclosure of Impact 
 Non Disclosure of Amount 
(Adverse effect) 
 Qualitative but no Amounts 
(Adverse effect) 
 Non disclosure of 
Impact 
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Study Sample 
Size and 
Data 
Disclosure 
Medium and 
Narrative 
Types 
Content 
Analysis 
Type 
Theoretic Reason Information 
Content 
Measure 
Attributions of 
Disclosure 
Variables 
Confirmed  
Variables not 
Confirmed 
Collet 
(2004) 
 UK 
 3,332 
statemen
ts 
 1995-
2001 
 Corporate 
Publications 
 Manual 
reading 
 Incremental 
Information 
 t-values 
 Market 
Adjusted 
 Days (-5, 10) 
 Presence of item 
 Tone: Good/ 
Bad 
 Future 
 Amount 
 Explanations 
 Trading 
Announcements 
 Changes in 
Margins 
 Changes in 
Sales 
Bryan 
(1997) 
 US 
 250 
firms 
 1990 
 Annual 
report 
MD&A 
(Form 10-K) 
 Manual 
reading, 
Presence 
of 
disclosure 
items 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market 
Adjusted 
Returns 
 Days (-5 to 5) 
 Days (6 to 
256) 
 Future 
 Explanations 
 Tone: Good, 
Neutral, Bad 
 Future Capital 
Expenditures 
 Revenue 
Change 
Explanation 
 Cost Changes 
Explanation 
 Future 
Liquidity 
Position 
Kanto and 
Schadewitz 
(2000) 
 Finland 
 380 firm 
years 
 1985-
1993 
 Interim 
Reports 
 Manual 
Reading:  
Likert 
Scales 
 Impression 
Management: Agency 
 Incremental 
Information  
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Model 
CAR 
 Days (0 to 10) 
 Presence 
 Explanations 
 Changes 
 Forward 
Looking 
 Analysis of 
financial 
statements 
 Financial 
Statements 
Information 
 Investments 
and Finance 
Lev and 
Penman 
(1990) 
 US 
 3,420 
items  
 1968-
1975 
 
 Corporate 
Earnings 
Forecasts 
 Manual 
Content 
Analysis: 
 Incremental 
Information: 
credibility 
 Impression 
Management: Agency/ 
concealment 
 Market Model 
 Market 
Adjusted 
 15 Monthly 
Returns 
 Days (-1 to 0)   
 Future News 
 Good News 
 Bad News 
 Amount 
 Qualitative 
 Good Earnings 
Forecast 
disclosure 
 Bad Earnings 
Forecasts 
 Non-disclosure  
 Quantified or 
qualitative 
disclosures 
Atiase et al 
(2005) 
 US 
 627 
firms 
 1994-
2003 
 Press 
Releases 
 Manual 
Reading 
 Compustat 
 Incremental 
Information: 
credibility/ factual 
 Impression 
Management: not 
factual  
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Model 
 Days (-1 to 1) 
 Past 
 Current 
 Future 
 Amount 
 Good and Bad 
 Future Earnings 
 Current 
Earnings 
 Reliabilitity of 
Earnings 
 Relevancy of 
Earnings 
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Study Sample 
Size and 
Data 
Disclosure 
Medium and 
Narrative 
Types 
Content Analysis Type Theoretic 
Reason 
Information Content 
Measure 
Attributions of 
Disclosure 
Variables 
Confirmed  
Variables not 
Confirmed 
Lennox and 
Park (2006) 
 US 
 6,050 
items 
 1988-
2002 
 Earnings 
Forecast 
Releases 
 Manual reading  Incremental 
Information: 
Information 
Asymmetry 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Adjusted 
 Days (0 to 1) 
 Presence of Item 
 Forward Looking 
 Historic 
 Tone: Good, 
Neutral, Bad 
 Amount 
 Qualitative 
 Earnings 
response 
Coefficient 
(ERC) as a proxy 
for forecast 
earnings 
 Historic ERC 
 Good New 
 Bad News  
 
Lakhal 
(2008) 
 France 
 309 items 
 1988-
2001 
 Voluntary 
Earnings 
Releases 
 Manual reading  Incremental 
Information: 
Information 
Asymmetry 
 T-statistics 
 Panel data 
Regression 
 Market Model 
 Days 
 Forward Looking 
 Tone: Good, 
Neutral, Bad 
 Good 
 Bad 
 Neutral 
Hutton et al 
(2003) 
 US 
 147 firms 
 1993-
1997 
 Management 
Forecasts for 
Earnings, 
Sales, Cash 
flows, 
Margins 
 Manual Reading 
 PR Newswire and 
Dow Jones News 
Retrieval Service 
 Incremental 
Information: 
for Good 
News 
 Impression 
Management: 
for Bad News 
 Multiple regression 
 Market Adjusted 
 Size Adjusted 
 Days (-1 to 1) 
 Forward Looking 
 Amounts 
 Qualitative 
 Explanation 
 Tone: Good, Bad 
 Good Quantified 
News 
 Bad News 
Anilowski et 
al (2007) 
 US 
 31,230 
items 
 1990-
2004 
 Management 
Earnings 
Forecasts 
 Manual reading  Incremental 
Information 
 Correlation 
 Market Adjusted 
 Monthly Returns 
 Days (-1 to 1) 
 Forward Looking 
 Amounts 
 Qualitative 
 Tone: Good, Bad, 
Neutral 
 Good News 
 Bad News 
 Aggregate 
Disclosures with  
Daily Returns 
 Aggregate 
Disclosures to 
Monthly Returns 
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Study Sample Size 
and Data 
Disclosure 
Medium and 
Narrative 
Types 
Content 
Analysis 
Type 
Theoretic 
Reason 
Information 
Content 
Measure 
Attributions 
of Disclosure 
Variables Confirmed  Variables not Confirmed 
Baginski et 
al (2004) 
 US 
 951 items 
 1993-1996 
 Management 
Earnings 
Forecasts 
 Manual 
reading 
 Incremental 
Information 
 Impression 
Management
: Internal 
Explanations 
 Adjusted R2 
 Market Model 
 Days (-1 to 1) 
 Presence of 
item 
 Tone: Good,  
Bad 
 Explanation: 
Internal or 
External 
 Value  
 Unexpected Earnings 
 Explanations to 
Forecasts  
 External Explanations 
 Explanation for 
Maximum Forecast 
 Explanation for Range 
Forecasts  
 Sales Forecast 
 Internal Explanations 
 Explanations for 
Minimum Forecasts 
 One time Income 
Benefit 
 Other Disclosures 
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The studies summarised in Table 9 include three UK based studies that have examined 
information content of all narratives commentaries in a financial report.  They include Firth 
(1984), Schleicher and Walker (1999) and Schleicher et al (2007).  In Firth (1984), all 
attributions were insignificantly related to share price returns.  In Schleicher et al (2007), 
explanations for performance and forward looking attributions were jointly relevant in share 
pricing for loss making firms.  It is only Schleicher and Walker (1999) who considered 
relative information content of various attributions to include narratives about past 
performance, future performance and comprehensiveness (segment reporting).  Their results 
showed that all these attributions were informative.   
Other studies in the UK consider attributions in specific information topics.  For example 
Lorraine et al (2004) established that rhetoric toning and amount attributions in environmental 
disclosures had no information content to share prices.  Murray et al (2006) alternatively used 
impression management but still the presence and volume attributions of environmental 
information were not relevant.  Collet (2002) based on both incremental information and 
impression management to justify the comparison of current with past attribution for 
employment changes is useful.  In another study, Collet (2004) used incremental information 
but yielded mixed findings on the comparison of current with past performance attribution, 
where change in sales had no effect on share price but changes in margins had an effect.   
3.11 Possible Reasons for Conflicting Results in Prior Literature 
The literature reviewed above demonstrates that there is no unanimous conclusion regarding 
the usefulness of any disclosure attribution to share pricing.  There are a number of possible 
reasons for this.  First, the studies are drawn from different countries with divergent reporting 
cultures and investors‟ behaviour or perceptions.  Bailey et al (2006) suggested the disclosure 
environment principally influenced variation in investor reaction to disclosures.  Second, the 
summary in Table 9 shows that there is a variety of techniques applied in disclosure 
measurement, estimation of share price returns and establishment of the relationship between 
narrative disclosures and share price returns.  Third, the use of variables by the various studies 
may also explain the conflicting results.  Fourth, the research reviewed has measured 
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disclosure from a number of mediums such as analyst ratings, annual, semi-annual or quarterly 
reports and various corporate announcements.  Furthermore, prior research has used a 
multitude of various theoretical underpinnings for narrative information content, broadly 
classified under impression management and incremental information.  Healy et al (1999) 
caution that generalisation of results may not be feasible due to variations in statistical 
techniques and conceptual frameworks.  In addition, the periods from which samples were 
drawn and the constitution of samples could explain the result variations.  Beattie et al (2008) 
confirm that narratives in UK annual reports have increased overtime and the development is 
thought to degrade the relevancy of the information.  Finally, firm characteristics such as firm 
size (e.g. Kasznik and Lev 1995; Lundholm and Myers 2002) and industry membership (e.g. 
Ettredge et al. 2002) may have influenced the extent of usefulness of the narrative disclosures.  
With such a diversity of possibilities that may explain the contradicting results in prior 
research on information content it is evident that more research is still required before a 
consistent pattern of results can emerge.     
3.12 Gap in Literature 
The preceding literature review has discussed previous studies on information content in both 
the UK and elsewhere.  The purpose of this section is to outline the gap in that literature so 
that the need for further research can be clearly delineated and provide the rationale for the 
current study.  First, it is clear from the previous research that there are only three studies (e.g. 
Firth 1984; Schleicher et al. 2007; Schleicher and Walker 1999) that have used UK data to 
measure information content of all narrative information.  However, the studies all used the 
annual report, which means the interim report has not been used in the UK to investigate 
information content of narrative information.  Therefore, a gap exists in establishing 
information content of the UK interim report narrative commentaries.    
Second, previous studies have used dichotomous scoring procedure.  The procedure has been 
criticised because it fails to reveal the disclosure quality attributes in narratives (Beattie et al. 
2004; Beattie and Thomson 2007).  As a result, a call has been made for more detailed 
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analysis of information items in narratives considering both disclosure variety and depth 
attribution as opposed to disclosure variety that only considers presence of themes or topics.  
Third, although some research that has considered the information content of interim reports 
have been undertaken in other countries, e.g. Kanto and Schadewitz (2000) and Schadewitz et 
al (2002) in Finland, it is important that further research is done using UK data for two 
reasons. One, the reporting environment may influence the results differently.  For example, 
changes in legislation have influence disclosure extent (Johnson et al. 2001; Rogers and Van 
Buskirk 2009).  Two, the studies by Kanto and Schadewitz (2000) and Schadewitz et al (2002) 
ignored attributions such as good or bad news, amounts, comparison of current with past 
performance and forward-looking disclosures.   
Fourth, another distinct observation by Beattie and Thomson (2007) and Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan (2007) is that repetitions are widespread in narrative reporting.  No narrative 
information content research was identified by this thesis found to give a lucid or well-
articulated attention to investigate the attribution‟s information content.  Francis et al (2002) 
give some notice in measuring disclosures with the attribution in mind; however, their analysis 
and discussion does not deliberate its usefulness.  In the review above, some studies (e.g. 
Schadewitz et al. 2002) give regard to the repetition surrogated as volume of disclosure.  
However, given that this attribute is not considered in UK literature, this indicates that there is 
a gap on the relevance of disclosure volume in UK financial reports, specifically the interim 
report.      
Finally, the literature review has also revealed that previous researcher have investigated a 
number of themes e.g. environmental, intellectual capital.  One reason for this is that such 
themes were thought to be useful.  However, since ASB (2005; 2006) suggested that narrative 
information should complement as well as supplement financial statements there is no 
available empirical evidence whether such information is useful.  As suggested before, this is 
more critical now given that investors are already suffering from information overload because 
of the volume of narrative disclosed.  Investigating the relative usefulness of complementary 
and supplementary narrative is therefore important as it may enable information providers to 
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prioritise what type of information to disclose.  Further, there is recent evidence (e.g. FRC 
2009; IASB 2009) to show that regulators and standard-setters support complementing and 
supplementing in financial reports.     
3.13 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has reviewed literature on information content of narrative disclosures in 
corporate specific releases and financial reports.  As indicated in the introduction to the 
chapter, the review is illustrative and does not assume a comprehensive approach.  First, 
attributes of narrative disclosures quality are identified.  Based on the attributes recommended 
in ASB (2005; 2006), the review of the information content of narrative commentaries 
literature is classified according to the attributions. These include good and bad news, volume 
of disclosure, presence of an information item, amount, comparison of current with past 
performance, reason for performance and forward-looking disclosures.   
Although there is no universal theory used in the studies to justify results, as also 
acknowledged in Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007), largely, the literature in review used 
mainly incremental information or impression management to conjecture for presence or 
absence information content.   Generally, despite the vast evidence examining information 
content of narrative commentaries, there are reasons that substantiate the relevance of this 
thesis.  As evidenced from the literature, there is no study that investigated the relative 
information content of complementary and supplementary disclosures in UK financial reports.  
This is in spite of regulatory judgment in ASB (2005; 2006) that both types of narrative 
commentaries are useful for investment decision making.  Secondly, and more specific, there 
is no research that has documented the relative importance of narrative disclosures in UK 
interim reports.  A few studies (e.g. Opong 1995; Rippington and Taffler 1995; Ryan and 
Taffler 2004; Wolfe et al. 2009) have documented that announcement of UK interim reports 
impact on share returns.   However, other than announcement impact on returns, there is gap 
concerning what information in the interim reports narratives do investors use for share 
pricing.  Furthermore, this research addresses the apprehension that prior research has largely 
neglected comprehensiveness in measuring and establishing information content of disclosure 
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quality attributes.  Beattie et al (2004), Beattie and Thomson (2007) and Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan (2007) recognise the scantiness of research taking into consideration attributions in 
narratives.  This study also responds to their call for new studies in narrative disclosure extent 
and narrative disclosures information content that recognise the variety of attributions in 
narrative commentaries.    
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4 USEFULNESS OF INTERIM REPORTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the usefulness of interim reporting.  This chapter assists in illuminating 
key aspects underlying the medium of disclosure whose narratives are examined for 
information content.  The issues considered include the definition of interim reporting, the 
purpose, cost-benefit analysis and investors‟ use of interim financial reports.  The discussion is 
also extended to the importance of features distinguishing interim reports from annual reports.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows.  The next section examines the role of interim 
disclosures.  The discussion then justifies investors as the prime user group of interim reports, 
leading to the identification of type of information required by investors.  Empirical evidence 
on the usefulness of interim information to investors is then examined.  The chapter then 
examines investors‟ use of the distinct features of interim reporting – voluntary audit 
involvement and reporting frequency.  Finally, a summary and conclusion is provided.  
4.2 The Role of Interim Reports 
The usefulness of the interim report is derived from the fact that interim reports precede annual 
reports in the financial year reporting cycle.  Green (1964) argues that the most important purpose 
of interim reports is to forecast annual financial performance thereby reducing uncertainty about 
the direction of the company.  The different techniques of interim reporting or computation of 
interim results (e.g. discrete, predictive or disclosure), are based on the rationale that interim 
reports are ancillary to the annual report with an aim of predicting the annual performance 
(Bollom 1973; Shillinglaw 1961). 1    The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) in AICPA (1973) agrees with this suggestion that usefulness of interim reports is 
embedded in the ability that the disclosures therein have in reference to anticipating annual 
                                                 
1
Discrete approach computes interim income without reference to other interim period; predictive approach 
requires income to be computed as an approximation for the entire year while in disclosure approach interim 
results are provided in other means without computation of interim income (Bollom 1973). 
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results.  This role is also recognised in UK guidance on interim reporting found in ASB (ASB 
1997) as well as the updated version in ASB (2007a). 
Various studies (e.g. Holmes 1971; Lunt 1982; Shaw 1981) find the interim report as a 
supplement to the annual report because of difference in the length of reporting intervals between 
interim and annual reports. The interval enables interim reports to capture short-term seasonal, 
random, scheduled, cyclic and non-recurring financial and non-financial fluctuations in the 
business (Bollom 1973; Green 1964; Shillinglaw 1961).  For example, Shaw (1981) suggests 
that the timeliness of interim reports pre-empts disclosure of extraordinary fluctuations in 
financial performance that would have been ignored in annual reports.  The short reporting 
interval facilitates disclosure of such fluctuations yet annual reporting would have them 
consolidated with the performance for the entire financial year.  Holmes (1971) says that a year 
is a long period to leave investors without information; therefore, interim reports serve to reduce 
the lengthy interval.  
In the study by Courtis (1987), the capacity entrenched in interim reports to disclose the impact 
of seasonality on financial performance provides an incremental role of the reports, compared 
to annual reports.  Interim information acknowledges that a firm‟s profit-making potential is 
not symmetrical across seasons or within halves of the financial year, unlike annual reports.  
Therefore, the seasonality in profits provides turning points of the business; which information 
is hardly existent in annual reports and allows a comparative assessment of performance from 
one period to another.  Early UK interim reporting regulation was partly motivated by the 
distinctive characteristics in interim reports disclosures compared to those in annual reports.  
 In the Regulation of Railways Act (1868) as well as the Bill preceding the Joint Stock 
Companies Act of 1884, railway companies and joint stock venture, respectively, were 
required to  provide interim reports (Carruthers and Espeland 1991; Edwards 1989).  Enacting 
of Regulation of Railways Act (1868) was inspired by financial crisis of 1866 that led to the 
collapse of Watson Overand & Co, a railway contracting company (Edwards 1989).  The aim 
of the regulation was to standardise accounting presentation and assist investors to see at 
glance the exact financial position of the company.  This purpose arguably is similar to that of 
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annual reports, the only differentiating factor being the reporting interval.  Also in ASB (1997), 
it is stated that interim reports facilitate the monitoring of business development using the 
preceding annual report as a benchmark.   The regulation therefore recognises the reporting 
interval length and benchmarking purposes of interim reporting.  ASB (2007a) further affirms 
this by suggesting that interim reports shorten the reporting period to acquaint investors with 
developments affecting trading conditions as well as acting as progress report on the operating, 
financing and investing activities of the business.  In the UK scenario, the interval length 
argument may arguably be challenged, as the interval between subsequent interim reports is 
similar to that between annual reports. 
However, the roles of interim reporting based on the distinguishing factors between annual and 
interim reporting have been challenged.  Arthur Andersen and Company (1972) and Atrill 
(1986) argued that it is very limiting to assume that the interim report deduces its relevance from 
its dissimilarities with the annual report.   Arthur Andersen and Company (1972) proceed to 
suggest the predictive role of interim reports should be determined by the ability of the reports to 
have such information.  Both interim and annual reports may incorporate forward-looking 
information or historical trends that can aid projection of both the short- and long-term.  
Therefore, it is misleading to suppose that the forward-looking information or trends that can help 
predict future performance in interim report make the medium relatively important compared to 
annual reports.  Atrill (1986) was of the view that the short-ranged distinction between the annual 
and interim report makes the prime purpose of both reports to be financial reporting to be 
financial reporting for investment decision-making.  
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) adopt another role of interim reports from the psychological 
concept of anchoring and adjustment.  Information is processed in two ways.  The first, step-
by-step (SbS), requires updating of a belief as each new piece of information is presented; the 
second, end-of-sequence (EoS), entails updating a belief after all evidence is accumulated.  
Holding information constant, interim reporting tends to fulfil SbS while annual reports amass 
both interim and post interim period to fulfil the EoS.  Hunton et al (2003) suggests that 
investors are likely to prefer SbS because of timeliness and likelihood of abating information 
overload despite the EoS‟s ability to provide more information.   
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Like annual reports, interim reports serve as a tool for monitoring of management stewardship.  
Whittington‟s (1991) viewed that financial reporting helps in judging agents‟ performance.  
Also, Coopers and Lybrand (1992) proposed that interim reports information is reflective of 
management‟s actions.  In concurrence, Trueman (1986) held that the company‟s market value 
is a function of investors‟ perceptions about management‟s ability to anticipate and respond to 
future changes in the firm‟s economic environment.  In disagreement, Atrill (1986) was of the 
opinion that investors are in pursuit of information relating to the company‟s performance in 
interim reports rather than stewardship by management.      
From the above discussion, it is arguable that interim reports fulfil the collective roles of 
financial reporting which may include informing users about the firms‟ performance as well as 
aiding in stewardship monitoring.  Additionally, the reporting of interim results prior to the 
annual report empowers interim reports to have predictive abilities about annual performance.  
Further, short reporting interval enables the interim reports to articulate seasonality effects and 
extraordinary fluctuations that are largely cumulated in annual reporting.  Also interim 
reporting may posses the benefit of updating investors as and when events occur; thereby 
reducing instances of information overload.  Lastly, like all financial reporting mediums, 
interim reporting facilitates investors with information to assess the investment‟s performance 
for investment decision making as well as stewardship monitoring.  However, noticeable, the 
studies above did not suggest any ordering regarding supremacy of the roles.  In this study, 
given that the aim of the thesis is to examine information content of disclosures; the main role 
assumed is decision usefulness of interim report disclosures.   
4.3  Investors as Prime Users of Interim Reports 
Prior literature (e.g. Buzby 1974; Elliott and Jacobson 1994; Gray et al. 1984; Hooks et al. 
2002a; Lee 1982; Wallace and Nasser 1995) suggests various users of financial reports.  
Buzby (1974) recognises the users as current and potential investors, creditors, financial 
analysts, employees, government, labour unions and socially oriented action groups.  Fairly 
alike, ASC (1975) suggests that anyone who has reasonable right to information of the firm is 
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classifiable as a user of financial reports and such include investors, creditors, analyst-adviser, 
employee, governments and the public.  The accountability concept in Hooks et al (2002a) and 
Wallace and Nasser (1995) proposes that companies have a responsibility to report to society 
without regard to a specific user group.  Clarkson (1995) elaborates the accountability concept 
using a three dimensional framework for stakeholder theory - descriptive, instrumental and 
normative.  The descriptive aspect related to management of the business state of affairs in 
consideration to stakeholder while the instrumental dimension examines specific links 
between stakeholder management and corporate performance.  The normative aspect relates to 
the moral obligation of the firm to its stakeholders.    
Another outlook of the accountability-reporting framework is Chen‟s (1975) managerial 
accountability model in Diagram 1 below.    
Diagram 1 Managerial Accountability Model 
 
Source:  Chen (1975, p. 539) 
In the diagram, accountability arises from the interaction of the business with its set of 
stakeholders and the impact of this relationship to disclosures.  The model postulates an 
amalgamation of both accountability and decision usefulness concept underlying disclosure 
enhances comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the information.  In the framework, society 
and the company affect each other‟s activities; thereby justifying the accountability concept.  
However, given that society owns the capital resources used by the firm through its 
management, the decision usefulness concept for disclosure is pertinent to aid society on 
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proper allocation of their resources to the firm.  In other words, investors, being part of 
society, are viewed as utilising disclosures from both an accountability view and decision 
usefulness notion.  
Whilst recognizing other users, Elliott and Jacobson (1994) emphasise that the principal users 
of financial reports are the investors and creditors because they effectively “buy” the 
information.  They argue that when buying corporate equity or bonds, shareholders and 
bondholders pay for the information; a characteristic that distinguishes them from other users.  
Beattie et al (2004), Lee (1982) and Gray et al (1984) all have a similar view that investors are 
the main users of disclosures; although the information ought to embrace needs of all 
stakeholders.    
Regulatory guidelines also assent to this opinion.  For example, the Jenkins Report in AICPA 
(1994) explicitly adopted the opinion in Elliott and Jacobson (1994) while recommending the 
types of narrative disclosures that reflect comprehensive business reporting.  Beattie et al 
(2004) acknowledged that proposals for financial reports narratives in ASB (2005; 2006) are a 
reverberation of the Jenkins report.   For interim reporting, regulation in the UK (e.g. ASB 
1997; 2007a) follows suit by considering that justification of interim reports draws from idea 
that annual reporting is too long a period for users, specifically shareholders, to be without 
information.  Even professional accounting bodies are consistent with this opinion.  For 
example, in ICAS (1988) the corporate report was considered to serve various information 
needs, but investors, creditors, business contacts and employees are primary users.  Also PWC 
(2008, p. 4) suggests “…in difficult economic times, corporate governance disclosures in 
financial reports are important to investors to guide going concern and liquidity risks of the 
company.”  It is for this reason that regulatory bodies, FRC and FSA were in consultation 
during 2008 to ensure that the Combined Code, Listing Rules and Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules be amended to require a harmonized Statement of Corporate Governance 
in line with EU Company Law Directives (4
th
 and 8
th
). 
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Within the companies, Gray and Roberts (1989) found that UK finance directors think that the 
main recipients of disclosed information are institutional investors, potential investors, private 
investors, financial analysts and the financial press.   
A contra argument against the assertion that the information is meant for investors is that some 
investors are unsophisticated and do not understand the information in financial reports.  
Nikolaev and Laurence (2005) argue that sophisticated and unsophisticated investors have 
dissimilar aptitude in analyzing financial reports.  Worse still, the discourse of financial 
reports is very technical that unsophisticated investors at times do not realise tendencies of 
management impression or intended withholding of information.  Therefore, such divergence 
in interpretation and exploration of the reports pre-empts the notion that the disclosures are not 
meant for all investors.  Stamps (1981) strongly supported this viewpoint on grounds that 
unsophisticated investors‟ lack of skill regarding usage of financial information to make good 
investment decisions, combined with the complexity of financial reports meant that the 
remedy of such investors is expert advice or managed investment trusts.  This position is 
advocated for in various studies (e.g. Healy and Palepu 2001; Schipper 1991) which suggest 
that the management disclose is primarily for financial analysts.   The justification for this 
perspective is that financial analysts are the intermediaries that the less skilled investors utilise 
to identify content relevant for investment decision making from the financial reports.  Lee 
and Tweedie‟s (1976; 1977; 1981) conform to this argument by their findings that analysts 
make use of financial reports and have relatively superior understanding of the information 
than private investors.  Further, a large body of literature (e.g. Bercel 1994; Lang and 
Lundholm 1996; Mangena 2004b; Nielsen 2004; Orens and Lybaert 2007) concurs that the 
technical knowledge of analysts enables them to use financial reports for forecasting, advising 
and investment decisions.  In contrast, Atrill‟s (1986) view is that the form and content of 
financial reporting as required by LSE emphasises that unsophisticated investor should be 
considered.  Similarly, Hammill (1979) studied interim reports and concurred that investors with 
limited accounting knowledge could easily understand the oration.  The evidence above provides 
mixed argument on the aspect of usefulness of the disclosures to unsophisticated investors.      
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4.4 Information Needs of Investors from Interim Reports   
This section assumes that investors are the principal users of interim reports and discusses the 
type of information they require from the disclosures.  As discussed earlier, interim reports 
assist investors to predict annual earnings, analyse performance progression, assess 
management stewardship and identify business turning points or seasonality in profitability.  
Also indicated before, given the lack of clarity in literature regarding which roles are most 
crucial, this study adopts the decision usefulness as the essential role based on the aim of the 
thesis.  Therefore, the information needs discussed are intended to meet the decision 
usefulness function.    
The latest regulation on half-yearly reporting, ASB (2007a) and FSA‟s Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules (DTR) in FSA (2009) distinguish the content of the interim report into 
three sections: the financial report, the management report and the statement of directors‟ 
responsibilities.  The financial report is a reflection of compliance to IFRS recommended 
financial statements in IASB (2007).  These include the profit and loss statement, the 
statement of total recognised gains and losses, balance sheet and cash flow statement.  The 
financial report should also be accompanied by supplementary disclosures explaining 
significant events and trends by way of a note or figures in a manner that is concise, consistent 
and comparable with either previous performance or like companies.  Responses of analysts to 
interim reporting recommendations in ASB (1996) called for more detail underlying interim 
reported earnings in order to give further explanation to the earnings figures.  It may be 
deduced that the disclosures recommended above are recommended to assist investors 
understand how the reported earnings were made.     
The information required by ASB (2007a) in the management report includes important events 
within the interim period and their effects on financial performance, together with principle 
risk and uncertainty expected within the next interim period.  The focus should be items that 
changed within the course of the interim period.  Although not required to be as 
comprehensive as the OFR, ASB (2007a) commends that its recommendations are in 
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compliance with the DTR; thereby making the recommended disclosures sufficient for use on 
the financial markets.  Further guidance is that the narratives should be balanced while 
providing reasons for any significant movements to ensure their reliability.   
Other disclosures suggested for interim narratives in ASB (2007a) include related party 
transactions and changes, seasonal activities and their underlying assumptions, explanation of 
financial statements‟ figures and the changes thereof and segment disclosures.  These 
disclosures give further justification of the interim financial position and performance.  To 
enable users assess reliability and relevance, ASB (2007a) asserts that interim reports should 
disclose the reporting period, approval date and extent of interim report audit or review.  
However, ASB (2007a) did not expect that its recommendation ensure full compliance to 
Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) and Statements of Standard Accounting Practice 
(SSAP).    
Empirical research observations and remarks demonstrate that there are various interim report 
disclosures that are relevant to investors.  Silhan (1983), showed that information about 
segmental sales and profit in US quarterly was a better predicator of returns than aggregated 
turnover and profitability figures.  This finding demonstrates that the usefulness of segmental 
reporting in interim reports.  In Davis et al (2007) financial performance ratios in US quarterly 
releases such as profitability, asset turnover, profit margin and book-to-market ratio were 
regarded as credible and useful to investors.  Amir and Lev (1996) concluded that high-level 
operation interim reports disclosures provided investors with information underlying the 
computation of performance measures.  Such included statistics about growth potential, 
operational success, book value of equity and earnings per share.  In Baginski et al (2000) it 
was shown that forecasts and their explanations in interim reports were used by investors in 
predicting annual performance.    
Finnish studies (e.g. Kanto and Schadewitz 2000; Schadewitz et al. 2002) investigated the 
information content of the entire narrative content in interim reports.  While Kanto and 
Schadewitz (2000) analysed usefulness of a range of themes in narratives, Schadewitz et al 
(2002) focussed on the association of share price returns with various levels of disclosure.  
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Kanto and Schadewitz (2000) argued that a structured disclosure of events and transactions 
narrows the agency problem arising from information asymmetry.  Interim reports offer this 
benefit due to their lower regulatory nature than annual reports, indicating management 
willingness to voluntarily disclose.  Further, interim reports have a character of newness in 
information since they have no preliminary report as is the case with annual reports.  
Disclosure by topics also was viewed as important because structured information reflected 
effective communication with users, simplifies information of listed firms whose structure is 
complex.  In the results, narratives under the financial analysis theme were informative due to 
their ability to provide explanations for performance.  Information under the financial 
statements section was insignificant in relation to cumulative abnormal returns, suggesting that 
components in the statements without further analysis are not useful to investors.  Overview of 
performance was negatively associated to returns, a finding accountable to the thought that 
troubled firms were compelled to providing a broad overview in an attempt to justify 
performance.  Lastly, disclosures under investments and finance had no information content 
due to distinct nature of industries that require various investment levels.  
Schadewitz et al (2002) were interested in why firms have varying levels of disclosure and 
investors reaction to the different patterns.  Their disclosure index comprised of information 
on governance, business and financial risks, capital structure, stock valuation, growth, growth 
potential, size and market maturity.  The findings showed that when firms disclosed a level 
equivalent to expected information, investors under reacted because the information was 
nearly public.  In conformity with this hypothesis, is the notion that the investors were 
interested in new information; an aspect that interim reports tend to fulfil by providing 
disclosures about changes within the interim period.  When disclosures were less than 
expected, investors were slow to react in pursuit of expected disclosures.  Failure to find the 
disclosures meant insignificant reaction, again conforming to the perspective that lack of new 
information makes the material in the reports less relevant.  The delayed reaction to more than 
expected disclosures in interim report narratives either inferred a requirement of more time to 
comprehend the voluminous information or more time to understand performance patterns due 
to the irregular earnings performance in various quarters.   
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In the UK, Mangena (2004b) used interviews to establish the perceived usefulness of various 
types of information that investors regard relevant.  Respondents found the profit and loss, 
cash flow from operations, management commentary and segment information useful.  The 
audit review and accounting policies were not confirmed as relevant.  Atrill (1986) also 
surveyed interim report information needs of analysts.  In the findings, 85% of interviewees 
preferred disclosure of segment analysis of sales and profit, discontinued operations, alongside 
cost of sales figures; while 78% of analysts required separate disclosure of the depreciation 
charge to enable proper prediction of future cash flows.   
In a Malaysian study, Ku Nor Izah and Chandler (2005), users were asked to rank 38 items 
disclosed in the quarterly reports.  In the narratives section, the most useful items were 
segmental analysis, breakdown of borrowings, performance review, issuance and payment of 
debt and equity securities.  The less important items were amounts and nature of exceptional 
and extraordinary items, investments in quoted securities, current year prospects.  For 
financial statements, profits, assets per share, long-term liabilities, cash and earnings per share 
were more useful whilst current assets and turnover, interest expenses were of lower 
significance.    
Specifically regarding financial statements components, Edwards et al (1972) found that 
financial analysts required the funds flow and cash flow statements at the interim stage 
because the statements showed the movement of financial resources during the interim period.  
Hussey and Bence (1992) established that analysts required cash flow disclosures due to the 
possibility that the information assists in affirming that the firm can finance its future 
investment plans as well as reflecting the quality in earnings.  ASB (1996) suggests that 
corporate managers revealed that almost all interviewees were in support of inclusion of a cash 
flow statement in interim reports.  As for the balance sheet, Edwards et al (1972) expressed 
that the information therein assisted users to estimate risks and anticipate profitability.  Seidler 
and Benjes (1967) conjecture that balance sheets, as a position statement, affirm the credibility 
of the interim income statement.  Mangena (2004a) interpreted Seidler and Benjes‟ (1967) 
thinking to imply that the balance sheet checks the possibility that that certain preparers of 
financial reports do not exercise due care and diligence when reporting income statement 
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disclosures.  The balance sheet thereby acts as control to this shortfall thereby reinforcing the 
usefulness of the financial statements.  In support, Chen et al (2002) advocate that the balance 
sheet is useful for appraising a firm‟s performance especially when interim earnings are 
relatively less informative or when future earnings are relatively uncertain.  Participants to the 
survey in ASB (1996) showed preference for interim balance sheet information such as 
disclosures on fixed assets, trade debtors, creditors and equity.    
As conclusion to this section, prior literature concentrated on investigating useful information 
items in financial statements disclosures, mainly the income statement, cash flow statement, 
the defunct funds flow and balance sheet as well as narrative commentaries.  Noticeable, with 
an exception of Mangena (2004b), no attention in literature is given to investigating usefulness 
of items in the statement of recognised gains and losses.  Also, the studies largely did not 
examine whether investors find disclosures in the statement of directors‟ responsibilities 
relevant.  In the UK, the responsibility statement is recommended in both FSA (2009) and 
ASB (2007a).  Lastly, most of the studies reviewed in this section based their conclusions on 
perceived usefulness of the interim reports as opposed to information content research.  
Despite the use of different research method, most of the studies confirm that both the 
financial statement components and the narrative information items are required by investors 
to inform their investment decisions.           
4.5 Empirical Evidence on Usefulness of Interim Reports 
Mangena (2004a) identified two methodologies that prior studies employed to investigate 
usefulness, (1) through surveys or questionnaires on respondent perception about importance 
of interim reports and (2) market reaction to publication of interim reports.  Accordingly, this 
section reviews studies on perceived usefulness as well as market reaction to interim reporting.      
4.5.1 Perceived Usefulness of Interim Reports 
Taylor (1965) is probably the pioneering study on usefulness of interim reports.  By surveying 
US financial analysts, several conclusions were drawn on the value of the reports.  Firstly, 
interim reports were viewed essential for enlightening on events that may affect share prices 
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within the interim interval.  Secondly, failure to disclose such information would entice 
management to engage in insider dealing.  Among the disadvantages of interim reporting was 
cost of disclosures; however, respondents largely suggested that the costs are immaterial.  The 
probability of competitive disadvantage by providing information to rival firms was 
considered an insignificant and the traditional argument was for benefits of the disclosures.  
Thirdly, the problem that the asymmetrical seasonality effect on interim information would 
deter comparison was rejected by respondents on the premise that it is based on the misguided 
assumption of obtuseness of users.  The only acceptable problem was that interim income 
estimation varied across industries, thereby deterring comparability.  However, a similar 
problem was evident for annual income measurement, subduing the argument that the problem 
is unique to interim reporting.  Newell (1969) used a Likert scale to rate perceptions of US 
financial analysts on the relevance of interim reports.  Similar to Taylor (1965) over 80% of 
the respondents found the reports essential for guiding investment decisions.  According to 
Newell‟s (1968) doctoral dissertation, analysts perceived the main setback in interim report 
was that quarterly earnings were prone to measurement inconsistencies, echoing Taylor‟s  
(1965) conclusion factors affecting usefulness of interim reporting.   
In the UK, Holmes (1971) confirms similarly that respondents in the study viewed interim 
reports as a relevant tool for informing the investment decision-making process.  Lee and 
Tweedie (1975) used surveys to establish whether private equity holders in the UK considered 
financial reports informative.  Similar to the US studies, over 80% of the shareholders used 
interim reports.  Revisiting their research, but this time using institutional investors, Lee and 
Tweedie (1981) came to a similar conclusion that interim reports are useful.  A significant find 
in the study was that almost half of the institutional investors ranked the interim report as the 
prime useful financial reporting medium. 
 A number of studies using UK data (e.g. Arnold and Moizer 1984; Bartlett and Chandler 
1997) have followed suit of carrying out comparative studies by inquiring participants‟ 
perceived ranking of the reports based on usefulness to investment decision making.  Arnold 
and Moizer (1984) analysed responses from 202 financial analysts of companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange.   The interim report was ranked third, after the annual report income 
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statement and balance sheet sections.  Bartlett and Chandler (1997) sought to establish the 
extent to which ordinary shareholders read the annual report and other sources of information.  
Likewise, interim financial statements were rated third after financial press reports and 
summary annual financial statements.  More ranked evidence in Hussey and Bence (1992) 
showed that interviewees who were equity holders of Wellcome Plc regarded the interim 
reports as second after preliminary statements.  However, Hussey and Woolfe (1994) found a 
contrary result to the paradigm supporting usefulness of interim reports.  The study, based on 
50 UK private shareholders, surveyed the readership of the interim and preliminary reports.  
Their evidence suggested that the interim report was less relevant to investors, even the 
sophisticated ones.  On the contrary, Bence et al (1995) who also studied user perceptions on 
relevance of preliminary announcements and interim reports found that users regarded both 
reports as vital.  Financial analysts ranked preliminary reports and interim reports first and 
second respectively, however institutional investors classified them as fifth and seventh 
respectively.  The result from institutional investors may be reflective of Holland‟s (1997) 
argument that these users are in a privileged position to get information from firms as opposed 
to dependence on publicly published sources.  In Barker (1998), both financial analysts and 
fund managers regarded the interim reports essential because the reports provide disclosures 
relevant for investment decisions.   
Elsewhere, Vergoossen (1993) compared the ratings of ten information sources that Dutch 
investment use.  Interim report like various studies above (e.g. Arnold and Moizer 1984; 
Bartlett and Chandler 1997) took third position after the annual report and investor briefings.  
Ku Nor Izah and Chandler (2005) found that Malaysian professional investors (that is, fund 
managers and financial analysts) used quarterly reports for investment decisions.  The most 
significant reasons for use of the reports included prediction of annual results, comparison 
with prior periods and ascertaining turning points.  Other uses included prediction of results 
beyond current financial year, evaluating management performance and determination of 
discount and growth rates for evaluating security prices.  In comparison with other information 
sources, the quarterly reports were ranked fifth after visits to companies, communication with 
management, advisory services, annual reports and prospectus.    
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4.5.2 Information Content of the Announcement of Interim Reports  
This section is concerned with studies that have investigated information content on the event 
of publishing interim reports.  Information content in this case is as defined in Firth (1981), as 
the movement of share market variable of volume of trade, share price returns, number of 
trades when the reports are published.    
Early information content studies (e.g. Ball and Brown 1968; Beaver 1968) concentrated on 
annual reports information.  Literature on information content of interim reports was prompted 
by the seminal work in Ball and Brown (1968).  In this study, the lack of information content 
in annual earnings numbers was attributed to either the presence of prior information 
anticipating the annual results or the relatively less timeliness of annual reports, among other 
reasons.  This evidence compelled researchers to turn to timelier information sources as well 
as other forms of disclosures other than income numbers.   
Firth (1981) provided early evidence of information content of interim reports in the UK.  The 
study used weekly abnormal returns, volume of trade and number of dealings to measure 
usefulness of various corporate announcements, including interim reporting.  Interim reports 
had information content due to their timelier nature compared to annual reports.  Brookfield 
and Morris (1992) used daily abnormal returns to investigate the information content of 
various types of firm announcements in the UK.  Similar to Firth (1981) they confirmed that 
investors use the announcements to continuously revise their expectations.  Noticeably, 
interim reports were among the most commonly used reports.  Opong (1995) refined this 
evidence by investigating the influence on daily share price returns on interim report 
announcement.  His argument for using daily prices was that using weekly or monthly prices 
ignores the precise time of price adjustment to new information.  Using the variance method, 
the evidence confirmed the informativeness of interim reports, mainly on announcement date 
despite the conjecture that the reports are subdued to unreliability arising from lack of third 
party authentication.  Rippington and Taffler (1995) confirmed the conjecture in Firth (1981) 
that the interim report was more useful to investors than the annual report.  The study, 
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conducted using London Stock Exchange listed companies, suggested that reports provided 
important information on firm performance for firms that media and analysts do not consider 
due to their small size.  The reports are small and are more likely to provide information that is 
precise and concise for the purpose of investment decision making.  Ryan and Taffler (2004) 
commented on prior studies that they consider information events and their usefulness to 
investors in isolation.  They conjecture that incorporating all information events in a study 
provided a holistic understanding of information content.  With data based on FTSE350 firms 
for the period 1994/1995, they find the interim reports trigger a significant change in trading 
volume and share prices.  Further, analyst advice does not substitute the information there 
since the analysts do not anticipate the information content of the reports.  A more compelling 
confirmation due to spectrum of study period was by Wolfe et al (2009).  The researchers 
differentiated their study from Ryan and Taffler (2004) by focussing on interim and annual 
reports only so as have to have a more detailed examination of information content on a 
longitudinal scale (FTSE 250 firms for the period 1984-2005).  Using daily returns from the 
market model, both interim and annual reports had a high impact on share returns.  Despite 
other announcements having information content, as suggested in Ryan and Taffler (2004), the 
two reports were regarded as the potential origin of the Parentian-like distribution found in 
share returns. 
For the UK studies, it appears that studies are in conformity that there is information content 
in the event of announcement of the interim reports.  Ryan and Taffler (2004) echo that the 
possibility of no preliminary report to the interim report underpins the newness of the 
disclosures therein, hence the usefulness of the report.  Opong (1995) advocates that the 
usefulness of interim reports could be related to the presumption that the reports contain 
information of investment value and this could be further enhanced by disclosing economic 
benefits to investors. However, he also connotes lack of third party verification of the interim 
reports in the UK may subdue their reliability.  The study also suggested that disclosures in the 
interim reports at the time were modest incorporating turnover, profitability, tax, dividends, 
earnings per share, extraordinary gains or losses.  Other disclosures included a brief discussion 
of past and short-term prospects.   
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The United States‟ research on information content of interim reports (also referred to as 
quarterly reports in the US), was antecedent to that in the UK.  The development of literature 
on information content of interim reports arguably commences in the 1960s with studies (e.g. 
Brown and Niederhoffer 1968; Green and Segall 1966, 1967, 1968) focussing on the power of 
interim earnings in predicting annual income.  Also in the 1960s as well as early 1970s, 
research (e.g. Benston 1967; Brown and Kennelly 1972) interest shifted to information content 
of interim incomes in relation to share price returns.  These studies all agree that the interim 
reports are useful.  Specifically, Brown and Kennelly (1972) established that apportioning 
annual earnings per share into quarterly components improved the predictive ability of the 
EPS series. The finding led to the conclusion that prior facts about quarterly earnings would 
result in improved returns than in a situation where only annual earnings were known.  Kiger 
(1972) too followed suit to investigate share price and volume reaction on announcement of 
interim reports, but provided new evidence on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
narrowed the price reaction interval to a shorter period.  Basing on Fama et al (1969), the 
study argues that markets react to new information immediately; hence using a 3-day and a 5-
day observation period is sufficient.  Evidence of market price adjustments on publication of 
the reports meant that investors use interim reports for predicting annual income.  
Information content literature examining the impact of mere announcement of quarterly report 
commenced with May‟s (1971) study.  The research objective was to establish the effect of 
quarterly announcements on market price changes as an affirmation of the publication‟s 
influence on investment decisions.  Other goals included the relative information content of 
quarterly and annual reports and whether the difference in the comparative usefulness reflects 
investor awareness of the measurement defect of the interim income.  The motivation was 
based on the critique that interview based or questionnaire studies disassociated themselves 
with actual investment decisions.  A further incentive was that price changes, regardless of 
being imperfect reflections, offer resultant evidence of whether investors‟ preference of 
whether to buy, sell or hold at the instance of new information on the market.  Using quarterly 
reports of American Stock Exchange (AMEX) listed companies, the study examined price 
changes on publication of interim reports by comparing the publication aftermath with price 
 113 
 
movements in control periods.  The outcome showed that the weeks subsequent to the 
publication had higher volatility in share prices compared to the control periods.  Further, 
comparative price changes demonstrated that quarterly reports were significantly more 
relevant to investors than annual reports.  Therefore, investors considered the interim reports 
relevant. 
Using NYSE data, Foster (1977) used time-series by applying models to suppress seasonality 
in quarterly earnings.  By comparing information content results of suppressed seasonally 
models to models having the seasonality effect, the findings suggested that non-seasonal 
models misclassified a higher proportion of firms than seasonal prediction models.  This 
therefore implied that firstly, interim reports announcement had information content and 
secondly, the market adjusted for seasonality when interpreting quarterly earnings 
information.  Hopwood and McKeown (1985) used time-series to model interim sales, 
expenses and earnings.  Their approach used market model share price returns to examine 
information content of the interim sales, expense and earnings.  A number of findings were 
made including the confirmation that interim expenses where informative to earnings but sales 
where incrementally more informative.  Landsman and Maydew (2002) was motivated by 
concerns raised in prior literature (e.g. Amir and Lev 1996; Lev and Zarowin 1999) that 
usefulness of accounting information was deteriorating.  Using abnormal trading volume and 
return volatility, evidence from a sample 1000 Compustat showed that there is no decline in 
information content of quarterly earnings announcements.  Contrary, three decades after 
Beaver (1968), the results suggested that usefulness of financial reports had increased.  
Relatively updated evidence of information content of quarterly reports is Atiase et al (2005) 
who used data from 1994 to 2003 on the Thomson Financial Historical Database.  They 
examined market reaction to quarterly announcements involving current and future earnings in 
order to establish whether investors‟ preference was towards relevance or reliability.  Current 
information was hypothesised to be more reliable since it was factual, reviewed or audited by 
external auditors but historical.  However, despite the setbacks of unreliability and 
unverifiable nature of future earnings, the information is more value-relevant.  Results showed 
that future quarterly earnings guidance had more relative information content than current 
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quarterly earnings.  This consequence led to the conclusion that the information is relevant in 
predictive future earnings.  On incremental information content, the outcome confirmed that 
both current and future earnings were useful; however, current earnings were stronger.  This 
suggested that investors put more emphasis on reliability of information.   
Across Europe, various studies with mixed findings have been conducted to examine 
information content of interim reports.  Schadewitz (1996) investigated investors use for 
Finnish interim reports.  The relationship between returns and earnings confirmed the 
conjecture that the reports are useful.  Also using data on the Helsinki Stock Exchange, Vieru 
et al (2006) disintegrated investors into five classes based on trading activity from most 
passive to most active, institutional investors being the benchmark.  The researchers assumed 
that investigating information content based on investor classes would give more precise and 
accurate evidence on which investors need the reports.  The outcome showed that interim 
announcement triggers trading in all classes.  Active individuals showed more trading activity 
in the pre-announcement period.  Another finding was that individual investors follow a short-
term contrarian rule which notions that on publication of good news activity will be biased to 
the selling, other than the buying side.  More specifically, active investors have a preference to 
buy (sell) if they envisage good (bad) interim news.  Gajewski and Que‟re´(2001), using data 
from France,  reported that although interim reports had information content, they relatively 
had less market reaction than annual reports.   
International comparative studies have confirmed the information content of interim reports, 
though exhibiting deviations in degree of informativeness.  Etter (1999) applied daily closing 
prices on the US, British and Japanese markets and daily trading volume on US market when 
examining whether US investors use British and Japanese annual and interim earnings 
announcements. The evidence was confirmatory in reference to usefulness of the information 
on publication as it makes the user more acquainted with business operations.  In a recent 
research, Mensah and Werner (2008) studied whether the differences in frequency of interim 
reporting regimes of four countries (quarterly: US and Canada; and half-yearly: UK and 
Australia) affected share price volatility.  The underlying assumption was that half-yearly 
reports would cause less price volatility because they are less timely and their information is 
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of less predictive value than quarterly reports.  Results confirmed this conjecture and further 
test confirmed that UK and Australia firms with American Depository Receipts experienced 
more volatility in prices than their counterparts on similar exchanges.  This indicated that 
more frequent interim reporting led to higher price volatility.  
4.6 Usefulness of Distinct Features of Interim Reporting 
There are characteristics that are specific to interim reports in comparison with annual 
reporting: (1) voluntary audit involvement and (2) reporting frequency deviation across 
countries.  Firstly, UK guidance on interim reporting (e.g. ASB 1997, 2007a; FSA 2008) does 
not mandate auditing of interim reporting.  Therefore, unlike annual reports, involvement of an 
external auditor in interim reporting remains a voluntary aspect (Mangena and Tauringana 
2008).  Secondly, though FSA (2008) requires UK listed companies to provide half-yearly 
reporting, cross listing, predominantly in the US and mainland Europe stock exchanges, some 
companies voluntarily provide quarterly interim information to abide listing disclosure rules of 
the respective countries.  Given these voluntary tendencies that are distinct to interim 
reporting, this section reviews literature on the usefulness of interim reporting audit 
involvement and reporting frequency. 
4.6.1 Usefulness of Audit Involvement in Interim Reporting 
There is a compelling evidence to suggest that audit review practice in the UK is increasing.  
For example, Hussey and Woolfe (1994) found only 1.8% of their sample having involved 
auditors.  Revisiting their results, Hussey and Woolfe (1998) realised that the number of UK 
companies with an audit review in interim reports had grown substantially to 29%
2
. Likewise, 
Bagshaw (1999) established that 73% of 30 FTSE 100 companies in their study had involved 
auditors in their interim reporting.  These studies suggest that large UK companies include 
auditors in the process of preparing their interim results for publication.   
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that Hussey and Woolfe (1994) sample included both small and large companies.  However, 
the results of the analysis suggest that the practice was prevalent in large companies 
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Although literature reviewed above suggested that interim reports are useful and there is 
evidence of increasing audit involvement, there are still studies (e.g. Atiase et al. 2005; Opong 
1995) that argue for a case of unreliability in interim reporting due to the lack of mandatory 
audit edict.  Particularly in the UK, Opong (1995) suggests that investor may be apprehensive 
in using interim information due to concerns of lack of third party authentication.   The 
research (e.g. Atrill 1986; Hussey and Woolfe 1994; Manry et al. 2003) is focused on the 
argument for a review or full audit report on interim disclosures.   
Ettredge et al (1994) criticise the relevance of the audit review from its procedural approach.  
Their concern was that the review examines neither internal control structures nor 
corroborative evidence nor balances and transactions.  Such a faint analytical approach 
therefore is less convincing about value-addition of the audit review.  Givoly et al (1978) 
empirically examined the influence of auditor involvement on predictive capacity and income 
smoothing in interim reporting.  A comparative approach between companies with and 
without an audit review showed no significant variation.  This resulted in a conclusion that 
auditor involvement does not improve the predictive ability of interim reports.  Findings by 
Alford and Edmonds (1981) also rejected the notion that audit involvement increases the 
quality of interim reports numbers.  Even in a later study by Edmonds (1983) there was no 
difference with the findings from these studies that established lack of predictive ability in 
interim reporting audit involvement.  Fabozzi and Fonfeder (1983) were motivated to examine 
the predictive ability of audit involvement by the aggressive stance the Security and Exchange 
Commission in the United States had taken to recommend audit involvement in quarterly 
reporting.  Like the studies above, there was no evidence in the results supporting the 
conception that audit reviews improve predictive ability of quarterly reports.  Further, they 
advocated that in light of the costs and delays attached to audit involvement, there is need for 
regulation to alter its position.  Studies that are more recent have a similar reverberation that 
audit involvement has no impact on the predictive power of interim reports.  For example, 
Ettredge et al (2000) suggest that the lack of attention to detail demeans the relevance of 
interim audit review since investors may not be able to identify significant differences 
between firms that include the review from those that do not.    
 117 
 
Since March 2000, SEC required that US quarterly reports should be audited prior to filing 
(timely review).  Prior to that, firms could have their interim reports reviewed at the end of the 
financial year (retrospective review).  Empirical literature (e.g. Manry et al. 2003; Ready and 
Rock 2003) shows that timely reviews have more information than retrospective audit reports.  
Manry et al (2003) established that the timeliness of the audit review influences its reliability 
and relevancy, thereby degree of informativeness to returns.  The study conjectured that when 
timely reviews are provided, they detect and correct errors that would have waited until the 
annual report, hence explaining their usefulness.  In confirmation, results showed that timely 
review for each of the four quarters were informative to returns.  On the contrary, 
retrospective reviews had less or no significance to returns, reflecting that they have no 
economic relevant information due to their reference to historic information.  Alves and 
Teixeira dos Santos (2008) provide a distinctive scenario of examining information content of 
audit involvement.  Their study is based on Portuguese quarterly reports for which the second 
quarter is subject to a limited audit involvement, the fourth quarter (annual report) requires a 
full audit involvement but the first and third quarter require no audit participation.  The 
findings suggested that the annual report with a full audit had more information content than 
the unaudited first and third quarters.  To the contrary, the second quarter reports with limited 
audit involvement were only relatively more informative than the unaudited reports for small 
firms.  This finding arguably is evident to the conjecture that audit involvement in interim 
reports is not universally relevant to investors.  Cornell and Landsman (1989) examination on 
share price reaction to quarterly earnings established that fourth quarter reports provided had 
more information content than other interim reports.  The reasons were that fourth quarter 
disclosures provided more information to analysts and it corrected any mistakes in earlier 
announcements.  The capability to correct mistakes was attributed to audit involvement in 
fourth quarter reports. 
Irrespective of the mixed findings on the usefulness of audit involvement in interim reporting, 
a number of reasons have been fostered to justify the practice.  Mendenhall and Nichols 
(1988) argued that unaudited interim reports present an opportunity for manipulation by 
management.  Manry et al (2003) connote that retrospective audit reviews are economically 
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detrimental thereby implying that audit reviews accompanying the respective interim reports 
are beneficial to users.  Further, Ettredge et al (2000) asserted that the provision encourages 
increased frequency and proportion of fourth quarter adjustments.  This debatably, makes 
earlier unaudited interim reports less relevant and a likelihood of more unfavourable fourth 
adjustment surprises.  As a credibility check, interim audit reviews fulfil various functions: 
useful to investment analysts as a third party authentication (e.g. Ettredge et al. 2000), improve 
the quality of interim report disclosures (e.g. Mcewen and Schwartz 1992), correct errors and 
detect fraud (e.g. Bagshaw 1999; Borgia 1991). 
4.6.2 Relative Usefulness Content of Interim Reporting Frequency  
The basic distinguishing factor between half-yearly and quarterly interim reporting is the 
frequency of reporting, where the latter refers to reporting every three months and the former 
on a 6-month‟s basis (Frost and Pownall 1994).  In the UK, both interim reporting prevailing 
regulation at the time of writing this thesis (e.g. ASB 2007a; Companies Act 2006; FSA 2009)  
and preceding regulation (e.g. ASB 1997; Companies Act 1985) require listed companies to 
provide half-yearly reports.  However, literature (Frost and Pownall 1994; Mensah and Werner 
2008) finds evidence of companies that disclose both quarterly and half-yearly interim reports 
in the UK, mainly attributed to their cross listing in countries that require quarterly reporting 
like the US.  This therefore compels this research to consider the relative usefulness of 
quarterly and half-yearly reporting.  We restrict this discussion to economies where there is a 
character of dual reporting regimes that is companies are at liberty to provide either half-
yearly or quarterly reports.  This form of setting is a replica of UK interim reporting 
environment, hence arguably analogous.  One exception in the discussion is van Buskirk 
(2005) discussed later on in the section in which monthly and quarterly interim reporting 
regimes were considered. 
Butler et al (2007) compared the speed at which earnings information is reflected in stock 
prices for firms reporting either quarterly or semi-annually.  Using a sample of 28,824 
reporting frequencies of firms from 1950 to 1973, they found little evidence supporting the 
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notion that timeliness is affected by reporting frequencies.  However, increased timeliness was 
observed for firms voluntarily changed there reporting frequencies from semi-annual to 
quarterly disclosures, unlike for firms compelled by regulation to change.  The usefulness of 
voluntary change was attributed to the benefits that the firm foresaw when making the 
decision to disclose was also envisaged by investors.  However, mandatory increase was 
considered to crowd out information on the market or had no economic benefit beyond 
meeting regulatory provisions.  Gigler and Hemmer (1998; 2001) are supportive of these 
findings in their notion that increased mandatory disclosures may reduce a firm‟s provision of 
voluntary disclosures as a means of reducing disclosure costs such as production, 
dissemination, litigation, propriety and agency.  
Mensah and Werner (2008) examined the impact of reporting frequencies in various countries 
on share price volatility.  They found that countries with semi-annual interim reporting 
regimes experienced less share price volatility than those with quarterly announcement 
regimes.  The reason provided was that compared to quarterly reports, half-yearly reports are 
less timely and have less predictive information.  With specific reference to UK and Australia 
which have semi-annual reporting regimes, companies on these exchanges and cross-listed on 
American exchanges yielded more price volatility than those only on home exchanges.  This 
finding affirmed the notion of increased priced volatility for quarterly reporting compared to 
half-yearly reports.  However, in comparison to and in line with Alford et al‟s (1993) 
argument, increased volatility in share price returns is indicative of lower market efficiency.  
In their study, Alford et al‟s (1993) suggested that Australian and UK financial reports were 
more value relevant than those of US because US financial reports were responded to by 
higher price volatility.  Durnev et al (2003) contends this position by suggesting that higher 
price volatility is reflective of more informed investment decision making arising from 
availability of private information on the market.  This arguably is supportive of the concept 
that increased disclosures equip investors with more private information processing abilities 
resulting in higher returns.  
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In a US doctoral research, van Buskirk (2005), an investigation on the relationship between 
increased interim reporting frequency and share prices revealed that monthly disclosures on 
revenues had information content because the disclosures pre-empted quarterly results.  
However, the monthly disclosures did not show any evidence that they reduce information 
asymmetry.  On the contrary, the number of periods with information asymmetry increased 
with the number of interim reporting announcements.  The result was that despite market 
reaction to increased disclosure frequencies, disclosure quality was not a function of 
disclosure frequency. 
Yee (2004) analysed probable relationships between increased interim reporting incidents  and 
market variables.  The study showed that among other findings, increased frequency of interim 
reporting would increase announcements of earnings, in turn increasing liquidity of the 
security and decreased price volatility on the announcement dates.  The conjecture of reduced 
price volatility increased frequency in interim seems in this theoretical paper in contravention 
of empirical evidence in studies by Mensah and Werner (2008) and Alford et al (1993) 
discussed above.  This also contradicts Botosan et al‟s (2004) study that increased disclosure 
frequency is associated with high price and volume volatility.  Worth noting, reading from 
Botosan et al‟s (2004) findings, the increase in volatility associated with increased disclosure 
frequency led to higher cost of capital.  This therefore meant that for investors, the disclosures 
were useful as they reduce asymmetry.  However, for the disclosing entities the decision was 
detrimental since it increased the cost of capital. 
4.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This chapter was concerned with the usefulness of interim reports.  On the purpose of interim 
reporting, the debate largely centres on stewardship and decision-usefulness, as is the case 
with annual financial reporting.  However, on the superiority of the roles, the issue remains a 
debate; but in this study, decision-usefulness is considered to synchronise the discussion with 
the aim of the thesis.  In addition, some of roles for the interim report were justified from the 
distinctiveness of the interim reports compared to annual reports.  The second theme of the 
chapter was the identification of the users of interim reports.  Although there are various users, 
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investors are considered the prime users because they finance the business.  On the 
information needs of investors, it is discussed that contents of both the financial statements 
and narrative commentaries are required by investors due to the various perspectives they 
posses in guiding investors when making investment decisions.  The last sections reviewed 
evidence of usefulness of interim reports to include perceived usefulness, information content 
of the instance of announcement of interim reports, audit involvement in interim reports and 
reporting frequency.  
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5 THEORETICAL INTERFACE OF ACCOUNTING WITH 
ECONOMIC MARKETS  
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the discussion relates to the evolutionary accounting theories and the 
respective market setting through which information content of accounting is explained in 
economic markets.  The purpose is to provide a conjectural justification for the relevance of 
financial reports in the economic market place.  Based on this analysis, the theoretical 
framework of the thesis in chapter 6 is constructed.          
In earlier chapters, the discussion suggested that regulation and standard setting (e.g. ASB 
2005, 2006; FRC 2009) principally initiated the proposal to have financial statement amounts 
complemented and supplemented.  The main intent for complementing and supplementing was 
to provide information relevant to investors‟ decisions of investment and managing the 
stewardship relationship.  Although other users are recognised, the assumption of the 
regulators and standard-setters was that investors are the main audience for financial reporting.  
In line with this and the intent of this study, the theoretical considerations of this thesis are 
limited to investors‟ use financial disclosures for investment purposes.  
Gonedes (1976) conceptualised the usefulness of financial disclosures to investors by 
interacting the market for capital and market for information.  In this study, a similar approach 
is adopted on the basis that AICPA‟s (1994) report, which largely influenced the 
recommendations in ASB (2005; 2006), conjectured that accounting information is a 
commodity whose buying customers are investors.  This presumption considers that investors 
and firm manager trade in information and capital.  Also, bearing the recommendation to 
complement and supplement is a result of regulatory guidance in ASB (2005; 2006), the 
economic markets conjectural justification for regulation is incorporated in the theoretical base 
discussed in this chapter.      
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The rest of the chapter is presented as follows.  The next section discusses the theories 
underpinning the evolution of accounting disclosure.  This is followed by an examination of 
role of the agency theory in explaining information content in line with the evolutionary 
accounting theories.  Thereafter the theoretical functioning of economic markets in relation to 
share pricing and returns is analysed to colligate with the thesis‟ aim of establishing 
information content of disclosures in the market setting.  The next section examines the 
conditions underlying the functionality of the markets settings (capital, information and 
regulation) as economic markets that explain the use of financial disclosures for investment 
decisions.  This aligns the general functioning of economic markets with the specific markets 
concerned with usefulness of accounting disclosures, thereby relating this chapter to the 
theoretical framework of the thesis discussed in chapter 6.  The last section of the chapter 
comprises of a summary and concluding remarks.     
5.2 Evolutionary Accounting Theories on Provision of Financial 
Disclosures 
5.2.1 The Focus of Attention under Proprietary and Entity Concepts 
Littleton (1953) defines accounting theory as an examination of beliefs and customs that 
critically seek to clarify the purpose of accounting work as well as explain the basis of the 
entire accounting process.  Rosenfield (2005) suggested that the rationale for the accounting 
disclosures is to comprehended through examining the evolution of “focus of attention” or the 
reporting unit.  The commonest, but contradicting, evolutionary accounting concepts are 
proprietary theory (Gilman 1939; Paton 1922) and entity theory (Hatfield 1909; Sprague 
1908).  Three other evolutionary theories are arguably derivatives of the two extremes and 
therefore not considered in this discussion.  These include the fund theory (e.g. Stewart 1989; 
Vatter 1947; Zeff 1961), the consolidation theory by Moonitz (1944) explaining consolidated 
financial statements and the commander theory by Goldberg (1965) applicable to managerial 
accounting.    
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Prior to the formulation of these theories, Pacioli (1494) introduced the double-entry treaties.  
In the treaties, personal obligations of the business owner as well as transactions of the 
business were recorded as though they are for one reporting entity.  The idea was that the 
business and its owner are the same.  Later on, practice changed by separating personal 
dealings from business records on grounds that the business is different from its owner.  The 
methodology in Pacioli‟s (1494) work depicted the proprietary theory where the business 
owner, as the proprietor, and the firm are unanimous.  The focus of attention then was the 
business owner.  This concept was progressively replaced with the entity concept, suggesting 
that the business is separate from its owner (Skinner 1987).  As a result, the entity came under 
attack with the argument that it was erroneous to mix personal dealings and those of the firm 
(Paton 1922; Snailum 1910).  This changed the focus of attention to the entity (Rosenfield 
2005).  
5.2.2 The Orientation Postulate of Proprietary and Entity Concepts  
In Zeff‟s (1961) doctoral work, the focus of attention was termed the “orientation postulate” 
referring to the view the accounting process ought to assume.  Zeff‟s “orientation postulate” 
had two parts – first is the subject (the unit being accounted for) and the beneficiary (the 
targeted user of the reported information).   
Under proprietary theory, the orientation postulate emphasises that the business owner is both 
the subject and beneficiary of accounting information (Zeff 1961).  In essence, the information 
in the financial reports relates to the net wealth of the proprietor who doubles as the user of the 
same information to assess their wealth.  Critiques of the proprietary theory (e.g. Previts and 
Merino 1979) argue that the concept fails to explain current accounting practices.  For 
example, it fails to differentiate going concern of the firm beyond the life of its owners as well 
as disregarding the firm as a legal being separate from the owner.   
The orientation postulate of the entity theory, on the other hand, considers that the firm 
(reporting unit) and its owner (beneficiary of reported information) are separate (Zeff 1961).  
Paton (1922) suggested that under entity theory, accounting reports on the stature of the firm 
for the benefit of the owner but does not report on the aggregated position of the firm and the 
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owner for the benefit of the owner.  Proponents (e.g. Previts and Merino 1979; Snailum 1910) 
of the concept contend that the theory recognises the capitalistic enterprise in which investors 
appoint agents to manage businesses while they (owners) concentrate on their investment 
activities.  A further justification of the entity concept is the avoidance of the complexity that 
would have risen if the proprietary orientation postulate is adopted in the capital markets.  All 
investors‟ wealth would be recognised in the firm‟s records and adjustments made every time 
the shareholding pool changes. 
5.2.3 Ideological Orientation for Regulation and Standard-Setting 
Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) suggests that whilst proprietary theory views the firm as an 
arrangement through which the shareholder operates, the entity theory stipulates that the 
business owns its resources and is only liable to capital providers, such as shareholders.  
Standard-setting and regulatory guidelines often distinguish the two theories with the postulate 
that proprietary concept looks at financial reporting from “the eyes of its owners” but the 
entity concept inclination is to consider financial reporting through the eyes of management 
(Stamp 1980). 
In view of the above, all regulatory guidelines (e.g. ASB 2005; 2006; FRC 2009; IASB 2009) 
that foster the need for complementing and supplementing financial statements in narratives 
explicitly state that the disclosures ought to reflect management‟s view on business 
performance and prospects.  This is in conformity with the entity concept.  ASB (2005; 2006) 
explicitly articulates this orientation by stating that directors prepare the narratives addressing 
to shareholders the analysis of the business, with a forward-looking direction to assist the 
shareholders assess the strategies adopted by the entity and the potential of the strategies to 
succeed.  
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5.3 Agency Theory 
5.3.1 The Role of Accounting Information under Agency Theory 
The adaptation of the entity principle by regulators arguably recognises that agency is at the 
centre of the relationship between the firm and its shareholders.  Agency is hastened through 
adaptation of entity concept that recognises the firm as a separate individual from its owner.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) define the agency relationship as “a contract in which one 
or more persons (the principals) engages another person or persons (the agents) to perform 
service that involve delegating some decision-making authority to the agent.”  From a business 
perspective, the agency is concerned with the separation of ownership and control.   
Jensen and Meckling (1976) analogised two dimensions of the agency concept: the principal-
agent paradigm and the positive-agency paradigm.  The principal-agent paradigm, owed to 
Coarse (1937) ascertains that the conflict of interest problem of agency is controlled by the 
existence of voluntary contracts amongst the various firm stakeholders.  Under the concept, the 
firm is a “nexus of contracts”, in which a set of voluntary contractual obligations amongst 
parties exists.  Fama (1980) expounds the “nexus of contacts” phenomena by including the 
capital markets and markets for managerial behaviour.  The principal-agent relationship is 
underpinned by the divergence in interest.  Whilst the agents (the managers) effort to maximize 
their fees for management, principals (shareholders) are interested in maximising their returns 
on investment. 
The potential that managers can maximise their interests at the detriment of the business owner 
is partly facilitated by privileged information that the agent accumulates through greater 
familiarity with business activities.  Eisenhardt (1989) and Fama and Jensen (1983) were of the 
opinion that the situation created information asymmetry that left shareholders unable to 
evaluate the extent and quality of the firm and managers‟ performance as well as that of the 
firm.  Eisenhardt (1989) further argued that the scenario worsens in periods of poor 
performance as managers intently indulge in concealment of information.  The resultant is 
twofold.  Firstly, there is adverse selection problem where the principal cannot make 
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appropriate decisions because the agent uses private information in a manner that the principal 
cannot verify the information.  Secondly, a moral hazard problem may occur where 
unacceptable behaviour of the agent regarding provision of information leads conflicts between 
the two parties and inappropriate choices on the part of the owner. 
To reduce these agency problems, Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) suggests that the conflicting interests 
of the shareholder and managers can be brought into equilibrium through agreed-upon 
contracts.  Baiman (1982) advocates that the contracts compel the parties to consent on a set of 
behaviours, in spite having self-interest motives.  Arguably, provision of information about the 
firm by the agent to the principal may be adopted to reduce information asymmetry.  This 
mirrors suggestions in literature and regulatory guides (e.g. ASB 2005,  2006; FRC 2009; 
IASB 2009; Stamp 1980) that the provision of financial disclosures should be provided by the 
managers to the owners. With reference to this thesis, complementing and supplementing 
information is considered by ASB (2005; 2006) as narratives the directors of a company expect 
will aid investors make a judgement on the past performance as well as prospects of the 
business.  This shows that the directors are aware of the agency relationship between them and 
the investors, therefore, the directors need to reduce the gap by providing complementary and 
supplementary disclosures.  Whilst complementary narratives relate to disclosures on aspects 
not on the face of financial statements, supplementary narratives explain the figures on the face 
of financial statements.  Therefore, with such information, investors are arguably less affected 
by information asymmetry that would have led to adverse selection in investment decision-
making.  
5.3.2 Criticism of Agency Theory 
5.3.2.1 Market for Corporate Control Theory 
The potency of agency theory relies on the aptitude that agents are self-interested.  Critics (e.g. 
Marris 1964) contend competitive capital market forces reduce the potential for such 
behaviour to prevail such that aberrance from the profit maximisation goal of the firm leads to 
decline in share prices.  The decline in share prices exposes the firm to take-over threats, 
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which effectively monitor managerial behaviour through the mechanism of the market for 
corporate control (Manne 1965).  The mechanism of the market for corporate control compels 
that where incumbent managers act in a manner that leads to adverse firm performance, the 
share price will fall to a level that induces need for new management to revive the firm‟s 
value.  Like most markets, the effectiveness of the theorem depends on the efficiency of the 
market for corporate control as well as the cost of takeover being higher than the gains of 
replacing management (Davis and Stout 1992).  Given that the market for corporate control 
prevails in enforcing managerial efficiency to reduce agency problems, the need for 
accounting disclosures as a curb on agency costs is critiqued.       
Jensen and Meckling (1976) challenged the market for corporate control concept as an 
alternative to provision of information, as the idea perceives the firm as a distinct object with a 
boundary between itself and its environment.  Rather, they viewed the firm as a medium 
where various market players with divergent objectives attain an equilibrium position through 
contractual obligations.  Therefore, the firm‟s behaviour is synonymous to the market‟s 
behaviour and such similarity is attained through the contractual relationships between 
managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders.  Hence, agency theorists extend the realm of 
their hypothesis to suggest that like manager, all other stakeholders in the firm serve their own 
interests which are the very premise for their involvement in a contractual relationship with 
the firm (Davis and Stout 1992).  Therefore, participants in the market for corporate control do 
not operate in mechanisms that subvert agency problems in the firm.   
As another criticism for the market for corporate control, Williamson (1963) are of the view that 
transactions of capital are “too costly” as an enforcer of the profit maximising behaviour.  That is, 
waiting for share price declines to assess whether managers are acting in the interests of 
shareholders is a dearer price to pay compared to monitoring through disclosures.  Further, Singh 
(1971) and Deakin and Singh (2008) presented evidence that the market for corporate control is 
at least partially ineffective and may be justified if it operates in parity with other market settings.   
Deakin and Singh (2008) ascertains that the three fundamental theories that explain the relevance 
of information to investors rather than acclaiming that the market for corporate control theorem 
disregards the relevance of disclosures.  The theories identified include agency, information 
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asymmetry and incomplete contracting which all support the argument that managers pursue their 
own interests.  Even when investors try to reduce management discretion through corporate 
governance mechanism, the mechanisms involve costs of agency nature.  For example, aligning 
investors‟ needs with managerial interests through pay incentives presents a cost of agency 
despite the likelihood that the action may reduce management‟s tendency to marginalise 
investors‟ value creation.   
Lastly, Scherer (1980) reviewed literature on market for corporate control as a monitoring device 
for management self-interest behaviour.  The conclusion suggested that the assumption of take-
overs as a viable deterrent to management‟s tendency of pursuing their interests is rarely 
defensible. 
Reflecting the arguments for and against the market for corporate control, based on the 
objectives of this study, the essence for complementing and supplementing may on one side 
reflect the discussion by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  Though management and shareholders 
have conflicting interests, the contractual arrangement between the two parties compels 
management in order to provide complementary and supplementary narratives in an attempt to 
reduce information asymmetry to attract capital from investors.  However, the cohorts of the 
market for corporate control may argue that the reason for management‟s provision of 
complementary and supplementary narratives is a self-interest realisation that if investors are 
not adequately informed, they may reduce their interest in the firm.  The resultant fall in share 
prices may lead to take-over bids and a change in management (Manne 1965).  Therefore, the 
current management prevents the change in management that may arise from take-over bids 
by ensuring that investors are provided with useful disclosures, such as complementary and 
supplementary narratives.  
5.3.2.2 Market for Managerial Talent 
Another line of literature (e.g. Alchian 1968; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Fama 1980) 
disagrees with the provision of disclosures as a solution to agency costs and proposes that 
market for managerial talent mechanisms are sufficient to control managerial behaviour.  
Fama (1980, p. 289) explicitly stated that:  
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“…the firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces the 
evolution of devices for effectively monitoring the performance of the entire team 
and of its individual members.  In addition, individual participants in the firm, and 
in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by 
the markets for their services, both within and outside the firm.” 
However, Fama (1980) subjected the effectiveness of this theory on the ex-post reward of 
managers for their performance, that is, compensation for their behaviour.   For example, 
management is conceptualised to act in the interest of the shareholders if there are share option 
plans that compel management as shareholders to align their interests with interests of other 
shareholders.  Empirical evidence that concurs that the market for managerial talent is associated 
with agency costs shows positive market returns with introduction of (1) long-term managerial 
plans (e.g. Brickley et al. 1985); (2) short-term executive plans (e.g. Tehranian and Waegelein 
1985) and (3) the golden parachute agreements (e.g. Lambert and Larker 1985).    
The provision of complementary and supplementary, if explained under the market for corporate 
control, would arguably be a means through which management communicate their performance 
to investors to protect their positions or remuneration.  However, for the same reason, 
management may decide not to provide disclosures, such as complementary and supplementary 
narratives.  Nagar (1999) modelled the relationship between disclosures by management and 
share pricing within the market for managerial talent.  In the model, management is privy to the 
firm‟s performance and has discretion to disclose.  If management discloses, it is uncertain about 
the investor reaction, which may either be a positive or negative assessment of the management.  
The uncertainty on the part of management arises from unawareness about the investors‟ 
considerations in information assessment, thereby affecting the management‟s decision to 
disclose.  If management decides not to disclose, the nondisclosure may be interpreted by 
investors a result of either untalented management or talented management that is afraid of 
uncertainty arising from disclosure.  In either case, nondisclosure aggravates information 
asymmetry and may lead to managerial welfare losses and adverse valuation of the firm (Nagar 
1999).    On the other hand, effective information dissemination of investor expectations to 
management, through corporate governance and reward mechanisms, enhances management‟s 
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provision of quality disclosure.  The disclosures then reduce information asymmetry and in turn, 
guide investment decision-making (Nagar 1999).   
5.3.2.3 Theoretical Legal Literature Critique of Agency Costs 
Metzger et al (1986) criticise the role of disclosures based on agency with reference to early 
foundations of the agency theory in legal literature.  Agency was originally a legal concept 
explaining the contractual relationship between the agent and principal.  The legal contract 
imposed duties of loyalty on the agent.  Clark (1985) argued that such an arrangement places a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty on the part of agent to the principal thereby preventing any sort of 
abuse of the managerial discretion.    
 Duska (1992) seemed to agree that the initial premise of the agency concept was loyalty by 
the agent suggesting that the introduction of the theory to management of the firm was the 
recognition that loyalty was the basis of any arrangement between owners and stewards.  
However, the economic theory that humans are egoistic and will act with rationality to 
maximally benefit themselves debased any argument that retained loyalty as the reason for 
agency relationship.  The self-interest economic theory was long established by Smith‟s 
(1776) classical work where he argued that humans are selfish and will not always look out for 
the interest of others although they are instances in which they compromise their interests to 
the benefit of others. 
The loyalty legal literature concept of agency by Metzger et al (1986) arising from legal 
literature implies that the premise on which investors and management enter into a 
relationship is fidelity.  Therefore, agency in this context arguably is not the underlying reason 
for the self-interest pursuit.  One can therefore argue that the rationale for providing 
complementary and supplementary narratives portrays that both management and investors are 
aware of their agency fiduciary obligations and disclosures serve this awareness by reducing 
information asymmetry.  However, as discussed by Smith (1776) that people pursue their own 
interests, the existence of the agency relationship between investors and management may 
have two implications about the motive of complementary and supplementary narratives.  
Either, management may act in line with the guidelines by ASB (2005; 2006) and provide 
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information that eliminates information asymmetry and useful for investment decision-making 
or management may pursue its own interests by providing disclosures that increase asymmetry 
and mislead investors. 
5.3.2.4 Utility Maximisation Critique of Agency Costs  
Under utility maximisation, agency would arise where agents tend to maximise their financial 
benefits from the principal.  Critiques of the utility maximisation assumption of the agency 
theory contain that utility is hardly measurable and it is difficult to prove whether people 
maximise utility.  Simon (1959) argue that most empirical work intended to measure utility are 
exploratory experiments that assume that participants  intend to maximise utility.  Davidson 
and Suppes (1957) further contend that in the experiments that are virtually “unreal” 
circumstances participants merely tend to act in line with what the theory requires, that is, act 
as if they maximise utility.  Therefore, assuming the results as functional in the real world may 
be erroneous.  Further, May (1954) argues that minor adjustment in the assumptions may lead 
to a significant change in the outcome.  Simon (1959) attributed large shift in outcome arising 
from the slight alteration of the utility maximisation conditions to the fact that the real world is 
very complex so that postulation of all choices under utility maximisation is a fallacy.  
A simulation of this complexity and dilemma with regard to disclosures may be reflected in 
management rhetorical choices to report the opportunities arising from a calamity.  For 
example, declaration of a war amongst countries presents a possibility of misplacing of people 
and increased hygiene and health risks.  The situation incorporates utility maximisation 
opportunities in terms future turnover for pharmaceutical, temporary shelter and power 
generating companies.  However, disclosing the situation as an opportunity may have a dual 
impact.  On one end, it is a utility maximisation opportunity that may be viewed by 
shareholders as having a positive impact on share returns.  Alternatively, investors who are 
socially conscious may view the company as being socially irresponsible by considering the 
situation as an opportunity, thereby withdrawing their stake in the firm.  Chua (1986) argues 
that the different roles that accounting disclosures serve leads to augmenting the mainstream 
utility maximisation concept underlying agency theory with critical and interpretative 
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viewpoints of the information.  ASB (2005; 2006) advised that the paramount importance of 
information in the operating and financial review, that is, complementary and supplementary 
narratives, is to serve information needs of investors.  In fulfilling this role, other users‟ needs 
such as those for creditors, employees, creditors and society ought to be considered as they 
affect the value of the firm, thereby influencing investors‟ decisions.  This postulate seems to 
consider that agency between investors and managers alone may not explain the relevance of 
complementary and supplementary narratives, however, recognising the needs of other 
stakeholders as well as other needs of investors may explain the relevance or usefulness of the 
disclosures to investors 
5.4  Market Mechanisms and Information Content of Financial 
Disclosures 
The previous sections conceptualise that the orientation postulate of the evolutionary 
accounting theories and the resultant agency relationship signify the usefulness of accounting 
disclosures to investors.  In the discussion, especially arguments relating to agency, 
stewardship monitoring is arguably most pronounced.  Hitherto, the conceptual use of 
information for investment decision making is less evident.  To introduce the investment 
usefulness of disclosures, this section extends the discussion by examining role of economic 
market mechanisms in explaining the relevance of managements‟ provision of financial 
disclosures to investors.  To examine this, first is an analysis of the reasons why investors need 
the information in the perspective of the thesis‟ objective.  Second, the broad spectrum on 
market mechanism is analysed.  The third consideration is a discussion integrating the 
information content of financial disclosures with the broad market mechanisms.   
5.4.1 Investors Use of Financial Disclosures 
In chapter 4, purposes of financial disclosures to the investors were identified to include 
investment decision making and stewardship monitoring.  Chambers (1955), as one the first 
theorists for the decision-usefulness paradigm of disclosures conceptualised that rational 
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management requires information-dispensing mechanism that aids decision making as well as 
facilitating  the review of decisions.  Therefore, any disclosures arising from the information 
mechanism should serve these purposes.  In Beaver et al (1968) it was further suggested that 
the best method for evaluating the importance of information is to establish its predictive 
ability in relation to the purpose for which it is provided.  In essence, since accounting 
disclosures are aimed at facilitating decision-making, then the information may be justified 
based on the extent it fulfils the role.  Prediction being an inherent part of the decision-making 
process, financial disclosures may be conjectured to help investors make predictions about the 
firms‟ economic performance (Beaver et al. 1968). 
5.4.2 Investors Use of Financial Disclosures and the Role of Markets 
Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) identified two major streams of accounting information decision 
usefulness theories namely, the individual-user paradigm (e.g. Bruns 1968) and the aggregate-
market-behaviour paradigm (e.g. Fama 1970; Gonedes 1972).  The individual-user paradigm 
is comprised of theories explaining the use of financial disclosures from an individual 
perspective, that is, behavioural tendencies within the accounting context.  Examples include 
the cognitive relativism, cultural relativism, linguistic relativism, functional and data fixation, 
information inductance and human information processing models such as the lens model, 
probabilistic judgement and predecisional behaviour.  The aggregate-market-behaviour 
conjecture deducts usefulness of accounting information from market responses to the 
disclosures as discussed in studies such as Gonedes (1972) and Fama (1970).  Market response 
may be established using various models such as efficient market model and hypothesis, 
arbitrage pricing model, capital asset pricing model, market model, beta estimation, Ohslon 
valuation, event studies and equilibrium theory (Riahi-Belkaoui 2004). 
 From the argument above, it is tenable to hold that the decision-usefulness of accounting 
information may be derived from the association of disclosures with share price returns, 
among other market variables.  Gonedes (1972) identified two scenarios against use market 
mechanisms for share pricing in justifying the decision-usefulness of accounting information.  
Firstly, is the suggestion that the variability in preparation and presentation of the financial 
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disclosures leads to variability of market use of disclosures.  Secondly, the users of 
information may be conditioned to react to the information in a particular manner by agents 
who prepare the reports.  However, to counter these observations, Gonedes (1972) advanced 
the suggestion that if both arguments were true, then preparers of information would always 
outperform the market, hence the demise of efficiency in capital markets.  This therefore 
meant that economic markets are viable mechanisms for explaining the usefulness of financial 
disclosures with regard to investments decisions. 
5.4.3 Economic Market Mechanisms 
In the previous sub-section, the theoretical connection between market mechanisms and 
usefulness of accounting information is discussed.  The discussion in this sub-section 
examines the main general economic mechanisms to provide the premise from which 
information content theories are constructed.  There are two opposing theories explaining the 
functioning of economic markets, the mainstream and heterodox market mechanisms.  
5.4.3.1 Mainstream Economic Market Concept 
Mainstream economics, also referred to as neoclassical or orthodox economics, is that school 
of economics that relates to an efficient market mechanism free from frictions and failures 
(Guerrien 2004).  Kanth (1999) argues that this market setting is characterised with a laissez-
faire environment in which economic optimal positions are achieved.  The assumption is that 
the market is in equilibrium because human beings are rational and at anyone time, no one is 
privy to information in a manner that allows them to benefit above the market from the 
information (Lawson 2006).  Precisely, the assumptions of the ideology are (1) people have 
rational preferences among outcomes, (2) individuals maximize utility and firms maximize 
profits and (3) people act independently on the basis of full and relevant information.  In this 
market situation, the argument regarding agency that the separation of management and 
investors may promote information asymmetry is not sustained.  Management, investors and 
all market participants are rational and have same information and expectations, therefore all 
market participants use the information at the equilibrium point where none can outperform 
the market (Kanth 1999).  Complementary and supplementary narratives in this case may not 
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yield above market returns since the state at which the disclosures are disseminated and used 
at the equilibrium point in the market. 
The critiques to mainstream economic markets argue that mutual balance of forces and results 
are hardly achievable in the real world because the rationality, utility maximization and full 
information are purely conceptual and not realistic (Kanth 1999).  However, developments in 
mainstream economics arguably have tended to recognise a degree of friction in markets 
thereby deviating away from the strict adherence of these assumptions to less stringent market 
mechanisms that recognise purposeful individual behaviour, enlightened self-interest and 
sustainability (Colander et al. 2004).  For example, numerous game theory models have been 
developed to recognise rationality in the context of other individuals‟ influence on one‟s 
economic decisions (Kirman 1989; Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).  
Another criticism of mainstream economics is the dependence on mathematical models to 
explain the world (Bigo 2007; Strassmann 1994).  Most models applied in explaining 
mainstream economic markets are in the form of mathematical equations, statistical inference 
or computer simulations which are habitually concluded with a definite solution.  
Mathematical deductive reasoning does not explain forms of societal relations or constructs 
(Dennis 1995).  The approach suggests that market problems have inert solutions, ignoring 
irregularities in the market.  As a contradiction to the assumptions in the mainstream 
economics market functioning, Strassmann (1994) notes that the criticism of a particular 
model is presented by another model.  However, it may be argued that the use of mathematical 
models to criticise other mathematical models portrays the mainstream‟s recognition of 
variability in the market forces.    
5.4.3.2 Heterodox Economic Market Concept 
The definition of heterodox economics is underlined in the rejection of the inflexible 
mainstream economics assumptions of market perfection and the application of mathematical 
models in evaluating economic decisions (Lawson 2006).  Various studies (e.g. Arestis 1990; 
Colander et al. 2004; Lavoie 1992) contain that the widely accepted characterisation of 
heterodox economics is the rejection of mainstream paradigm.    
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The heterodox line of thinking views economics from a relational perspective, either internally 
or structurally (Bigo 2007).  Internal relations refer to the capacity in which individuals relate, 
for example, the investor – management relationship.  Structural relations include social 
structures, processes, human practices, actions or omissions beyond the internal relations.  
Such may influence or be influenced by the operations of the internal relations, hence having 
an open system of relations.  In this respect, heterodox economics introduces concepts such as 
uncertainty, evolutionary developments, care for others, institutionalisation of relations and 
individual behavioural tendencies.  
Usefulness of complementary and supplementary narratives under the heterodox economic 
markets is a realisation that people have diverse expectations, levels of rationality and 
therefore perceive information differently, hence information asymmetry.  Such variations in 
people and their use of disclosures contradicts the equilibrium position as is in mainstream 
economic market concept, thereby suggesting the likelihood of earning abnormal (above 
market) returns through the use of narrative commentaries in financial reports.    
As a critique to heterodox economic market mechanism, Lawson (2006) does realise that 
mainstream economics caters for relations in its closed relation model of 
independent/dependent variables.  For example, uncertainty is termed as risk while 
evolutionary concepts and institutionalisation are found in game theory or non-linear theory 
modelling and care for others as a variable in a utility function.  Further, the error term 
commonly incorporated in the statistical models recognise the idiosyncratic characteristics of 
market constituents.     
5.4.3.3  Integration of Mainstream and Heterodox Economic Market 
Concepts 
Since there are no unifying concepts for heterodox economics, other than challenging 
mainstream economics, understanding of both schools is attainable through comprehension of 
mainstream economics assumptions (Bresser-Pereira 2006; Lawson 2006).  In other words, the 
absence heterodox economics logical explanation detached from mainstream concepts 
indicates that heterodox economic is dependent on mainstream economics deficiencies 
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(Lavoie 2006).  Therefore, a clear explanation for the functioning of economic markets would 
integrate the two ideologies.  Bresser-Pereira (2006) argues that due to the complexity of 
markets, it is reasonable to enhance the orthodox (mainstream) thinking with the neoclassical 
(heterodox) economic concepts.  Bresser-Pereira (2006) adds that mainstream economics 
provides the essential theoretical grounding of the functioning of markets while heterodox 
economics adopts a pragmatic approach.  The two combined provide a holistic explanation on 
market mechanisms. 
5.4.4 Information Content of Financial Disclosures under Market 
Mechanisms 
As discussed above, the construction of the theoretical framework for information content of 
accounting disclosures concepts is based on aggregate market reaction to disclosures rather 
than individual investors‟ tendencies.  Whilst formulating the framework, the approach taken 
is to conceptualise market settings in which accounting information is conceptualised to 
influence share price returns.  There are mainly three markets.  While Gonedes (1976) 
identifies two of the markets as the market for capital (MC) and market for information (MI), 
Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) adds the market for regulation (MR).  The MC has its commodity as 
firm‟s capital and information content arises from the desirability or effect of available 
information on share price returns (Gonedes and Dopuch 1974).  Under the MI, accounting 
disclosures are the commodity and are demanded by users for various purposes to include the 
potential to influence the share price returns (Allen 1990).  Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) argues that 
the MR is necessitated to ensure fair functioning of the two market (capital and information).   
The three markets (capital, information and regulation) when related to the two economic 
market extremes, the mainstream and heterodox concepts, present a construct that may explain 
information content of financial disclosures.  Under the mainstream extreme, the assumptions 
of fully informed, rational individuals are reflective of underlying conditions in the MC.  The 
MI recognises that the MI assumptions have flaws in real world application and therefore are 
classifiable under the heterodox market setting.  Gonedes (1976) shows an discrete diversion 
of the two markets based on market participants‟ homogeneity with regard to information 
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symmetry and expectations.  The extreme form in the market for capital argues that there is 
homogeneity in market participants‟ knowledge and expectations.  This depicts the 
assumptions in the mainstream school of thought thereby negating the relevance of disclosures 
in outperforming the market.  The alternative school, market for information, contends that 
there is heterogeneity in market participants‟ knowledge and expectations, therefore, 
information (accounting disclosures) are useful and can be used to gain abnormal returns.  The 
market for regulation, as discussed in Riahi-Belkaoui (2004), acknowledges that as free 
economic markets, there is a likelihood of inequitable allocation of resources in the markets of 
capital and information, hence the need for regulating.  The recognition of inequitable 
functioning may be considered as a realisation of market failures.  The market for regulation 
may be classifiable under the heterodox economic market concept.   
5.5 Market Conditions Necessary for Information Content of 
Financial Disclosures 
To provide further insight into the classification of the markets for capital, information and 
regulation under the two economic market extremes (mainstream and heterodox) in section 
5.4.4 above, this section discusses the conditions underlying the three markets.  First, 
conditions for the market for capital are discussed, followed by those for the market for 
information.  Lastly, the conditions for the market for regulation are examined.  This section is 
also intended to guide the identification of market settings in which the various theories 
discussed in chapter 6 explain the usefulness of financial disclosures to investment decisions. 
5.5.1 Conditions for the Market for Capital 
As earlier identified, the commodity traded in this market is comprised of corporate shares.  
Usefulness of disclosures is therefore conceptualised from the ability of the information to 
influence share prices and returns thereto (Fama 1965).  The conditions presume that prices 
include all available information and any new piece of information is instantaneously reflected 
in the share prices in an unbiased manner.  To facilitate such functioning, all market 
participants are assumed have homogenous expectations of maximising returns and minimise 
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losses.  Information is also freely available to all market agents.  The participants are price –
takers because the market is free from bias and friction.  Therefore, share price returns are 
unanimously agreed by market agents at an aggregated market basis, thereby being equivalent 
to the market return.  
In such a setting, there is perfect equilibrium reflecting the Walrasian general equilibrium 
model described in Vahabi (2002).  The Walrasian model stipulates that all market 
transactions take place at an equilibrium position which is attained through tâtonnment and 
recontracting (Walras 1874).  The process of tâtonnment relates to market mechanism in 
which market prices are determined by an invisible hand, also known as an auctioneer (Arrow 
1959; Jaffe 1967).  The auctioneer calls out a price and the market agents reveal their 
intentional or notional demand and supply.  Effective transacting only takes place when the 
auctioneer declares the equilibrium price.  However, there is no deviation between notional 
and effective demand and supply, that is, a complete harmonious amongst individuals where 
intent is in parity with actions or a state of perfect foresight (Vahabi 2002).  Recontracting 
recognises that even in the state of disequilibria, the Law of Indifference sets in through 
arbitration where market agents agree and transact at an equilibrium position by aligning their 
expectations to the prices indicated by the auctioneer (Vahabi 2002).  The Law of Indifference 
works in a manner that allows a feedback mechanism in which where mispricing of shares is 
successively corrected by reference to the disequilibria it generates (Arrow 1974).  However, 
the mispricing in this case is arguably conceptual as market agents only exercise effective 
trading at the equilibrium price.  
In brief, such a market setting is characterised with rational participants who have 
homogenous expectation as well as a frictionless mechanism of operation.  Consequently, all 
available and new information is instantaneously reflected in the share prices in a manner that 
does not present an opportunity for any participant to earn more or less than the market return.  
So, there is no benefit or information content in using information, including financial 
disclosures.   
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5.5.2 Conditions of the Market for Information 
Under the MI, disclosures are the commodity being traded amongst market agents (Gonedes 
and Dopuch 1974).  As discussed earlier, the heterodox economic market mechanism justifies 
its efficacy from the inadequacy of the mainstream market concept with regard to real world 
operation of markets.  Likewise, the MI ideology rejects the effectiveness of the MC 
propositions in explaining the relevancy of information in share price determination.  In other 
words, Gonedes (1976) termed conditions underlying the MI as implicit, as they are derived 
from the disagreement with the MC assumptions.  He states that inconsistency between 
available evidence and capital market efficiency construes that the true source of the 
inconsistencies is from the nature of the market for information rather than that of the market 
for capital.  
The conflicts arise from the assumptions of homogeneity in expectation, exclusivity and 
costless use of financial disclosures.  In the market for information, these notions are relaxed 
based on the perception that the demand and supply for financial disclosures arises from the 
impact that information has on share pricing (Gonedes 1972).  Secondly, given that 
information production has a cost, there should be some value that justifies the provision of 
such disclosures.  Gonodes (1975) further suggests evidence of value relevance of financial 
disclosures to share pricing reflects that there is exclusivity in the use of the disclosures.  This 
is opposed to the market for capital postulate that information is uniform in reference to 
availability and interpretation for all market participants.   
5.5.3  Conditions for the Market for Regulation 
Broadly, the hypothesis for regulating of free economic markets results from the 
comprehension those markets may fail to efficiently or equitably allocate resources due to 
inconsistencies between their underlying assumptions and the real world operations.  Riahi-
Belkaoui (2004) suggests that there are two broad thoughts on the market for regulation in 
relation to usefulness of accounting disclosures for capital market use.  They include the 
deregulated market concept and the regulated market theorem. 
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The unregulated market ideology relies on agency theory to foster market deregulation.  The 
existence of agency incentivises managers to voluntary disclose financial information to 
shareholders because financial reports are used to appraise both managerial and firm 
performance.  The instance of not disclosing may be perceived as a concealment of bad news, 
which is penalised through share price deterioration.  In addition, the strategy of concealment 
may not be successful as there are numerous sources from which investors may obtain 
information about the performance of the firm and its prospects.   
The regulated market concept is applicable where market failures exist, thereby forcing 
government intervention in operations of free economic markets.  Among the earliest 
proponents of this phenomenon is Pigou (1932, p. 173 ) who viewed that, “…the differences 
between marginal private and marginal social values would deter a free economic market 
system from achieving the maximum national dividend.”  To counter this inclination of the 
free economic market system to maximising mostly private values, other than national 
dividend, government intervention was necessary.  To amplify this argument, Weimer and 
Vining (1992, p. 30) noted that, “…the justification of government intervention in private 
affairs in the US has always been market failures in allocation of societal resources whilst 
pursuing private interests.”   
In the case of firms, market failures often arise from expropriation where managers assume 
possession of investors‟ wealth (La Porta et al. 2000).  This points towards the agency cost 
which Jensen and Meckling (1976) conjectured to occur when insiders (agents) enrich 
themselves at the expense of the shareholders (principals).  Considering the possibility of 
agents to prioritise their interest over duty in agency contracts, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argued that laws and government bodies such as courts and police are vital to ensure reliance 
and enforce execution of the contracts.  La Porta, et al (2000) consider such government 
intervention as a protection of investors‟ rights which include the right to disclosures that 
provide investors with information necessary to make investment decisions.  Market failures 
arising from non-disclosure of information may be a consequence of various instances such as 
mere reluctance to disclose as the firm is monopolistic supplier of information about it, fraud, 
or underproduction of information as a public good (Riahi-Belkaoui 2004).  The propensity of 
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market failures resulting from insufficient production of relevant accounting information 
therefore is the main condition for the viability of the regulated market concept.   
5.6 Schematic Impression for Financial Disclosures Usefulness in 
Economic Market Settings 
Diagram 2 presents a flow chart outlining the theoretical network describing the usefulness of 
financial disclosures with regard to investment decision making in relation with economic 
market mechanisms. 
The usefulness of accounting disclosures in the market place for investment decision making 
is traceable to the evolutionary accounting theories by reference to their focus of attention.  
While the proprietary theory recognises that the firm and the owner are synonymous, the 
entity theory recognises the two are separate.  For the proprietary concept, the focus of 
attention is the owner of the business as disclosures are about the proprietor‟s property where 
the firm is only part.  The focus of attention under the entity concept is the firm where 
disclosures are about the firm and disclosed to the shareholders in their capacity as business 
owners.  The separation of the firm from its shareholders in the entity concept introduces the 
agency concept thereby resulting in the need for information from the agents who run the firm, 
to the principals who own the firm.  Shareholders may use the disclosures then either as a 
means of monitoring stewards or for investment decision making.  
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Diagram 2 Theoretical Flowchart for Usefulness of Disclosures under Market Mechanisms   
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For the investment decision role, the discussion in the chapter interfaces the exchange of 
disclosures and investment capital between investors and the firm by aid of economic markets.  
Two main economic markets under which this interface is explained are identified as the 
mainstream and the heterodox market mechanism.  The exchange of investment capital is 
conceptualised under the mainstream market mechanism as the market for capital.  The 
underlying concepts in the market for capital are that there is information symmetry in market 
players and despite the agency relationship between market players (investors and managers), 
all parties are rational and have homogeneous expectations (Fama 1965).  In this market too, 
information is costless (Fama 1965).  The markets for information and regulation, which are 
classified under the heterodox economic market, recognise that the agency relationship 
between management and investors results into information asymmetry because neither are all 
market players rational nor have homogeneous expectation (Gonedes and Dopuch 1974).  
Also, information may have a cost due to the variability in market players‟ use of the 
information.  The exchange of information, as a counter to the deficiencies in the mainstream 
market mechanism, is conceptualised in the market for information.  Arguably, as free 
economic markets are subject to failures, the need for the market for regulation is also 
considered under the heterodox market mechanisms as a monitor ensuring equitable allocation 
of resources in both the market for capital and the market for information (La Porta et al. 
2000).  Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) adds that where the market for regulation is not necessary, the 
agency relationship plays a pivotal role in ensuring that managers act in the interest of 
shareholders with regard to provision of information for investment decision making.   
5.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, the discussion focussed on the founding theories of accounting disclosures and 
how the information befits the investment decision-making process.  The first consideration 
was to the focus of attention of the two evolutionary accounting theories, the proprietary and 
entity concepts.  Central to the arguments, the agency relationship created by the separation of 
the entity from its owners and the resultant information asymmetry necessitates the role of 
financial information in economic markets where shareholders engage in share trading 
activities.  One extreme is the mainstream economic market mechanism that assumes 
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disclosures do not play any role in aiding investors‟ decisions as all market participants are 
rational and have homogeneous expectations and act similarly in the market place.  
Information is costless in such a mechanism.  The alternative extreme is the heterodox 
economic market mechanism that recognises market imperfections and failures, therefore, 
fosters the usefulness of disclosures.  However, considering that in the real world there are no 
extremes, in line with Gonedes (1972), the usefulness of accounting disclosures for investment 
decision making is conceptualised by integrating the two mechanisms.  Under the mainstream 
economic market mechanism, the study identifies the market for capital (MC) concept, while 
under the heterodox economic mechanism, the discussion considers the market for information 
(MI).  Based on the fact that the recommendation to complement and supplement financial 
statements in order to aid shareholders in the investment decision process resulted from 
regulatory guideline  (e.g. ASB 2005,  2006), the market for regulation (MR) is also included 
in the discussion.  Theoretically, the MR is considered herein under the heterodox economic 
market mechanism to correct market failures in the MC and MI. 
As highlighted above, three markets are identified through which information content of 
narrative commentaries may be explained.  They include market for capital, market for 
information and the market for regulation.  The next chapter analyses the various theories 
operating in the three markets of capital, information and regulation.  
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6 MARKET BASED THEORIES FOR INFORMATION CONTENT 
OF FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the theoretical framework for the information content of complementary and 
supplementary narrative commentaries is discussed with relation to theories under the market 
for capital (MC), market for information (MI) and market for regulation (MR).  The three 
markets are classified in the two broad economic market streams discussed in chapter 5, that 
is, the mainstream (for MC) and heterodox economic market streams (for MI and MR).  
Complementing and supplementing have only been recently introduced to the financial 
reporting domain by provisions in ASB (2005; 2006).  Therefore, it is open to discussion that 
there are no theoretical underpinnings in accounting and finance literature specifically meant 
to explain the worthiness of complementary and supplementary narratives to share valuation.  
This argument is further supported by the review of literature in chapter 3 above where no 
study was found to have empirically examined the usefulness of either classification of 
narratives to investors.  In brief, it is deductable that there is a lack of theories that exclusively 
explain information content of complementary and supplementary narrative commentaries.  
Therefore, this thesis is compelled to draw from concepts that account for investors‟ 
usefulness of accounting disclosures in general for investment decision making.   
The next section presents theoretical underpinnings in the market for capital (MC).  
Thereafter, theories in the market for information (MI) are discussed, followed by theories 
relating to the market for regulation (MR).  The last section is a summary and conclusion to 
the chapter.     
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6.2  Market for Capital Theories 
6.2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Some of the literature (e.g. Ball and Brown 1968; Holmes 1971; Lunt 1982; Rippington and 
Taffler 1995; Shaw 1981) advance the hypothesis that interim reports have information 
content because they are timelier, compared to annual reports.  With reference to agency 
theory, disclosures in interim reports, such as complementary and supplementary narratives, 
alleviate information asymmetry and thereby posses information that can be used to earn 
abnormal returns in the market for capital.  The implication of this postulate is a rejection of 
the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) in the semi-strong form to suggest that one may use the 
disclosures in interim reports to outperform the market.    
The EMH, in its most conformist construct, disagrees with any suggestion that information 
can be used to outperform the market (Fama 1970).  EMH functionality requires that in 
addition to utility maximisation, individuals are rational and have homogenous expectation 
and information is costless (Fama 1970).  Therefore, these assumptions of EMH reflect that in 
the agency relationship between investors and managers, there is no information asymmetry.  
In turn, the only returns that can be earned on the market are normal market returns that 
incorporate all available information instantaneously and accurately, leaving no opportunity to 
earn above normal returns by using this information.  Though EMH is largely categorised 
under the mainstream economic school of thought, it recognises a degree of imperfection in 
the market.  Fama (1991; 1998) recognised that when new information gets to the market, 
some participants may over- or under-react.  However, the general trend is that the movement 
in prices is random and normally distributed such that the net effect is that no one can make 
abnormal profits from the information.  Fama (1970) theorised market efficiency under three 
information types based on their availability on the market.  The types included (1) information 
in past share price trends (2) all publically available information and (3) all publically and 
privately available information.  The efficiency of the market conditioned to the information 
types are referred respectively as (1) weak, (2) semi-strong and (3) strong forms of efficiency.  
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6.2.1.1 Weak Form Efficiency  
Under weak form efficiency, one cannot profit from predicting future prices by way of analysing 
past share prices.  In other words, technical analysis as an investment strategy for modelling 
future returns through trend analysis of past share prices does not result into future excess returns.  
Malkiel (1996) affirmed the randomness of share prices both sophisticated and unsophisticated 
have the same chance to make excessive returns and this chance is independent of the 
security‟s past performance on the capital market.  
Empirical evidence on the random walk theory is divergent.  Using stochastic dominance, 
Dickens and Shelor (2003) confirmed Malkiel‟s (1996) conception that expertly identified  
stocks could as well be picked randomly on the S&P 500, DJIA, Nasdaq and the Russell 2000 
indices.  A contradiction to the weak form or the random walk hypotheses is by Saad, et al. 
(1998) who found that market prices tend to trend from intervals as short as a week.   
However, Clive and Oskar (1963), though the short term price movements supported the 
random walk theory on the NYSE, the long term price movements did not conform to the 
weak form efficiency.  
In the UK, Kendall (1953) examined the presences of weak form efficiency through an 
estimation of the correlation coefficients between price changes of shares prices at different 
periods on the Actuaries Index of Industrial Share Prices for the London Market.  The results 
suggested a random walk that concurs that there is no pattern in share price movements as the 
changes seemed irregular.  Following Kendall‟s findings, various studies (e.g. Brealey 1970; 
Cunningham 1973; Dryden 1970) empirically confirmed the random walk theorem using UK 
trading data.  However, tests for random walk on UK FTSE indices by Opong, et al (1999) 
showed that FTSE All Share, 100, 250 and 350 FTSE differed from the random walk theorem.  
The study‟s tests for independence based on correlation showed that the indices did not exhibit an 
independent and identically distributed pattern.  Given that cycles occurred more frequently than 
would have been in a true random pattern, the conclusion was that the movements on the indices 
were not purely random.  Using both parametric and non-parametric tests, Belaire-Franch and 
Opong (2005) provided further evidence suggesting that UK FTSE indices do not follow a 
 150 
 
random walk.  However, for the FTSE 100, there was a relatively lower level rejection of the 
random walk than other indices.  This was attributed to the high analyst following and high 
liquidity levels for the FTSE 100 compared to other indices.  Mills and Jordanov (2003) also 
provided evidence on the size effect with regard to the random walk on the London Stock 
Exchange.  Largest securities, rather than the smaller ones, had the highest potential to reject the 
random walk hypothesis.  However, they qualified the results that they may not be generalised to 
a different market setting or other periods outside the sample period. 
6.2.1.2 Semi-Strong Efficiency 
The semi-strong form efficiency is mainly concerned with the speed and accuracy of the 
market in incorporating new public announcements about a firm in its share prices such that 
no abnormal returns are attributed to the information.  In this state of the market, neither can 
technical analysis nor fundamental analysis be used to outperform the market (Fama 1970).   It 
is under this form of efficiency that the publication of information in interim reports is 
expected not to influence share price abnormal returns.  Opong (1995) argued that if the 
market is efficient, the publication of interim reports would result in a share price return equal 
to zero.  With relation to this study, semi-strong efficiency would lead to two deductions.  
Firstly, both complementary and supplementary narrative commentaries would have an 
abnormal share price returns equal to zero.  Secondly, because of the same share price return, 
there would be no difference in the return attributed to investors‟ use of either complementary 
or supplementary narrative commentaries. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) discussed the role of disclosures in the capital markets using the 
agency concept and information asymmetry.  They argued that agency arises when savers 
invest in a business venture in which they relegate role of utilising the funds to management.  
However, the management at times makes self-interested decisions that expropriate investors‟ 
funds through high executive pay packages and other decisions that devalue the investors‟ 
equity.  Top reduce these instances, Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that one alternative is 
the signing of optimal contracts between the two parties.  Such contracts require management 
to reduce information asymmetry by providing information on the firm‟s performance so that 
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the investors can assess the management‟s performance.  Alternatively, the shareholders may 
use corporate governance mechanisms such as board of directors who have the role to monitor 
and discipline management on behalf of investors.  Similarly, for this role to be executed, the 
management has a responsibility to reduce information asymmetry by reporting on its 
performance to the board of directors.  The other option for reducing the agency problem is 
that investors may use services of information intermediaries, such as financial analysts and 
rating agencies who engage in private production of information to uncover any misuse of 
funds by management (Healy and Palepu 2001).  This may at times be enhanced through 
regulation.  To protect their positions, management will influence their appraisals through 
reducing information asymmetry by providing disclosures that reduces instances that may lead 
to wrong judgements.   
In all the solutions that Healy and Palepu (2001) provide, which are based on a review of prior 
empirical and theoretical work, the key element is that disclosures, such as complementary 
and supplementary narratives in interim reports, help to reduce information asymmetry 
between investors and management.  This is either directly by the two parties engaging with 
each other through optimal contracts or use of proxies, such as boards of directors and 
financial intermediaries.  Even in a semi-strong efficient market, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978; 1986) argued that management might prefer to provide accounting disclosures to 
reduce information asymmetry and agency costs, as there are significant costs in writing and 
enforcing contracts as well as political costs in regulatory processes.  Emphasising this, studies 
(e.g. Barry and Brown 1985; Healy and Palepu 2001) consider that managers who engage in 
capital market transactions have an incentive to provide disclosures, such as complementary 
and supplementary narratives to reduce the information asymmetry problem and associated 
cost of capital. 
The earliest empirical work on semi-strong efficiency is documented by Fama, et al (1969), 
examining the impact of information implied by stock splits on share prices in the US.  The 
results showed that the information was spontaneously incorporated in share prices on its 
release such that there were no abnormal returns accrued to the announcement.  Among early 
tests of semi-strong efficiency in the UK is Franks et al (1977) in which information about 
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mergers was predicted three months to the event.  This indicated presence of semi-strong 
efficiency because abnormal returns did not accrue to the publication of information about the 
merger due to the anticipation of the news.  In addition, the possibility of any miniature returns 
was ruled out, as they would be absorbed in transaction costs.  In a related study, Firth (1976) 
established presence of abnormal share price movements prior to announcement of take-over 
bids.  The tendency was ascribed to information leakage rather than prediction, thereby 
associating the market with inefficiency.  The magnitude of occurrences being limited to a few 
firms obliterated the thesis that the market is inefficient.   
Contrary to the studies above, another line of literature (e.g. Ball 1978; Bernard and Thomas 
1989) observe post-announcement drifts in share prices after a new piece of information is 
published.  Ball (1978) envisaged that either such drifts are a result of the researcher‟s 
misspecification of the market equilibrium by omission of a component in computational 
model or a failure of market efficiency in incorporating new information into share prices.  
The failure to include new published disclosures into share prices was conjectured as a result 
of either the high cost of using the new information or information-processing frictions that 
deter the market‟s ability to capsulate the predictive potential of the news.  Ball (1978) was 
inclined to suggest that market inefficiency was more likely to be the cause of the post-
announcement drifts.  Bernard and Thomas (1989) found it hard to suggest the cause of the 
drifts and assumed that the market does not understand the autocorrelation between quarterly 
returns.  Fama (1991) discard the presence of post-announcement drifts as evidence of semi-
strong form market inefficiency by suggesting that the drifts could be a result of 
misspecification in measuring abnormal returns.  Also, in response to Bernard and Thomas 
(1989), size could have been the explaining factor since small firms are susceptible to 
unrelated price movements.  Fama (1991) disagreed with the direct attack on market efficiency 
that participants do not understand earnings movements.  He rather argued that analysts 
closely follow share price movements such that drifts cannot simply indicate inability to 
understanding movements.  
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6.2.1.3 Strong Form Efficiency 
Under strong form market efficiency, all information whether publicly or privately available is 
already impounded in the share prices, not even insider trading would yield abnormal returns.  
Similar to semi-strong efficiency, financial reporting has no impact on share price returns in 
strong form efficiency.  An assumption for the effectiveness of strong form efficiency is that 
there are no legal barriers impounding the public disclosure of private information.  Therefore, 
the market operates at optimal efficiency without market failures such that there is no need of 
regulation.  However, in the real world, regulation of public disclosure of private information 
undermines the effectiveness of the strong form efficiency (Huddart et al. 2001).    
Various studies (e.g. Jaffe 1974; Lorie and Niederhoffer 1978) have tested for strong form 
efficiency through the presence of abnormal returns from insider trading and confirmed that 
largely markets are inefficient.  This finding means that individuals can privately use price 
sensitive information to outperform the market.  The results in the study by Jaffe (1974) 
furthered an argument that even after insiders have profited from the use of their private 
information, public use of the insider information made public could still accrue abnormal 
returns for months thereafter.  Though Seyhun (1986) concurred that private use of insider 
information may profit the individual, they found no evidence supporting Jaffe‟s (1974) 
position that public use of insider information earns abnormal returns.  Seyhun (1986) argued 
that Jaffe‟s (1974) findings could have been influenced by the methodology.  Seyhun (1986) 
further argued that insider trading was affected by the size effect.  Larger securities were more 
prone to insider selling while small securities showed greater proportion of insider buying 
reflecting the notion that large securities have lower average returns than small securities.   
In the UK, Pope et al (1990) examined the pattern of returns resulting from trading based on the 
action of directors‟ share dealings.  Save for bid-ask spreads and transaction costs, the findings 
reflected that a trading strategy based on news of directors share dealings had abnormal returns.  
The evidence concurs with Jaffe (1974) that stock exchange is strong form inefficient. 
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6.2.2 Criticism of Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The critics are broadly characterised into two – behavioural or psychological and market 
mechanism.  As discussed earlier, given that this study inclines to the market mechanisms, the 
main concern is the market-based critique of EMH.  However, behavioural and psychological 
based rejections of EMH are briefly considered to provide a holistic discussion on the 
instances of ineffectiveness of the hypothesis.   
6.2.2.1 Behavioural and Psychological Critiques 
Behavioural psychology emphasises the external behaviour and reaction of people to a 
circumstance rather than the internal, mental, rational state of mind for those people (Burnham 
1994).  Therefore, behavioural and psychological argue against theories that consider 
rationality as a prerequisite of market functioning by suggesting that cyclic patterns of share 
price trends are evidence of irrational behaviour.  The recurrence of patterns on the capital 
market shows a violation of EMH because it is possible to predict the market trends and 
thereby presenting a possibility of earning abnormal returns by following the trends.  
Malkiel (2003) examined alternate theories reflecting the behavioural and psychological 
influences on share pricing rather than rationality.  The theories in this category include short 
run momentum due to under reaction (e.g. Lo and Mackinlay 1988); long run return reversals 
arising from over reaction (e.g. Debondt and Thaler 1985) and seasonal or day-of week effect 
(e.g. French 1980).  Another class of such theories are those based on patterns from macro 
economic variables, for example short term interest rates (e.g. Fama and Schwert 1977).  
Irrationality in the market place is also reflected in the trending of equity risk premiums, for 
example Ibbotson data between 1926 and 2001 showed that US common stocks returned on 
average 10.5% and high grade bonds returned approximately 5.5% (Malkiel 2003).  Firm 
specific characteristics conjectured to influence share pricing, such as sample size effect (e.g. 
Fama and French 1993b) are evident of psychological traits.  Value stocks based on financial 
performance ratios have also been established as predictors of share prices, for example price 
earning (e.g. Ball 1978), dividend yield (e.g. Campbell and Shiller 1998), earnings per share 
(e.g. Patell 1976) and price-to-book value (Fama and French 1993a; 1997).   
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There are ongoing debates suggesting that behavioural influences on share pricing are 
reflected in events such the October 1987 market crash, the internet bubble of 1990 (Malkiel 
2003).  However, evidence of rationality in the market may be interpreted from the evidence 
of the failure by professional investment managers to outperform the market despite being 
remunerated for abnormal profits (Jensen 1968).   
6.2.2.2 Market Mechanism Based Critiques 
6.2.2.2.1 Efficient Capital Markets II 
Fama (1991) revisited the assumptions of the original EMH by Fama (1970).  The 
assumptions suggested that for a market to be efficient there should be no costs for obtaining 
and using information on the market.  However, practically, such a situation was envisaged as 
unattainable.  Therefore, given that information and trading costs are prevalent in the market 
place, the original EMH is a fallacy (Fama 1991).  The new position assumed is that EMH is 
realisable with consideration of respective information and trading costs in the market.   
The second consideration is that EMH is not an isolated phenomenon explaining market 
functioning, therefore cannot be proven in isolation.  The modification of EMH by Fama 
(1991) considers that presence of efficiency can be confirmed through an asset-pricing model 
such as the market equilibrium model.  Any empirical findings about EMH ought to be judged 
based on both EMH and the effectiveness of the respective market equilibrium model to 
correctly specify efficiency.   
Based on these amendments to EMH, Fama (1991) posits that the cleanest tests of EMH are 
event studies, particularly if based on daily returns.  The studies precisely map the event to the 
date the information becomes public and estimate abnormal returns around the announcement 
date.  This modelling allows the testing of both the impact of the event on the share prices as 
well as speed of the market to reflect the information in the firm‟s share prices.  
6.2.2.2.2 Market for Information 
The critique of EMH by the market for information (MI) has been discussed earlier in chapter 
5 and its respective theories are discussed later on in section 6.3.  Suggested by Gonedes and 
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Dopuch (1974), the MI hypothesis assumes that the prevalence of frictions in the market for 
capital (MC) incapacitates EMH as the absolute explanation for share price movements.  In 
other words, the assumptions of EMH are considered to be unrealistic given that the market 
players are human actors, some of whom may not behave rationally and have diverse 
expectations.  The actors too have various levels of access to information and different 
information assessment abilities.  Therefore, the presence of agency between investors and 
managers, alongside the above diverse characteristics of human actors creates information 
asymmetry in the market for capital.  This argument reflects the discussion by Gonedes (1976) 
that inadequacy of EMH arises from heterogeneity in market participants‟ expectation and the 
resultant exclusive and costly use of financial disclosures.  Disclosures, for example 
complementary and supplementary narratives, are needed in the market for capital to 
compensate for these EMH shortcomings.  The exclusive and costly use of information 
postures the disclosures as a commodity demanded and supplied due to its ability to influence 
share prices on the MC (Demsetz 1970; Gonedes 1975).  Hence leading to the inapplicability 
of the conventional semi-strong form EMH suggestion that all available information is 
spontaneously and correctly reflected in share prices at no cost by market participants having 
homogenous expectations such that no abnormal returns accrue to such information (Gonedes 
and Dopuch 1974).  Resultantly, as management supplies information in form of accounting 
disclosures to investors in the market for information, they (management) expect that these 
disclosures will reduce agency costs and therefore encourage investors to supply capital in the 
market for capital.  
6.2.2.2.3 Market for Corporate Control 
In Parkinson‟s (1993) study, it is explained that the effectiveness of the market for corporate 
control relies on efficacy of EMH.  Under the market for corporate control, any managerial 
underperformance will be accurately and promptly incorporated in share prices leading to a 
decline in share prices.  The fall in share prices is interpreted as managerial failure and will 
entice new management to control the firm as a replacement for inadequate managers.  
Because of the fear of replacement, the existing management will ensure optimal performance.   
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Deakin and Singh (2008) based on market crashes of the 1987 US stock market crash, late 
1990s crash of the Asian exchanges and the 2001 bubble bursts of the technology securities to 
reject EMH due to the ineffectiveness of the market for corporate control.  If the market for 
corporate control, which relies on EMH, was effective during the crash periods, the causes of 
the crashes would have been identified and the crashes would not have occurred.    
Tobin (1984) suggests that for market efficiency to occur, two steps (types of efficiency) are 
adhered to.  The first is the information arbitrage efficiency (IAE) requiring that information is 
immediately disseminated to and decoded correctly by all market participants without bias.  
The second is fundamental valuation efficiency (FVE) ensuring that the same disclosures are 
correctly and suddenly incorporated into the firm‟s share prices by the homogenously 
expectant participants such that no abnormal return from this information can be obtained by 
any of them.  Deakin and Singh (2008) and Singh (1999) suggest that although it is largely 
assumed that developed markets exhibit IAE, the market crashes above disapprove the 
argument for presence of FVE.  The past bubbles, the 2008/9 bank and market crises and 
subsequent government bailout of US and UK banks affirm this line of reasoning.  The 2008/9 
bank crises and capital market failures has been largely blamed on corporate governance 
mechanisms which reflect the impact of the market for corporate control on capital markets 
(Kirkpatrick 2009). 
In relation to this thesis, the first concept of the market for corporate control by Tobin (1984) 
that information arbitrage efficiency in the market place requires dissemination and decoding 
of information reflects the entity concept, the resulting agency relationship and information 
asymmetry.  To this, complementary and supplementary disclosures are disseminated by 
management to investors who are expected to decode the information.  The second concept of 
fundamental evaluation efficiency that the investors incorporate this information accurately 
and instantaneously into share prices aligns with EMH semi-strong form efficiency where 
complementary and supplementary narratives can only yield normal market returns.  However, 
Deakin and Singh (2008) and Singh (1999) argument that though markets may comply with 
information arbitrage efficiency, hardly is fundamental evaluation efficiency achieved shows 
that complementary and supplementary narratives m ay yield abnormal returns.  The failure to 
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achieve fundamental evaluation efficiency may imply that there is information content in 
complementary and supplementary disclosures.  Therefore, management may provide the 
narrative disclosures to avoid adverse effects within the market for corporate control.    
Another observation is that the two forms of efficiency in the market for corporate control 
(information arbitrage efficiency and fundamental valuation efficiency) mutually explain the 
role of disclosures for investment decision making.  Arguably, this is a realisation that the 
market for capital and market for information jointly explain the usefulness of complementary 
and supplementary narratives as earlier conceptualised in chapter 5. 
6.3  Market for Information Theories 
Given that the objective of this thesis is to analyse the information content of narrative 
commentaries, it is posited that the most suited alternative to EMH for the study is the market 
for information (MI).  Various scholars (e.g. Allen 1990; Barker 1998) consider the MI as a 
suitable theory for explaining the usefulness of accounting disclosures for share price 
determination.  One significant observation in Barker (1998) is that although EMH presumed 
that markets are efficient in incorporating all available information in share prices, both in 
speed and accuracy, the theory did not mention the quantity and quality of disclosures it 
referred to.  The MI therefore suffices to provide conceptions that consider the attributions of 
disclosures whilst explaining the mechanism through which share pricing and information 
interact. 
In this section, the first part explains the mechanisms through which the MI operates.  
Secondly, the relevant theories under the MI are discussed.  As suggested in chapter 5 that the 
MI is an implicit rejection of the MC no consideration is given to the critiques of the MI.   
6.3.1 Mechanisms of the Market for Information 
Gonedes (1976) uses two postulates to explain how the MI operates.  They  include the  game 
theory in the MI credited to Gonedes (1975) and the private production of financial disclosures 
as a public good by Demsetz  (1970).  The two modi operendi are explained below.   
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6.3.1.1 Game Theory 
Using game theory, Gonedes (1975) provides a simulation for equilibrium in the MI.  Like in 
EMH, there is costless and uniform access and use of information.  Further, no participant is 
forced to produce or use information.  However, without any restriction, participants may 
enter a contract for information at terms agreeable to all parties of the contract.  Through 
contracting and recontracting, information is produced and disseminated to the contracting 
parties.  The equilibrium is reached upon when there is sameness between individual and 
group rationality and Pareto optimality (Gonedes 1976).  In other words, at equilibrium it 
makes no difference in returns to enter a contract of information with a subgroup of the market 
or acting as an individual player in the market.  Therefore, private use of information by a 
subgroup or an individual does not yield returns above the market equilibrium value of that 
information.  The resultant of this assumption of similar equilibria for individual agents and 
subgroups or coalitions is that collusion in the MI does not result into above market returns 
from the disclosures.  This concept of collusion and equilibrium is the premise on which the 
various forms efficiency under EMH are constructed (Gonedes 1976). 
Given the above state of the market, game theory further stipulates that markets for economic 
factors of production (for example labour and finances) are used by both information-
producers and the capital market in a perfect and frictionless manner.  New information in the 
MI is conjectured to assist investors to appraise the distributive patterns of returns on assets, 
thereby facilitating the optimal portfolio decisions.  Therefore, information produced to 
influence investors‟ decisions regarding allocation of their capital will influence the 
information production-investment decision as the disclosures have an influence on share 
pricing.  This cyclic causal relationship of investor‟s need for information, management‟s 
production of disclosures postulates information as a commodity.  To produce this commodity, 
management has to use the firm‟s resources with an expectation that the disclosures will 
attract more resources from investors to the firm.   
The presence of coalitions in the game theory is aimed at distinguishing financial disclosures 
from private goods where the use of the good by one participant prevents another from using it 
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(Gonedes 1976).  Since financial disclosures are published in a manner that one‟s usage does 
not prevent others from using them, each coalition or grouping will have an equilibrium 
position and through Pareto optimality, a singular competitive equilibrium position on the use 
of disclosures will be reached.  The groupings may take the form of institutional investors, 
security analysts or classes of securities.  To enhance this mechanism, Demsetz (1970) 
simulates the MI with the theory of private production of public goods.   
6.3.1.2 Private Production of Public Goods 
The public goods model by Demsetz (1970) assumes that accounting information is a public 
economic good produced for investors‟ use.  The model is based on the premise that private 
production of public goods is characterised by the ability to exclude non-purchasers, as is the 
case with cable television.  The supplier produces the goods for a group of consumers, 
however, the consumption of the good by one consumer in the group does not affect other 
members‟ consumption.  Therefore, a new member is able to consume the good at no extra 
cost to the supplier and without affecting other members‟ consumption.   
Compared to other types of goods, public goods such as financial disclosures have a 
distinctive character.  Whilst in the case of collective goods, it is not possible to exclude non-
buying users, financial disclosures are mainly purposed to aid investors (purchasing users) in 
their decision making process.  For private goods, allocation to consumers is determined by a 
price mechanism in which goods are apportioned to the highest bidding price.  The rationale is 
that the opportunity cost of disallowing other consumers is lowest with the highest bidder.  
However, in the case of the public good, such as financial disclosures, that are associated with 
a group of users, the good is available to all purchasing clientele and thereby it is unnecessary 
to use price to allocate the good.  Given that one user‟s consumption does not deter other users 
from using the good, it is unlikely that allocation of goods is determined by price 
discrimination.   
Both models, the game theory and private production for private goods are related to Pareto 
optimality (Gonedes et al. 1976).  The Pareto Optimality implies that social preference of the 
information will determine its usefulness or desirability so that no subgroups of the market 
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agents can use the information to benefit outperform the market by not cooperating with other 
market participants.  The general assumptions for the MI are that there is costless and 
unrestricted bargaining among market participants in the process of information production 
and usage.  Secondly, there is no participant acting under duress to produce or purchase 
information, and any participants is under freewill to enter into the contract for information at 
mutually agreed terms.  The assumptions depict that the production and usage of information 
is influenced by contracting and recontracting amongst of groups of stakeholders in 
information.  Unlike in EMH, the contracting and recontracting and the production of 
disclosures is based on the value that information has in respect to illuminating the investment 
decisions.  
6.3.2 Market for Information Theories 
The MI hypothesis is an assemblage of various theories explaining the market usefulness of 
disclosures for share pricing rather than EMH.  Gonedes (1976) argued that by not considering 
the relevance of the MI may lead to an overlook of some theoretical concerns explaining the 
relevance of information in share price determination.  Given the copiousness of theories that 
have developed over the years, the discussion hereunder is not comprehensive but rather 
illustrative of conceptions under the MI.   
6.3.2.1 Uncertain Information Hypothesis and Over-Reaction Hypothesis 
The uncertain information hypothesis (UIH), first tested by Brown et al (1988), evolves from 
the suggestion that markets at times misprice information due to investors risk averseness.  
The origin of this school of thought is Fama (1965) where it was discussed that large share 
price changes are often followed by random irresolute responses.  This observation counters 
the EMH rational and instantaneous response assumption in a case of an important 
information surprise on the market.  To refine EMH, Brown et al (1988) proposed the UIH 
which too assumes rational investor behaviour.  Under UIH, when a sudden substantial piece 
of information gets to the market, the first reaction does not reflect that full price of the event‟s 
value.  Thereafter, as the market begins to understand the effects of the event, prices adjust 
accordingly until the true price of the event is established.  It may be argued that despite 
 162 
 
investors being rational, there is information asymmetry in the market, possibly arising from 
the separation of the firm from its owners (entity concept).  As a result, semi-strong EMH is 
unattained leading to traces of over- or under-reaction to information, showing uncertainty in 
the impact of the disclosures.  Dependant on the value of the disclosures, such as 
complementary and supplementary narratives, and ability of investors to fully and rightly 
interpret the event, the post-announcement drifts are intended to rectify the price to the true 
price of the announcement. 
Brown, et al (1989) exemplify UIH with a sudden arrival of a piece of unexpected bad news 
on the market about the firm, say, a sudden demise of an executive.  Investors will quickly 
mark down the value of the firm‟s shares.  However, given that the only true assessment of the 
event can only be possible on announcement of a replacement, investors can only have 
subjective assessment in the interim about the long-term effect of the event.  The result 
therefore is a double-effect on the firm‟s share value where the first impact is the event itself 
and the second is the magnitude of the event.  Similar reaction, though in opposite direction is 
expected for good news.   
As a cohort to this theorem, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) through their Over Reaction 
Hypothesis (ORH) concur that markets habitually over react to new information and have to 
persistently revise their original pricing of the news.  However, the two theories differ as far as 
good news is concerned (Brown et al. 1989).  Rather than over reaction, good news leads to an 
under reaction where the first reaction attributed to the sudden good news is a share price 
increase and the second reaction based on the magnitude is reacted to by further price increase.  
Diagram 3 shows a simulation by Brown, et al (1989) of share price adjustment under EMH, 
UIH and ORH on receipt of a new piece of information on stock exchange.   
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Diagram 3 Stock Price Changes in Response to Bad and Good Uncertain Information 
Source : Brown, et al (1989, p. 49) 
Panel A shows a price adjustment under EMH when bad news in announced.  There reaction 
is an instant downgrading of prices and accurate such that no further price movement as a 
result of the news is experienced.  Panel B presents a reaction to bad news under UIH and 
ORH.  There is an instant overreaction due to the systematic risk embedded in the uncertain 
event.  Thereafter, as investors understand the full impact of the event, they revise pricing 
upwards to the true value of the event.  Panel C shows the perfect pricing scenario for good 
news.  Panel D shows the reaction to good news under ORH.  In this case, the new leads to an 
overreaction and as investors comprehend the influence of the news, they revise the prices 
downwards to the true value.  Panel E shows the reaction to good news under UIH.  In this 
case, the uncertainty in the good news will compel investors to under react at the 
announcement time and later revise their prices upwards.  In summary, the UIH presupposes 
that the average (or aggregated reaction to major uncertain events will be an increase in share 
price returns variability.  The instant reaction for bad news is a downward over reaction while 
for good news it is an upward under reaction.  Therefore, for both cases, then revised position 
in the post-event period is an upward trend in price variability due to reduced uncertainty and 
risk averseness; as well as the expectation by investors that they will benefit from the news/ 
event. 
Evidence of uncertain information on the capital markets and the subsequent impact on share 
pricing has been tested in a number of countries for various events.  For example, Vuchelen 
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(2003) tested the effect of political election results on the Brussels Stock Exchange.  Further, 
Ajayi and Mehdian (1994) used data from stock exchanges in Canada, Germany, France, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, UK and the US to test for evidence of EMH, UIH and ORH by way of 
post-event volatilities, cumulative abnormal returns and the risk/return relationship.  The 
results confirmed that when the strict certain information assumption by EMH is relaxed, 
rational investor behaviour was explained by UIH.  Also the study showed that the preposition 
by UIH that markets generally under react to favourable and over react to unfavourable news 
was more prevalent than the suggestion by ORH that markets over react to new information 
regardless of whether it is good or bad.  Yu, et al (2009) tested for the UIH on the S&P500 and 
its SPDR using 5 days‟ returns.  Before the introduction of the SPDR (1963 – 1993), the return 
on the S&P500 showed a persistent one-day pattern.  This contradicted both UIH and EMH 
since the result was both predictable and persistent.  In the post-SPDR period (1994 – 2003), 
there was strong evidence for presence of UIH as investors showed an overreaction to bad 
news as the 5-day post event returns were a result of a series of positive upward price 
revisions.  However, irrespective of the vast evidence of UIH, Brown et al (1989) contend the 
efficacy of rejecting the EMH and its assumptions in favour of alternative theories that have 
not fully developed as EMH with regards to explaining finance theory.  
Relating to evidence presented on the pattern of reaction to the announcement of interim 
reports in the UK and the discussion above on UIH, EMH and ORH there are various 
conclusions.  In Rippington and Taffler (1995), the pattern seems to support the argument for 
good news under ORH as there is sharp increase in average absolute abnormal returns on the 
event day followed by a sharp decline in the two days after the event.  Based on the frequency 
ranking of abnormal returns for 5 days around the interim report, results in Opong (1995) may 
be supportive of the ORH as there is a sharp rise on the interim date followed by a gradual 
decline in abnormal returns on the following days.  Likewise, recent evidence in Wolfe et al 
(2009) where abnormal return dispersions were used for FTSE350 companies, the pattern for 
good news under ORH was observed.    
Commenting on the UK interim report information content studies reviewed above, the 
peculiar observation is that although good news under ORH is reflected, the studies do not 
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refer to interim reports as good news but rather consider the information highly impactful.  It 
may then be concluded that though the studies observe that announcement of UK interim 
reports is a major event having an immediate upward thrust on share price returns and a 
downward trend in the post-event days, there may be an indication ORH for good news for 
event of interim reporting announcement.     
Given that all the literature above on information content of UK interim reports have no 
mention about narrative disclosure attributions in interim report information, in this thesis the 
shortfall is considered.  UIH is justified on attributions of good and bad news.  In fact, the 
suggestion by Brown et al (1989) that UIH is a two-impact phenomena (first – the shock of the 
news and two – the true value established through reduction of uncertainty), narrative 
disclosure attributions arguably take a pivotal role on the second degree of impact.  As 
conjectured in disclosure extent literature (e.g. Beattie et al. 2004; Beattie and Thomson 2007; 
Hooks et al. 2002a; Wallace and Nasser 1995), attributions may be considered to exhibit 
quality in disclosures.  This quality arguably explains their role in affecting share price returns.   
Another observation is that UIH and ORH are only associated to good and bad news 
attributions.  Since the good and bad news attribute is only part of the set of attributions that 
are found in interim reports narrative commentaries, this study conjectures that the two 
theories may be applicable to other attributions that possess qualitative properties of 
information.  The application of UIH and ORH to these other attributes is discussed in the 
hypothesis development in Chapter 7.  However, since the researchers on UIH (e.g. Brown et 
al. 1988) and ORH (e.g. Debondt and Thaler 1985) only subjected their theories to instances 
of good and bad news, there is need to consider other market for information theories that may 
apply other disclosure attributions with regard to information content of complementary and 
supplementary narratives.  These theories are discussed below. 
6.3.2.2 Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis 
The Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis (IRH) considers two market characteristics: (1) 
rational and homogenous expectation of participants and (2) quantified and non-quantified 
information.  Proposed by Bloomfield (2002), IRH criticises the rational expectation 
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assumption of EMH in two ways.  Firstly, in spite EMH asserting that neither technical nor 
fundamental analysis can yield above market returns in its weak and semi-strong form, 
respectively, there is substantial empirical evidence suggesting that investors and financial 
analysts engage in the activities.  Secondly, it is also evinced that despite regulators endeavour 
to impede obscurity in disclosures, managers engage in concealment habits, for example by 
information in footnotes.  However, even in such situations, EMH upholds that all information 
is reflected in prices regardless of attempts to conceal it.  
To moderate the perfect market in EMH to a more real world mechanism, IRH replaces the 
rational expectation assumptions with the noisy rational expectation.  The preposition 
recognises that in the market place, there are two types of agents, the noisy and rational 
traders.  Whilst the rational traders chose to trade based on analysing information, the noisy 
traders choose to trade randomly.  Since, noisy traders do not analyse information on the 
market, there is a possibility of mispricing which the rational investors exploit through their 
information advantage to make above normal profits.  The equilibrium position of the noisy 
rational expectation model is at the point where there are just enough rational traders to make 
the economic gains of analysing information equal to the costs of the collected information.  If 
rational traders are so many, the costs of collecting information will outweigh the profits from 
the information.  In a case of few rational traders, more traders that are rational are attracted to 
the market since the benefits of analysing information are greater than the costs.    
Pertaining to interim reports announcement, it may be considered that initial price adjustment 
to the news is a result of mixed reaction based on early perceptions about the information in 
the reports by both rational and noisy traders.  However, the post-announcement drifts ensue 
from further analysis by rational investors for price sensitive interim reports‟ information that 
was previously mispriced by noisy traders.  The relationship of this theory to IRH is the 
recognition that an event‟s full valuation on the market is gradual in the post-event period and 
not instant.  The presence of both rational and irrational investors under IRH and the resulting 
variability in interpreting disclosures denotes the prevalence of the entity concept.  The entity 
concept stipulates that the management and investors are separated and this may result in 
information asymmetry.  Theorising under IRH that information is perceived differently by 
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rational and irrational investors is a manifestation that the information is provided by a third 
party (management).  Further, the argument in IRH that investors‟ initial reaction to the 
disclosures is reflection of either rational or noisy trading stipulates that the disclosures can 
either reduce or reduce information asymmetry.  In addition, the post-announcement drifts to 
which IRH suggests that is an attempt by the market to correct the mispricing show that 
investors use disclosures, such as complementary and supplementary, to reduce the 
information asymmetry.  The initial reaction and post-announcement reaction show that the 
disclosures, such as complementary and supplementary narratives in interim reports, have 
information content.  This in turn is contrary to EMH semi-strong form, which stipulates that 
the disclosures cannot yield abnormal returns. 
Another assumption of IRH is that information is in two forms: data and statistics.  Data is all 
information about the firm and statistics are useful financial information extractable from the 
data.  Whilst the data is publicly available, statistics (for example financial ratios, profitability, 
and turnover) are hard to extract.  Given the costly exercise in computing statistical 
information, few investors base their trading on statistics thereby providing an opportunity to 
more investors to benefit from such information.  A caveat to IRH is that market inefficiency 
does not necessarily mean irrationality as there are cases where the cost of obtaining statistical 
information is higher than the abnormal profits accruing from the use of the information.  In 
such scenario, it is rational not to trade on such information; even though there is no full 
ramification of all available information.  
There is a large body of literature (e.g. Cheng et al. 1996; Francis and Schipper 1999; 
Hodgson and Stevenson-Clarke 2000) that concur that statistical data contains information 
content.  Further, studies such as Ball and Brown (1968) and Barberis, et al (1998) contend 
that although financial statement information has information content, other non-statistical 
disclosures are useful to investors.    
6.3.2.3 Market for “Lemons” 
Initiated by Akerlof (1970), the market for lemon (ML) theory is concerned with quality and 
uncertainty in a market in which many goods with varying valuation are traded.  The 
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presumption is that buyers will use statistics to evaluate their prospective purchase.  
Consequently, sellers are inclined to deceptively convince the buyers to buy their poor quality 
goods.  This theory is closely linked to the moral hazard phenomena widely explored in the 
works of Arrow (1963; 1965; 1971).  The moral hazard occurs when a well-informed party 
deliberately misinforms the other contracting party with intent of benefiting from the 
information asymmetry.   
Using the automobile market, Akerlof (1970) illustrated the ML with the decision to sell a car.  
In the initial periods of owning the car, the seller has a hazy estimate of whether the car is 
good or bad (lemon).  However, after owning and using the car for some time, a clearer 
judgement of whether the car is good or a lemon is formed.  At this point, there is information 
asymmetry between the seller who now has more information about the car and the buyer who 
virtually knows nothing about the car.  Due to the information asymmetry, the quality of car 
does not affect its value as the buyer cannot tell the difference between a good car and a 
lemon.  Hence, the buyer receives less quality for the amount he invests because of deception 
on the part of the seller.  The likelihood that a lemon can trade for a similar value to a good car 
creates adverse selection for the buyer as there was no incentive to trade in good cars for the 
seller.  There are more returns to deceptively sell bad cars for the price of good ones. 
Interpreting this scenario in reference to accounting disclosures, Kane (2004) argues that 
mangers can and actually inflate the firm‟s value and productivity by concealing unfavourable 
information and providing news that is more positive.  Watchdog agents are often either 
fooled or coerced to co-operate with the managers.  The recurrent capital market collapses in 
the 1990s, 2001 and 2008 reflect the difficulty in identifying the lemons in the financial 
reports.  
 Akerlof‟s (1970) solution to the perpetual disequilibria in the market place caused by 
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers is regulation.  Regulation will compel both 
parties to provide full information on the market, thereby eliminating adverse selection that 
arises from misinformation.  In addition, litigation may require sellers to repossess their goods 
in circumstances of failing to meet buyers‟ expectations.  However, Anderson (2001) criticised 
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the ML on four grounds.  One, the proposition ignores the fact that buyers can seek 
information from alternative sources other than the seller.  Two, the ML disregards the sellers‟ 
craving for repute.  Three, perpetual disequilibria is more of a myth than reality.  Economic 
market mechanisms operate in a manner that any instance of market imperfection creates 
entrepreneurial opportunities that correct the market deficiencies.  Four, regulation cannot 
solve all market problems and may even deter the free will of providing information that may 
result into litigation risk to the informant.  
As rhetoric toning (good and bad news) is prevalent in narrative reporting, the suggestion that 
investors may be misled to trade shares based on deceptive disclosures may indicate that these 
attributions in interim reports posses information content.  Secondly, the recognition of 
regulatory influence on information dissemination to rectify the delusion and provide investors 
with useful disclosures assents with the original intent for complementing and supplementing 
disclosures as expressed in ASB (2005; 2006).   A further note on the applicability of the 
market for lemon theory to this thesis is the observation in Anderson (2001) that the theory 
disregards the possibility of investors rectifying their positions when they realise that they 
were manipulated.  This observation may be considered to recognise post-event price 
movements that arise from further insight in disclosures which arguably are deduced from the 
level of attributions in the information.  Prior literature (e.g. Abrahamson and Amir 1996; 
Hope et al. 2008) regard attributions as indicators of precision having a propensity to provide 
investors with more useful revelations about the firm. 
The key conceptual foundation of the study in chapter 5 is agency that arises from the entity 
concept of the firm.  The agency relationship, if interpreted in terms Akerlof‟s (1970) market 
for lemons, stipulates that information asymmetry may be exploited by management to 
provide disclosures that mislead investors.  Hence, disequilibrium is experienced in the market 
for capital due to misleading disclosures that are supplied through the market for information.  
The market for regulation thereby supplies regulation to moderate the supply of information, 
such as complementary and supplementary narratives, and the usage of the disclosures for 
investment decision making.  This exhibits the connection of the three markets, that is, market 
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for capital, market for information and market for regulation with reference to usefulness of 
complementary and supplementary narratives.               
6.3.2.4 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory also capitalises on information asymmetry.  However, rather than 
concealment of information as in the ML, the signalling theory suggests that market agents 
with comparatively higher information advantage will maximise their returns by disclosing to 
less informed agents.  Initiated by Spence (1973; 2002), signalling requires the informed party 
in a contract to alleviate information asymmetry by giving signal to the other party.  The 
incentive to give the signal arises from the assumption that previously uninformed party will 
offer a better price for the commodity that would have otherwise offered in absence of the 
signal.  Although Spence (1973; 2002) illustrated signalling theory using the labour market, 
Morris (1987) argued that the phenomenon is extendable to any market where information 
asymmetry is prevalent.  Signalling theory arguably reflects the entity theory of a firm where 
the separation of the firm from its management creates information asymmetry.  Disclosures, 
such as complementary and supplementary narratives, therefore are provided to signal the 
performance of the business to investors who in turn use the information to make investment 
decisions. 
An example of signalling theory is where Ross (1979) explained that the voluntary provision 
of good forward-looking disclosures to the capital markets by managers is consistent with the 
signalling conjecture.  As managers are aware that the capital market evaluates their 
performance through share pricing, they provide information to avoid any under-pricing.  The 
shareholders, through the capital market, will accordingly base their decisions on the 
information to assess management‟s performance and prospects.  It is therefore advantageous 
for managers to provide good forward-looking disclosures.  Likewise, in instances where firms 
have no news or constant level of performance, managers are incentivised to signal their 
vacuity lest it may be misinterpreted as bad news.   
The querying of signalling theory arises from its failure to explain why managers conceal 
information.  Okcabol and Tinker (1993) contend that signalling falls short of justifying the 
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suppression of certain information such as bad news and competitively sensitive information.  
Thus, the meaning of the signal can be ambiguous in that investors would have no way of 
telling whether containment of disclosures is good or bad.  Even, in instances of good news in 
an inefficient market, strong form EMH provides an alternative motivation for concealing of 
information (Fama 1970).  According to EMH, strong form inefficiency compels insiders who 
have information that is potentially viable to posses above normal market returns to withhold 
with anticipation of profiting from it.   
6.3.2.5 Incomplete Contracting Theory 
Contract theory is construed to introduce the concept of agreement between parties.  Arrow 
and Debreu (1954) pioneered economic theory regarding completeness of contracts.  The 
researchers presented a model for competitive equilibrium based on finite properties, for 
example the number and specifications of commodities traded, the location at which each 
commodity is traded, the time of trading for each commodity were considered fixed.  The 
fixing of physical properties, location, price and time in an economic setting presented a case 
of perfect informativeness in a contract for sale of commodities.  This may alternatively be 
termed as a complete contract classifiable under mainstream economics contract theory 
(Masten 1999).  This type of contract assumes that contracting parties are symmetrically 
informed and there is no motivation for either party to strategically withhold or signal to the 
other party or even alter behaviour to unfairly gain by reducing the joint gains.  This 
contractual setting is synonymous to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) standard economic theory 
of the information market.  The theory considers market agents to have rational expectations 
and the information which the participants acquire at a fixed specified cost can be accurately 
assessed by all market participants.  Another reflection of complete contracting is Walrasian 
tâtonnment.  Vahabi (2002) and Arrow (1959) discuss the Walrasian tâtonnment as a market 
mechanism in which all participants are price takers.  An invisible hand in the economy, 
acting as an auctioneer “announces” market prices and the individual traders react by 
revealing their demand and supply plans but do not make any transactions until the auctioneer 
announces the equilibrium price.  Tâtonnment implies that the notional and actual demand or 
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supply do not defer, thereby no need to reconsider positions and no one can outperform the 
market.  
The complete contract theory, in relation to usefulness of complementary and supplementary 
narratives, may be traced to the entity concept explained in chapter 5, but in a situation where 
there is no information asymmetry.  In such a situation, the underlying assumptions of market 
perfection exhibit properties of EMH under semi-strong efficiency where accounting 
disclosures can only yield abnormal returns; therefore, the disclosures have information 
content equal to zero. 
The main deficiency of the mainstream thoughts on information economics from a contracting 
perspective is the assumption of symmetrical, rational interpretation of information amongst 
market participants.  Chen (2005) discusses various criticisms of the assumption.  First, 
information asymmetry is inevitable in the market place since information-processing abilities 
are imbalanced amongst people because each has unique background knowledge.  Worsening 
the asymmetry concern is the argument the uneven level of equivocation.  Equivocation is a 
measure of information asymmetry measured by the correlation between the source of 
information and receiver of information.  Given that the same financial report is produced for 
a variety of investor types, it would be impractical to assume a perfect correlation.  Third, the 
value of information is often inversely proportional to the number of people who understand 
it.  Chen (2005) illustrates this by suggesting that an investor who buys shares of a company 
before it becomes popular will normally earn a higher rate of return when the company 
becomes a blue chip on the market.  Warren Buffet hinted information asymmetry when he 
once suggested that while a few bought shares for the right reason in 1925, so many got it 
wrong in 1929 (Buffet 2001).   
The asymmetry in the market, therefore presents an alternative contract theory that may 
explain the usefulness of disclosures for share price determination, the incomplete contract.  
Hart and Moore (1988) ascertain that it would be extremely costly and impractical to have a 
complete contract between or amongst individuals.  The law often provides simplistic rules to 
supplement the incomplete contracts that often reflect normal transacting behaviour.  By 
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relaxing the rationality assumption, the incomplete contract hypothesis supposes that people 
have unlimited forecast and cognition, therefore departing from the ideal symmetrically 
informed contractual arrangements proposed in Arrow and Debreu (1954).  Another argument 
for incomplete contracts is the presumption that transaction costs deter parties from including 
all aspects of future into the current contract ex ante thereby allowing parties to contract on 
such issues ex post (Segal 1999).  There are two main results from the incomplete contracts, 
either non-renegotiable positions or renegotiable scenarios (Masten 1999). 
In the case of non-renegotiation, agency problems are common.  In these circumstances, the 
agent uses the information asymmetry to benefit from their superior informed position at the 
cost of the principal.  In a capital market setting, the execution of a non-renegotiable 
incomplete contract would occur when investors trade or do not trade their shares based on 
financial reports disclosures characterised with either deception or concealment.  The 
consequence would tantamount to the moral hazard or adverse selection problems.    
An alternative incomplete contract is the stance of renegotiation if disequilibria caused by 
information asymmetry posit an opportunity of ex post gains.  The conditions for the 
practicality of this contract are that the unrealised gains justify renegotiation and the 
contracting terms allow renegotiation if parties mutually consent (Masten 1999).  On realising 
such ex post gains, the market participants will continuously renegotiation their positions and 
recontract until the point when there are no returns associated with further recontracting.  This 
contracting phenomenon is similar to Edgeworth‟s recontracting theory.  Vahabi (2002) 
explains the Edgeworth‟s recontracting theory to be comparable to the Walrasian tâtonnment.  
However, rather than being price takers, the market participants are price makers and that 
there is actual contracting positions before agreeing on a final settlement.  The interim 
contracting positions reflect renegotiations arising from market players‟ use of free 
information flows by making and breaking contractual positions.  From a market for 
information perspective, such alteration of market positions reflects investors‟ revision of their 
prior positions after having more insight into intrinsic value in disclosures (Gonedes 1976).  
However, Fama (1998) disregards the idea that such price adjustments are an attack on EMH 
as such evidence of anomalies in empirical studies may reflect methodological errors.  
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Alternatively, if the anomalies occur on the capital markets, they are chances in a short term 
correctible in the long-term returns. 
In relation to this thesis, a case where there is non-zero information content of complementary 
and supplementary narratives, the incomplete contracting theory may be applied to recognise 
that information asymmetry exists because of the entity concept of the firm.  In such a 
scenario, the agency between investors and management contradicts EMH semi-strong form.  
This is similarly discussed by Gonedes (1976) that disclosures posses intrinsic information 
that can be used to gain above market returns. 
6.4 Market for Regulation Theories 
This study largely relies on regulation and standard setting as the recommendation to 
complement and supplement financial statements owes its origin to ASB (2005; 2006).  The 
market for regulation, as discussed in chapter 5, is a realisation that there are market failures in 
the markets for capital and information.  These failures arise from agency costs that accrue 
from management‟s pursuit of self-interests, which are not in line with investor interests.  In 
turn, the information provided to investors may be misleading, therefore, as argued by 
Seligman (1983), regulation is suffice to monitor the equitable operation of the markets for 
information and capital.  The regulations thereby are an assurance to the investors that the 
information, such as complementary and supplementary narratives, is reliable for the purpose 
of investment decision-making.  This is because regulation tends to reduce the information 
asymmetry that arises from the agency relationship between investors and management.  It is 
thus imperative to consider the market based theories regarding the effectiveness of regulation 
and standard setting to influence share prices through disclosures.   
Posner (1974) suggested two broad categories of economic markets based theories for 
regulation and standard setting, the public interest theory of regulation and the capture theory 
of regulation.  Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) put forward broad assumptions underlying the market 
theories of regulation.  Firstly, the theories assume that accounting information is a 
commodity subject to forces of demand by users and supply by the preparers.  The resultant is 
the provision of the optimal information at an optimal price.  If the market requires 
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information and offers the right price for it, the suppliers will offer the information if the cost 
of the disclosures does not exceed the price.  However, for an ideal mechanism, regulation and 
standard setting will complement the free market such that the right types of information are 
produced for the recipients.  The rationale for regulation is that both the suppliers and users of 
information want to maximise their profits from the information and there is need to protect 
either party in circumstances where the interests are in contention.   
6.4.1 The Public Interest Theory of Regulation 
This theory bases on the presumptions that economic markets are apt to inefficient or 
inequitable transacting and that government intervention is both almost costless and better 
alternative to self-monitoring concept of the markets (Posner 1974).   The demand of 
regulation is from the public and implementation of the regulation is for the public good.  
The cardinal critiques of this theory is that it is practically arduous to achieve a good result for 
the entire public and there is evidence that government agencies have not always been 
successful in achieving their objectives (Posner 1974).  Enrlich and Posner (1974) further 
criticise the public interest theory of regulation because of cost.  The output of public 
regulation is highly costly because the process of negotiating with stakeholders involves 
dealing with various bodies each with different motivations.  In the case of accounting 
disclosures, apart from investors, there are numerous stakeholders such as employees, 
environmentalists, and various industry agencies that may have to be consulted prior to 
formulating the regulative framework for the information.   
Since the regulatory motivation for complementing and supplementing were specifically 
intended for the interest of investors, the applicability of public interest theory of regulation 
may be doubtable to this research.  A contrary postulate that may support this theory is the 
adoption of the managerial accountability concept by Chen (1975) presented in Diagram 1 on 
page 100.  The concept considers investors as part of the entire society as owners of resources 
which are provided to the firm.  Based on this, regulatory requirement of accountability to 
society is implies disclosure to investors for investment decision making.   
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6.4.2 The Capture Theories of Regulation  
The capture theories provide an alternative to the public interest theory by proposing 
government agencies to act in the interest of the special interest groups whilst formulating 
regulation for those groups (Levine and Forrence 1990).  From this research‟s perspective, 
these theories ought to emphasise regulation of accounting disclosures to protect the interests 
of investors as opposed to protecting the interests of the entire public.  For example, ASB 
(2005; 2006) suggested that the need to complement and supplement financial statements was 
to aid investors understand the statements for the purpose of aiding their investment decisions.  
In Jenkins report (AICPA 1994), narratives are argued to be intended for investors as they are 
the “buying” consumers of accounting information.   
One way of viewing this capture phenomenon is the argument in Laffont and Tirole (1991) 
that special interest groups have a role in formulating public policy or regulation.  The 
alternative view is the Marxist thinking that big businesses control the institutions of society, 
including regulation (Posner 1974).   Capture theories are mainly supported in Olson‟s (1965) 
suggestion that businesses, whether big or small, can collectively act as building blocks to 
foster regulations for the industry to collectively benefit rules.  Conflicting interests amongst 
various special interest groups, for example suppliers and consumers, are arbitraged through 
government intervention (Laffont and Tirole 1991). 
Posner (1974) criticised the capture theories on the basis of lack of theoretical underpinnings.  
Firstly, the theories ignore the justification for the interaction between the regulated firm and 
the regulating agencies and resultantly, the regulation process is viewed as an outcome of 
bargaining between the two parties.  Secondly, no reason is provided to propose that special 
interest groups can efficiently regulate the firms.  The theory further ignores that often it is the 
interest of the customers or other interest groups that are fostered by the regulating agencies 
but not necessarily those of the firm.  
Capture theories may explain the regulation set by bodies such as SEC in the US (e.g. Benston 
1985).  However, Hussein and Ketz (1980) examined and rejected the applicability of the 
capture theory regarding FASB‟s accounting regulation activities.  Seligman (1983) supports 
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regulation on the ground that there is potential for management to conceal information that 
may adversely influence investor decisions. Further, the likelihood of insider trading, the 
deterioration of public confidence in capital markets and the resulting slowdown of economic 
growth all offer a case for regulation.   
Benston (1969) generally disregards the relevancy of regulation on the basis that with or 
without regulatory bodies, evidence of capital market failures have emerged over time.  
Secondly, competitive market mechanisms are efficient in protecting investors through 
allocation of capital to deserving firms.  Third, regulation has failed to end the debate 
regarding the timeliness and materiality of accounting disclosures.     
6.5 Schematic Diagram for Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical structure of the study is market based to reflect the principal aim of the study 
of establishing the usefulness of narrative disclosures to investors.  The stance adopted is that 
there are two markets in which information content of narratives is explained.  They are the 
market for capital and market for information where the respective products are capital and 
accounting disclosures.  In other words, the interaction of the markets is that there is an agency 
relationship between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents).  Whilst the principals 
supply capital to the agents to manage the company, they are in quest for information about 
the firm from the agents.  Elliott and Jacobson (1994) ideates this relationship between the two 
markets with the suggestion that investors are buying customers of accounting disclosures 
when they intend to or effectively trade based on the information. 
 However, as earlier discussed, the main motivation for regulation is the existence or 
propensity of market failures.  Therefore, the market for regulation is augmented by the 
interaction between the two markets (that for capital and that for information) to control free 
market deficiencies.  The inclusion of the economic theories of regulation in this thesis‟ 
theoretical framework recognises that the regulatory and standard-setting instruments, ASB 
(2005; 2006), recommend complementing and supplementing.  
Diagram 4 provides a sketch of the thesis‟ theoretical setting. 
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Diagram 4 Theoretical Framework for Usefulness of Complementary and Supplementary 
Narratives 
 
The framework above provides an illustrative impression for the theoretical framework 
explaining the essence of complementary and supplementary information to investors using an 
economic market based approach.  The first consideration is identification of the markets 
involved, that is, the market for capital and the market for information, distinguished above by 
the thick dotted line.  The upper section of the structure relates to the market for capital while 
the lower relates to the market for information. 
In the MC, the commodity traded is capital, supplied by the firm‟s shareholders and demanded 
by the entity‟s management.  In the MI, the commodity is information, in this case 
complementary and supplementary disclosures, supplied by management to the shareholders.   
The theories for the MC assume the mainstream economics perspective that the capital market 
is efficient and therefore all available information is correctly priced.  Therefore, since 
accounting disclosures are a form of information, they are accurately reflected in the share 
price and have no abnormal returns.  For reference,  the irrelevance of accounting narrative 
commentaries for share pricing is explained by Fama‟s (1970) semi-strong form efficiency of 
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EMH.  Since accounting information has no value in informing share pricing, the MC theories 
do not have any regard for the disclosures as visualised in the diagram above with the arrow 
symbolised as A .  
The theories for the MI reflect the heterodox economics, which consider inefficiency in 
markets.  The MI in reference to accounting disclosures realises that there is an agency 
relationship between shareholders and the firm‟s management, reflecting Jensen and 
Meckling‟s (1976) agency theory.  Therefore, for investors to make prudent investment 
decisions, they will require information to assess both the firm and management‟s 
performance.  Investors will demand information which in return they will use to supply 
capital to the capital market.  The theories under here consider that the two markets, MC and 
MI, interact as denoted with the arrows B.  Most crucial to the study is the UIH and ORH 
which considers disclosure attributions and post-event price adjustments to news.  Other 
augmenting theories include IRH, ML, signalling and incomplete contracting.  
The third group of theories is the market for regulation (MR) which is based on the possibility 
that free economic markets may fail to equitably or efficiently operate.  Regulations or 
standards by either government to protect the public in which markets operate or special 
interest to protect interests of their members are enforced on to the free economic markets.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) as well as Watts and Zimmerman (1979) opinionated that 
existence market failure justifies the consideration of regulations and standard setting to 
correct the market inefficiencies.  More related to this study, complementing and 
supplementing as the fundamental information types of concern are a result of a regulation and 
standard-setting documented in ASB (2005; 2006).  Arrows C above stand for the MR theories 
that may impact on either the functioning of the MC or the MI or their interaction.  The 
theories under this category include the public interest and the capture theories of regulation. 
6.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Given that the objective of the study is to investigate information content of narratives, a 
market-based theoretical approach is adopted since information content relates to market 
valuation of an event.  The purpose of this chapter was to discuss the theories that explain the 
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relevance of accounting disclosures to investment decision-making.  The discussion related to 
chapter 5 where the entity concept of the firm underlines the essence of accounting disclosures 
for the purpose of investment decision-making through which information asymmetry may be 
alleviated.  By way of the mainstream and heterodox economic mechanisms assumptions 
explained in chapter 5, the theories justifying information content of complementary and 
supplementary narratives are explained in this chapter.  The discussion is done by classifying 
the theories under the market for capital (mainstream) and the markets for information and 
regulation (heterodox).  
Under the mainstream stance, markets are efficient and the market agents have homogenous 
expectations as well as being rational.  This would suggest that no market participant can 
profit from new information on the market above the market return.  Concerning accounting 
disclosures, such a setting is reflective of the efficient market hypothesis in its semi-strong 
form which suggested that the information cannot be used to make abnormal profits.  Hence, 
in the market for capital narrative commentaries accompanying financial statements have no 
value.  
Alternatively, the heterodox mechanism recognises that there are market imperfections such as 
diversity in expectations and irrationality that result in market inefficiencies.  With regard to 
the relationship between accounting disclosures and capital markets, this setting presents the 
market for information.  Ideally, the theories under this stream intend to conjecture that 
accounting information affects share pricing in the market for capital.  The basis for this 
postulate is the existence of the agency relationship between shareholders and the firm‟s 
management arising from the contracting of managers to run the business on behalf of the 
shareholders.  Due to heterogeneous expectation, irrationality or other market inefficiencies, 
shareholders depend on information from managers to make investment decisions.  Thereby, 
management will reduce information asymmetry in attempt to attract capital from 
shareholders.  By providing accounting disclosures, management alleviates the risk of adverse 
selection on part of the shareholders.  However, another stream of market for information 
theories, there is an argument that would compel managers to mislead investors through 
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concealment and deception.  In such cases, information asymmetry leads managers to beget a 
moral hazard scenario through accounting disclosures. 
The realisation that free economic markets may not function efficiently or equitably largely 
due to inconsistencies between their assumptions and the real world applicability, the market 
for regulation theories are also considered in the theoretical milieu of the study.  A further 
problem is that integrating two markets, that for information and capital, results in conflicting 
assumptions and the posture regarding relevance of accounting disclosures in the investment 
decision-making process.  These problems may result in market failures that are presumably 
correctible through regulation.  Further, given that complementing and supplementing was 
introduced in the UK accounting environment through regulative instruments (e.g. ASB 2005; 
2006), it is suffice to consider the market for regulation and standard setting in the study.  
There are two broad regulatory theories, the public interest and the capture theories.  The 
public interest regulation theory in which regulation intends to control free economic markets 
for the good of the society.  However, with criticism such as the inability to have a common 
good for the entire public and high costs involved in negotiating regulation for the entire 
public, the capture theories of regulation are fostered.  The capture theories arise from special 
interest groups who formulate regulation or standards for the benefit of their members.  The 
cardinal critic of capture theories in Posner (1974) is that they have no definite theoretical 
underpinning.  Benston (1969) disregarded the broad relevancy of regulation on the ground 
that the presence and absence of regulation did not deter slumps in capital markets.  In 
addition, free markets can exhibit the potential to efficiently allocate resources without 
government intervention.   
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7 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters 5 and 6, various theories explaining the information content of 
narrative commentaries were discussed.  This chapter, which builds on preceding chapters, 
identifies the variables in disclosures and discuss theoretical and empirical underpinning 
regarding their importance to market returns.  Zimmerman (1987) recommended that relating 
research to theory enables the researcher to identify and explain variables that ought to be 
considered in pursuit of the objectives of the study.  Baiman (1990) supported this opinion and 
added that relating theory to the research question guides and focuses the analysis.   Gibbins, 
et al (1992) also agrees that synthesising of theoretical structure to variables provides a logical 
and synchronised linkage amongst variables.   
The independent variables in this research are in three broad categories: complementary 
narrative attributes, supplementary narrative attributes and control variables that include 
financial performance variables.  This structure is guided by the statement in ASB (2005; 
2006) that narrative commentaries need to complement and supplement the financial 
statements in order to assist investors understand the financial performance, position and 
direction of the company.  In other words, investors‟ comprehension of firm‟s financial 
performance is aided through financial statements and the accompanying narratives that ought 
to include complementary and supplementary commentaries.  As a recollection, in chapter 1, 
complementing and supplementing are defined in accordance to ASB (2005; 2006).  
Complementary narrative information refers to useful financial and non-financial information 
about the business and its performance that is not reported in the financial statements but which 
the directors judge might be relevant to the members‟ evaluation of the past results and 
assessment of future prospects.  Supplementary narrative information is defined as additional 
explanations of amounts recorded in the financial statements and explains the conditions and 
events that shaped the information contained in the financial statements. 
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It is worth noting that not all attributions of narratives are considered.  Wallace and Nasser 
(1995) argue that attaining a comprehensive disclosure profile for narratives is difficult due to 
various functions and stakeholders that accounting disclosures serve.  In line with the 
objectives of this study, that is to establish the information content of complementary and 
supplementary narrative commentaries, the focal reference for attributions is ASB (2005; 
2006).  In addition, prior literature (e.g. Beattie et al. 2004; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007) 
that considered accounting narrative disclosure attributes for investment decision making is 
referred to.     
To avoid subduing the statistical significance of the model, the number of attributions 
considered is also guided by recommendations in literature (Field 2005; e.g. Green 1991) on 
relationship between variables and sample size in regression analysis as discussed in section 
8.3 of this thesis.  Other considerations include the argument by Lorek and Willinger (1996) 
that too many or too few number of independent variables may lead to weak predictive 
performance.  In addition, Kvalseth (1985) suggested that the most influential independent 
variables should be considered.  Similarly, Cramer (1972) suggested each variable should have 
an independent contribution to ensure high predictive power of the model, thereby reducing 
the risk of multi-collinearlity.   
However, in spite of the arguments above, the selection of the variables was not entirely based 
on the strength of the variable.  In prior studies (e.g. Firth 1981; Francis et al. 2003; Wilson 
1986), relative information content has been applied to investigate the dominance of a variable 
or a set of variables over variables or group of variables in reference to explaining returns.  
Therefore, the ability to classify the variables into particular sets with a purpose of comparing 
the groupings‟ power in explaining share returns is a determining factor in this thesis to 
include variables in the models. 
In the hypotheses developed in this thesis, either a single or a combination of the theories 
explains relationship of the independent variables to share price returns.  The variables are 
categorised under complementary narrative attributes, supplementary narrative attributes and 
control variables.  For complementary and supplementary narratives, the attributes are 
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grouped according to two alternating techniques of measuring narratives through content 
analysis.  The techniques are disclosure variety and disclosure depth.  Disclosure variety has 
one attribute, that is, number of information items.  Disclosure depth has four attributes, 
including (1) good news, (2) amounts and comparison of present with past performance, (3) 
reasons for performance and (4) forward-looking disclosures.  Control variables are financial 
performance metrics.  The selection of the financial performance metrics was aimed at 
reflecting the nature of information that ASB (2005; 2006) stipulate that complementing and 
supplementing provides to investors: the financial performance, direction and position of the 
company.  The financial performance variables include the dividend yield and earnings per 
share, both as indicators of investment performance and direction, and total assets as a 
measure of position.     
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows.  The next section provides a diagrammatical 
impression of the hypothetical model relating the dependent and independent variables.  This 
is followed by the discussion on the hypotheses for the relative information content of 
complementary and supplementary narratives.  Thereafter, the hypotheses for the relative 
usefulness of the complementary and supplementary attributes under disclosure depth are 
considered.  Next, are hypotheses for the information content of the financial performance 
variables.  Lastly, the summary and concluding remarks to the chapter is provided.  
7.2 Relationship between Dependant and Independent Variables 
The objectives of the study are centred on the information content of complementary and 
supplementary narratives.  Therefore, the dependant variable reflects investor reaction to 
information, in this case, share price return.  Complementary and supplementary attributes of 
disclosure, either individually or in combination, are the independent variable, alongside 
financial performance measures.   
Diagram 5 shows the model construct for the study.  In the illustration, two sections of interim 
reports information are considered, the narrative commentaries and the financial statements.  
The narrative commentaries are disintegrated into complementary and supplementary 
disclosures, which are further dissection into disclosure quality attributes.  The attributes form 
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the complementary and supplementary narrative commentary independent variables.  The 
control variables are financial performance variables that are derivable from financial 
statements and/or metrics arising from financial market trading data 
Diagram 5 Hypothetical Information Content Model 
 
7.3 Usefulness of Complementary and Supplementary Narratives  
The main topics in disclosures with reference to this study are complementary and 
supplementary narratives.  To discuss the relative importance of complementary and 
supplementary narratives to share returns, this section examines a number of issues.  First, 
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o Good  News  
o Amount and Comparison with Past 
Performance 
o Reason for Performance 
o Forward-looking Disclosures 
Supplementary Attributes 
 (Independent Variables) 
 Disclosure Variety 
o Presence of Information Items 
 Disclosure Depth 
o Good  News 
o Amount and Comparison with Past 
Performance 
o Reason for Performance 
o Forward-looking Disclosures 
Control Variables 
(Independent Variables) 
 Dividend Yield 
 Earnings per Share 
 Total Assets 
Complementary Supplementary 
Financial Performance 
Measures 
Interim Report 
Narrative 
Commentaries 
Financial Statements Information 
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usefulness of financial reports‟ narratives in general is examined in relation the three markets 
under the theoretical framework, that is market for capital (MC), market for information (MI) 
and market for regulation (MR).  Next, is a discussion about the importance of complementary 
narratives for investment decision making.  This is followed by a discussion of investors‟ use 
of supplementary narratives.  Lastly, relative usefulness of complementary and supplementary 
narratives is discussed to formulate the respective hypothesis.  
7.3.1 Usefulness of Narrative Commentaries to Investors 
7.3.1.1 Market for Capital and Market for Information Justification 
The initial position is to consider ASB (2005; 2006) view which generally states that the 
narrative commentary provides information useful to investors in assessing the present and 
future performance of the business and the progress towards the achievement of future 
objectives.  The regulatory guide also requires that the disclosures are a reflection of the view 
of managers about the business performance and future prospects and these views are 
presented in a manner that captures the relevant aspects to investors.  This discourse reflects 
the discussion in chapter 5 where, under the entity concept of a firm, the agency concern 
created by separation of investors and management may lead to information asymmetry, 
thereby necessitating disclosures to aid investors make informed investment decisions. 
In Abrahamson and Amir (1996), narrative commentaries were considered to alleviate the 
discrepancy between the objective of financial statements and the ability of the actual content 
of the statements to fulfil this function.  Whilst financial statements are aimed at aiding 
investors in timing and valuing future cash flows and dividends, the information therein is 
purely historical.  However, management posses the information that can be helpful in 
explaining current performance and forecasting but such data cannot be expressed within the 
financial statements.  Therefore, narratives provide the platform for the disclosures.  Another 
argument for narratives is the ability to reduce information asymmetry as explained by 
Barberis, et al (1998) with regard to causes of under and over reaction to earnings figures.  In 
the case of under reaction, investors assume that figures have a large temporally component.  
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The reason is that investors may depend on the earlier earnings that may be too low to justify 
current earnings.  In the circumstance of over reaction, investors erroneously assume that past 
good performance is reflective of future good performance.  In such cases, more information is 
required to justify current earnings.    
To the contrary, although Ball and Brown (1968) recognised that other disclosures published 
with financial statements (for example, narratives) may have an influence on returns, they 
upheld that the income number captures nearly all information about the firm.  Also, Kanto 
and Schadewitz (2000) argued that due to the agency relationship, managers can successfully 
use narratives to mislead investors.   Further, some studies (e.g. Ali and Pope 1995; Ou and 
Penman 1989) conclude that financial statement figures arguably undermine the relevance of 
narratives.  Other studies take an indecisive opinion (e.g. Healy et al. 1999; Lev and Penman 
1990) and suggest that the association between abnormal returns and narrative disclosures 
reflects agency but explained as either a case of impression management or management‟s 
willingness to subdue information asymmetry.   
From the above discussion, the insufficiency of financial statements to provide all information 
required by investors as well as the presence of agency may be the underlying reasons why 
investors need narratives.  Given that investors need the information to make investment 
decisions, agency arguably creates two postures for providing the information.  The first is the 
reduction agency problems by providing disclosures that reduce information asymmetry, 
thereby a state of incremental information.  The second is a state of management impression 
where agency allows managers to increase information asymmetry.  Interpreting this with 
reference to the theoretical framework, a mixed theoretical paradigm drawn from the MC and 
MI seems to explain share price returns due to narrative commentaries.  The paradigm consists 
of efficient market hypothesis (EMH), uncertain information hypothesis (UIH), over reaction 
hypothesis (ORH) and incomplete revelation hypothesis (IRH).  The other theories include 
market for lemons (ML), signalling and incomplete contracting.  
Under EMH, when narratives are published, the market instantaneously reflects their value in 
share prices correctly to the level of market returns such that abnormal returns are nil.  So, if 
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the disclosures are bad, an accurate downward and immediate share price slump is observed.  
Alternatively, an exact positive and instant valuation of shares is experienced for good news.  
A nil effect will be realised immediately and rightly for narratives that are neither bad nor 
good.  In all cases under EMH, the return that accrues to investors on publication of narratives 
is the market return or nil abnormal returns.   
For UIH and ORH, the perfections that cause accurate share price reactions to narratives are 
relaxed.  However, the right direction of movement is sustained but is only over or under 
reacted to and the right value of the information is achieved with time.  This could imply that 
the disclosures have information content, however, full comprehension of the disclosures is 
realised with time.  The delay may be argued be caused by either the degree of rationality in 
investors or extent to which the effect of the information in the narratives is easily understood.  
The easiness in understanding disclosures could possibly be embedded in the level of 
attributions in narratives.  This line of reasoning is drawn from disclosure extent studies (e.g. 
Beattie et al. 2004; Beattie and Thomson 2007; Hooks et al. 2002a; Wallace and Nasser 1995) 
which suggest that the level of attributions enhances the quality and preciseness of 
information.   To relate to UIH and ORH, therefore, it is inferable that the level of attributions 
in narratives enhances investors‟ understanding of disclosures.   
Under IRH, the market is comprised of both irrational and rational investors.  This possibly 
signifies that some investors can understand the impact of disclosures but others may not.  
Therefore, narratives serve two roles, either impression management (to misled investors) and 
incremental information (to non-misled investors).  As the rational investors rightfully 
interpret the narratives and correctly value them in the share prices, the misled investors fail to 
rightly value the disclosures.  The rational investors later realise an opportunity to profit from 
the mispricing and take advantage of it to earn abnormal profits.  A number of deductions 
could be made from this mechanism.  Firstly, unlike UIH and ORH, share prices could move 
either direction, regardless of whether the information is good or bad due to the influence of 
irrational trading by some investors.  Secondly, the theory recognises that the agency 
relationship and the presence of both rational and irrational investors may create an 
opportunity for both incremental information (reduction of uncertainty) and impression 
 189 
 
management (increase of uncertainty).  The rebounding of rational investors to make abnormal 
returns from the decisions of irrational investors suggests that the true valuation for the 
narratives is not instantaneous but rather gradual.  
The ML and signalling theories, as well incomplete contracts may be considered to suggest 
that the rhetoric or discourse and the selection of information provided in narratives may 
influence investors‟ decisions.  For example, under ML, the main concern is selection of 
information where the concealment strategy is adopted.  For signalling theory, managers may 
use the disclosures to either mislead or direct investors about the important aspects of 
performance.  In incomplete contracts, attributions in disclosures play a key role to enhance 
the completeness of the contract between firm managers and investors with regard to 
information dissemination.   
7.3.1.2 Market for Regulation Justification 
Given that the objective of this study is to investigate the information content of 
complementary and supplementary disclosures, it is imperative to relate to the theoretical 
perspectives in the market for regulation.  Complementing and supplementing arise from the 
regulatory guidelines by ASB (2005; 2006) where it was conceptualised the disclosures should 
reflect management‟s view of performance with an aim of aiding investors understand the 
performance for investment decision-making.  This implies that Accounting Standards Board 
recognised the entity concept thereby necessitating the disclosure from management about 
performance through complementary and supplementary narratives to investors.  In turn, the 
Board expected that such disclosures would alleviate information asymmetry and help 
investors make decisions about their investment.  This reflects the arguments in chapters 5 and 
6 that the entity concept of the firm is prone to information asymmetry due to the agency 
relationship between investors and management.  To reduce the asymmetry, the mechanisms   
of the mainstream economic market (market for capital) and heterodox economic market 
(markets for information and regulation) make the disclosures relevant for investment 
decision-making.  Whilst the market for capital (mainly based on EMH semi-strong 
efficiency) and the market for information (based on criticism of EMH semi-strong efficiency) 
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mutually interact, the market for regulation plays the role of ensuring equitable resource 
allocation within the two markets.  This role of regulation theories with respect to usefulness 
of accounting disclosures is acknowledged by Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) by the suggestion that 
agency is the main realm fostering the debate between regulating and deregulating accounting 
disclosures for investment decision-making.  The reasons for regulating disclosures arise from 
the impression management perspective of agency, including concealment, misinformation 
and underproduction of accounting information.  The reasons indicate free economic market 
failures, correctible through regulation by monitoring the nature of information provided to 
investors and penalising management for incompetence or intent to provide reliable 
disclosures.   
These market failures are either explicit or implicit.  Gonedes and Dopuch (1974) suggested 
that the explicit market failure arises from the disparity between quality or quantity of a 
commodity produced in an regulated market and the benefits or costs derived or arising from 
the commodity.  Given that accounting information is a public good by nature, if not 
regulated, it may be impossible to reduce the benefits of non-purchasers.  This possibility to 
gain from information without paying for it presents the non-Pareto equilibria.  Secondly, the 
likelihood of disparity between the quality or the quantity of disclosures and the value paid (in 
form of share pricing) justifies the need of regulation (Riahi-Belkaoui 2004).  
The implicit arguments for regulating accounting disclosures are various.  Ball (1972) 
suggests that managers have a monopolistic advantage regarding information about the firm 
which they may inappropriately use to impress investors.  Regulation therefore deters the 
occurrence of such behaviour.  Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) explains four implicit market failure 
hypotheses arising from accounting methods variety, that is, naive investors, functional 
fixation, misleading numbers and procedural diversity.  The naive investor concept claims that 
unsophisticated investors may be fooled through various accounting methods and performance 
measure terminologies.  Functional fixation recognises that some investors, whether 
sophisticated or non-sophisticated fail to change their processing of accounting disclosures in 
relation to changes in accounting technique changes or types.  Impliedly, the change in 
accounting techniques may result into change in accounting numbers and may mislead 
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investors due to naivety or functional fixation.  Even without change in accounting techniques, 
the diversity in accounting procedures may makes it difficult for investors to make adequate 
investment decisions amongst firms on a cross-sectional basis.  Leftwich (1980) attributes the 
longitudinal and cross-sectional incomparability of accounting disclosures to the lack of 
objective criteria that management may use to select an accounting technique or discourse.  
Hammersley, et al  (2008) expounded that the requirement by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2008 to 
provide disclosures of internal controls in the US was intended to warn investors on the 
potential financial statement problems resulting from controls.  Resultantly, the information 
asymmetry problem would be curbed.  The results of their study supported this hypothesis 
with share price returns were impacted by the disclosures.  Results in Greenstone, et al (2006) 
were in agreement that mandatory disclosures have information content.    The provisions in 
the US Securities Act of 1964 were amended to require audited financial reports, informative 
proxies, insider trading disclosures and over-the-counter trades to big firms.  Firms affected by 
the disclosures had statistically significant abnormal returns in the period the laws were passed 
compared to the unaffected firms on the NYSE and AMEX.  The study argued that there are 
high costs contained in formulating and enforcing complete contracts; therefore regulation 
through mandated disclosures is sufficient to monitor the private contracts.  The mandatory 
disclosures eliminate any ambiguity regarding what ought to be disclosed and provide 
shareholders with certainty on the information expected from managers.  A demonstration of 
the irrelevance of regulation is arguably in evidence of information content of voluntary 
disclosures.  Lev and Penman (1990) argue that non-mandated disclosures substantiate the 
conjecture that management are willing to reduce information asymmetry by providing 
information that screens or signals their firms as viable investment ventures in comparison to 
those that do not provide discretionary information.  This screening or signalling is an 
indication that the firm is undervalued and the information will aid correction of the firm‟s 
price.  However, Lang and Lundholm (2000) had mixed findings regarding the provision of 
voluntary disclosures prior to equity offering.  Firms that maintained a constant level of 
disclosure suffered minimal price declines on equity issuance; suggesting that their pre-offer 
disclosures reduced asymmetry.  Firms that substantially increased their disclosures in the pre-
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offer period faced significant price decline on declaration of their intent to issue equity 
manifested adverse selection.    
7.3.2 Complementary Narrative Commentaries 
ASB (2005, para 14; 2006, para 14) conceptualised that complementary narratives help 
investors in evaluating past results and future performance to inform their investment 
decisions.  In IASB (2005, para 41), complementary narratives are argued to help users 
interpret financial statements or improve users‟ ability to make economic decisions.  Both 
perspectives would arguably indicate that complementary narratives are associated with share 
returns.  In the academic realm, only Tauringana and Mangena (2006) distinguished between 
complementary and supplementary.  They argued that complementary disclosures are essential 
for aiding the investment decision-making process.  Flostrand and Strom (2006) discussed that 
investors are becoming more inquisitive in the non-financial statements value factors affecting 
of the firm.  They exemplify this conjecture with the attempt of the balance sheet to include 
intangible items such as goodwill.  However, the figures are inadequate in explaining the 
entire intrinsic value of the firm.  Their results confirmed that analysts use the non-financial 
statement information in financial reports, particularly forward-looking disclosures.  The 
finding indicated investors‟ preference for leading rather than lagging financial statement 
information.  In relation to the conceptual framework of the study, the discussions by 
Tauringana and Mangena (2006) and Flostrand and Strom (2006) tends to be suggestive of a 
scenario criticising EMH where the agency between investors and managers necessitates the 
provision of complementary narratives by managers.  The disclosures in turn are value 
relevant because of the information asymmetry they reduce, therefore are useful in the 
investment decision-making process. 
7.3.3 Supplementary Narrative Commentaries 
Under ASB (2005, para 15; 2006, para 15), supplementary narratives are considered to 
provide explanations of the amounts in the financial statements as well as explanations of 
events and conditions that shape the financial statements.  However, the regulatory guides 
provided no reason to justify the usefulness supplementary disclosures to investors.  
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Tauringana and Mangena (2006) provided various incentives for supplementing.  Firstly, 
explanations for changes in financial performance figures are crucial for informing the 
investors‟ judgement with regard to investing in a firm.  For unsophisticated investors, the 
supplementary information provides an illuminating narration about the financial statements 
disclosures, making them easier to understand.  Prior literature (e.g. Bartlett and Chandler 
1997; Courtis 1986; Lee and Tweedie 1976) all agree that unsophisticated investors find 
financial statements difficult to understand.  Beaver, et al (1989) argued that mandatory 
supplementary disclosures in banks financial reports provide explanations of the financial 
statement figures.  The results in their study indicated that the information content of 
supplementary disclosures about default and interest rate risks showed that the narratives were 
important to investors.  Hutton, et al (2003) suggested supplementary narratives provide a 
“soft-talk” alternative that increases the credibility of earnings as they provide further detail 
about the figures.  Secondly, in case of good news about financial performance, the 
supplementary narratives also serve a credibility role by eliminating scepticism about the 
figures.  Lev and Penman (1990) expound on the credibility perspective of supplementary 
disclosures with the conjecture that they are verifiable by reference to financial statements or 
ex-post in case of forward-looking disclosures.  The justification for supplementary-type 
disclosures highlighted by most studies (e.g. Bartlett and Chandler 1997; Courtis 1986; Hutton 
et al. 2003; Lee and Tweedie 1976; Tauringana and Mangena 2006) is to illuminate on the 
figures in the financial statements.  This line of reasoning arguably shows that due to agency, 
managers are superiorly informed, compared to investors, and reduce this gap with regard to 
financial statements information, supplementary narratives are warranted.  If the reduction of 
asymmetry interprets into information content, as most of these studies imply, then this 
contradicts EMH and fosters the market for information theories such as UIH and IRH.   
Alternatively, supplementary narratives in interim reports may not have information content.  
Ahmed and Ian (2005) argues that institutional investors and analysts often hold briefings with 
management, for instance monthly or quarterly.  Further, various studies (e.g. Abarbanell and 
Lehavy 2000; Barber et al. 2003; Bozzolan et al. 2009; Jegadeesh et al. 2004; Orens and 
Lybaert 2007) recognise that analyst use disclosures to obtain the most accurate forecast of 
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earnings.  Therefore, it is likely that they would be keen to get information that relates closely 
to profitability to arrive at the best estimate of earnings.  Arguably, such information if 
disclosed in interim reports may be more reflected in supplementary narratives than 
complementary narratives since it is closely linked to earnings.  Therefore, it may not have 
information content as it was already disclosed in the briefings and does not present new 
information to the market.  In other words, the information asymmetry about earnings and 
related narratives would have been reduced at the briefings and not at the time of releasing the 
interim reports.   
7.3.4 Relative Usefulness of Complementary and Supplementary 
Narrative Commentaries 
From a regulatory perspective, neither ASB (2005; 2006) nor IASB (2005) provide a 
theoretical comparative rationale for complementary and supplementary narratives.  However,  
Tauringana and Mangena (2006) argued that since supplementary narratives refer to the 
specific amounts in financial statements, the disclosures are easier to regulate unlike 
complementary commentaries.  In the perspective of the investor protection incentive for 
government intervention in the markets of capital and information, simplicity in regulation 
enhances the efficacy of the market for regulation which is to minimise free economic market 
failures.  This conforms to auxiliary theoretical underpinnings for regulation, such as the 
adjunct role of regulation in incomplete contracts, alleviation of information asymmetry and 
adverse selection.  Further, the feasibility of regulation for supplementary disclosures may 
correct the markets failures identified in Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) that include naive investments, 
functional fixation, misleading numbers and procedural diversity.  Secondly, the closeness of 
supplementary disclosures to the highly regulated financial statements which at times are 
audited fosters the argument that the disclosures are verifiable (Hutton et al. 2003).  The 
comparatively low level of verification for complementary disclosures, the credibility concern 
becomes apparent in narratives that are not easily traceable to financial statements (Stocken 
2000).   Also in support of supplementary disclosures could be the argument in Modigillian 
and Miller (1958) that when adjusted for errors, the earnings figure is the most important 
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explanatory factor for the value of the firm and its common stock.   Inferably, this would 
arguably indicate that narrative commentaries intended to explain financial statement figures 
are more valuable than other narratives.   
Complementary narratives may be justified by the deficiency in financial statements which 
arguable affect narratives that are directly linked to financial statements.  Firstly, accounting 
numbers fail to timely reflect economic events and therefore may not explain share price 
movements (Beaver et al. 1980).  Secondly, earnings are prone to measurement errors and do 
not possess the intrinsic value of the firm that may not be expressible in quantifiable terms 
(Hayn 1995).  The flexibility of complementary disclosures in providing information about the 
various aspects of the organisation other than financial statements may explain the relevance 
of the disclosures.  Complementary narratives are argued to be useful since they are able to 
reduce information asymmetry while expounding on the intrinsic value of the firm in the 
various aspects undisclosed in financial statements.  Such evidence includes Bukh, et al (2005) 
and Dumay and Tull (2007) with reference to intellectual capital disclosures; Hammersley, et 
al (2008) on internal controls; Warner, et al (1988) and Collet (2002) regarding management 
changes; and Milne and Chan (1999) on social disclosures. 
Given the lack of particular reasons for distinguishing between complementary and 
supplementary narratives in ASB (2005; 2006) and IASB (2005), there seems no motivation to 
suggest that either of the narrative types is more important with reference to share returns.  
Both complementing and supplementing are justified on ground that they aid investors in 
making investment decisions in the regulatory guides.  In support of this neutral position is 
Wilson and Allison-Koerber‟s (1992) argument that the integration of qualitative and 
quantitative perspectives of data enhances the predictive power of information.   For these 
reasons, the following hypothesis is formulated:  
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H 1: There is no difference in the information content of complementary and supplementary 
narrative disclosures 
7.4   Relative Usefulness of Attributes under Disclosure Depth 
Under disclosure variety, one attribute (number of information items) is used to measure 
narratives.  The attribute‟s hypothesis for relative information content of complementary and 
supplementary narratives is implicit in hypothesis H 1 above.  For disclosure depth, 
complementary and supplementary narratives are estimated using a set of four attributes.  The 
attributes are good news, amounts and comparison of current with past performance, reasons 
for performance and forward-looking narratives).  To this effect, the hypotheses below relate 
to the relative information content of complementary and supplementary narratives for each 
disclosure depth attribute.  
7.4.1 Good News 
Abrahamson and Amir (1996) consider good news in narrative commentaries as an attempt by 
managers to “sugar coat” performance or impress investors, whereas bad news have 
information content.  For good news, this argument aligns with notion that managers exploit 
information asymmetry arising from agency by misleading investors.  For bad news, however, 
managers adopt a contrary strategy of eliminating information asymmetry by disclosing 
factual past or future events that affect performance.  Likewise, results in Lee, et al (2004) 
suggested that investors are interested in bad news as the disclosures portray management‟s 
openness and willingness to take responsibility of controllable events.  However, Lang and 
Lundholm (2000) consider a double-faced conjecture for good news by relating the firm‟s 
performance to its economic environment.  If there is no change in the economic conditions, 
good news disclosures were considered as an endeavour to hype the share and thus reflected 
negatively to share pricing.  Alternatively, where positive economic changes prevailed, good 
news reduced information asymmetry and thus positively affected share returns.   
Another view explaining the effect of rhetoric toning on share price returns are the signalling 
and adverse selection theories.  Lev and Penman (1990) explained that firms with good 
performance will disclose in an attempt to distinguish themselves from poor performing ones.  
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They further conjecture that firms with bad news would conceal the information to avoid 
affecting their share prices.  The results affirmed the proposition for disclosing good news on 
ground that such information aids in correcting misevaluation if its credibility is verifiable 
either ex ante or ex post the reporting date.  Concealment however did not result into negative 
share price returns; thereby not reflecting the view that investors consider non-disclosure as 
bad news.  Arguably, the lack of information content may have reflected either that the 
disclosures do not reflect managerial opportunistic tendencies or management success in 
misleading the market. 
These arguments for and against the usefulness of good and bad news which mainly base on 
verifiability of the disclosures owe their origin to the information asymmetry arising from the 
agency relationship between investors and managers.  Impliedly, this reflects principal-agent 
paradigm between investors and managers discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Coarse (1937) which Fama (1980) uses to explain working of capital markets and markets for 
managerial behaviour.   The relationship creates a divergence in interest where the agents (the 
managers) try to maximize their fees for management whilst the principals (investors) are 
inclined to maximise their returns from the investment.  Therefore, in a bid to bargain higher 
management fees, managers may emphasise good news and de-emphasise bad news reflecting 
either Akerlof‟s (1970) market for lemons in instances where the disclosures are misleading or 
show signalling of good performance as theorised by Spence (1973; 2002).  Alternatively, 
willingness to emphasise bad news and underplay good news in periods of bad performance, 
as discussed by Lee, et al (2004), may show that management‟s enthusiasm to reduce 
information asymmetry arising from agency.  With reference to the market for information and 
regulation theories, this can be explained by Akerlof‟s (1970) solution to the market for lemon 
that regulation deters management from misleading investors.    
With regard to comparative usefulness for complementary and supplementary narratives, 
rhetoric toning may be explained based on verifiability.  Tauringana and Mangena (2006) 
argued that supplementary disclosures are easily confirmed than complementary narratives 
through cross-examination with the regulated, and at times audited, financial statements.  
Therefore, it is assumable that the complementary narratives are more prone to opportunistic 
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behaviour than supplementary disclosures.  Contrary, studies (e.g. Abrahamson and Amir 
1996; Lev and Penman 1990) justify the usefulness of rhetoric toning through the ability of the 
attribute to provide an insight into the future.  In this respect, good/ bad news in 
supplementary disclosures is less relevant to investors.  The complementary attribute for good/ 
bad news is therefore more useful, despite being unverifiable.  Lev and Penman (1990) 
contend that verifiability for forward looking information is possible ex ante.  Therefore, the 
usefulness of the rhetoric toning in complementary disclosures may be comparatively above 
that in supplementary narratives.  Another argument in favour of rhetoric toning in 
complementary narratives may be drawn from the possibility of the disclosures to provide 
intrinsic value that cannot be expressed in supplementary information.  As earlier discussed, 
studies (e.g. Bukh et al. 2005; Dumay and Tull 2007; Hammersley et al. 2008; Warner et al. 
1988) finding information content in themes of complementary nature explain their result by 
the limitation that financial statements are fixed on financially measurable business aspects.  
Since supplementary disclosures are anchored to financial statements, they suffer the inherent 
restraint of inflexibility.  Good/ bad news in supplementary disclosures can only be interpreted 
from absolute values on the face of financial statements and changes thereof.   
The mixed arguments about the comparative usefulness for good or bad news in 
complementary and supplementary narratives lead this research to hypothesise that:  
H 2 There is no difference in the information content of complementary and supplementary 
attribute of good news 
7.4.2 Amount and Comparison with Past Performance 
7.4.2.1 Disclosure of Amounts 
Quantification in narratives refers to the disclosure strategy of using statistics or numbers in 
commentaries.  Abrahamson and Amir (1996) argued the use of amounts preserves the 
credibility of disclosures since it is verifiable, particularly if the amounts relate to the financial 
statements.  In essence, quantities in narratives provide more precision to the non-quantified 
disclosures, thereby providing investors with more specific parameters to use for decision-
making.  Kasznik and Lev (1995) provide a conditioned hypothesis for usefulness of the 
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quantification attribute.  If there is a large divergence between actual performance and investor 
expectations, management will provide statistical attributions to reduce the expectation gap.  
However, where the expectation gap is relatively small, managers have less motivation to 
disclose amounts because factual verifiable attributions may excite investors‟ into scrutinising 
the information.  Consequentially, risks of managerial reputation loss and litigation may 
escalate.  The arguments are in line with the incremental information effect of disclosures 
arising from agency that presumes that managers have superior informed position about the 
firm and will avoid mispricing by reducing information asymmetry.  However, where the risk 
of mispricing is minimal due to low information asymmetry, there is no motivation to provide 
attributes that are more precise.  The degree of attribution based on information asymmetry 
also closely relates to uncertain information hypothesis (UIH) and incomplete revelation 
hypothesis (IRH).  As discussed in section 7.3.1.1 above, the level of uncertainty in goodness 
or badness of disclosures is based on scale of preciseness.  Therefore, to positively influence 
share price returns, uncertainty or bad news under UIH needs to be alleviated through 
extended preciseness.  In IRH, quantified disclosures are considered to provide a higher 
degree of exactitude that lessens incomplete information relevant for share pricing.       
Another reason explaining the usefulness of the amount attribution is the signalling theory.  
Schadewitz, et al (2002) and Penno (1996) discuss that firms that have performed badly or 
have large performance surprises will prefer to provide attributes that are more exact.  It is 
anticipated that this strategy deters investors‟ dependence on the current performance but 
rather on expected future performance and an extended analysis of the poor performance.  
This disclosure strategy was termed as back-to-the-wall strategy, which may result into 
delayed share price returns as investors seek for intrinsic value from the precise detail 
provided.  Alternatively, in cases of good performance or expected performance, companies 
adopt the don‟t-rock-the-boat strategy where they chose to signal with less precision.  As a 
result, investors are aware that there is no surprise and will correctly value the firm based on 
the less precise disclosures.   
With reference to complementary information, studies that confirmed the association between 
the quantification attribution and share price returns include Berry et al (1998) and Misund et 
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al (2008)  who used high level operating data in the petroleum industry.  More evidence on the 
usefulness of the amount attribute in complementary narratives includes Lajili and Zeghal 
(2006) on human capital disclosures, Smith et al (1984) regarding foreign payments and 
various studies on segment analysis (e.g. Givoly et al. 1999; Hope et al. 2008; Thomas 2000).  
For supplementary narratives, studies confirming information content of the quantification 
attribute include Francis et al (2002) and Baber et al (2006).   
There is a complexity in judging the relative information content of the quantification 
attribution between complementary and supplementary disclosures from prior literature.  
Studies (e.g. Baber et al. 2006; Francis et al. 2002) use the quantification attribution from 
supplementary disclosure to cover most of the bottom line themes of financial statements.  
However, complementary studies, as the ones above, only concentrate on a single theme such 
as human capital, segmental analysis or high operational data.  With reference to theoretical 
conclusion on the usefulness of the attribute, the arguments are mixed.  This may be 
aggravated by the concern raised in Beattie, et al (2004) and Tauringana and Mangena (2006) 
that whilst all narratives based on financial statements are quantifiable, some narratives of 
complementary nature are non-quantifiable. 
7.4.2.2 Comparison of Current with Past Performance 
In addition to quantification, in most cases narratives offer a comparison of current with past 
performance for the respective information item.  This is especially in most aspects of 
financial statement based narratives (supplementary disclosures) as well as segment analysis 
and high level performance data (complementary disclosures).  One explanation to the 
usefulness of performance comparisons is the incremental information concept through 
signalling.  The notion presupposes that managers will signal positive progress of the company 
to investors as an indicator of a good direction of the business.  Collet (2002) exemplified this 
notion with positive association of returns to disclosures of redundancies and new job 
openings in the UK indicating that the redundancies meant an attempt to reduce cost base 
whilst new jobs announcements positioned the firm to take advantage of revenue and earnings 
opportunities.   
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Another incremental information perspective through which the comparison attribute may be 
useful to investors is the closure of the information gap about past performance and the effect 
of such performance affecting future outcomes.  SEC (1980), suggests that financial 
statements are insufficient to assist in projecting future performance by inference from past 
performance.  Therefore, narratives can provide extensive comparatives from which investors 
can make predictions.  ASB (2005; 2006) also noted that the relevance of disclosing past 
performance trends is in the ability of the information to have implications on future 
performance.  Specifically, the regulation required firms to disclose known trends in 
performance, liquidity and capital resources.  Riley et al (2003) argues that seasonality is one 
of the instances in which comparison with past performance can be reflective of future 
performance; affirming the importance of the longitudinal benchmarking in narratives.   
Hope et al (2008) view the relevance of the comparison attribute from the relationship 
between information asymmetry and cost of capital.  Given the computation work involved in 
arriving at comparatives and then appraising the result into future cash flows, it is likely that 
investors will incur less information cost if comparatives are provided in financial reports.  
Otherwise, investors would employ more resources for the computations.  This relationship 
between disclosures and cost of capital is articulated in Botosan, et al (2004).  If there is more 
precision in private information (in this case private computation of comparisons) then the 
cost of capital will be high, thereby investors will demand higher share price returns.  
However, higher precision in public information (in this study relating comparatives in interim 
report narratives), investors will demand less returns or lower cost of capital due to less 
asymmetry.  These arguments align with incomplete revelation hypothesis, which suggested 
that quantification in narratives present, more precision in disclosures that may help in 
attaining abnormal returns.  Given that most of the comparative information, especially for 
supplementary disclosures, is numeric in nature, the benchmarking attribute may be 
considered to yield abnormal returns under IRH.  
A contrary view on the relevance of comparatives is also assumed from the information 
asymmetry problem inferred from the agency relationship between managers and 
shareholders.  Under this standpoint, disclosure literature (e.g. Cassar 2001; Guillamon-Saorin 
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2006; Lewellen et al. 1996; Schrand and Walther 2000) considers that managers selectively 
choose past benchmark figures that portray better current performance.  Two notions under the 
market for lemon hypothesis may explain this biasness.  First, the adverse selection envisages 
that managers intentionally use their advantaged informed positions to manipulate information 
in a manner that is self-suiting.  This line of reasoning is augmented by observation in Riahi-
Belkaoui (2004) that performance comparability in financial reports is  made difficult by the 
variability in accounting techniques and the firms‟ autonomy in selecting operating 
performance measures.  Second, the moral hazard postulates that management use the 
diversity in accounting methods and performance measures to choose benchmarking figures 
that conceal bad news.  For example, Guillamon-Saorin (2006) found that most of the 
comparative disclosures in press releases were used to emphasise positive figures.   
In hypothesising for the relative information content of the comparison of current with past 
performance attribute in complementary and supplementary commentaries, three factors are 
considered.  As discussed in subsection 7.4.2.1 above, unlike supplementary disclosures, not 
all complementary narratives are quantifiable, therefore comparable.
3
    Secondly, possibly 
related to the quantification problem, most literature on usefulness of comparison attribution 
in narratives has concentrated on supplementary type of narratives, and the few studies on 
complementary narratives have concentrated on a few themes.  Thirdly, the theoretical 
explanations of the attribute‟s usefulness to returns are divergent.    
                                                 
3
 In this study, to reduce the dependence of the comparison of current with past performance attribute on the 
disclosure of amounts, comparison are recognised as a rhetoric through which firms mention about past 
performance and current performance within an information item with or without reference to amounts.    
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From the discussions above on the relative usefulness complementary and supplementary 
information with regard to the attributes of disclosure of amounts and comparison of current 
with past performance, this study hypothesises that: 
H 3 There is no difference in the information content of complementary and supplementary 
attributes of disclosure of amount and comparison of current with past performance 
7.4.3 Reasons for Performance 
The relevance of the explanatory attribution lies in the ability of the ascription in reducing 
information asymmetry arising from the agency relationship between investors and managers, 
thereby providing incremental information.  One aspect of this argument is the realisation that 
explanations can provide further detail on a firm‟s performance and plans used by investors to 
value the firm, hence rejecting the applicability of EMH under semi-strong efficiency.  
Regulatory guides have adopted this position in justifying the attribution.  ASB (2005; 2006) 
argue that entire operation and financial review provides main factors underlying the 
development, performance and position of the company both in the reporting and future 
periods.  The essence is to assist shareholders examine the corporate strategies and the 
capability of the strategies to function.  Similarly, SEC (1987; 1989) and Baginski, Hassell et 
al. (2002; 2004) suggested that material performance changes need explanations to make 
disclosures useful to investors when estimating future cash flows.  This discourse directs to the 
incremental information postulate for explanatory attribution with a view that explanations 
weaken incidences of information asymmetry, especially when conjecturing future 
performance from past and present performance.   
 Another tenet for the usefulness of the causal attribution is the signalling theory arising from 
agency based on the credibility of the disclosures, leading to either impression management or 
incremental information.  Managers are well aware that their performance and the firm‟s 
performance may be interpreted from disclosures in financial reports (Staw et al. 1983).  This 
compels them to adopt a selective self-servicing expression style language while explaining 
performance given that they have an information-advantaged position.  Instances of this biased 
behaviour include Clatworthy and Jones‟ (2003) argument that successes are attributed to 
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internal factors but failures to externalities.  Further evidence is in Hutton et al (2003) where 
more quantitative and verifiable explanations were provided for good news.  However, 
qualitative and non-verifiable justifications, including factors such as macroeconomic, 
industry level, firm-specific, long/ short-term prospects and segmental information 
accompanied bad news.  Whilst the verifiable and more precise disclosures were useful to 
investors, the qualitative disclosures were not relevant to share returns due to their vagueness.  
Arguably, Lee et al (2004) concur by suggesting that if causal attributions for bad news are 
credible, especially by management taking blame, investors would find them useful.  
Accepting responsibility for bad performance is a realisation that management is 
knowledgeable about the weakness of the business and may be keen in taking corrective 
measures. 
Construing the relevance of the explanation attribution based on the goodness and badness of 
the news arguably leads this study to incorporate UIH and ORH in the theories that justify the 
influence of the attribution on share prices.  Credible disclosures may be considered as good 
news as they are trustable and hence increase certainty, leading to upward share price 
movements.  However, self-serving explanations could be indicating bad news as they may 
cause doubt about the disclosed information, thereby causing uncertainty and fall in share 
prices.     
Alternatively, the relationship between the explanatory attribute with qualitative and 
quantitative disclosures suggested by Hutton et al (2003), compels this research to include 
IRH as one of the theories that substantiate usefulness of the causal attribute.  Quantification 
of good news provides more precise and relevant information that can be priced favourably 
while the bad news that is generally qualitative and unverifiable reduces revelation in 
disclosures.  
 Comparatively, ASB (2005; 2006) consider that complementing and supplementing are 
essential for enhancing the overall corporate disclosure.  Inferring from this, the regulation 
adopts a discourse that considers the two themes of disclosure as a mutual integral part of 
financial reporting rather than being mutually exclusive to each other for usefulness.  In 
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addition, the conceptual rationales for the casual attribution are inconsistent.  Therefore,   this 
study hypothesises that: 
H 4 There is no difference in information content of complementary and supplementary 
disclosures of reasons for performance attribute 
7.4.4 Forward-Looking Disclosures 
From a regulatory perspective, ASB (1993; 2003; 2005; 2006) all agree that among other uses, 
narrative commentaries help members assess future prospects in a bid to estimate the firm‟s 
future cash flows.  In the European Union, the EU (2003) requires disclosures of future 
business developments to assist investors in assessing future performance.  Even professional 
accounting bodies (e.g. AICPA 1994; CICA 2002; ICAEW 2003) concur with this rationale 
for the forward-looking attribute.  FASB (1978) conceptual framework of financial reporting 
in the US interprets the relevance of forward-looking attributes from the inconsistence 
between the purpose of accounting and the ability of financial statements to provide the 
relevant information.  The accounting function in an organisation is charged with the 
responsibility of providing information useful to investors‟ economic decision-making.  Since 
the function of accounting is to aid decision-making as an imminent action, it is necessary for 
the information to possess an anticipatory outlook.  Regulated financial statements can only 
accommodate historical information but narratives minimise this through the ability to include 
forward-looking disclosures.  The premise of regulation concurs with incremental information 
school of thought that management provide disclosures to reduce information asymmetry.  
Given that financial statements information is historic in nature, managers use narratives to 
provide future opportunities and risks of the business that investors use to value the business 
(e.g. Abrahamson and Amir 1996; Schleicher and Walker 1999).     
Another theoretical setting explaining the usefulness of forward-looking disclosures is 
signalling effect on information asymmetry.  Studies (e.g. Boo and Simnett 2002; Schadewitz 
et al. 2002; Schleicher et al. 2007) argue that in a period of bad financial performance or 
financial distress, managers have a motivation to provide credible forward looking disclosures 
to appeal to investors.  Good financial performance either is indicative of a self-explanatory 
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current feasibility of the firm without need for more precise future narratives or characterised 
by insignificant requirement for external financing since the performance may lead to 
sufficient internal financing.  Interpreting this argument in relation to UIH and ORH, in cases 
of current news, managers realise that the share prices are bound to be negatively impacted.  
To reduce this impact or even reverse the effect of bad news to share price returns, managers 
provide forward-looking disclosures that assure investors on the future viability of the 
investment.   
The argument in Bozzolan, et al (2009) about information content of the prospective attribute 
could be considered to be related IRH.  They maintained that information content of forward-
looking attributions is embedded in the verifiability of disclosures such that credible 
disclosures are useful but unverifiable disclosures are not.  The reason is that the ability to 
avoid adverse selection by accurately estimating future cash flows is construed on reliance on 
credible and verifiable information.  IRH views usefulness of disclosures from the ability to 
provide complete revelation.  Credibility and verifiability of information may be regarded as 
characteristics that reduce incompleteness, as the respective disclosures are considered 
reliable.  
It is certain that the above arguments for the usefulness of forward-looking disclosures in 
narratives are owed to the presence of information asymmetry between investors and 
managers.  Relating to the discussion in chapter 6, information asymmetry arises from the 
agency concept where managers, due to their duty of day-to-day involvement in the business, 
have an information advantage over investors.  Therefore, it is arguable that they 
(management) are better placed than investors to know the direction of the business and 
disseminating the same to investors reduces the information gap.  This situation aligns with 
the market for information theories that consider usefulness of forward-looking narratives.  
However, the situation contravenes EMH that presupposes that both management and 
investors are symmetrically informed about the direction of the business.    
There are several complexities for hypothesising for the comparative information content of 
the forward-looking attribution in complementary and supplementary narratives.  Firstly, ASB 
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(2005; 2006) ascertains that the entire narrative commentary (regardless of whether 
complementary or supplementary) is to assist investors assess the current performance and 
estimate future performance of the firm.  Inferably, the prospective attribute has a similar 
function in both themes.  Secondly, like other disclosure attributions, the theoretical 
underpinning the forward-looking attribute is mixed.  Although regulatory guides reviewed 
above agree that the attribute provides incremental information for share pricing, evidence 
from empirical research in section 3.9 is divided as there are questions raised on the credibility 
and variability in usefulness depending on performance.  For complementary disclosures, 
verifiability would arguably constrain the usefulness of the forward-looking attribute due to 
the qualitative nature of the disclosures.  For supplementary narratives, verifiability of 
prospective disclosures may be achieved ex ante through future financial statements.  
However, supplementary prospective information is incapacitated to provide insight into 
intrinsic value of the firms in aspects such as future opportunities, strategies and risks because 
it only relates to information on the face of the financial statements.  Although complementary 
prospective narratives may disclose on aspects of intrinsic value, the usefulness of such 
disclosures is challenged by the argument that investors are only interested in predicting future 
cash flows  and earnings (e.g. Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Waymire 1984).  This is supported by 
the observation that nearly all the firm‟s value is entrenched in the earnings number (e.g. Ball 
and Brown 1968).  Given the theoretical inconsistencies, this thesis hypothesises that:    
H 5 There is no difference in the information content of complementary and supplementary 
disclosure of forward-looking attributes 
7.5 Financial Statement Performance Attributions 
In section 7.1 above, it is discussed that the reason ASB (2005; 2006) recommends 
complementing and supplementing the financial statements is to assist investors understand 
the financial performance of the company for investment decision making.  Deductively, a 
disclosure structure comprising of complementary, supplementary and financial statements 
information offers a complete set of information relevant for illuminating investors‟ 
comprehension of current and future performance. 
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As control variables, performance ratios based on financial statements information are 
included in the hypothetical model of the study.  Ball and Brown (1968) recognised that the 
power of their studies could have been improved by including other information that 
accompanies financial statement figures.  Arguably, they realised that both financial 
statements and narratives improve share returns as opposed to considering a biased model with 
narratives or financial statement performance measures only.  Various studies on information 
content of narratives (e.g. Abrahamson and Amir 1996; Boo and Simnett 2002; Firth 1984; 
Kanto and Schadewitz 2000; Lundholm and Myers 2002; Schleicher et al. 2007) have 
included financial statement performance measures as controls in their models.     
Abrahamson and Amir (1996) argue that the recognition of quantified information in models 
is based on the ability of the numbers to provide more precision to the non-quantified 
information thereby enhancing credibility of the entire disclosure profile.   
To further augment the decision to include financial performance metrics in the model for 
examining information content of narrative commentaries, reference is made to the discussion 
in Johnson (1970).  The study discussed various constraints that deter financial metrics from 
having information content if used without regard to narrative commentaries.  Firstly, the 
metrics, on their own, fail to predict failure or success because the information they provide is 
historical and does not incorporate strategies and intervening economic conditions that 
managers and investors face.  Secondly, although comparable both cross-sectionally and 
longitudinally, the financial metrics contain an incomparability problem arising from 
measurement errors and variability and different regulation and standards for accounting.  
Third, financial performance figures are not a true measure for comparison across firms 
because they fail to consider firm uniqueness.  For example, analysts use the burden coverage 
ratio to measure riskiness.  This ratio cannot measure differences in business life cycle or 
business seasonality, which are unique to firms regardless of being in the same industry or 
having similar age or rate of financial performance.  Contrarily, narratives can be used to 
identify such individuality in firm characteristics.  Fourth, ratios are static as they measure 
performance over fixed predetermined periods yet a firm‟s propensity to succeed or fail is a 
dynamic process involving timing or mistiming of cash flows, opportunities and risk.  Worse 
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still, ratios may not be easily calibrated to relate to the diminutive detail of operations.  
Narratives, on the other hand, can be used to relate to any organisation function to the tiniest 
degree of specificity.  From a behavioural perspective, Griffin and Tversky (1992) considered 
that investors preferred the subjective strengths of evidence to statistical weight.  This suggests 
that investors are inclined to use narratives over financial ratios.  Other literature (e.g. 
Tauringana and Mangena 2006) argues that unsophisticated  investors are more likely to use 
narratives to inform their investment decisions due to the complexity in interpreting financial 
statement information and ratios. 
In line with the discussion in the theoretical framework, under section 6.3.2.2, IRH considers 
statistical information more precise compared to qualitative disclosures, therefore having 
greater potential of influencing share prices.  A number of reasons may be deduced from the 
discussion in Bloomfield (2002) concerning IRH and the comparative usefulness of statistical 
and qualitative disclosures.  Firstly, the definite nature of quantified disclosures compared to 
qualitative information aids users to make clear decisions about the respective investment.  
Secondly, qualitative disclosures, unlike financial statements figures, are often published in 
other forms of media therefore lack newness when disclosed in financial reports.  Another 
argument for usefulness of financial statement figures under IRH is the fact that the statistics 
are not easily understood.  Therefore, investors with the skills of interpreting financial 
statement figures are likely to earn abnormal returns when they discover the hidden meaning 
of the figures.      
As discussed in section 7.1 above, three financial statement performance measures are 
selected.  These include dividend yield, earnings per share and total assets. 
7.5.1 Dividend Yield 
In an efficient market, free of imperfections, trading costs and consisting of rational agents, 
Merton and Modigliani (1961) advocate that dividend yield has no information content.  
Dividend policy is conjectured to be affected by the integration of financing and investment 
decisions.  The firm may either adopt the strategy of high dividend payout and finance 
investment activities through externally (debt or equity issuance) or pay out low dividends and 
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use the retained earnings to meet investment obligations.  In a rational and perfect economic 
environment, the two strategies cancel out, as they are illusionary financial engineering 
schemes, hence having no incremental information transferable to share price returns.  
Investors rather rely on the real earnings power of the firm‟s assets and its investment policies 
but not on the packaging of earnings for distribution.  This argument seems consistent with the 
information asymmetry notion that the agency relationship allows managers to exploit the less 
informed investors by structuring disclosures in a self-serving manner.  In this case, dividends 
may be used to mislead investors that the firm is performing well yet the underlying 
performance is contrary to the trend of dividend payout. 
In instances of uncertainty, Merton and Modigliani (1961) still conjecture that dividends may 
not be relevant for share valuation.  In this respect, they introduce the assumptions of imputed 
rationality and symmetrical market rationality.  An individual investor assumes that all other 
investors are rational, that is, preferring more wealth regardless of the form in which the 
wealth is packaged.  Secondly, symmetric market rationality sets in when all investors in the 
market assume similarly by imputing rationality to all other investors.  Therefore, as in the 
case of the perfect market, investors will not be compelled to be manipulated through wealth 
packaging but rather will base their investment decisions on real asset and investment strategy 
performance.  However, the researchers realised that using personal judgement and 
extrapolating the same to overall market behaviour may critic the imputed rationality and 
symmetric market rationality as some investors may behave contrary by presuming that other 
investors are irrational.    
However, Merton and Modigliani (1961) agree that there are instances when the dividend 
yields communicate information relevant to share pricing.  For example, a stable or increased 
dividend pay may be perceived by investors as management‟s view that the firm‟s 
performance outlook is sturdily good or based on future growth opportunities.  This viewpoint 
is in conformity with the conjecture that dividend yield has incremental information.  Alike, 
studies  (e.g. Campbell and Shiller 1988; Fama and French 1988; Kothari and Shanken 1997) 
found the dividend yield being associated with share price returns as it had predictive power 
about the firm‟s future earnings and cash flows.    
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Although Sadka (2007) agrees that dividend yield carries information about future cash flows; 
dividend amounts or growth as a parametric of dividend yield has no association with share 
price returns.  The reason for the insignificancy of the relationship between dividend growth 
and share price returns is that it is susceptible to manipulation.  Nevertheless, the usefulness of 
dividend yield is embedded in its ability to change in line with business conditions and change 
in profitability (Fama and French 1989; Sadka 2007).  As earlier discussed, there are studies 
(e.g. Fairfield and Yohn 2001; Watts and Zimmerman 1990) suggesting that profits too are 
vulnerable to management impression.  Therefore, it may be inferred that dividend yield is 
informative as one of its parameters (dividend amount) as well as variable it is able to predict 
(profitability) are subjected to manipulation.  Likewise, Watts (1973) rejected the hypothesis 
of information content of dividends on the basis that the proportion of future earnings that can 
be communicated by unexpected dividend changes is trivial.   
From the above analysis, there seems theoretical impasse as to whether dividend yield has 
information content.  In addition, the empirical studies relating to the association of share price 
returns and dividend or measures of dividend yield have mixed findings regarding the 
relationship.  For these reasons, the study hypothesises that:  
H 6 There is no association between dividend yield ratio and share price returns 
7.5.2 Earnings per Share 
There are several reasons that have been suggested to support the usefulness of earnings per 
share (EPS) ratio.  For example, Ball and Brown (1967; 1968) contend that the information 
content of earnings per share is entrenched in the ratio‟s association with macro economic 
factors affecting the firm‟s performance.  Secondly, Opong (1996; 1997) established that the 
EPS ratio interacts with dividend for the reason that both are disclosed jointly and thereby 
have a joint signalling effect regarding the information they convey to investors.   In case of 
increased EPS and dividend investors will perceive that the firm is performing well.  In case of 
increased dividend but decreased EPS, managers signal to investors that the decreased EPS is 
temporary.  Opong (1996) augmented this argument with the supposition in Allen (1992) and 
Lintner (1956) that management increase dividends at a level they are confident is sustainable 
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in future and is defensible.  Thirdly, on a reporting frequency basis, Brown and Kennelly 
(1972) suggested the interim EPS enables investors to predict the annual earnings 
performance.  This argument may be considered to imply that the interim EPS incorporates the 
seasonality factor in earnings.  The coefficient of the interim EPS can then be used to estimate 
the earnings in the next interim periods based on the season‟s impact on the firm‟s 
performance.  Foster (1977) illustrated this through time series where each quarter‟s earnings 
had a seasonal component in them.  Further, Opong (1995) argued that it may be useful to 
provide quarterly reports for a more precise view of the seasonality effect on the outcome of 
the year.    
Arguments against the usefulness of EPS rely on susceptibility of earnings to manipulation.  
Through the earnings smoothing hypothesis, Barnea, et al (1975) suggest that management use 
earnings to undermine GAAPs, arguably the principles of prudency and periodicity.  They 
report earnings in a manner that signals optimistic expectations about performance of the firm.  
Hand (1989) supplements this argument with the contention that management compute and 
present EPS in a way that conforms to capital market expectation  as well as signalling that the 
good outlook of EPS is sustainable in future.  The schemes used include presentation skills 
include longitudinal graphical presentations (e.g. Beattie et al. 2008; Beattie and Jones 2002).  
Bartov (1993) identifies several accounting earning smoothing methods such as timing of asset 
sales to create other incomes, early debt retirement to reduce interests and timing as well as 
selection for sale of marketable securities in a manner that a security with high unrealised 
gains is sold to boost reported earnings.  Another theoretical explanation arising from 
impression management explaining the irrelevancy of earnings is the debt-equity hypothesis.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1986; 1990) and Smith (1993) explore this proposition by way of debt 
covenants or implied investor covenants.  The covenants are either affirmative or negative.  
The affirmative covenants compel managers to attain specific accounting performance 
measures such as working capital, return on investment or interest coverage.  The negative 
covenants restrain activities relating to investment or financing such as soliciting financing 
from other sources, dividend payments on condition that certain accounting ratios are 
achieved.  The obligations relating to accounting performance ratios enthuse management to 
 213 
 
manipulate EPS to meet the contractual debt holder or implied equity holder expectations 
(Bartov 1993).   
Various studies have investigated the information content of EPS measures but with mixed 
findings.  Confirming the information content of EPS is Patell (1976) considering the ratio 
being necessary for firm valuation as affirmed in asset valuation models such as the integrated 
model combining the Asset Pricing Model by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) and the 
Miller-Modigliani model by Hamada (1969).  Similarly, Foster (1973) found information 
content in EPS estimates at both individual investor and aggregate market levels.  More recent 
studies (e.g. Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2009; Lennox and Park 2006) find a association 
between EPS and share price returns on the basis that the EPS strength signalled to investors 
on future performance of the firm. 
To the contrary, Said, et al (2008) found an insignificant association between returns and EPS 
underlined that by the argument that investors seek for economic rather than accounting 
measure performances.   Given that EPS is prone to impression management schemes, 
investors resort to cash flow measures, which are closely related to economic performance to 
base their judgement about the future viability of the firm.  Similarly, Collins, Li et al (2009) 
compared the information content GAAP EPS and Street EPS.  Whilst GAAP EPS include 
nonrecurring or noncash items such as restructuring costs, write-downs, asset impairments, 
costs and gains on sale of assets, mergers and acquisitions, goodwill amortisation as well as 
research and development expenses; Street EPS do not.  Street EPS is the actual reported EPS 
as recorded on I/B/E/S.  The results showed that whereas there was an improving association 
between market measures of information content and Street EPS over time, there was a 
decline for GAAP EPS.  This was partially attributed to resilience of street EPS as far as 
manipulation is concerned.  This therefore meant that street EPS was relatively more related to 
the future firm‟s economic value and cash flows than GAAP EPS.  However, Bartov (1993) 
questions the argument of impression management with regard to EPS since the market is 
comprised of many sophisticated investors who can detect such manipulative tendencies.      
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EPS has earnings component that makes it disposed to management tendencies of impression 
management.  On a divergent note, EPS has also useful information about the performance of 
the investment, which information may be extrapolated to future performance.  Due to the 
irreconcilable arguments regarding the information content of EPS, this thesis hypothesises 
that: 
H 7 There is no association between interim earnings per share ratio and share price 
returns 
7.5.3 Total Assets 
In recommending complementing and supplementing, ASB (2005; 2006) suggested that the 
extent narrative discussions should be commensurate to size and complexity of the business.  
Various studies have argued for the relationship between narrative disclosures with size and 
complexity.  Cooke (1991) argues that the larger a company is, the more susceptible it is to 
complexity due to the diversity in segments, both product wise and geographical locations.  The 
study adds that such complexity requires sophisticated management information systems for 
effective managerial control and ability to meet information needs of investors.  Such settings 
would therefore implicate more disclosure compared to small firms that are less complex.  In 
contrast, Wallace (1987) argues that the relationship between disclosure level and firm size or 
complexity is bi-directional.  It could be positive where the company expects that by disclosing 
more about the high profits (or losses) that big firms normally make, the likelihood of political 
action is lessened.  On the other hand, large firms may minimise the level of disclosure if the 
information is likely to increase the cost of combating effects of political pressure. 
Tauringana (1997) identified the common proxies for company size as total assets, turnover, 
the number of shareholders and market capitalisation.  Through a review of disclosure studies,  
Tauringana (1997) finds that the most popular surrogate for company size that is significantly 
associated with disclosure level being total assets, followed by  turnover.  Number of shares 
and market capitalisation were less popular.  Due to its popularity in prior literature as an 
influential variable on disclosure as well as being a variable from financial statements,  total 
assets is selected in this research as a control variable.   
 215 
 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) found significant negative association between total assets and 
returns.  They argued that large firms have lower investment opportunities than small firms.  
This is worsened by the tendency of smaller competing firms to eat into the market share of 
these companies.  Grullon and Michaely (2004) further suggest that reduction in reinvestment 
opportunities leads to a build-up of excess free cash flows for these firms which will be 
demanded by shareholders in either share re-purchases or dividends.  Hence, with the 
declining investment opportunities, higher total assets values may signal to investors that there 
are lesser returns.  Even in cases where there are investment opportunities, the negative 
relationship between returns and total assets is evidenced.  Campbell, et al (2001) examine the 
association between cumulative abnormal returns and the method of payment in mergers.  
Total assets as measure of size was negatively associated with returns for acquirer firms 
postulating the possibility of overpayment by big firms.   
Bamber (1986) found firm size (measured by total assets, total equity and market 
capitalisation) having an inversely significantly inverse relationship with trading volume when 
financial results are announced.  The result was attributed to less availability of information on 
smaller firms, thereby exhibiting higher unexpected earnings than bigger firms do when 
financial results are released.  The most informative surrogates of firm size were total assets 
and total equity.  However, Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski (1998) found market 
capitalisation as a measure of size more powerful in explaining the information content of 
earnings than either total assets or revenues on the Warsaw Stock Exchange.   
From the above discussion, there is mixed evidence regarding the usefulness of total assets as 
a measure of size in explaining share price returns.  Therefore, it is hypothesised that:  
H 8 There is no association between interim total assets and share price returns 
7.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this chapter was to develop a set of hypotheses in line with the literature 
review and theoretical framework.  The hypotheses developed are used to identify the 
variables described in the methodology chapter.  The variables will be subjected to tests of 
information content in the result and analysis chapter.  The first hypothesis, H 1, considers the 
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relative information content of complementary and supplementary narrative commentaries in 
general.  Hypotheses H 2, H 3, H 4, and H 5 are concerned with the relative information 
content of complementary and supplementary narrative attributions when disclosure depth is 
used to measure narratives.  The attributions are presence of information items, good news 
disclosures, disclosures of amounts and comparison of current with past performance, reasons 
for performance and forward looking disclosures, respectively.  The underlying theorem for 
relating the attributes to share price returns is the entity concept of the firm, from which the 
agency concept and the resultant information asymmetry commend information content of the 
narrative disclosure attributes.  Taking this point of view, contravenes semi-strong form EMH 
that the publically available information (in this case complementary and supplementary 
narrative attributes) is accurately and instantaneously reflected into share prices.  However, the 
arguments suggest that the market for capital works in partnership with the markets for 
information and regulation to reflect the disclosures in share prices.  Under the market for 
capital, the dominating theory used in the hypothesis chapter is the semi-strong form EMH 
while the market for information theories are UIH, ORH, IRH, market for lemons, signalling 
theory and incomplete contracting and the market for regulation theories are public interest 
and capture theories. 
The next set of hypotheses, H 6, H 7 and H 8 attributions refers financial performance 
measures used as control variables and include dividend yield, earnings per share and total 
assets, respectively.  The basis for inclusion of financial statement ratios in the hypotheses is 
that ASB (2005; 2006) recommends complementing and supplementing for the purpose of 
aiding investors understand the financial statements.  Additionally, there is empirical evidence 
that finds the ratios informative to share price returns.  Further, in line with the theoretical 
framework of the study, IRH considers that statistical information in financial reports 
enhances information content of the qualitative disclosures.   
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8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology and methods used to estimate information content of 
complementary and supplementary narratives.  The rest of the chapter is organised as follows.  
The first section discusses the research philosophy applied in the thesis.  This is followed by 
an explanation of the sample.  The suitability of the event study technique to measure 
information content and the steps adopted to apply the technique are discussed.  The key steps 
considered include the method used to measure the dependent variable and the estimation of 
the predictors.  Models for measuring information content are then described.  Sensitivity tests 
for checking robustness are then explained.  The last section is a summary and concluding 
remark to the chapter.  
8.2 Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy refers to development of knowledge and its nature and can be thought of 
in three main dimensions, namely: epistemology, ontology and axiology (Saunders et al. 
2003).  The three dimensions are regarded as a paradigm where a paradigm is a set of basic 
beliefs that represent a worldview that defines, for its holder, the nature of the world, the 
individuals placed in it, and the range of possible relationships to that world and its parts 
(Guba and Lincoln 1998).  Epistemology concerns what constitutes acceptable knowledge in a 
field of study while ontology refers to the nature of reality characterised by objectivism and 
subjectivism and axiology studies judgements about personal value (Guba and Lincoln 1998).  
Under ontology, objectivism depicts the position that social entities exist in reality external to 
social actors whilst subjectivism maintains that social phenomena are created from the 
perceptions and consequent actions of social actors (Guba 1990).  
Collis and Hussey (2003) suggest two main research philosophies. First are positivist 
(quantitative) who believe that the objects they are studying are unaffected by their research 
activities and will persist even when the study is completed.  The second is phenomenological 
or qualitative research inclines to an interpretive approach.  In Table 10, quantitative and 
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qualitative research is distinguished along the aspects of ontology, epistemology, axiology and 
rhetoric.    
Table 10 Assumptions of Quantitative and Qualitative Research Paradigms 
Assumption Question Quantitative Qualitative 
Ontological  What is the nature of 
reality  
Reality is objective 
and singular, apart 
from researcher 
Reality is subjective 
and multiple as seen 
by participants in a 
study.  Researcher 
interacts with that 
being researched 
Epistemological  What is the 
relationship between 
researcher and the 
researched  
Researcher is 
independent from 
that being researched  
Researcher interacts 
with that being 
researched  
Axiology  What is the role of 
values  
Value-free and 
unbiased  
Value-laden and 
biased 
Rhetorical  What is the language 
of research  
Formal  
Based on set 
definitions  
Impersonal voice  
Use of accepted 
quantitative words  
Informal  
Evolving decisions 
 
Personal voice 
Use of accepted 
qualitative words 
Source: (Collis and Hussey 2003) 
 
Given that this study is concerned with information content of narratives, that is, the 
relationship between disclosures and share prices, the quantitative approach is based suited.  
The nature of this research is more inclined to both mainstream and critical accounting 
research which reflect characteristics of the quantitative methodology suggested by Collis and 
Hussey (2003) in Table 10.  To substantiate this, reference is made to Hopper and Powell 
(1985) and Chua (1986) explanations of mainstream and critical accounting research.  Hopper 
and Powell (1985) suggest that mainstream accounting research is concerned with 
functionalism where the researcher is concerned with regulation and objectivism seeking to 
understand the creation of order in society and how society is held together.  Critical 
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accounting research is partially concerned with radical change and objectivism where the 
researcher is interested in order change or facilitating discussions about the trend of change 
(Ryan et al. 2002).  Chua (1986) provides the ontological, epistemological, axiology and 
rhetoric aspects of mainstream and critical accounting research that are reflective of this thesis 
approach.  Table 11 summarises these positions. 
Table 11 Mainstream and Critical Accounting Research Philosophy 
Mainstream Accounting Research 
Beliefs about knowledge: 
Theory and observations are independent of each other, and quantitative  methods of data 
collection are favoured to provide a basis for generalisations 
Beliefs about physical and social reality: 
Empirical reality is objective and external to the subject and the researcher.  Human actors are 
essentially passive objects, who rationally pursue their assumed goals.  Society and 
organisations are stable, and dysfunctional behaviour can be managed through design of 
control systems. 
Relationship between accounting theory and practice: 
Accounting is concerned with means, not ends: it is value neutral, and existing institutional 
structures are taken for granted. 
Critical Accounting Research 
Beliefs about knowledge: 
Criteria for judging theories are always temporal and context bound.  Social objects can only 
be understood through a study of their historical development and change within the totality of 
relations 
Beliefs about physical and social reality: 
Empirical reality is characterised by objective, real relations, but is transformed and 
reproduced through subjective interpretation.  Human intention and rationality are accepted 
but have to be critically analysed because human potential is alienated through false 
consciousness and ideology.  Fundamental conflict is endemic in society because of social 
justice.   
Relationship between accounting theory and practice: 
Theory has a critical imperative, in particular identification and removal of domination and 
ideological practices. 
Source: Chua (1986) 
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Designing this study‟s objectives to suit the quantitative methodology exposes the research to 
the criticism of the methodology.  For example, conventionalists argue that there is no reality 
except that agreed by convention but such conventions are caused to occur by human actors 
(Easton 1998). On the hand, constructivists argue that reality is socially constructed, that is, 
people cause reality to occur and describe how this reality is created (Easton 1998).  However, 
positivists consider that there is a reality “out there” waiting to be discovered and that reality is 
independent of us (Easton 1998).  To discover this reality, the positivist approach relies on 
analysis of event regularities or correlation, in closed or close-able systems through isolation 
and control of variables (Ryan et al. 2002).  Many studies in business and industry embrace a 
positivistic paradigm, which attempts to reduce the study of a phenomenon to something that 
can be measured by focusing on large-scale empirical hypothesis testing and deductive 
reasoning (Gibson 2004).  Another disadvantage of quantitative research is reflected in Chua 
(1986) where the objectivist approach is concerned with predictions but the subjectivist 
approach emphasises describing and understanding phenomena.  The resultant of these 
positivist approach shortcomings lead to two further limitations discussed by Tsoukas (1989).  
First, its evaluation of knowledge claims lacks an explicit backward link with ontological 
assumptions of what the world must be like if our knowledge claims are true.  Second, it lacks 
a forward link with the sociological arrangements of the social relationships in which the 
scientific adequacy of knowledge claims is ascertained. 
8.3 Sample for the Study 
8.3.1 Presentation of the Sample 
For a security to be included in the sampling frame, it met three conditions.  Firstly, it was 
constituent of the FTSE350 in the period from 4
th
 January 2005 to 31
st
 January 2008.  Second, 
it was consistently listed on the FTSE350 throughout the period above.  Lastly, it was not 
classified under industrial classification benchmark (ICB) 8000 representing financial services 
industry.  Table 12 summarises how the sample used was arrived at. 
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Table 12 Sampling Frame 
Condition Companies 
Constituents of FTSE 350 from 4th January 2005 to 31st January 2008 
Less: Companies not on FTSE 350 consistently throughout period 
Total Companies meeting conditions 1 and 2 
Less: Financial services Industry (ICB 8000) meeting conditions 1 and 2 
479 
- 267 
212 
 - 76 
Total companies meeting all three conditions – The sampling frame 136 
Sample of the study (approximately 76%  of sampling frame)  103 
 
From the sampling frame of 136 firms, a sample of 103 firms was selected.  Sampling from 
the frame was considered appropriate since the discussion justifying the sample under section 
8.3.2 below confirms that a sample of 103 was sufficient for a reliable statistical inference 
study.  The main reason underlying sampling from the sampling frame was to arrive at the 
sufficient number of constituents suitable for reliable statistical inference.  Considering all 136 
firms would be time consuming as the disclosure measurement technique was labour 
intensive, yet a sample of 103 was sufficient for the study.  The method applied in selecting 
the sample was the unrestricted sampling technique.  The firms were coded 1 to 136 and a 
random sample for 103 firms was generated through a computerised run.  Under the technique, 
all firms had an equal probability to be selected.  The method offers the least bias and hence 
provides the most generalisable statistical inferences (Sekaran 2000).  The sample constituents 
are presented in Appendix 3. 
The FTSE350 was selected for four reasons.  The FTSE350 constituents include those in 
FT30, FTSE100 and FTSE250 which, according to FTSE International Limited (2008a; 
2008b), aggregate to 96.67% of UK‟s market capitalisation.  It is therefore arguable that 
FTSE350 is representative of UK‟s capital market.  Secondly, large samples lower the risk of 
statistical errors (Saunders et al. 2003).  In comparison to FT30, FTSE100 and FTSE250, the 
FTSE350 provides more constituents for analysis.  However, FTSE International Limited 
(2007) indicates that the FTSE All-Share has 683 companies.  The downside of the FTSE All-
Share is that almost half of the listed companies are part of FSTE Small-Cap aggregating to 
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only 2% of UK‟s market capitalisation, thereby likely to bias the data towards small-cap 
companies.   
Third, although the Operating and Financial Review (OFR) applied to all UK listed 
companies, the Business Review that replaced it only applies to large and medium companies 
(Trucost 2006).  Therefore, FTSE350 is suitable for the study since the regulations in 
reference apply to FTSE100 and FTSE250 that make up the FTSE350 index.     
Financial sector firms are exposed to more reporting regulation unlike other service or 
industrial firms (Tauringana and Mangena 2006; Wallace et al. 1999).  Their exclusion in the 
study enables analysis of results of companies with similar regulatory disclosure requirements.  
Prior information content studies, such as Schadewitz et al (2002), adopt the same approach. 
8.3.2 Justification for the Sample 
There are several propositions in literature that provide a guide on a representative sample.  
The Economist (1997) recommends a minimum of 30 in every category within the overall 
sample as a rule of thumb.  Sekaran (2000) suggests a rule of thumb of between 30 – 500 
samples depending on sampling design and research question.  Qualitative research uses 
smaller samples due to intensiveness of the study (Sekaran 2000).  Field (2005) in reference to 
sample size in regression analysis indicates the most common rules of thumb being 10 or 15 
cases per each predictor in the model.  However, the text qualifies the rules as pervasive and in 
harmony MacKinlay (1997) suggests the size of the sample depends on the strength of the 
relationship required for the study; but the bigger the sample the better.  Green (1991) 
provides two rules for the minimum acceptable sample size.  The first is based on the model‟s 
overall fit, which is the R
2, 
where the minimum sample is given by: 
𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 50 + 8𝑘 
Where, Smin is the minimum sample size and k is the number of predictors. 
Alternatively, if the intent is to examine the importance of each predictor, the minimum 
sample is determined by: 
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𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 104 + 𝑘 
When both the model‟s fit and importance of each variable are necessary, Green (1991) 
recommends that both formulae be used and the decision is based on the largest sample.  
Field (2005; 2009) however views the technique as inadequate to solving the problem and 
recommends use of graphs for sample size variation in relation to power, different effect sizes 
and number of predictors in Miles and Shevlin (2001).  Basing on Cohen‟s (1988) high level 
of power, that is 0.8, and the recommendations Miles and Shevlin (2001), the conclusion is 
that:  
1. For a large effect, a sample of 80 with a maximum of 20 predictors is necessary; with 
fewer predictors, the sample may be revised downwards. 
2. For a medium effect, a sample of 200 with a maximum of 20 predictors is sufficient; the 
minimum sample being 60.  For less than six predictors, a sample of 100 is adequate. 
3. For a small effect, a minimum of 600 cases suffices for six predictors; with increasing 
sample size as predictors increase. 
The above recommendations by Cohen (1988) are graphically presented in Appendix 1. 
From all above guidelines with a maximum of 20 predictors, a sample of 309 cases is well 
specified for a parametric statistical case.  As discussed later in the chapter, there is no model 
used to estimate information content that exceeds 10 predictors.  Based on population size, 
Sekaran‟s (2000) sample size tables in Appendix 2 suggest that for a sampling frame between 
130 and 140, a sample of 97 to 103 is adequate.  Given that the sampling frame in this study is 
136 companies, the sample of 103 firms conforms to the guidance.     
8.3.3 Database for Compilation of the Sampling Frame 
FTSE350 daily closing share data sheets published by FTSE International Limited at the end 
of each trading day were used to compile the sample constituents.  The data sheets, obtained 
through correspondences between the researcher and officials at FTSE International Limited, 
clearly indicate companies that traded on the FTSE 350 for each day.  Therefore, new entries 
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and exiting firms for each day are easily identified and eliminated in pursuit of the first and 
second conditions.  Further, the data sheets indicate the sub sector industrial benchmarks for 
each firm.  This enabled the researcher to identify the industrial classification of the sample 
firms in pursuit of the third condition.   
The daily data sheets used were selected on an interval basis of one sheet per 3 days of FTSE 
350 trading days from 4
th
 January 2005 to 31
st
 January 2008.  The interval was used to allow 
symmetrical number of data sheets throughout the study period.  Due to cost and time 
implications, it was impractical to use all data sheets in the period.  In 2007, when the sample 
was being developed, each year‟s file of index values cost £50 whereas each full constituent‟s 
file cost £150.  It would require extensive time as well as financial resources to compile the 
sample from the 775 trading data sheets available in the study period.  In total, 260 daily share 
data sheets analysed representing, 33.5% of the datasheets available and an average of one 
data sheet for every three trading days.  This is in line with the recommendation in Sekaran 
(2000), as shown in Appendix 2 that for a population of 800 members, a minimum sample of 
260 is representative.   
The method applied for selecting the days is the stratified probability sampling.  The method is 
applied in cases where the researcher aims to ensure a more representative sample since each 
strata is represented (Saunders et al. 2003).  The reason for applying the method was to ensure 
that each stratum (every three days) of trading was equally represented.  The days were 
labelled from 1 to 775 (for 2005: days 1 to 253, for 2006: days 254 to 502, for 2007: from day 
255 to 753 and for 2008: days 754 to 775).  Unrestricted random sampling using SPSS was 
used to select a random number (day) for each three trading days.  The resultants days are the 
dates for which the daily trading data sheets were requested for from FTSE International 
Limited.  The technique ensures that all days in the sampling frame had an equal chance to be 
selected (Saunders et al. 2003).   
For days that the research did not obtain FTSE350 daily closing share data sheets, entry and 
exit were checked by scanning the continuity of historical share price and trading volume 
activity.  Daily historic share price and trading volume were obtained from various sources 
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that included FT.com Market Data, UK Yahoo Finance and the LSE Historic Price Service 
(HPS).  These market data services are considered credible by ICAEW (2010).  Further checks 
confirmed that none of the sampling frame constituents had splits, suspension and re-listing 
status.   
Furthermore, there is a systematic way in which companies are included and excluded in 
FTSE350 membership that reduces the uncertainty regarding the entry and exit of firms.  The 
process of entry and exit of firms to and from FTSE350 membership is governed by rules 
published by FTSE International Limited.  At the time of writing the thesis, the prevailing 
ground rules were version V10.6 June 2009 in FTSE International Limited (2009).  Prior to 
that, V9.7 January 2006 in FTSE International Limited (2006) prevailed.  The two versions do 
not differ substantially.  To this effect, checking for entry and exit of firms to and from the 
FTS350 was made with reference to V9.7 January 2006 in FTSE International Limited (2006) 
that related to the period of study.   
8.4 Event Studies Technique for Estimating Information Content 
8.4.1 Justification of Event Studies Technique 
This section explains the means by which the information content of complementary and 
supplementary narrative commentary to investment decision making is determined in the 
study.  The event study method was used to measure information content.  The method is 
widely used and acceptable in market-based accounting research.  Kothari (2001) reviewed 
information content studies and found a considerable number of them to have applied the 
technique.   Two forms of event studies evolve from prior literature: (1) market efficiency 
studies that examine speed of market reaction to information (e.g. Brown and Warner 1980; 
Fama et al. 1969) and information content studies as in Ball and Brown (1968) studying the 
existence of abnormal returns attributable to the piece of information.  
A number of reasons compelled this study to use event studies.  First, the study meets the 
conditions of the technique.  Event studies are suitable for scenarios where the incident of 
information publication is identifiable, the disclosures are measurable and can be related to 
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their impact on shareholders‟ wealth through statistical measures (Brown and Warner 1980).  
Second, event studies provide a platform for understanding corporate policy decisions because 
the magnitude of abnormal performance upon the occurrence of the event implicates the 
impact or importance on the returns to shareholders (Kothari and Warner 2007).    
Third, in relation to the theoretical framework, capital markets efficiency theory in Fama 
(1965) explains that intrinsic values of new information is reflected in actual share prices 
shifts and speed of reflecting the information in share prices.  From a positive theory 
approach, Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that capital markets will estimate the 
variability of share prices around the event.  This therefore establishes the usefulness of new 
information from the event about the amount, timing and or uncertainty of future cash flows 
(Kothari 2001).  The event study technique is suitable in establishing these effects on returns 
from complementary and supplementary narratives.   
From the perspective of market for information, event studies possibly substantiate and 
explain the alternative arguments to market efficiency inconsistencies.  The inconsistencies in 
the market for capital theories are termed as “error” term but market for information theories 
provide a conceptual explanation about markets reaction to information (Gonedes 1976).    
Event studies are key means in identifying and estimating this error term due to an event as 
well as providing the explanatory influences on the relationship (Brown and Warner 1980, 
1985). 
8.4.2 Guideline for the Event Studies Procedure 
Enhancement of precision in an event study depends on the validity of assumptions underlying 
the choice of the method and research design used to implement the study (Mcwilliams and 
Siegel 1997).  Precision is aimed at avoiding Type I and Type II errors (Kothari and Warner 
2007).  Type I error occurs when the null hypothesis is falsely rejected whereas Type II error 
occurs when the null hypothesis is wrongfully accepted.  The two properties to prevent the 
errors are embedded in the correctness and adherence to the assumptive requirements for the 
test-statistic and its power (Mackinlay 1997).  The probability that a correctly specified 
statistic can lead to type I error is equal to the assumed size of the test.  The power of the test 
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statistic is in its ability to detect abnormal performance when it is present.  The power of the 
test statistic is therefore one minus the probability Type II error occurring.  While comparing 
test statistics, the degree of precision or reliability is attributed to the most well specified 
(correct) statistic with higher power (Kothari and Warner 2007). 
Therefore, to ensure reliability, it is worth considering the appropriate steps for the event 
study.  This is possible through a review of various procedures recommended for reliable 
event studies and selecting the most appropriate.  Three methodological studies (Mackinlay 
1997; Mcwilliams and Siegel 1997; Strong 1992) are reviewed in this respect.  The review is 
aimed at identifying the most appropriate steps for the study.  Table 13 summarises the steps 
in the studies.   
Table 13 Event Study Procedures 
Procedure 
Reference 
Procedure 
Order of steps in the studies 
Strong (1992) 
McWilliams 
and Siegel 
(1997) 
MacKinlay 
(1997) 
P.1 Define the event providing new information 
to the market 
- 1 1 
P.2 Outline the theory that justifies a financial 
response to the new information and likely 
relationship 
- 2 - 
P.3 Identify firms that experience the event and 
the event day: selection criteria.  Provide 
appendix for firm names and event dates   
- 3 3 
P.4 Choice whether to use discrete or logarithmic 
metrics 
1 - - 
P.5 Definition of measuring intervals – intraday, 
daily, monthly, annual 
2 - - 
P.6 Determination of model for computation of 
abnormal returns – CAPM, APT, MAR, IM, 
MM, etc 
3 - 5 
P.7 Selection and justification of event (and 
estimation) period for abnormal return 
calculation 
4 4 2 
P.8 Treatment and justify for firms that 
experience other relevant events during the 
event window - confounding 
- 5 - 
P.9 Choice of Market Index (for some models) 
for normal returns estimate 
5 - 4 
P.10 Model for computation of abnormal returns, 
compute and accumulate abnormal returns 
over event period 
6 6 6 
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Procedure 
Reference 
Procedure 
Order of steps in the studies 
Strong (1992) 
McWilliams 
and Siegel 
(1997) 
MacKinlay 
(1997) 
P.11 Provide regression model, outline of 
independent variables and measure of 
association (regression analysis).  
Tests for Type I and Type II errors (arising 
from statistical measurement) 
Report on test statistic specification both sign 
and magnitude 
7 7 - 
P.12 Control for errors arising from data 
characteristics (non-synchronous, cross-
sectional dependence and cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity) 
Report on biasness in small samples and 
impact of outliers 
8 8 and 9 7 
P.13 Control for extra-market characteristics and 
their justification in model 
9 - - 
P.14 Discuss findings 10 - 8 
 
Following the order of presentation in the table, procedure P.2 was discussed in the hypothesis 
development chapter and procedure P.3 is explained in the previous section of this chapter.  
Therefore, the rest of this chapter is concerned with procedures P.1, P.4 to p.10 and part P.11.  
The results chapter will address part of procedure P.11 and rest of the procedures. 
8.5 Method for Estimating the Dependent Variable 
8.5.1 The Event and Event Day 
The objective the thesis is to establish the relative information content of complementary and 
supplementary narrative commentaries in UK interim reports.  Therefore, the event under 
study is reaction of investors to complementary and supplementary disclosures in interim 
report around the release date.  The reaction is depicted from the variability in share price 
movement within the period surrounding the announcement date.  The release or 
announcement date refers to the date the interim report becomes available to the public.  The 
definition is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Kanto and Schadewitz 2000; Opong 1995) 
investigating information content of disclosures in interim reports. 
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The announcement date was either indicated on the face of the interim report or on the signing 
off the interim report narratives and/or balance sheet by management or signing off the audit 
review where applicable.  In a few cases, where there was no mention of the release date, the 
financial calendar in the preceding year‟s annual report was used and/or obtaining the 
information from the respective company‟s website.  Further the dates were checked with the 
interim dividends announcement dates for companies that issued an interim divided and 
perfectly coincided with the interim reports announcement date as was the case various studies 
using UK data (e.g. Opong 1995; Wolfe et al. 2009).  The dates on these primary sources were 
verified for consistence with London Stock Exchange Regulatory News Services (RNS) 
archives accessed on www.londonstockexchange.com.  The crosschecking exercise did not 
find any inconsistencies.  However, this thesis also realises that some studies using UK based 
data (e.g. Rippington and Taffler 1995) at times used the day following the announcement as 
the event day, but in only cases where the announcement was considered to have been made 
after the official closing time of the day‟s trading activity.  This study followed a similar 
approach.  As the LSE official time trading time between 0800 and 1630 hours, the time of the 
announcement is indicated in the RNS database.  Therefore, where a report was published 
after 1630 hours, the event date was considered to be following day.  For reports published 
before or after 0800 but before 1630 hours, the announcement date was the event date since 
closing returns are the basis of computing returns, as explained in section 8.5.3.  Further, 
referring to the regulation, the provision DTR 2.3 in FSA (2008) requires that all price 
sensitive information by LSE listed companies should be provided at the company‟s website 
by close of the business day following the day of the announcement.  Therefore considering 
the event day as either the announcement day when the announcement is made before 1630 
hours or the following day for announcements after 1630 hours concurs with the regulatory 
provision.  There was no case where the researcher failed to obtain the announcement date.  
The announcement dates for firm years are shown in the list of companies in Appendix 3. 
8.5.2 Return Estimation Interval 
Intervals for return estimation include intraday, daily, weekly, monthly, and annual.  The 
choice is determined by the possibility of attaining highest test power compared to 
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alternatives.  MacKinlay (1997), Brown and Warner (1985) and Dyckman et al (1984) all find 
daily returns better than monthly returns as monthly returns are long and can be influenced by 
other events.  MacKinlay (1997) argues that intervals shorter than one day may be 
misspecified.  However, information content based on hourly returns has been established 
(Opong 1996; 1997).  Apart from this, daily returns are criticised for thin trading (Scholes and 
Williams 1977).  The problem arises from the use of closing prices commonly adopted in 
event studies using daily returns which do occur at different times of the day or even in cases 
where a security does not trade for the entire day (Fisher 1966; Mackinlay 1997).  Empirically, 
Jain (1986) find the influence of thin trading on distribution of abnormal returns being 
minimal.  Likewise, in Brown and Warner (1985) daily returns were less destabilised by 
nonsynchronicity.  A second problem with daily returns is the influence that the day of week 
effect.  For example, the Monday effect in the USA in French (1980), the negative Tuesday 
effect in Australia in Ball and Bowers (1988) and Finn et al (1991).  In the UK, Spyrou et al 
(2007) showed that the weekend effect (Friday and Monday week of the day effects) were 
statistically insignificant on the FTSE 250 and FTSE Small-Cap.   
Daily closing returns are used in this study as there are mixed findings about the criticisms.  
Secondly, various studies in the literature review as shown in Table 9 have used daily closing 
prices.   
8.5.3 Computation of Returns 
Strong (1992) provides two methods for computing returns, discrete and continuously 
compounded return computation.   The formulae for the two methods are provided below 
1. Discrete Returns 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
 𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
 
2. Continuously Compounded Returns  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
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Where, 
 Rit   is the observed return for security i at end of period t 
Pit   is the market price for security i at end of period t 
Pit-1   is the market price for security i at end of period t-1 
Dit   is the net dividend paid on security i during period t. 
Strong (1992) suggests that both theoretically and empirically continuously compounded 
returns preferable.  Theoretically, they are analytically more manageable when linking sub-
period returns while empirically they conform to standard statistical technique assumptions 
since they are more normally distributed.  Thus, continuously compounded returns have an 
incremental ability to increase number of time intervals as well as reducing the impact of 
outliers. 
However, regardless of the merits of the continuously compounded technique, returns have 
characteristics that deter them from following a normal distribution.  Fama (1976) suggested 
that daily returns are leptokurtic.  Brown and Warner (1985) argued that non-normality tends 
to reduce as the sample size increases but much pronounced in individual data.  Both daily 
returns and abnormal daily returns in their study were highly non-normal for both discrete and 
continuously compounded techniques.  Dyckman et al (1984) rather finds that non-normality 
is less prevalent with regard to the choice of an event study method using daily data.  While 
some UK studies (e.g. Rippington and Taffler 1995; Ryan and Taffler 2004) use daily 
continuously compounded returns, there is also evidence that studies, such as Spyrou et al. 
(2007) use discrete daily returns based on UK data.   
Given that both discrete and continuously compounded returns are susceptible to non-normal 
distribution, this study does not assume superiority of either technique.  The discrete method 
was used in the study because transforming returns into logarithmic values also yielded a non-
normal distribution.
4
 
                                                 
4
 The results are presented in the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable. 
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8.5.4 Computation of Abnormal Returns 
In MacKinlay (1997), abnormal returns refer to the appraisal of the event‟s impact above the 
normal returns.  The normal return represents the expected return of the security in absence of 
the event.  In other words, abnormal returns isolate the returns attributed to the event from the 
normal performance of the security and are derived using the formula below.  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸 𝑅𝑖𝑡  𝑋𝑡  
Where,  
ARit    is the abnormal return on security i at end of period t 
Rit    is actual return on security i at end of period t 
E(Rit|Xt)  is normal return on security  i at end of period t 
Xt   is a conditioning term for the normal return at end of period t. 
To arrive at abnormal returns, a choice was made regarding the method to compute normal 
returns.  The options include the Unadjusted Returns Model (URM), Mean Adjusted Returns 
(MAR), Market Adjusted Returns or Index Model (IM) and Market Model (MM).  Others are 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT).  More options are 
drawn from the Modern Portfolio Models (MPT) that emerge from adjustments to the above 
models.  These include industrial classification factor loading model by Sharpe et al (1995) 
and size factor loading.  Modifications to the market model also present more models, 
predominantly based on the estimation of the systematic risk, the beta.  The mainstream 
method, credited to Markowitz (1959) and Sharpe (1962) uses Ordinary Least Squares for beta 
computation.  Extensions based on need to allow for nonsynchronous trading problems in 
daily returns include Scholes-William  Beta Model in Scholes and Williams (1977) and the 
Dimson Beta Model in Dimson (1979).  Several others have evolved such as Generalised 
Least Square and the Maximum Likelihood (Mcdonald 1985).  Sharpe (1964) and Markowitz 
(1959), also advocate Post-Modern Portfolio Theories (PMPT) in place of MPT.     
For this study, the method selected is the market-adjusted returns model or index model.  IM 
assumes that the ex-ante expected return for all securities are similar at anytime and is equal to 
the expected market return at the respective time.  The equation for the technique is given as: 
𝐸 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸 𝑅𝑚𝑡   
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Where, 
 E (Rit)  is expected return for security i at any time t 
E (Rmt)  is mean return of the market m as well as all securities i at any time t 
 
The ex-post abnormal returns of the security i at end of period t is therefore computed with the 
model below as:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸 𝑅𝑚𝑡   
Where,  
ARit    is the abnormal return on security i at end of period t 
Rit    is actual return on security i at end of period t 
E (Rmt)  is mean return of the market m as well as all securities i at any time t 
A number of reasons justify the choice of the IM over other models.  The choice of  the 
method depends on its ability to specify the returns attributed to the event; thereby avoiding 
Type I or Type II errors (Kothari and Warner 2007).  The ideal decision therefore depends on 
the relative fitness of the assumptive properties of the respective model and its incremental 
ability to detect abnormal returns compared to other methods.   
The unadjusted and mean adjusted return models are naive since they fail to account for 
market wide factors.  Further, Brown and Warner (1985) found that the market adjusted return 
outperformed the models and attributed their low power to the presence of clustering in the 
data.  However, simulation studies (e.g. Brown and Warner 1980, 1985; Dyckman et al. 1984) 
conclude that there is no compelling evidence to assume that more complicated models 
perform better than single factor models.   
In comparison to MM, the market adjusted returns require neither an estimation period nor 
process, hence easy to compute (Henderson 1990).  However, Ritter (1991), considers the IM 
appropriate in cases of no prior information on the security performance such as initial public 
offers.  Henderson (1990) too prefers the market model on the basis that the market adjusted 
return model, as is with the naive models fails to manage clustering.  Dyckman et al (1984) 
found the market model is more powerful than the market adjusted return in detecting 
abnormal returns.  Irrespective of this finding, they suggest that though significant, the result 
was not important to warrant superiority of the market model over the market adjusted return 
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model.  Brown and Warner (1985) also established that IM performs as good as the market 
model.    
CAPM has a number of deficiencies that deter this study from considering the method.  
MacKinlay (1997) ascertains the declining use of CAPM due to subjecting results to its 
specific restrictions.  Fama and French (1996) suggest that empirical failures of the CAPM are 
caused by bad proxies for the market portfolio. That is, the true market is mean-variance-
efficient, but the proxies used in empirical tests are not.  Further doubt on the CAPM is 
documented in Fama and French (1992) where such variables as firm size, book-to-market 
equity, financial leverage, earnings-price (E/P) ratio, dividend yield and stock price are related 
to return; hence beta alone is not sufficient for return estimation.   
Reaction to the Fama and French (1992; 1993b) three factor model, as alternative to CAPM, is 
varied.  Kothari et al (1995) rejected the model when statistically significant results on the 
ability of beta in explaining returns were still evident.  Kothari et al (1995) thereby suggested 
that the three-factor model validity was due to survivorship bias.  Contrarily, Chan et al (1995) 
dispute the explanation.  Another case of disagreement with the three-factor model is the data 
mining assertion (Black 1993; Lo and Mackinlay 1990).  However, the evidence of the book-
to-market ratio in other markets established in Chan et al (1995) questions the assertion.  
Lastly, the three-factor model is criticised because of irrationality in markets by Lakonishock 
et al (1994) in which investors are over cynical on distressed securities while overly sanguine 
on value securities.  More recent empirical evidence against the three-factor model is in Daniel 
and Titman (1997) but refuted in Davis et al (2000) by a reinstatement of workability of the 
model.  Daniel et al (2001) reinstate the findings by Daniel and Titman (1997) with further 
empirical evidence against the three-factor model in Japan.   
Concerning the APT, its major concern is to eliminate the CAPM shortcomings.  However,  
since the statistical models are sufficient in eliminating the biases, they dominate the research 
environment (Mackinlay 1997). 
The multifactor models as the industrial classification and or size factor loading techniques 
have less benefit compared to IM.  The additional factors are only relevant if the data is to a 
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particular to industry or of similar size (Mackinlay 1997).  In relation to this thesis, the data is 
from different industries as well as of different weight to the FTSE350, making such 
techniques inappropriate.   
Models that modify the market model, that is, the Scholes-William and Dimsom Beta Models 
base their argument for applicability on the nonsynchronous nature of daily returns to criticise 
the market model.  However, Brown and Warner (1985) find no evidence of different results 
between the results of the OLS market model and of the two modifications, Scholes-William 
and Dimsom Beta Model.  
The PMPT models were not considered for two reasons.  First, this study found no prior UK 
studies that have used the models in estimating information content of narratives.  Therefore, 
comparability of the study to previous literature would be compromised if the PMPT models 
were considered.  Secondly, the subjectivity of the target would arguably make it impractical 
to establish the target coefficient for investors‟ investment decision at the incident of interim 
results‟ announcement. 
8.5.5 Selection of the Event Window 
Henderson (1990) defines the event period as the days, weeks or months around the event date 
when the sample securities experience unusual returns.  The event window is used to capture 
all returns that result from the event.  To do so, it is normal practice to assume that for short-
term returns, the event window is distributed in the period around the event, considering the 
pre-event and post-event period (Kothari and Warner 2007).
5
  To moderate the researchers‟ 
subjectivity, consideration is given to studies that have measured information content using 
daily returns using UK data.  Table 14 summarises the studies. 
                                                 
5
 Kothari and Warner (2007) provide a theoretical underpinning for the event window.  If the event is expected, 
some return behaviour will be experienced within the pre-event period.  The post-event period is a test of market 
efficiency as nonzero abnormal returns after an event are inconsistent with efficient market hypothesis.   
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Table 14 Summary of Studies on Event Window Selection 
Study Data Model of Abnormal 
Return 
Event Date Event Window 
Opong (1995) 237 firm years of 
LSE listed firms: 
1983 - 1987  
Market model 
adjusted for non-
synchronous by lead 
and lag betas 
Interim Report 
announcing 
Event date ± 5 days 
Rippington and 
Taffler (1995) 
337 LSE listed 
firms 1979 - 1981 
Market Model, 
Market Adjusted 
returns and CAPM
6
 
Preliminary report, 
Annual Report, 
Annual General 
Meeting and Interim 
Report 
For Interim report: -
9 days, event day, 
+4 days 
Ryan and Taffler 
(2004) 
215 FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 firms 
1994 - 1995 
Market adjusted 
returns with Market 
model 
Date of 
economically 
significant price and 
volume movement 
Event day, - 1 day 
and + 5 days 
Spyrou et al (2007) FT30, FTSE100, 
FTSE250 and FTSE 
Small-Cap 
Market Model Shock on Market 20 days after event 
 
Opong (1995), who investigated information content of interim reports in the UK used an 
event window of ±5 days around the event.  To allow for comparability, a similar period is 
used in this study.  
All studies in Table 14 confirm evidence of information content within the three days after the 
event and little information content in the pre-event period.  Therefore, the event window of 
±5 days around the event is arguably sufficient to capture most returns attributed to narratives 
in the interim window.  Longer windows may expose the study to events other than the 
announcement of interim reports.     
The days in the window exclude all non-trading days on the LSE that include all Saturdays, 
Sundays,   bank holidays in England and Wales and days that had no trading data.  The bank 
holidays excluded from the window are listed in Appendix 4.  Where such days were within 
the window, they are disregarded and the next trading day is incorporated within the window 
                                                 
6
 Study reported only market model results because all three models yielded similar results.  Justification of 
similarity in results was attributed to the likelihood of results being less sensitive to the magnitude of beta when 
using daily returns since the impact of the event will overwhelm any systematic reaction to very small market 
reactions. 
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until a window of ±5 days was realised.  Below is diagrammatic impression of the event 
window. 
Diagram 6 Timeline indicating the event window 
 
The event window used in the study is the five days prior and five days after the 
announcement of the interim report.  The day of announcement of interim reports is day 0.   
8.5.6  Market Index for Estimation of Normal Returns 
Market adjusted returns require computation of the market returns in the event period.  It is 
common to use the market indices for computing market returns (Mackinlay 1997). The 
FTSE350 index is selected because all firms of the sample were constituents of the FTSE350 
index.  The index is also suffice in the market under study as its constituents represent almost 
97% of the market capitalisation in the UK (FTSE International Limited 2008a, 2008b).  The 
daily closing values of the FTSE350 within the event window of each firm are used to 
compute the market returns.  Daily closing values are used for the index returns because daily 
returns were used for estimating the securities‟ returns.  This enables the study to use the same 
basis of returns to estimate abnormal returns. 
8.5.7 Aggregation of Abnormal Returns 
The aggregated abnormal returns are the dependent variables used in the thesis.  Strong (1992) 
provides two motivations for aggregating returns of the event window.   Firstly, the procedure 
aims at fully capturing all information attributable to the event.  Secondly, if there is 
Event Window 
t=Day -5 t=0  
(Interim Report Announcement Day) 
t=Day 5 
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uncertainty over the exact event date, the procedure eliminates the uncertainty effect.  In this 
study, all event days are known.  Kothari and Warner (2007) argue that event studies focus is 
to establish any residue (abnormal returns) around the event.  Therefore, aggregating abnormal 
returns in the period prior to the event will show market anticipation whereas post-event 
abnormal returns will test market efficiency.  In addition, the coefficient of the aggregation 
will indicate the wealth valuation of the event.   
Henderson (1990) provides three accumulation methods: cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), 
abnormal performance index (API) and the standardised cumulative prediction error (SCPE).  
The API is assumed not to be a true statistics test.
7
  CAR, alternatively has been widely 
applied and has stood to the test of time (Henderson 1990).  Strong (1992) provides further 
distinctions between the two techniques.  While computing returns in continuous time, CAR is 
appropriate as it rebalances abnormal returns hence giving equal weighting to each security in 
the portfolio.  Alternatively, in discrete time computations, API assumes an initial equal 
investment in each portfolio constituents and then holds securities over the aggregation period.   
CAR is considered appropriate for this study because it is a truer statistic.  Further, the wide 
appreciation of CAR in prior studies allows comparability of the results in the study.  The 
equation for CAR is  
Equation 1   Market Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
5
𝑡=−4
 
Where,  
 CARit   Market Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns for security i at end of period t 
8.6 Method for Measuring Independent Variables 
The independent variables are comprised of disclosure quality attributes for complementary 
and supplementary narratives and control variables based on financial performance measures.  
                                                 
7
 Winsen (1977) suggest some alterations to ensure the API conformity to a test statistic 
 239 
 
The disclosure quality attributes are disclosure variety that is estimated dichotomously and 
disclosure depth set of attributes whose measurement considers repetitions in narratives.  The 
disclosure depth attributes include good news, amounts and comparison of current with past 
performance, reasons for performance and forward–looking disclosures.  The financial 
performance measures include annual dividend yield, interim earnings per share and interim 
total assets. 
The first section explains the disclosure measurement techniques and the second section 
explains the source for financial performance measures. 
8.6.1  Measurement of Complementary and Supplementary 
Narratives 
Complementary and supplementary narratives are measured using the disclosure index 
technique.  The prime reason for using disclosure index is the ability to transform textual 
information into quantitative scores (Cerf 1961).  Disclosure indices are widely accepted in 
disclosure measurement (Hooks et al. 2002a).  Chavent et al (2006) provide vast evidence on 
empirical studies that employed the method to measure accounting narrative information.    
Four considerations were made while measuring disclosures.  The first is the identification and 
justification of the skeletal framework and disclosure indices.  Secondly, the process used to 
profile disclosures is explained.  Third, the rules and equations for estimating disclosure extent 
are accounted for.  Lastly, validity and reliability of the techniques used to measure narratives 
is discussed. 
8.6.1.1  Skeletal Framework and Disclosure Indices 
Marston and Shrives (1991) advises that the validity of a disclosure profile should be 
confirmed.   To ensure validity of the disclosure skeletal framework and indices, both past 
literature and regulatory guidelines are referred to as explained in the sections below.   
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8.6.1.1.1 Skeletal Framework 
The Jenkins report in AICPA (1994) is viewed in literature as a commendable guide into 
informative disclosure (Beattie et al. 2004).  A number of disclosure studies (e.g. Barako et al. 
2006; Beattie et al. 2004; Hooks et al. 2002b) developed disclosure frameworks with topics 
identical to those in Jenkins report.  Further, Beattie et al (2004) suggested that report was 
instrumental in formulating regulation (e.g. ASB 2005; 2006) that governs UK narrative 
reporting during the sample period of this study.  Therefore, the Jenkins report is used to 
explain the contents of the disclosure index used in the thesis.  In addition, ASB (2005; 2006) 
are considered for developing the disclosure framework to relate to the regulatory and 
standard-setting guidelines for narrative disclosures during the study period.  Similarly, the 
guidelines EU (2003), referred to as the EU Accounts Modernisation Directive, that replaced 
ASB (2005; 2006) in 2006 are also considered in formulating the disclosure index.  Another 
regulatory guide used is IAS 1 and 34 that govern interim financial statements are especially 
applied in developing the supplementary narrative commentary skeletal framework.    
In addition, past literature that has developed disclosure indices (e.g. Beattie et al. 2004; 
Wallace and Nasser 1995) are referred to.  Particularly, studies (Mangena 2004a; e.g. 
Mangena 2004b) that developed disclosure indices for UK interim reports‟ narratives are 
considered. 
Disintegration of narrative disclosures into complementary and supplementary information 
was first presented in Tauringana and Mangena (2006) based on the inscriptions by ASB 
(2005; 2006), FASB (2001) and IASB (2005).  In their study, Tauringana and Mangena (2006) 
used a dichotomous decision rule that if information was visible on the face of the financial 
statements (balance sheet and income statement); it was classified as supplementary; 
otherwise, it is complementary information.  The reason for the rule was that it avoided 
ambiguity in distinguishing the two types of information (Tauringana and Mangena 2006).  
Having no other reference in prior literature, this study finds the rule a reliable basis for 
determining complementary and supplementary narratives and is in conformity with 
guidelines by ASB (2005; 2006).   
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For supplementary disclosures, Tauringana and Mangena (2006) investigated disclosures for 
the two financial statements while their subsequent research (Mangena and Tauringana 2007a) 
extended to the cash flow statement.  This study extends their indices to include disclosures 
required in the statement of changes in equity.  Financial reporting in the UK, with effect from 
1
st
 January 2005 became regulated under IFRS (Fearnley and Hines 2007).  The primary 
interim financial statements under IFRS (IAS 1 and IAS 34) include the profit and loss 
statement, balance sheet, cash flow statement and the statement of changes in equity (IASB 
2007).  Therefore, in compliance with ASB (2005; 2006), FASB (2001) and IASB (2005), 
supplementary information in this study refers to disclosures relating to amounts on the face of 
the respective four financial statements. 
Prior literature has neither a skeletal framework nor disclosure index for complementary 
information topics or items.  Schadewitz et al (2002) and Mangena and Tauringana (2007a) 
tended to distinguish complementary and supplementary disclosures in accordance to titles 
used in narratives.  However, both studies did not provide complete profiles of information 
items in the respective sections as they intended to investigate voluntary disclosures.  Other 
studies (e.g. Barako et al. 2006; Beattie et al. 2004) with comprehensive profiles had the same 
predicament as they disregarded mandatory disclosures.  Studies including both mandatory 
and voluntary in their profiles were subjected to the specific disclosure practices of their 
samples.  For example, Wallace (1987), Wallace and Nasser (1995), and Mangena and 
Tauringana (2007b) adjusted their indices to portray reporting characteristics in the respective 
country, while Hooks et al (2002a; 2000) customised their index to reflect performance 
measures in the electricity industry.   
Diagram 7 presents the skeletal disclosure profile for the study.  To ensure that the profiles are 
fit for this study, the first category topics are complementary and supplementary disclosures, 
and then the Jenkins report categorisations are classified under the two main topics.   
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Diagram 7 Skeletal Disclosure Profile 
 
As the Jenkins report is dated over 10 years since its publication, rather than strict adherence 
to its topics, the study adjusts the indices to include items not in the Jenkins report.  Another 
shortcoming of the Jenkins report is that it was not concerned with complementing and 
supplementing financial statements and therefore may not include all disclosures that are 
considered in ASB (2005; 2006).  The modifications are justified in prior disclosure studies 
(e.g. Barako et al. 2006; Beattie et al. 2004; Wallace and Nasser 1995) that it enables the index 
 
Narrative Disclosures in 
interim reports 
Supplementary Complementary  
Financial statements and 
related information  
Income statement 
Statement for changes in equity 
Balance Sheet 
Cash flow statement 
Financial ratios from the 
financial statements 
Financial statements and related information  
 
High level operational and performance measures 
used internally by management 
Opportunities and risks, including those from key 
trends 
Objectives, strategies and management plans, 
including critical success factors 
Management and shareholders information 
Scope and description of the business and 
reporting characteristics 
Industrial structure information 
Other disclosures not in Jenkins report 
Financial performance measures not from 
financial statements information 
Segment information 
KEY 
A 
A 
A 
A 
All narrative disclosures 
Main category - ASB (2006) Reporting 
Standard 1 recommendation: 
complementary and supplementary 
Third level subcategory – IFRS 
financial statements and ratios for 
supplementary and Jenkins report for 
complementary  
Second level subcategory – Jenkins 
report 1994 types of information 
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to relate to the objectives of the study.  Boyatzis (1998) argues that such alterations confirm 
the validity of the disclosure profile.   Therefore, the topics in Jenkins report form the second 
level category for the profile.  The Jenkins report topic “financial statements and related 
disclosures” was the only one found with both supplementary and complementary 
information, therefore appeared at the second level category of both main categories.  The 
third level category for supplementary information category was with reference to the four 
IFRS financial statements (profit and loss Statement, balance sheet, cash flow statement and 
the statement of changes in equity) and key financial ratios that are derived from financial 
statements.  Any other financial related disclosures not in reference to financial statements are 
considered as complementary third level category.  They include other financial performance 
measures and segment information.  All other Jenkins report topics have no supplementary 
information; therefore, they are considered as second level category under complementary 
disclosures.  These include high-level operational data and performance measures used 
internally by management; opportunities, risks, including those from key trends; and 
objectives, strategies and management plans, including critical success factors.  Others are 
management and shareholders information; scope and description of the business and 
reporting characteristics; industrial structure information; and other disclosures not in Jenkins 
report. 
The framework was in agreement with the framework in ASB (2006) Reporting Standard 1 
described under paragraphs 27 – 74.  This confirms the suitability of the profile for estimating 
disclosure level of complementary and supplementary information items.   
8.6.1.1.2 Disclosure Indices 
From the skeletal framework, two disclosure indices were developed, one for complementary 
and the second for supplementary disclosures, each comprising of 50 disclosures items.  The 
items are based on past disclosure literature, regulatory and standard-setting guidelines.  No 
specific theoretical rationale was found in prior literature to give advice on the number of 
information items in an index.  In Hooks et al (2001), a note was only made that while judging 
the number of items to consider, regard should be given to the notion that enormous lists 
compromise focus while too few items lessen impartiality.  Given no guidance in this respect, 
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50 items for each index was selected on three grounds.  Most studies (e.g. Beattie et al. 2004; 
Mangena 2004a; Tauringana and Mangena 2007) that construct disclosure frameworks based 
on UK financial reports have their indices containing about 50 to 100 items.  Secondly, all 
information contained in the interim narrative commentary feasibly classified in the 
information items developed for the disclosure indices in the study.  Having 50 items for each 
index arguably lessens the risk of biasing the research tool where one disclosure profile has 
more information items.  The information items selected conformed to the framework in ASB 
(2006) under paragraphs 27 – 74 for narrative commentaries.  The full list of disclosure items 
in the two indices is presented in Appendix 5. 
8.6.1.2 Measurement of Disclosure Extent 
8.6.1.2.1 Attributes for Measuring Disclosure Extent 
The attributions used in measuring disclosures are drawn from the definition of 
complementary and supplementary disclosures.  In complementing financial statements, ASB 
(2005; 2006) suggested that the narratives should provide financial and non-financial 
information that is not reported in the financial statements but relevant to evaluation of past 
results and future prospects.  In supplementing financial statements, the narrative commentary 
should provide additional explanations of amounts in the financial statements; explain 
conditions and events that shaped the information contained in the financial statements in a 
manner that helps investors evaluate past results and future prospects.  In the principles 
guiding narratives, ASB (2005; 2006) also require the disclosures to reflect 
comprehensiveness and neutrality.    
From the discussion above, the sets of attributions selected to represent extent of disclosure for 
complementary and supplementary narratives are aimed at reflecting either disclosure variety 
or disclosure depth.  Disclosure variety is an attribute that reflects breadth in number of 
information items disclosed without considering repetitions.  Disclosure depth shows various 
attributions in information items, taking into consideration repetitions.  Therefore, the attribute 
under disclosure variety is the presence of information items in narratives.  Disclosure depth is 
a set of attributes (good news, amounts and comparison of current with past performance, 
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reasons for performance and forward-looking attributes).  Good news represents neutrality; 
amount and comparison of current with past performance tenet recognise quantification, both 
financial and otherwise, as well as the principle of comparability.  Reason for performance is 
in reference to explaining the results as well as ensuring understandability.  Lastly, the 
forward-looking attribute is in pursuit of identifying disclosures on future prospects.  All the 
disclosure depth attributes consider repetitions.  The attributes are justified in the literature 
review and hypothesis development chapters. 
8.6.1.2.2 Description of Disclosures Scoring Technique   
Jones and Alabaster (1999) identifies two techniques of scoring disclosures as shown in 
Appendix 6.  First is the categorical (or qualitative) and the second is the numerical (or 
quantitative).  The qualitative variable attaches non-numeric tags or labels to assign meaning 
to information whist the quantitative is numeric.  Under the categorical, either the nominal or 
the ordinal scores are used, while the numeric applies ratios or interval scores.  In this study, 
the method used was a mixed method, each technique having a role to fulfil the attainment of 
the final scores that were in form of either a scale or a ratio.  Beattie et al (2004) adopted a 
similar approach.   
Firstly, an ordinal label was attached to each information item to identify it with the respective 
category, either supplementary (SUP1, SUP2, up to SUP50) or complementary (COM1, 
COM2, up to COM50) as shown by the disclosure indices in Appendix 5.  In other words, 
total information items investigated were 100, equally distributed between complementary and 
supplementary information items.   
In Appendix 7, the application of the scoring technique is shown using the interim report of 
Davis Group for 2006.  For each interim report, the narrative section was coded based on 
paragraphs, diagrams or tables.  The codes were used for ease of reference whilst scoring.  
Under  Panel A of Appendix 7, the hand written codes A1, A2, …, B1, B2, …, C1, C2, ..., D1, 
D2, … and X1 represent the reference for a particular grouping of text, say paragraph or 
diagram or section.  The letters on the codes represent the page referred to and the numbers 
code for the text, section, diagram or table.  These codes were used to identify the narratives 
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from which information items and respective tenets were extracted.  In Panel B of Appendix 7, 
information items and respective tenets are grouped in accordance to the codes.  This provided 
ease of reference between the interim report and the scoring sheets. 
Information items and respective tenets of disclosure were then scored based on a disclosure 
unit.  A disclosure unit is the smallest piece of disintegrating the narrative commentaries from 
which context or meaning could be obtained.  The unit was either a word, text string, a cell in 
a table, a picture, a symbol or a number provided the unit was disclosed in such a manner that 
meaning or context could be decoded by the coder.   
To illustrate scoring of disclosures, reference is made to Panel B of Appendix 7.  An extract of 
the scoring results for the Davis Group 2006 interim report narrative text coded B1 and B2 is 
presented in Diagram 8.  
Diagram 8 Extract for Disclosure Scores for Davis Group 2006 Interim Report 
 
Whenever an information item was identified (without consideration of repetitions), it was 
denoted by its corresponding number from the ordinal scores above.  For example, SUP1 or 
COM1 was denoted by 1 while SUP2 or COM2 were denoted 2; however, these scores were 
still regarded ordinal.  Complementary and supplementary information items were 
distinguished by the use of different pen colour when scoring.  For example, for code B1 are 
items (1, 15, 10, 14, 14, 42 and 21) all in red ink, denoting that they are supplementary items.  
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While under code B2, there are items (42 x2, 42 x2, 42 x2, 17 x10, 26 x10, 48 x10, 47 x10, 15 
x2 and 23 x2) all in blue ink, showing that they are complementary. 
8.6.1.2.3 Scoring and Estimating of Disclosures based on Attributes 
8.6.1.2.3.1 Presence of Information Items 
Each present ordinal score was awarded a score of one to represent that the respective 
information item at least appeared once in the interim report.  The total score was the 
summation of either complementary items or supplementary items identified in the respective 
interim report which could be at the minimum of zero (for no disclosure at all) to a maximum 
of 50 representing disclosure on all information items.  Under B1, item 14 appears twice, 
indicating that SUP14 had two appearances in the respective section of the interim report.  
However, since repetitions are not considered for disclosure variety, the item is only given a 
score of 1.  Other items appear once and are also awarded 1.  Therefore, the total score for 
disclosure variety score for supplementary narratives in section B1 is 6.  For complementary 
items under section B2, item 42 appears three times, while the rest of the items appear once.  
For each item in the example, there is a figure, preceded by “x”.  This expression also 
represents repetition where the respective information item appeared more than once in a unit 
of disclosure.  The figure preceded by “x” is the number of times the information item was 
scored from the text unit.  However, for the disclosure variety attribute, repetitions are 
disregarded.  Therefore, the total number of information items for disclosure variety under 
section B2 is 7 complementary information items.  
Therefore, the formulae below are used to compute disclosure variety 
Equation 2 Measure for Complementary Disclosure Variety 
𝐶𝐼𝐼 =   
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀  50
𝐶𝑂𝑀1
 
Where,  
CII    Presence of Complementary Information Items 
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COM1 and COM50 Ordinal code for complementary information items 1 and 50, 
respectively 
 
Equation 3 Measure for Supplementary Disclosure Variety 
𝑆𝐼𝐼 =   
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝑆𝑈𝑃  50
𝑆𝑈𝑃1
 
Where, 
SII    Presence of Supplementary Information Items 
SUP1 and SUP50 Ordinal code for supplementary information items 1 and 50, 
respectively 
8.6.1.2.3.2  Good News Attribute 
Whilst considering repetitions, each information item was denoted by a sign either positive (+) 
or negative (-) for good or bad news, respectively; as illustrated in Diagram 8.  The decision of 
good or bad news was determined by the toning of the information item.  A similar approach 
was used in Abrahamson and Amir (1996).  For example, on page 2 under section C6, the 
statement, “… the reduction in net interest charge…” was considered good news under 
supplementary disclosures   while “Amortisation of acquired customer contracts amounted to 
£2.4 million (2005: 0.9 million).” under section C7 was considered bad news.  For 
complementary items, under section C3, the phrase “The UK market continued to face more 
significant challenge from increased cost and competition.” was denoted as bad news.  While 
under the same section, the statement: “We expect to see benefit of the acquisitions we have 
made in the UK …” was regarded as good news.  
In reference to example used above (Sections B1 and Sections B2) of Davis Group 2006 
Interim Report, at the end of each information item scored or before the squared brackets 
where applicable, there is “+” or “-”.  However, in both sections of the interim report, B1 and 
B2 only “+” was awarded for the information items suggesting that only good news was 
reported in the sections.  The signs were counted for all appearances of the respective 
information items, including all repetitions.  The total sum of the sign, “+” or “-” was grouped 
for complementary and supplementary disclosures respectively.  Under section B1, since all 
information items are supplementary and are all denoted with “+”, the conclusion is that there 
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are 7 good news and 0 bad news supplementary information items.  While for B2, all items are 
complementary signifying 50 good news and 0 bad news complementary information items.  
The extent good news disclosure is then expressed as a ratio of the total of good and bad news 
disclosures for either complementary or supplementary nature.  The formulae used are:  
Equation 4 Measure for Complementary Good News Score 
𝐶𝐺𝐷
=    
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑠 "+" 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠
  𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀  50
𝐶𝑂𝑀1
  
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑠 "+"𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠" − "  𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠  
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀  50
𝐶𝑂𝑀1
  
Where, 
CGD  Complementary Good News 
“+”  Ordinal proxy for Good News 
“-”  Ordinal proxy for Bad News 
  
Equation 5 Measure for Supplementary Good News Score 
𝑆𝐺𝐷
=    
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑠  𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠 "+"
 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝑆𝑈𝑃  50
𝑆𝑈𝑃1
  
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑠" +"𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠" –" 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠
  𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝑆𝑈𝑃  50
𝑆𝑈𝑃1
  
Where, 
SGD  Supplementary Good News 
Supposing the B1 and B2 represented the entire interim report narratives in Davis Group 
Interim Report 2006, complementary good news score, using Equation 4, would be 
50
(50+0)
= 1; 
while, applying Equation 5, the score for supplementary good news would be 
7
(7+0)
= 1.   
8.6.1.2.3.3 Amounts and Comparison of Current with Past Performance Attribute 
The two tenets of amounts and comparison of current with past performance were transformed 
into one variable for suitability to include both attributes in the study.  On recommending 
complementing and supplementing, ASB (2005; 2006) requires both attributes.  However, due 
 250 
 
to methodological issues, a decision was taken to consider the variables as one.
8
  The 
relationship between the two attributes also warrants their combination to increase precision of 
the single variable other than disregarding one of them.  
The amount and comparison with past performance attribute has four dimensions: an 
information item could disclose either amounts only or comparisons of current with past 
performance without regard to amounts or disclose both attributes or disclose neither of the 
attributes.  First, amounts and comparison of current with past performance are denoted by 
ordinal score of “A” and “C”, respectively.  Whenever an amount is sighted in the information 
item, “A” is awarded; likewise, identification of comparison of current with past performance 
is awarded “C”.  If both tenets are seen, then “A/C” is awarded; however, absence of both is 
not awarded any mark.  Repetitions were recognised under this attribute to portray the extent 
to which the tenet is disclosed in the interim reports.   
For example: the statement under section C6 of the Davis Group Interim Report 2006, p2,  
“Revenue from continuing operations in the period was £348.8 million (2005: £328.1 
million).” was awarded “A/C” under supplementary information items.  However, on the same 
page under section C2, the statement, “The group grew its revenue by 6%” was awarded “C”.  
Similarly, under C3, p2, “In Continental Europe, we have seen benefits of this additional 
revenue…” was awarded “C” under complementary narratives as the item disclosures on 
revenues of complementary information.  Likewise, under C8, p2, “our gearing level was 
64%” was awarded “A” under supplementary items as no comparison was provided.  
The tallying process converted the ordinal scores into nominal scores by awarding one mark 
for an “A” or a “C” and two marks for “A/C” was awarded.  The total score was then 
determined by summation of the tallies.  The tallying procedure was done by way of tallying 
templates, a sample of which is presented under Appendix 7 Panel C.   
                                                 
8
 The results of correlation and regression analysis considering the amounts and comparison with past 
performance are not reported in here.  However, the regression model having both variables as independents 
showed a high VIF coefficient and low coefficient for the tolerance.  Subjecting the model to sensitivity tests 
whilst removing either variable reduced the exposure to colinearity; however, regression tests were not better 
than the model that considers the variables as one. 
 251 
 
The formulae for amounts and comparison with past performance are provided below: 
Equation 6 Measure for Complementary Amounts and Comparison with Past Performance 
𝐶𝐴𝐶 =   
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟  "𝐴"
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 +   
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟  "C"
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀  50
𝐶𝑂𝑀1
𝐶𝑂𝑀  50
𝐶𝑂𝑀1
  
Where, 
CAC  Complementary Amounts and Comparison of Current with Past Performance 
“A”  Nominal proxy for amount 
“C”  Nominal proxy for comparison of current with past performance 
Equation 7 Measure for Supplementary Amounts and Comparison with Past Performance 
𝑆𝐴𝐶 =   
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟  "𝐴"
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝑆𝑈𝑃  50
𝑆𝑈𝑃1
+   
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟  "𝐶"
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝑆𝑈𝑃  50
𝑆𝑈𝑃1
 
Where, 
SAC  Supplementary Amounts and Comparison of Current with Past Performance 
The example used above for sections B1 and B2 of the Davis Group interim report of 2006 
shows that under B1, the total number of “A” is 7 and “C” is also 7.  As all information 
supplementary, the total score for SAC is under section B1 is 7+7, equalling to 14 but nil for 
CAC.  Under B2, the total number of “A”, which includes repetitions expressed by squatted 
brackets or otherwise, is nil; likewise, the tallies for “C” are nil.  Given that all information 
under B2 is of complementary nature, the score for CAC is 0+0, which is nil and also SAC is 
also nil. 
8.6.1.2.4  Reasons for Performance Attribute 
Whenever the reason for performance attribute was identified in an information item, an 
ordinal score “R” was awarded; repetitions too being awarded.  The decision rule to award the 
score was based on presence of causal or explanatory disclosure units elaborating a particular 
situation.  For example, under section C13, page 2 of Davis Group Interim Report 2006, the 
phrase: “The business held up well following the strengthening of senior management and 
restructuring we managed last year”, an explanation to why the business held up well was 
awarded “R” under complementary information.  Likewise, under the same page, section C8, 
the statement, “Free cash flow of £24.2 million was generated …, which included £1.8 million 
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from the Elliot business” was awarded “R” under supplementary disclosures as the 
contribution of the Elliot business partially explained the amount of free cash flows.  For 
tables where narratives disclosed figures and respective totals, the figures leading to the 
summations, subtractions or any other computation were regarded as reasons, as illustrated 
below:  
Table 15  Illustration of the Reason for Performance Attribute in Tabulated Narratives 
£ millions 2006 
Base 
Business 
Acquisitions/ 
Disposals 
Business 
Improvement 
Cost 
Exchange 2007 
Revenue 
- year-on-year change 
2,296 
 
140 
+6% 
- 
- 
- 
- 
(110) 
-5% 
2,326 
+1% 
Underlying Profit from 
Operation 
- year-on-year change 
192 
6 
+3% 
- 
- 
(12) 
-6% 
(18) 
-10% 
168 
-13% 
Underlying Operating Margin 8.4% 8.1%    7.2% 
Source: Cadbury Schweppes Interim Report 2007, page 2 
In Table 15, the figures for underlying operating margin for the columns 2006 and 2007 are 
derived by dividing the respective figures of underlying profit from operations by revenue 
amounts.  Such computations are regarded as a reason for performance for underlying profit 
margin as they show how the margins were reached at.   
After awarding “R” to reasons for performance attribute in all information items, the ordinal 
scores were converted into nominal scores by assigning 1 every time “R” was identified 
through the use of the tally sheets illustrated in Appendix 7.  Then all scores of 1 arising from 
the ordinal scores of “R” were summed to give the total score for reason for performance of 
either complementary or supplementary information items.  The models used for estimating 
the scores for the attribute are: 
Equation 8 Measure for Complementary Reasons for Performance 
𝐶𝑅𝐸 =   
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟  "𝑅"
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀  50
𝐶𝑂𝑀1
  
Where, 
CRE  Complementary Reasons for Performance 
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“R”  Nominal proxy for reasons for performance 
Equation 9 Measure for Supplementary Reasons for Performance 
𝑆𝑅𝐸 =   
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟  "𝐴"
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝑆𝑈𝑃  50
𝑆𝑈𝑃1
 
Where, 
SRE  Supplementary Reasons for Performance 
To illustrate this process reference is made to Diagram 8.  Under code B1, only one “R” was 
awarded in all information items under the section.  Given that all the items under the section 
are supplementary, it is concluded that B1 had a total score of 1 for the SRE and nil for CRE.  
For B2, the total number of “R” awarded were 44, including repetitions.  Given that all 
information items were complementary, CRE is equal to 44 and nil for SRE. 
8.6.1.2.5 Forward-Looking Attribute 
The decision rule for awarding an information item for presence of the attribute of forward 
looking disclosures was based on the incidence of reference to the future.  Such information 
was either prospective, or in other words anticipatory.  For example, under section A5 of 
Davis Group Interim Report 2006, page 2, “… and these create opportunities to win new 
business contracts …” was considered complementary text unit with information items with 
forward looking attributes.  Likewise, in section D6, page 2 of the same interim report, “These 
purchases are expected to result in a small enhancement to 2006 earnings per share” is a text 
unit that has a prospective attribute under supplementary information. 
Equation 10 Measure for Complementary Forward-looking Attribute 
𝐶𝐹𝑊 =   
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟  "𝐹"
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀  50
𝐶𝑂𝑀1
  
Where, 
CFW  Complementary Forward-looking 
“F”  Nominal proxy for forward-looking attribute 
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Equation 11 Measure for Supplementary Forward-looking Attribute 
𝑆𝐹𝑊 =   
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟  "𝐹"
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝑆𝑈𝑃  50
𝑆𝑈𝑃1
 
Where, 
SFW  Supplementary Forward-looking 
The procedure for scoring and tallying forward-looking attribute was similar to that used for 
reasons for performance, but, the presence of the attribute in an information item was awarded 
“F” as illustrated in Appendix 7.  In sections B1 and B2 of Davis Group Interim Report 2006, 
Diagram 8 there is no award of “F” under both sections.  Therefore, both CFW and SFW are 
equal to nil.  
The scores for all attributes by company are provided in Appendix 8 and Appendix 9 for the 
respective year of the interim reports. 
8.6.1.3 Scoring Technique Shortcomings and Remedies 
Given that the context of the information item is the basis for scoring, the decision rules 
explained above are subject to the researcher‟s interpretation; thereby exposing the techniques 
to researcher‟s subjectivity.  However, the degree of subjectivity is lessened as the researcher 
can only award equal scores for any attribution identified and only exercises the discretion to 
identify and classify attributes (Chau and Gray 2002; Meek et al. 1995).  Another solution to 
avoid the subjectivity of the researcher was to refer prior disclosure studies (e.g. Beattie et al. 
2004; Meek et al. 1995; Schadewitz et al. 2002; Tauringana and Mangena 2006; Wallace and 
Nasser 1995; Watson et al. 2002) on their application of techniques.   To sustain reliability of 
the scoring technique, inter-coder reliability tests were carried out for both scoring and tallying 
of the scores.   
Another flaw of the technique used is the assumption that attributions carry equal weight.  For 
example, in segment analysis, disclosure of any amount is all is scored as one regardless of the 
value disclosed.  Likewise, where narratives described a change as either substantial or 
favourable, such degree of variation was disregarded.  If both changes were good, they were 
all attributed a score for good news and another for disclosure of comparison of current with 
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past performance.  One way of recognising such variation in degree of value is use of interval 
scores rather than ordinal scores for mere presence of an attribute.  However, Marston and 
Shrives (1991) argue that the disclosure index technique may achieve more reliable ordinal 
measures unlike the calibration of the scores into intervals, such as Likert scales that are prone 
to a higher level subjectivity.  Further, studies (e.g. Beattie et al. 2004; Wallace and Nasser 
1995) recognise that rather than subjecting information items to subjectivity scores (for 
example: less important to most important, worse to best) it is better to score narratives based 
on the attributes within the narratives that are less vulnerable to subjectivity.  Another support 
for awarding a similar score for each attribute identified is the argument that different scores 
for each attribute negates rationale that the decision to disclose an information item is a 
recognition that each respective item is useful for decision making (Chau and Gray 2002).  In 
other words, each attribute disclosed is considered to aid investors make decisions and 
arguably, all attributes are intended for the same purpose. 
Lastly, the scoring and tallying process demonstrated under Appendix 7 were time consuming.  
Studies (e.g. Beattie et al. 2004; Beattie and Thomson 2007) acknowledge that consideration 
of attributions in measuring extent of disclosure is a time consuming process.  Given the 
variability in the size of interim reports across firms or over time, it was not possible to exactly 
estimate the time consumed by the processes for each report.  From Table 16, the average 
number of pages of scoring sheets (illustrated in Appendix 7, Panel B) per interim report were 
6; and typically, approximately 18 hours were required to generate the pages.  Transforming 
the ordinal scores in the scoring sheets into the nominal data in Appendix 7 Panel C and Panel 
D consumed an average of 6 hours per interim report.  After the two processes of scoring and 
tallying, the tallies were entered into statistical data computer software for analysis, a process 
that required an average of 20 minutes.  In all, the attainment of the processes involved 
approximately 7,516 hours or 895 eight-hour days.   
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Table 16 Time Approximation for Disclosure Measurement 
 Number of  
Interim 
Reports 
Average 
Pages of 
Score 
Sheets 
from 
Scoring 
Hours 
for the 
Process 
per  
Page 
Hours 
for the 
Process 
per 
Interim 
Report 
Total 
Hours 
for 
Process 
Scoring 309* 6 3 18 5,562 
Tallying 309* 6 1 6.00 1,852 
Data Entry : (for computerised analysis) 309*   0.33 102 
Total Time Required     7,516 
Number  of days based on an 8-hour work day     895 
Note: * Interim reports for 103 firms over a three-year period (2005, 2006 and 2007), leading to 309 Interim 
reports 
 
To moderate the time constraint, outsourcing of the tallying was applied for approximately 
half of the sample.  Using a research firm, 68 individuals were trained on the tallying process 
and were required to tally the information from the score sheets of 147 interim reports to the 
tally sheets.  The process of tallying is not exposed to interpretive subjectivity since the 
requirement is to award one to an attribute under an information item on the tally sheet where 
corresponding ordinal score for the attribute was awarded on the score sheet.  However, 
human error could arise from misreading, misallocation, omission, lack of concentration and 
fatigue.  To lessen the occurrence of such error, ample training was provided prior to an 
individual taking on the task.  Secondly, part of the team was charged with the responsibility 
to crosscheck every tally sheet from the tallying team.  Thirdly, approximately 10% of the 
tallied reports were randomly selected for reliability re-tallying.  The group that repeated the 
tallies was also randomly selected from the entire group of 68 individuals and the allocation of 
the reports for the second tallying was also random.  The results of this reliability check are 
discussed in section 8.6.1.4 below.  Health and safety concerns were also considered to avoid 
fatigue.  Such included breaks, no work overload, refreshments, to mention a few. 
8.6.1.4 Reliability for Disclosure Measurement 
Marston and Shrives (1991) recommends that it is essential to subject disclosure scores to a 
reliability test.   The purpose for reliability is to assure research quality; otherwise, high 
 257 
 
degrees of variation amongst coders may indicate weaknesses in research methods, poor 
organisation, definition of the research tools or inadequate training of the coders (Kolbe and 
Burnett 1991).  
The Krippendolff Alpha (K-α) inter-coder agreement reliability test, whose computation 
process is diagrammatically shown in Appendix 10, is used for various reasons.  First, inter-
coder reliability shows consistence based on third parties and is suitable in the absence of 
standard-coding (Beattie et al. 2004).  Second, Tinsley and Weiss  (2000) argues that inter-
coder agreement is a more defensible strategy for reliability testing since the measure is 
theoretically more oriented to comparable exactness between the scores as opposed to 
variation between the scores.  Krippendorff (2004) provides other merits that include ability to 
allow any number of coders, applicability to various levels of measurement (nominal, ordinal, 
interval and ratios), complete or missing data as well as large or small samples.  The K-α is 
also customisable to suit data sets with different characteristics unlike other techniques are 
highly specialised and restricted.  The main draw back of K-α is that its computation is 
complicated.  However, as advised in Krippendorff (2007), the SPSS macro (KALPHA) 
developed in Hayes and Krippendorff (2007) was used in this thesis.   
For acceptable levels, Neuendorf (2002) reviewed various content analysis literature and 
found that regardless of the technique used, a rule of thumb was to accept levels between 0.70 
and 1.00 as reliable.  Likewise studies (Beattie et al. 2004; Boyatzis 1998; Guthrie and 
Matthews 1985) are in agreement with the range of 0.70 to 1 for a content analysis technique 
to be regarded reliable.  
The sections below provide the results of the reliability tests for the scoring and tallying 
techniques.   
8.6.1.4.1 Reliability Tests for the Scoring Technique 
To conduct the disclosure scoring reliability tests, three coders with accounting and finance 
background were identified.  The inter-coders included (1) Mr Aylwin Yafele, reading for a 
doctorate at Bournemouth University on disclosure extent in UK listed and non-listed 
companies; (2) Mr Faisal Batiibwe, a certified chartered accountant (ACCA) with a London-
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based accounting and audit firm; and (3) Mr Robert Mpagi FCCA, formerly with PwC and 
currently a World Bank consultant in West and East Africa.  Prior studies (e.g. Beattie et al. 
2004; Beattie and Thomson 2007) concur with the use of professionals in the subject area for 
inter-coder reliability to enhance consistence in the output.   
The three coders were briefed on the background and objectives to the study.  Thereafter, they 
were trained on the scoring technique and decision rules using illustrations.  A pilot exercise 
was conducted with the three intercoders prior to commissioning the process.  Through 
random selection, three reports were sent to the inter-coders along with disclosure indices, 
decision rules and tally sheet templates.  The results for the attributes were compared with 
those of the researcher.  The summary of the results of the tests are shown in Appendix 11
9
; 
the table below reports on the K-α estimate.  The results show a high level of reliability.   
Table 17 Krippendorff‟s Alpha Reliability Results for the Scoring Technique  
Interim Report Type of K-α  Test Reference for Detailed K-α 
Results 
K-α Value 
Millennium & Copthorne 
2006 
Two-coder ratio data Appendix 11, Panel B 0.9989 
Barratt Developments 2005 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 11,  Panel C 0.9955 
Kesa Electricals 2006 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 11, Panel D 0.9909 
8.6.1.4.2 Reliability Tests for the Tallying Technique   
Neuendorf (2002) suggested that one of the merits of reliability confirmation is the ability to 
distribute the coding work to various people.  The tallying technique made use of the 
advantage by outsourcing for the exercise for almost half of the sample.  The tallymen and 
women were given score sheets that had complementary and supplementary attributes ordinal 
scores and tally sheet templates.  Training of the tally technique was made and pilot exercise 
conducted prior to commissioning the exercise.  This thesis found no prior literature 
documenting the process of reliability testing for tallying of scores.  To this effect, a custom 
process based on the same procedure used reliability testing for the scoring technique.  
                                                 
9
The coincidence and delta matrices have been excluded because of the enormous data they present 
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Table 18 provides the K-α values and a summary of the SPSS KALPHA macro is provided in 
Appendix 12.
10
  The results show that there is a high level of reliability. 
Table 18 Krippendorff‟s Alpha Reliability Results for the Tallying Technique  
Interim Report Type of K-α  Test Reference for Detailed 
K-α Results 
K-α Value 
Arriva 2007 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel B 0.9993 
Berkeley 2007 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel C 0.9980 
GlaxoSmithKline 2006 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel D 0.9613 
Findel 2007 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel E 0.9986 
Euro Money Institutional Investor 2006 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel F 0.9890 
Euro Money Institutional Investor 2007 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel G 0.9771 
Carpetright 2005 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel H 0.9905 
Carillion 2007 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel I 0.9985 
SSL 2005 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel J 0.9705 
Unilever 2005 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel K 0.9941 
Redrow 2005 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel L 0.9992 
United Business Media 2005 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel M 0.9935 
United Business Media 2006 Three-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel N 0.9897 
Persimmon 2006 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel O 0.9979 
Smith and Nephew 2005 Two-coder ratio data Appendix 12, Panel P 0.9988 
8.6.2 Financial Performance Measures 
The control variables are financial performance measures of annual dividend yield (ADY), 
interim earnings per share (IES) and interim total assets as a measure of firm size (ITA).  ADY 
is the annual average dividend yield based on previous and current years‟ dividend yield from 
DataStream.  IES is interim earnings per share is the basic earnings per share in £ pence 
extracted from the interim reports.  ITA is firm size and position measured as the log values 
for interim total assets (current assets and fixed assets) drawn from the interim reports. 
The association of the financial performance variables with share price returns is established 
in past literature.  For example, studies (e.g. Campbell and Shiller 1988; Fama and French 
1988; Kothari and Shanken 1997) found the dividend yield relevant to returns.  Recent studies 
(e.g. Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2009; Lennox and Park 2006) find a association between 
                                                 
10
 The coincidence and delta matrix are not included as they are voluminous 
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EPS and share price returns.  Bamber (1986) and Grullon and Michaely (2004) find a 
significant relationship between total assets and returns. 
8.7 Models for Measuring Information Content 
This section discusses the tests used to measure information content, the basis for information 
content decisions and the models used to estimate relative and incremental information 
content. 
8.7.1 Tests for Information Content 
Parametric statistical tests are used in the study to establish information content.  To confirm 
that parametric tests are the suited technique for the study, a number of considerations are 
made.  First, Field (2005) suggests that parametric tests require measurement of information to 
be interpreted into interval or ratio scores.  In the discussion regarding the methodology for 
measuring dependent and independent variable, all variable measures suit the properties of 
intervals or ratios.  The properties are described in Appendix 6.    
Another assumption of the parametric test is the requirement that the data should follow a 
normal distribution.  As discussed above regarding the normality of returns, there is consensus 
in literature that daily returns are non-normal but this does not affect their predictive power.  
In the results chapter, the descriptives show that transforming returns by using continuously 
compounded returns does not normalise returns.  For the independent variables, Field (2005) 
argues that it is not necessary for predictors to be normally distributed.  
While comparing parametric to non-parametric tests, Field (2005) argues that parametric tests 
are more precise in capturing all the effects of the predictors.  In event studies, parametric tests 
were found to be better specified than non-parametric tests for measuring information content 
based on daily share returns (Berry et al. 1990). 
To supplement the parametric tests, the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used.  
Saunders et al (2003) suggests that the normal distribution requirement in ANOVA may not be 
necessary provided the sample is large enough (30 cases and above); however, Field (2005) 
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argues that such a suggestion is still subject to debate.  ANOVA is used when the regression 
model consists of more that one categorical independent variables and a normally distributed 
dependent variable.  The aim is to test for variance of the dependent variable partitioned by the 
levels of the independent variable (Schipper and Thompson 1985).  
8.7.2 Basis for Information Content Decisions 
The parametric test used in the study is multiple regression models, supplemented by 
ANOVA.  Two considerations are made prior to make conclusion about the results of the 
models.  First for each model, serial correlation and multicollinearity for each set of results are 
considered to confirm that the models are well specified. Second, the coefficients, signs and 
significance of the model and predictors are used to confirm information content. 
The statistic used to determine serial correlation is the Durbin -Watson (D-W) statistic.  
Presence of serial correlation indicates that the variables in the model violate the assumptions 
of regression (Anderson et al. 2007).  The D-W test results range from zero to four, with a 
value of two indicating no concern about serial correlation.  However, perfect lack correlation 
may not be easily attained as Field (2005) argues that each variable in a set of independent 
variables tends to have a relationship with the dependant variable may be partially due to 
correlation in the independent variables.  Therefore, D-W test perfect result of two may not be 
attained.  The rule of the thumb is to consider values are nearer to two to accept absence of 
multicollinearity, where less than one or greater than three calls for doubt in the model. 
To test for multicollinearity, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and the tolerance are used.  The 
guidelines to determine presence of multicollinearity are discussed in Field (2005).  If in the 
model there is any value of a predictor‟s VIF ≥ 10, then the level of multicollinearity is high 
and if on average, VIF is substantially greater than one, then the regression may be biased.  
Tolerance coefficients with values below 0.1 indicate the model is highly exposed to 
multicollinearity and below 0.2 may subject the model to the problem.  Anderson et al (2007) 
argues that it would be extremely assumptive to avoid interdependence of predictors in any 
statistical sense and some degree of correlation is expected in independent variables.   
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The squared multiple correlation (R
2
) is used determine the information content of the 
independent variables.  The R
2
 states the degree to which changes in the group of independent 
variables will lead to a change in the dependent variable.  However, R
2
 is not the best 
estimator of information content as inclusion of variables largely increases the coefficient, 
even useless variables.  The adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted R
2
) is more stable 
in avoiding this problem of increasing coefficient of determination as independent variables 
increase (Anderson et al. 2007).  Adjusted R
2
 is considered to give an idea of how well the 
model may be generalized and reduces the overestimated impact in R
2
 arising from adding 
independent variables (Field 2005).  To test for the significance of the relationship between 
the dependent variable and the set of independent variables, the F-Ratio is used.  The ratio 
measures overall significance or goodness of fit (Anderson et al. 2007).  On specifying the 
tests for the significance of the information content models, this paragraph discusses the test 
for information content of the predictors used in the models.   Relative information content in 
the study is determined by comparing the coefficients of the adjusted R
2
.   Comparison of 
coefficients is one the techniques of relative information content determination recommended 
in Hotelling (1940).  Incremental information content is determined by comparing the adjusted 
R
2
 of relative information content and those of incremental information content. 
The test-statistic (t-statistic) is used to measure the null hypothesis that a unit change in the 
coefficient of the independent variable (normally referred to as unstandardised β) does not 
result in a unit change of the dependant variable.  Therefore, the t-statistic value of the 
unstandardised β is zero; if the t-statistic is significant, then the null hypothesis that 
unstandardised β is equal to zero is rejected.  To this effect, the alternative hypothesis that the 
predictor‟s unstandardised β coefficient is different from zero is accepted implying that the 
independent variable contributes significantly to predicting the dependant variable.  In this 
study, the t-statistic is used.  Field (2005) identifies that a major problem with the 
unstandardised β is the coefficient being based on measurement unit, regardless of the 
significance of the predictor to the dependant variable; yet units may be different for each 
predictor.  Therefore, the standardized β, which is not based on unit measures for predictor is 
reported in this study alongside the t-statistic.  The standardized β are comparable as they are 
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all measurable in standard deviations.  They show the number of standard deviations that the 
dependant variable will change as a result of one standard deviation change in the predictor; 
hence the extent of importance of the predictor to the dependant variable.  
8.7.3 Models for Relative Information Content 
As applied in prior relative information content studies (e.g. Berry et al. 1998; Firth 1981; 
Wilson 1986), the relativity is measured through separate regression models, one for each set 
of classification being examined for higher information content.   Relative information content 
therefore assesses whether one measure (set of measures) provides greater information content 
than another (Biddle et al. 1995).   In the context of this study, relative information content 
establishes the greater of the two narrative types, complementary and supplementary, in terms 
of usefulness to investors.  Below is a mathematical expression of this argument. 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 
  
>
=
<
 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
  
The equation above states that information content of complementary narratives is either 
greater than or equal to or less than the information content of supplementary narratives.  
Relative information content is established using four models, two based on disclosure variety 
and two based on disclosure depth.  In both disclosure variety and disclosure depth, relative 
information content is established by comparing the results of the model for information 
content of complementary narratives with that of supplementary narratives.    
For relative information content based on disclosure variety, the models compared are 
information content of (1) complementary narratives based disclosure variety and (2) 
supplementary narratives based on disclosure variety.  The models are provided below. 
Model 1 Information Content of Complementary Narratives based on Disclosure Variety 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4IT𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
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Model 2 Information Content of Supplementary Narratives based on Disclosure Variety 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
For relative information content based on disclosure depth, the models compared are (1) 
complementary narratives based on disclosure depth and (2) supplementary narratives based 
on disclosure depth.  The models are given below. 
Model 3 Information Content of Complementary Narrative based on Disclosure Depth 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
Model 4 Information Content of Supplementary Narrative based on Disclosure Depth 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
Where,  
CAR  Market Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns computed for the days 
t=-4 to t=5 computed using Equation 1 
CII and SII  Complementary and Supplementary attribute of presence of information 
items without repetitions in interim report of narratives measured by use 
of Equation 2  and (Equation 3), respectively.
11
 
CGD and SGD  Complementary and Supplementary attribute of good news in interim 
report narratives measured by Equation 4  and Equation 5, respectively. 
CAC and SAC Complementary and Supplementary attribute of amount and comparison 
of current with past performance in interim report narratives measured 
by Equation 6 and Equation 7, respectively. 
CRE and SRE  Complementary and Supplementary attribute of reasons for 
performance in interim report narratives measured by Equation 8 and 
Equation 9, respectively. 
CFW and SFW Complementary and Supplementary attribute of forward-looking 
disclosures in interim report narratives measured by Equation 10 and 
Equation 11, respectively. 
ADY  Annual average dividend yield based on previous and current years‟ 
dividend yield from DataStream 
IES Interim earnings per share is the basic earnings per share in £ pence 
extracted from the interim report 
                                                 
11
 As CII and SII have a known denominator, ratios may be used.  In this study, absolute values are used for 
consistence with other variable measures when disclosure attributes are considered.  In results not presented in 
this study, ratio values are highly correlated for supplementary and perfectly correlated for complementary 
absolute scores.  The regression results were also similar and therefore there is no substantial benefit in 
transforming the absolute scores into ratios 
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ITA Firm size and position measured log values for interim report current 
assets and fixed assets 
β1, 2, 3 Coefficients for the independent variables 
i Security i 
t For the dependent variable, t refers to the day for which the CAR is 
computed and for the independent variables, t refers to the interim 
period announced for day t=0 
 
Relative information content compares competing models that are mutually exclusive (Said et 
al. 2008).  Therefore, the significance of the difference between the information content of 
complementary and supplementary narratives is estimated using the significance tests for non-
nested models.  The significance of the difference is the determinant for the judgement for 
relative usefulness (Pesaran 1982).  One of the tests applied in this thesis is the Hotelling‟s t-
statistic (Hotelling‟s t) developed by Hotelling (1940).  The test is selected because it is widely 
accepted in empirical research as the pioneer and traditional standard for comparing models 
(Efron 1984).  However, the Hotelling‟s t has some problems for example the test fails to 
address confidence in one or other models as a positive departure can have opposite 
implications depending on the location of the mean vector (Fraser and Gebotys 1987).  
Secondly, the Hotelling‟s t in some instances overestimates the t-value because it uses 
multiple correlation coefficients that are not normally distributed R-values, subjecting the test 
to Type 1 error.  Also, Steiger and Lind (1980) found that Hotelling‟s t is at times not suitable 
for some social sciences research.   To counter these concerns, this thesis complements the 
Hotelling‟s t with the Steiger‟s Z statistic developed in Steiger and Lind (1980).  Various 
studies (e.g. Klehe and Anderson 2007; Lee and Koubek 2010; Park et al. 2008) have used 
both the Hotelling‟s t and Steger‟s Z for comparing non-nested models.  The computation is 
done using the FZT computator, an online program to compute both Hotelling‟s t and Steger‟s 
Z as applied in prior literature (e.g. Raboyeau et al. 2009).  
8.7.4 Models for Incremental Information Content 
Statistically, Tauringana (1997) recognizes that models having more variables in a study are 
better specified for reducing Type II errors because the risk of erroneously rejecting the 
hypothesis due to neglecting important variables is minimized.   Including an unimportant 
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variable does not bias results but exclusion of a relevant variable misspecifies results.  
However, the reliability of a model may be affected when it is comprised of many unimportant 
variables.  Therefore, a model having more relevant variables is well specified to avoid Type I 
errors.    
On establishing relative information content, Biddle et al (1995) suggests that there is need for 
examining incremental information content as both relative and incremental usefulness are 
related mathematically.  The relationship between relative and incremental information 
content is illustrated in Appendix 13.  The incremental information content model assesses 
whether combining complementary and supplementary disclosures in one model provides 
better information content than the relative information content models.  If this is the case, 
then both narratives have incremental information content, otherwise, the narratives with less 
relative information content have no incremental information content.  To align with this 
study, incremental information is recognition of synergy between complementary and 
supplementary narratives.  In ASB (2005; 2006), the recommendation was to complement and 
supplement but not either complement or supplement.  Whilst relative information content is 
arguably concerned with the “either…or” scenario, incremental information content extends 
the argument to the “….and…” scenario. Therefore, incremental usefulness establishes the 
relevance for the use of disclosure types as one piece of narrative commentaries as opposed to 
two pieces of narratives to investors‟ understanding of financial statements while making 
investment decisions.    
The mathematical expressions below illustrate incremental information content. 
Expression 1: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
    
≥
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 
 
   
Expression2: 
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𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
  
≥
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 
 
     
Expression 1 states that information content of complementary and supplementary narratives 
is greater or equal to information content of complementary narratives.  Expression 2 
demonstrates that information content of complementary and supplementary narratives is 
greater or equal to information content of supplementary narratives.  
Based on the above expressions, the models combining complementary and supplementary 
narratives are two.  They include information content of complementary and supplementary 
narratives based on (1) disclosure variety and (2) disclosure depth.  The models are given 
below 
Model 5 Model Combining Complementary and Supplementary Narratives based 
Disclosure Variety 
  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
Model 6 Model Combining Complementary and Supplementary Narratives based on 
Disclosure Depth 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑆𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
The definition of variables is similar to that for the relative information content models. 
Incremental information content evaluates whether one measure contributes information in 
addition to that of one or more measures (Said et al. 2008).  The approach used in this instance 
is the analysis of variance comparing nested linear models with normal error (Fraser and 
Gebotys 1987).  The comparison of nested models applies the difference between the squared 
multiple correlation coefficient (R
2
) of the models in question to establish the significance of 
the F-test (Mendenhall and Sincich 2003).  One way of testing the significance of nested 
models is by forward or backward stepwise method and the all-subset method (Fraser and 
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Gebotys 1987).  This can be through a statistical computer program such as SPSS by changing 
from one model to another and computing the resulting R
2
 change significance change.  
Alternatively, the F-statistic part of the FZT computator may be used.  In this study, the FZT 
computator F-test is used.  The F-test is widely acknowledged in empirical research 
(Mendenhall and Sincich 2003). 
8.7.5 Reliability of Regression Models 
The reliability of regression models depends on the conformity to the conditions of regression 
analysis.  Apart from the normality assumptions and multicollinearity conditions already 
discussed in this chapter and examined in the results chapter, Field (2005; 2009) suggest 
testing for the impact of outliers and externalities.     
To test for linearity and homoscedasticity of the models, the regression-standardised plots 
were examined for each of the models for the event day as shown in Appendix 14.
12
  In this 
respect too, the descriptive statistics in the results and analysis chapter discusses the 
distributive characteristics of the dependent and independent variables.  Outlier cases were 
removed from the sample but the results did not differ substantially, therefore, were retained in 
the results. 
Externalities relate to variables outside the regression models but may influence power of the 
predictors to have information content.  Sometimes these predictors are included in the 
regression model as the error term.  However, it may be hard to establish all externalities and 
their respective impact, but their association with predictors may mispecify the model.  To 
investigate the reliability of the results of the regression analysis, sensitivity tests are 
conducted.  The tests carried out in the study include regulation change and audit review effect 
                                                 
12
 In the results and analysis chapter, the discussion shows that the event has the highest coefficients of 
determination for most models.  Due to the enormous data from the event studies, as the models are tested for 
each day in the event window, the most significant event day is selected for the plots in the Appendix.   
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based on results of the event day for all models.
13
  The F-statistic part of the FZT computator 
will be applied to compare the main results and the result of the models that include the 
sensitivity test dummy variables. 
8.8 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, the methodology for the study was discussed.  To conduct the study, a random 
sample 103 firms was selected from a sampling frame of 136 UK listed firms.  The sampling 
frame constituents had to be consistently members of the FTSE350 for the period 2005 to 
2007 and non-financial services sector firms.  The event study technique was considered most 
appropriate for the study.   
Cumulative market adjusted daily returns ±5 days around the announcement of interim reports 
are used to estimate the dependent variable.   
The predictors comprised of measures of narrative disclosures and financial performance 
measures.  The disclosure index technique was applied to estimate the extent of 
complementary and supplementary disclosures.  Two indices, one for complementary and one 
for supplementary were used.  A manual content analysis technique was used.  Disclosures 
were measured considering both disclosure variety and disclosure depth.  Disclosure variety 
was measured dichotomously, leading to one attribute, the presence of information items.  
Disclosure depth considered various attributes (good news amounts and comparison of current 
with past performance, reasons for performance and forward-looking attributes) and repetition 
there in.  The financial performance measure include annual dividend yield, interim earnings 
per share and interim total assets.   
Multiple regression analysis is used for estimating information content.  Both relative and 
incremental information content are estimated using disclosure variety and disclosure depth.   
                                                 
13
 An attempt to carry out sensitivity tests based on industry classification was deterred by the presence many 
industry classes for the Industrial Classification Benchmark.  Also, other classifications in literature  (e.g. Gray et 
al. 1995) had a similar shortcoming.  
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The sensitivity tests considered in the study include regulation change effect and audit review 
effect.   
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9 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the researcher presents the results of the study.  First, the descriptive statistics 
are examined.  Second, the correlation of the independent variables is analysed.  Third, results 
of relative information content of complementary and supplementary narratives are discussed.  
The fourth consideration is the incremental information content of complementary and 
supplementary narratives.  Fifth, the robustness of the results is examined through sensitivity 
tests.  Lastly, a summary and concluding remark are provided 
9.2 Descriptive Results 
In this section, a description of the variables used to estimate information content of 
complementary and supplementary narrative commentaries in interim reports is discussed.  
The presentation is in two sections.  The first section examines the descriptive characteristics 
of the dependent variables, that is, the daily market adjusted cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) for each day in the window ±5 days around the interim reporting date.  The second 
section discusses the descriptive results of the predictors.  These include complementary and 
supplementary narrative attributes and the financial performance variables. 
9.2.1 Descriptive Results for the Dependant Variables 
The CARs were computed for each day in the window period based on closing share price 
returns.  Table 19 presents the descriptive statistics for CARs.  Reading from the mean, 
median and 75
th
 percentile, returns for the period before the announcement of the interim 
report, CAR (-5,-4) to CAR (-5,-1), shows very slight changes in CAR.  Both mean and 
median values range from 0.001 to 0.005.  At the 75
th
 percentile, CAR in the pre-event period 
ranges from 0.009 to 0.021.  The increasing trend of returns from CAR (-5,-4) to CAR (-5,-1) 
is a result of accumulation.  The low values of CAR in the pre-event period may indicate that 
investors have very low anticipation of the contents of the interim report.  The event date 
returns, CAR (-5, 0), show a sharp increase in returns compared to pre-event period.  For days 
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+1 to +3, there is a gradual decline in returns while for days +4 and +5, returns fall 
substantially.   
Previous studies based on UK data (e.g. Opong 1995; Rippington and Taffler 1995; Wolfe et 
al. 2009) report similar patterns despite using different estimates for returns.   Opong (1995) 
argues that  the instant jump in returns on the day of the interim report announcement suggests 
that the reports have information that is relevant for investment decision making.  Such 
information includes progress in the yearly reporting cycle, pre-emption of insider trading and 
an update on the firm‟s changing fortune.  Wolfe et al (2009) attributes the trend to high 
impact interim reports have on share price returns as a source of new and useful information.  
For interim reports, such information may include dividend policy changes, ex-dividend date 
and seasonality effect on performance.   
Table 19 Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variable 
Dependant 
Variable 
Min.
 

 
Percentiles

 Max.
 

 
Mean

 Mode

 
Std

 
Dev. 
Skew- 
ness* 
Kurto- 
sis** 
25 Median 75 
CAR(-5,-4) -0.050 -0.007 0.001 0.009 0.107 0.001 0.006  0.015 1.195 8.345 
CAR(-5,-3) -0.086 -0.008 0.001 0.012 0.089 0.003 0.008  0.021 0.169 3.182 
CAR(-5,-2) -0.089 -0.011 0.003 0.018 0.121 0.004 -0.017  0.025 0.310 2.586 
CAR(-5,-1) -0.118 -0.012 0.005 0.021 0.104 0.005 0.004 ¹ 0.028 -0.266 2.206 
CAR(-5,0) -0.070 2.127 4.311 7.990 38.068 6.062 0.011  6.023 2.138 6.613 
CAR(-5,1) -0.090 2.119 4.297 7.990 38.092 6.066 -0.090 ¹ 6.024 2.137 6.609 
CAR(-5,2) -0.078 2.127 4.286 7.987 38.117 6.068 -0.078 ¹ 6.024 2.138 6.612 
CAR(-5,3) -0.130 2.126 4.280 7.959 38.155 6.051 -0.130 ¹ 6.034 2.133 6.582 
CAR(-5,4) -0.181 1.887 4.122 7.285 38.165 5.631 -0.181 ¹ 5.805 2.303 8.160 
CAR(-5,5) -0.146 1.207 3.970 6.796 38.173 5.272 -0.146 ¹ 5.806 2.370 8.568 
Notes: CAR = Daily Market Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns, 

The coefficients CAR were multiplied by 
100  as the values were minute to aid a substantive discussion, *Standard Error of Skewness = 0.139 **Standard 
Error of Kurtosis = 0.276, 
1 
Multiple Modes exist, the smallest value is shown, n=309 and missing = 0 
To examine normality distributive characteristics of returns, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the 
Shapiro-Wilk test are used.  The tests are conducted for both discrete and continuously 
compounded cumulative abnormal returns.  The results in Table 20 show that for all tests, a 
significance of p<0.05 for the statistic is attained.  Therefore, for both discrete and 
continuously compounded techniques, CARs do not follow a normal distribution.   
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Table 20 Normality of Distribution Tests for Discrete and Continuously Compounded 
Returns 
Dependant Variable 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
1
  Shapiro-Wilk 
Discrete CAR 
Continuously 
Compounded CAR 
 Discrete CAR 
Continuously 
Compounded CAR 
Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig.  Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. 
CAR(-5,-4) 0.087 0.000 0.086 0.000  0.915 0.000 0.922 0.000 
CAR(-5,-3) 0.086 0.000 0.089 0.000  0.946 0.000 0.946 0.000 
CAR(-5,-2) 0.071 0.001 0.072 0.001  0.967 0.000 0.969 0.000 
CAR(-5,-1) 0.054 0.032 0.056 0.022  0.975 0.000 0.973 0.000 
CAR(-5,0) 0.162 0.000 0.066 0.002  0.805 0.000 0.931 0.000 
CAR(-5,1) 0.162 0.000 0.059 0.011  0.806 0.000 0.963 0.000 
CAR(-5,2) 0.162 0.000 0.055 0.023  0.806 0.000 0.966 0.000 
CAR(-5,3) 0.161 0.000 0.061 0.007  0.806 0.000 0.957 0.000 
CAR(-5,4) 0.158 0.000 0.056 0.020  0.797 0.000 0.965 0.000 
CAR(-5,5) 0.175 0.000 0.056 0.023  0.784 0.000 0.974 0.000 
Notes: CAR = Daily Market Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns, 
1
Lilliefors Significance Correction, n= 
309 
Although the dependent variables are exposed to non-normality distribution, the study uses 
parametric tests based on discrete returns for a number of reasons.  First, as shown above, 
transforming CARs through continuously compounded returns fails to normalise the returns.  
Secondly, there is evidence in prior studies that returns follow a non-normal distribution.  For 
example, Fama (1976) observed non-normality in US monthly and daily returns while Alles 
and Spowart (1995) a similar pattern for Australian monthly returns.  Third, as argued in Field 
(2005), the ranking used in non-parametric techniques fails to detect the power of tests 
although the technique is assumption free about distribution.  Therefore, using non-parametric 
tests in this thesis may expose the study to Type II error by accepting that there are no 
differences in information content of complementary and supplementary narratives yet the 
variations may exist.   
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9.2.2 Descriptive Results for the Independent Variables 
Table 21 relates to the descriptive results of the independent variables.   
Table 21 Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables  
Predictor Min. 
Percentiles 
Max. Mean Mode 
Std 
Dev. 
Skew- 
ness* 
Kurto-
sis** 25 Med. 75 
Panel A: Complementary Attributes 
CII 25.000 38.000 40.000 42.000 47.000 39.463 39.000 ¹ 3.744 -1.203 2.274 
CGD 0.673 0.847 0.902 0.940 0.998 0.889 0.892 ¹ 0.065 -0.823 0.394 
CAC 56.000 378.000 647.000 939.500 6,307.000 798.214 678.000  698.054 3.410 18.205 
CRE 18.000 279.000 538.000 821.000 4,638.000 642.712 384.000 ¹ 556.265 2.853 13.637 
CFW 17.000 144.000 257.000 486.500 2,357.000 370.560 64.000  352.972 2.279 7.294 
            
Panel B: Supplementary Attributes 
SII 6.000 17.000 22.000 27.000 35.000 22.045 22.000 ¹ 6.227 -0.081 -0.828 
SGD 0.340 0.617 0.708 0.811 1.000 0.709 0.589  0.140 -0.208 -0.469 
SAC 13.000 53.000 89.000 148.500 484.000 109.049 60.000  73.115 1.381 2.275 
SRE 0.000 23.000 41.000 70.000 260.000 51.871 38.000  38.685 1.450 3.039 
SFW 0.000 6.000 10.000 18.000 80.000 13.893 8.000  12.230 1.893 4.958 
 
Panel C: Financial Performance Measures 
ADY 0.000 0.016 0.024 0.033 0.057 0.024 0.000  0.012 0.012 -0.131 
IES -19.530 6.050 14.700 28.450 254.430 22.358 6.300  27.082 3.337 19.654 
ITA 2.104 2.814 3.222 3.750 5.074 3.291 2.731  0.614 0.402 -0.412 
Notes: CII (SII) = Complementary (Supplementary) Number of Information Items, CGD (SGD) = Complementary 
(Supplementary) Good News, CAC (SAC) = Complementary (Supplementary) Amounts and Comparison of Current 
with Past Performance, CRE (SRE) = Complementary (Supplementary) Reasons for Performance, CFW (SFW) = 
Complementary (Supplementary) Forward-looking Attribute, ADY = Average Annual Dividend Yield, IES = 
Interim Earnings per Share, ITA = Firm Size by Interim Logarithmic Total Assets, *Standard Error of Skewness = 
0.139 **Standard Error of Kurtosis = 0.276, 
1 
Multiple Modes exist, the smallest value is shown, n=309 and missing 
= 0 
Panel A presents results for the variables related to complementary information while Panel B 
is relates to predictors based on supplementary information attributes.  Panel C is for 
descriptive results for financial performance variables. 
There are substantial differences in the distributive characteristics of complementary attributes 
(Panel A) compared to supplementary attributes (Panel B).  For disclosure variety attribute, 
that is number of information items (CII and SII), complementary information items were 
disclosed more than supplementary information items.  For CII, majority of the firms 
disclosed approximately 40 items compared to just above 20 items for SII.  Tauringana and 
Mangena (2006) discussed that there are few chances of manipulating supplementary 
disclosures. Therefore, for the purpose of impression management, managers are likely to 
concentrate on the less verifiable complementary disclosures.  In the same study, it is 
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recognised that while supplementary narratives are only limited to information on the face of 
financial statements, complementary narratives report on all other aspects of the organisation.  
Therefore, the results may reflect the fact that complementary narratives have a wider range of 
topics for discussion unlike supplementary narratives that discuss only financial performance.   
Under disclosure depth, the four attributes are good news, amounts and comparison of current 
with past performance, reasons for performance and forward-looking attribute. 
Both median and mean coefficients are approximate at 90% for CGD and about 70% for SGD, 
therefore complementary narratives have more instances of good news compared to 
supplementary disclosures.  Abrahamson and Amir (1996) made a similar observation that 
most narratives are oriented towards good news, most notably for complementary narratives.  
They attributed the pattern to management‟s intent to impress investors by emphasising good 
news.  Similarly, Beattie et al (2008) noted the growth of narratives in UK financial reports 
overtime with the probable reason being the transformation of reports to more public relations 
tools than financially-oriented reports.  In addition, Tauringana and Mangena (2006) suggest 
that supplementary narratives are easily reconcilable to the audited financial statements.  
Arguably, therefore, it is difficult to emphasise good news over bad news in supplementary 
narratives unlike in complementary narratives where there is no authenticated reference.      
The mean value for CAC is about 800 items, supplementary narratives (SAC) score is 109.  
The disclosures relating to reasons for performance attribute have a mean value of 643 items 
for complementary narratives (CRE) and 52 items for supplementary items (SRE).  The higher 
rate of disclosure for complementary disclosures about the attributes, compared to 
supplementary disclosures, reflects the argument by Tauringana and Mangena (2006) that 
supplementary attributes are limited to only financial statements.  On the other hand, 
complementary narratives disclose on all other aspects of the company such as intellectual 
property, customer relations, segment analysis, management and shareholders, key 
performance indicators and social responsibilities.   
The forward-looking attribute, (CFW and SFW), was the least disclosed attribute under 
disclosure depth attributes.  Bozzolan et al (2009) theorised that under Incomplete Revelation 
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Hypothesis (IRH) forward-looking disclosures would only be useful if they accurately 
estimate future cash flows and verifiable.  However, given that the forward-looking 
disclosures are estimates, it may be hard to argue a case for their effectiveness in eliminating 
adverse selection since the future is largely unclear.  Therefore, management are not willing to 
bind themselves through forward-looking attributes.  Lev and Penman (1990) seem to support 
this perspective through the argument that forward looking disclosures based on financial 
statements are verifiable ex ante by reference to future financial statements.  To this effect, 
managers are deterred to provide such explicit prospective disclosures that may lead to 
questioning management‟s credibility and litigation when prospects are not attained (Kent and 
Ung 2003).   
For financial performance ratios, there are several observations.  For annual dividend yield 
(ADY), the minimum and mode values of 0.000 suggest that the number of companies that did 
not issue a dividend exceeds one.  The minimum of a negative value for earnings per share 
(IES) indicates that there are cases where companies had a loss, however, a positive value at 
the 25
th
 percentile shows that over 75 percent of the firms reported an interim profit.  For 
interim total assets (ITA), the median is 3.222 and mean is 3.291.  The small difference 
between mean and median for ITA may show that values for the sample are almost evenly 
distributed around the mean.    
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Table 22 Distribution Normality Tests for the Independent Variables 
Independent 
Variable 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
)1
  Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic Sig.  Statistic Sig. 
CII 0.128 0.000  0.918 0.000 
CGD 0.091 0.000  0.948 0.000 
CAC 0.176 0.000  0.715 0.000 
CRE 0.146 0.000  0.774 0.000 
CFW 0.164 0.000  0.785 0.000 
SII 0.078 0.000  0.980 0.000 
SGD 0.039 0.200*  0.990 0.027 
SAC 0.133 0.000  0.878 0.000 
SRE 0.134 0.000  0.887 0.000 
SFW 0.176 0.000  0.820 0.000 
ADY 0.041 0.200*  0.989 0.016 
IES 0.179 0.000  0.731 0.000 
ITA 0.059 0.012  0.976 0.000 
Notes: CII (SII) = Complementary (Supplementary) Number of Information Items, CGD (SGD) = 
Complementary (Supplementary) Good News, CAC (SAC) = Complementary (Supplementary) Amounts and 
Comparison of Current with Past Performance, CRE (SRE) = Complementary (Supplementary) Reasons for 
Performance, CFW (SFW) = Complementary (Supplementary) Forward-looking Attribute, ADY = Average 
Annual Dividend Yield, IES = Interim Earnings per Share, ITA = Firm Size by Interim Logarithmic Total Assets, 
1
Lilliefors Significance Correction, *Lower bound of the true significance. Valid Cases = 309 
The results show that only CGD and ADY are normally distributed under the Kolmogorov-
Smimov test with a significance of p>0.05.  However, under the Shapiro-Wilk test all 
variables follow a non-normal distribution.  The non-normal distribution may reflect 
variability in reporting culture and financial performance of organisations.  However, Field 
(2005) argues that the independent variable may not follow a normal distribution for 
parametric tests.  Therefore, despite most variables having a non-normal distribution, 
parametric tests are appropriate for the thesis. 
 
9.3 Correlation Analysis for Independent Variables 
The purpose of correlation analysis is to identify independent variables that are highly 
correlated.  A high correlation between the predictors leads to the problem of multicollinearity 
(Anderson et al. 2007; Saunders et al. 2003).  When the correlation coefficient is positive, both 
variables increase and decrease in the same direction and for a negative value, one predictor 
increases as the other declines.  Multicollinearity leads to misspecified test results of the 
regression where unrealistically high standard errors on the partial coefficients may yield a 
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smaller t-statistic compared to the critical t-statistic.  To this effect, a problem of wrongfully 
accepting the null hypothesis that the partial regression coefficient is effectively zero arises.  
This would imply that the true predictive power of the variable in question is lost and the 
results of the regression are misspecified. 
Tauringana (1997) suggested that one way of checking for multicollinearity is through visual 
scanning of the correlation matrix, as the one in Table 23, for high values and the significance 
of the coefficients.  However, there is inconsistent guidance on determining a high value.  
Among the suggestions on the coefficient for considering presence of high correlation are 
values around and above ±0.60 (Eastman 1984), ±0.70 (Saunders et al. 2003), ±0.80 (Judge et 
al. 1985), and ±0.90 (Field 2005; Field 2009).  Given the vast number of suggestions, this 
study assumes the most update rule of thumb and assumes high correlation existent at ±0.90.  
Table 23 presents the results for Pearson correlation.   
Table 23 Pearson Correlation between the Independent Variables 
 CII CGD CAC CRE CFW SII SGD SAC SRE SFW ADY IES 
CGD -.022            
CAC .489** .038           
CRE .466** .226** .803**          
CFW .434** .210** .727** .839**         
SII .574** -.093 .494** .433** .357**        
SGD -.281** .283** -.231** -.209** -.294** -.308**       
SAC .430** -.088 .565** .435** .372** .737** -.238**      
SRE .473** -.102* .548** .471** .352** .761** -.273** .854**     
SFW .379** -.007 .269** .263** .258** .528** -.122* .500** .647**    
ADY .101* -.028 .025 .022 -.009 .060 -.069 -.109* -.068 -.017   
IES .006 -.160** -.063 -.056 -.064 .074 .134** .037 .052 .140** -.004  
ITA .297** -.298** .385** .287** .230** .453** -.164** .429** .386** .316** .081 .174** 
Notes: CII (SII) = Complementary (Supplementary) Number of Information Items, CGD (SGD) = 
Complementary (Supplementary) Good News, CAC (SAC) = Complementary (Supplementary) Amounts and 
Comparison of Current with Past Performance, CRE (SRE) Complementary (Supplementary) = Reasons for 
Performance, CFW (SFW) = Complementary (Supplementary) Forward-looking Attribute, ADY = Average 
Annual Dividend Yield, IES = Interim Earnings per Share, ITA = Firm Size by Interim Logarithmic Total Assets, 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed), *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed), 
n=309 and missing = 0 
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Scanning through the correlation matrix, there is no coefficient to the magnitude of ±0.900; 
therefore, there is no high risk of correlation.
14
   
Observed from the correlation matrix, the correlation coefficients between complementary 
narrative attributes and financial performance measures seem to be lower than the correlation 
results between supplementary narratives and financial performance measures.  For example, 
the highest coefficient for complementary narratives is between CAC and ITA at 0.385 
whereas the highest coefficient for supplementary narratives is between SII with ITA at 0.453.  
Possibly, the reason for the higher coefficients of correlation between supplementary attributes 
and financial performance measures, compared to complementary attributes, is that 
supplementary attributes explain financial statements. 
The highest correlation coefficients between complementary and supplementary attributes are 
0.574 for CII with SII, 0.565 for CAC with SAC and 0.548 for CAC with SRE.  The probable 
reason for this may be the use of geographical and product-line segment analysis in explaining 
overall sales and profitability performance.   
For the correlation between complementary attributes, the highest coefficients were 0.839 for 
CRE with CFW and 0.803 CAC with CRE.  The results may indicate that where management 
provided amounts, comparisons or forward-looking information, the disclosures were 
frequently accompanied with justifications.    
For supplementary attributes, the highest correlation coefficients were between SAC and SRE 
at 0.854, showing that reasons for performance are most of times provided for disclosures of 
amounts and comparisons.  Other high coefficients include 0.737 for SII with SAC and 0.761 
for SII with SRE.  Supplementary number of information items (SII) is a measure for 
narratives under disclosure variety while SAC and SRE are measures of the same 
                                                 
14
 Correlation was also tested by reducing the cut-off point for high correlation to ±0.80.  Excluding the variables 
above the coefficient of ±0.80 from the information content models did not change the results compared to the 
simulations that incorporated the variables.  Further tests, that is, serial correlation (Durbin-Watson statistics) and 
multicollinearity (Variance Inflation Factor and tolerance) are discussed in the Result and Discussion chapter for 
each model. 
 280 
 
supplementary disclosures under disclosure depth.  Therefore, the correlation between SII with 
SAC and SRE may indicate that disclosure variety and depth are alternate measures of 
disclosures.  
9.4 Relative Information Content of Complementary and 
Supplementary Narratives 
9.4.1 Results 
The main objective of this is to examine relative information content of complementary and 
supplementary narratives.  Analysing relative information content is attained based on two 
techniques of measuring disclosures, disclosure variety and disclosure depth.  Therefore, 
results are in two parts.  Firstly, relative information content is examined based on disclosure 
variety by comparing results of Model 1 to those of Model 2.  The only attribute of 
complementary and supplementary narratives under disclosure variety is number of 
information items, where mere presence on an item, with no regard to repetitions is the 
measure for disclosures.  Secondly, relative information content is examined by comparing the 
outcome of Model 3 and Model 4, where extent disclosure is estimated by disclosure depth.  
Under disclosure depth, complementary and supplementary narratives are represented by sets 
of variable, which are measured with regard to repetitions.  For each type of narratives 
(complementary and supplementary), the variable set is comprised of four attributes: (1) good 
news, (2) amounts and comparison of current with past performance, (3) reasons for 
performance and (4) forward-looking attribute.  In addition to the main objective, results of 
usefulness of the disclosure depth attributes for complementary narratives is compared with 
the counterpart disclosure depth attributes in supplementary narratives.     
9.4.1.1 Relative Information Content based on Disclosure Variety 
Table 24 shows results of the relative information content of complementary and 
supplementary narratives measured by disclosure variety.  Relative usefulness is judged by 
comparing the adjusted R
2
 results of Model 1 and Model 2, representing complementary and 
supplementary narratives, respectively.   
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The pre-event period results are presented under Panel A.  For the complementary narratives 
model, the adjusted R
2
 coefficients range from -0.011 to 0.010, while for the supplementary 
narratives model, the least value was -0.003 and the highest was 0.013.  Based on the 
significance of the F-ratios, neither the complementary nor the supplementary model was 
significant in the period.  The measures for complementary number of information items (CII) 
and supplementary number of information items (SII) had no significant t-statistics.  Similarly, 
no financial performance variable (ADY, IES and ITA) was associated with cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) in the period.  For CAR (-5,-4) to CAR (-5,-1), the D-W statistics of 
the complementary range between 1.959 to 2.066 while all tolerance values range within 0.80 
and 0.99 and the highest VIF value is 1.137.  For the supplementary model, also the D-W 
statistics do not differ much from 2.000, tolerance values are all above 0.200 and VIF values 
are way below 10.000.  The D-W statistics show that no model is exposed to high serial 
correlation while the VIF and tolerance indicate low exposure to multicollinearity in the pre-
event period. 
The post-event period results in Panel B show that the adjusted R
2
 for the complementary 
model are highest for CAR (-5,0), CAR (-5,1) and CAR(-5,2) at 0.390.  On day +3, there is a 
slight decline in adjusted R
2
 to a value of 0.389.  Thereafter, adjusted coefficient of 
determination consistently declines to 0.252 for CAR (-5, 5).  For the supplementary 
narratives model, a similar pattern is observed where for CAR (-5,0) to CAR (-5,2), the  
adjusted R
2
 is constant at 0.397.  A small fall is observed for day +3 where the adjusted R
2
 
value is 0.396.  For days +4 and +5, the adjusted coefficients of determination are 0.301 and 
0.267, respectively.  All F-ratios within the post-event period are significant at p<0.01 level.  
The t-statistics show that, CII had no significance for any day, the SII was negatively 
significant for CAR (-5, 4) and CAR (-5, 5).  All financial performance measures (ADY, IES 
and ITA) had at least an instance of significant t-tests in the complementary narratives model.  
In the supplementary narratives model, while annual dividend yield and interim earnings per 
share were significant for all days, total assets as a measure of firm size had no significant 
value in the post-event period.  Based on the D-W statistics, VIF and tolerance values, Model 
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1 and Model 2 were not affected by serial correlation and multicollinearity as the cut-off 
points are met.  
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Table 24 Relative Information Content based on Disclosure Variety 
Panel A. Pre-event Period 
  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀   𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
R
2 
[Adj. R
2
]  
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.)  
<D-W Stat> 
  
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CII 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
 
R
2
  
[Adj. R
2
]  
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
 <D-W Stat> 
  
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
SII 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAR(-5,-4) 0.011    -0.040 -0.053 -0.025 -0.057  0.011    0.037 -0.057 -0.023 -0.086 
 [-0.002]   [1.541] [-0.673] [-0.918] [-0.423] [-0.939]  [-0.002]   [1.691] [0.571] [-0.989] [-0.389] [-1.319] 
 {0.849}   (0.124) (0.502) (0.359) (0.672) (0.348)  {0.817}   (0.092) (0.568) (0.323) (0.697) (0.188) 
 (0.495)    {0.904} {0.987} {0.967} {0.880}  (0.515)    {0.795} {0.992} {0.970} {0.772} 
 <1.959>    <1.106> <1.014> <1.034> <1.137>  <1.963>    <1.259> <1.008> <1.031> <1.295> 
CAR(-5,-3) 0.002    0.010 -0.010 0.048 -0.019  0.010    0.099 -0.012 0.048 -0.061 
 [-0.011]   [0.170] [0.158] [-0.179] [0.825] [-0.311]  [-0.003]   [0.250] [1.552] [-0.208] [0.829] [-0.940] 
 {0.188}   (0.865) (0.874) (0.858) (0.410) (0.756)  {0.785}   (0.803) (0.122) (0.835) (0.408) (0.348) 
 (0.945)    {0.904} {0.987} {0.967} {0.880}  (0.536)    {0.795} {0.992} {0.970} {0.772} 
 <2.051>    <1.106> <1.014> <1.034> <1.137>  <2.050>    <1.259> <1.008> <1.031> <1.295> 
CAR(-5,-2) 0.015    0.059 -0.056 0.072 -0.094  0.020    0.102 -0.054 0.069 -0.122 
 [0.002]   [0.139] [0.993] [-0.980] [1.240] [-1.551]  [0.007]   [1.518] [1.594] [-0.946] [1.205] [-1.892] 
 {1.180}   (0.890) (0.322) (0.328) (0.216) (0.122)  {1.574}   (0.130) (0.112) (0.345) (0.229) (0.059) 
 (0.320)    {0.904} {0.987} {0.967} {0.880}  (0.181)    {0.795} {0.992} {0.970} {0.772} 
 <2.013>    <1.106> <1.014> <1.034> <1.137>  <2.010>    <1.259> <1.008> <1.031> <1.295> 
CAR(-5,-1) 0.023    0.054 -0.101 0.104 -0.040  0.026    0.085 -0.099 0.102 -0.062 
 [0.010]   [-0.123] [0.913] [-1.776] [1.806] [-0.656]  [0.013]   [0.951] [1.333] [-1.745] [1.774] [-0.957] 
 {1.759}   (0.902) (0.362) (0.077) (0.072) (0.512)  {2.000}   (0.342) (0.183) (0.082) (0.077) (0.339) 
 (0.137)    {0.904} {0.987} {0.967} {0.880}  (0.094)    {0.795} {0.992} {0.970} {0.772} 
 <2.066>    <1.106> <1.014> <1.034> <1.137>  <2.070>    <1.259> <1.008> <1.031> <1.295> 
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Panel B. Event Day and Post-event Period 
  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀   𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
R
2
  
[Adj. R
2
] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
 <D-W> 
  
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CII 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
 
R
2
 
[Adj. R
2
] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
  
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
SII 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAR(-5,0) 0.398    0.005 0.285 0.570 -0.036  0.405    -0.092 0.288 0.570 0.007 
 [0.390]   [0.187] [0.108] [6.365] [12.607] [-0.766]  [0.397]   [0.913] [-1.860] [6.476] [12.678] [0.136] 
 {50.243}   (0.852) (0.914) (0.000) (0.000) (0.444)  {51.675}   (0.362) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.892) 
 (0.000)    {0.904} {0.987} {0.967} {0.880}  (0.000)    {0.795} {0.992} {0.970} {0.772} 
 <1.926>    <1.106> <1.014> <1.034> <1.137>  <1.974>    <1.259> <1.008> <1.031> <1.295> 
CAR(-5,1) 0.398    0.004 0.285 0.570 -0.036  0.405    -0.093 0.288 0.570 0.007 
 [0.390]   [0.204] [0.093] [6.366] [12.600] [-0.768]  [0.397]   [0.923] [-1.871] [6.477] [12.673] [0.135] 
 {50.196}   (0.839) (0.926) (0.000) (0.000) (0.443)  {51.646}   (0.357) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) (0.893) 
 (0.000)    {0.904} {0.987} {0.967} {0.880}  (0.000)    {0.795} {0.992} {0.970} {0.772} 
 <1.926>    <1.106> <1.014> <1.034> <1.137>  <1.975>    <1.259> <1.008> <1.031> <1.295> 
CAR(-5,2) 0.398    0.005 0.285 0.570 -0.037  0.404    -0.093 0.287 0.570 0.007 
 [0.390]   [0.204] [0.098] [6.359] [12.599] [-0.773]  [0.397]   [0.930] [-1.868] [6.470] [12.672] [0.131] 
 {50.170}   (0.839) (0.922) (0.000) (0.000) (0.440)  {51.614}   (0.353) (0.063) (0.000) (0.000) (0.896) 
 (0.000)    {0.904} {0.987} {0.967} {0.880}  (0.000)    {0.795} {0.992} {0.970} {0.772} 
 <1.927>    <1.106> <1.014> <1.034> <1.137>  <1.975>    <1.259> <1.008> <1.031> <1.295> 
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  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀   𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
R
2
  
[Adj. R
2
] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
 <D-W> 
  
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CII 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
 
R
2
 
[Adj. R
2
] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
  
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
SII 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAR(-5,3) 0.397    0.008 0.284 0.570 -0.038  0.404    -0.092 0.287 0.569 0.006 
 [0.389]   [0.136] [0.176] [6.342] [12.595] [-0.809]  [0.396]   [0.926] [-1.857] [6.458] [12.662] [0.113] 
 {50.071}   (0.892) (0.860) (0.000) (0.000) (0.419)  {51.489}   (0.355) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.910) 
 (0.000)    {0.904} {0.987} {0.967} {0.880}  (0.000)    {0.795} {0.992} {0.970} {0.772} 
 <1.937>    <1.106> <1.014> <1.034> <1.137>  <1.984>    <1.259> <1.008> <1.031> <1.295> 
CAR(-5,4) 0.302    0.028 0.297 0.474 -0.095  0.310    -0.109 0.302 0.472 -0.037 
 [0.292]   [0.339] [0.564] [6.152] [9.727] [-1.857]  [0.301]   [1.969] [-2.042] [6.307] [9.763] [-0.685] 
 {32.814}   (0.735) (0.573) (0.000) (0.000) (0.064)  {34.192}   (0.050) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.494) 
 (0.000)    {0.904} {0.987} {0.967} {0.880}  (0.000)    {0.795} {0.992} {0.970} {0.772} 
 <1.936>    <1.106> <1.014> <1.034> <1.137>  <1.963>    <1.259> <1.008> <1.031> <1.295> 
CAR(-5,5) 0.262    0.015 0.275 0.443 -0.128  0.277    -0.136 0.280 0.442 -0.062 
 [0.252]   [0.935] [0.295] [5.551] [8.848] [-2.441]  [0.267]   [2.760] [-2.479] [5.710] [8.919] [-1.123] 
 {27.004}   (0.350) (0.768) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015)  {29.096}   (0.006) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.262) 
 (0.000)    {0.904} {0.987} {0.967} {0.880}  (0.000)    {0.795} {0.992} {0.970} {0.772} 
 <1.966>    <1.106> <1.014> <1.034> <1.137>  <1.984>    <1.259> <1.008> <1.031> <1.295> 
                  
Notes: CAR = Daily Market Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns, CII (SII) = Complementary (Supplementary) Number of Information Items, ADY = 
Average Annual Dividend Yield, IES = Interim Earnings per Share, ITA = Firm Size by Interim Logarithmic Total Assets, Single and double underline show 
significance respectively at 0.05 and 0.01 level, n=309
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Diagram 9 illustrates relative information of complementary and supplementary narratives 
based on disclosure variety. 
Diagram 9 Relative Information Content based on Disclosure Variety 
 
The diagram shows that in both the pre-event and post-event periods, the model for 
information content of supplementary narratives based on disclosure variety has higher 
adjusted R
2
 values than that of information content of complementary narratives based on 
disclosure variety.  The differential of adjusted R
2
 between the models is small in both 
periods.  However, the values of adjusted R
2
 for both models are low in the pre-event period 
but increase from the event day (CAR -5,0).  After day +3, the coefficients decline for both 
models. 
To augment the comparison above, Table 25 presents the significance tests for relative 
information content using Hotelling‟s t-statistic and Steiger‟s Z-statistic. 
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Table 25 Relative Information Content based on Disclosure Variety Significance Test 
  
 R1 
 
 R2 
Corr. 
 (1, 2) 
df t Z Critical 
 t 
Critical  
Z 
Is change 
significant  
based on  
t? 
Is change 
significant 
 based on  
Z? 
CAR(-5,-4) 0.104 0.116 0.852 306 0.388 0.388 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,-3) 0.048 0.106 0.554 306 1.080 1.078 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,-2) 0.158 0.158 0.870 306 0.695 0.694 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,-1) 0.147 0.157 0.920 306 0.443 0.443 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,0) 0.631 0.636 0.991 306 0.845 0.844 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,1) 0.631 0.636 0.991 306 0.845 0.844 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,2) 0.631 0.636 0.991 306 0.845 0.844 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,3) 0.630 0.636 0.991 306 1.014 1.012 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,4) 0.549 0.557 0.979 306 0.822 0.821 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,5) 0.512 0.526 0.969 306 0.157 1.154 1.97 1.96 No No 
Note: R1= R coefficient for Model 1, R2 = R coefficient for Model 2, Corr. (1, 2) = Two-tailed Pearson 
correlation  between the unstandardised predicted values of Model 1 and  Model 2, df = degrees of freedom, t = 
Hotelling‟s t-statistic, Steiger's Z-statistic, Critical t = Two-tailed t-critical for (p<0.05, for df of 306), Critical Z = 
Two-tailed Z-critical for  p<0.05 
The result shows that for both Hotelling‟s t and Steiger‟s t values comparing Model 1 and 
Model 2, the differences in information content are not significant throughout the event 
period.  Therefore, relatively, information content of complementary and supplementary 
narratives based on disclosure variety does not differ significantly. 
9.4.1.2 Relative Information Content based on Disclosure Depth 
Relative information content based on disclosure depth is established by comparing results of 
Model 3 (complementary narratives) to those of Model 4 (supplementary narratives).  The 
results of the two models are presented in Table 26.  
The pre-event period results are provided in Panel A.  The adjusted R
2
 coefficients for 
complementary narratives model ranges from -0.002 to 0.008.  The F-ratio values for the 
model range from 0.903 to 1.340 and none is significant.  For the supplementary narratives 
model, the adjusted coefficients of determination are lowest at -0.009 and highest at 0.014.  
The F-ratios are all not significant and range between 0.587 and 1.620.  Neither 
complementary nor supplementary attributes have significant t-statistic value.  For both 
models, the results of the pre-event period are not exposed to serial correlation because the D-
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W statistics do not differ substantially from 2.000.  In addition, neither the complementary nor 
the supplementary model has an instance of a VIF value exceeding 10.000 and a tolerance 
below 0.200, hence no high exposure to multicollinearity.   
Results in Panel B relate to the post-event period.  The adjusted R
2
 coefficients for 
complementary and supplementary narrative models are highest for CAR (-5, 0) at 0.439 and 
0.389, respectively.  The lowest adjusted R
2
 values are for CAR (-5, 5) at 0.312 and 0.265 for 
complementary and supplementary narratives, respectively.  Both Model 3 and Model 4 have 
significant results of information content because all F-ratio coefficients are significant.  The 
range for F-ratios is from 36.376 to 20.974 for the complementary narratives model while the 
F-ratio range for the supplementary narratives model is from 29.050 to 16.869.  Significant t-
statistic values are observed for the complementary narratives attributes CGD, CAC and CRE, 
but no attribute is significant in the supplementary narratives model.  In Model 3, all financial 
performance variables (ADY, IES and ITA) are significant for all post-event days.  In Model 
4, both ADY and IES are significant throughout the post-event period but ITA was not 
significant on any day.  Both models have similar tolerance and VIF values as in the pre-event 
period and are all within acceptable limits.  Therefore, the risk of multicollinearity is not 
substantial.  The D-W statistics for both models are between 1.900 and 1.999, suggesting no 
instances of high serial correlation.    
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Table 26 Relative Information Content based on Disclosure Depth 
Panel A. Pre-Event Period 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀  
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀 
 
R2 
[Adj. R2] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
  
R2 
[Adj. R2] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
SGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAR(-5,-4) 0.027  0.086 -0.143 0.111 0.030 -0.055 -0.017 -0.028   0.023  0.049 0.199 -0.122 -0.022 -0.037 -0.023 -0.094 
 [0.005] [-0.779] [1.339] [-1.395] [0.885] [0.281] [-0.967] [-0.289] [-0.419]   [0.000] [0.700] [0.810] [1.744] [-0.963] [-0.289] [-0.641] [-0.385] [-1.437] 
 {1.206} (0.437) (0.182) (0.164) (0.377) (0.779) (0.334) (0.773) (0.675)   {0.995} (0.484) (0.419) (0.082) (0.336) (0.773) (0.522) (0.701) (0.152) 
 (0.299)  {0.775} {0.307} {0.205} {0.285} {0.991} {0.941} {0.722}   (0.435)  {0.886} {0.248} {0.201} {0.552} {0.959} {0.928} {0.759} 
 <1.966>  <1.291> <3.256> <4.876> <3.505> <1.010> <1.063> <1.384>   <1.976>  <1.129> <4.027> <4.981> <1.812> <1.043> <1.077> <1.317> 
CAR(-5,-3) 0.022  0.037 -0.127 0.235 -0.052 -0.011 0.055 -0.013   0.013  -0.027 0.114 0.010 -0.052 0.004 0.062 -0.060 
 [-0.001] [-0.386] [0.564] [-1.231] [1.867] [-0.485] [-0.196] [0.933] [-0.195]   [-0.009] [0.816] [-0.437] [0.990] [0.082] [-0.678] [0.076] [1.036] [-0.921] 
 {0.952} (0.699) (0.573) (0.219) (0.063) (0.628) (0.844) (0.352) (0.845)   {0.587} (0.415) (0.662) (0.323) (0.935) (0.498) (0.939) (0.301) (0.358) 
 (0.466)  {0.775} {0.307} {0.205} {0.285} {0.991} {0.941} {0.722}   (0.766)  {0.886} {0.248} {0.201} {0.552} {0.959} {0.928} {0.759} 
 <2.036>  <1.291> <3.256> <4.876> <3.505> <1.010> <1.063> <1.384>   <2.044>  <1.129> <4.027> <4.981> <1.812> <1.043> <1.077> <1.317> 
CAR(-5,-2) 0.021  0.029 -0.056 0.125 -0.010 -0.052 0.077 -0.081   0.022  0.008 0.140 -0.031 -0.063 -0.036 0.079 -0.107 
 [-0.002] [0.151] [0.450] [-0.546] [0.990] [-0.092] [-0.903] [1.315] [-1.206]   [-0.001] [1.235] [0.124] [1.226] [-0.240] [-0.821] [-0.624] [1.329] [-1.629] 
 {0.903} (0.880) (0.653) (0.585) (0.323) (0.927) (0.367) (0.190) (0.229)   {0.956} (0.218) (0.901) (0.221) (0.811) (0.412) (0.533) (0.185) (0.104) 
 (0.504)  {0.775} {0.307} {0.205} {0.285} {0.991} {0.941} {0.722}   (0.464)  {0.886} {0.248} {0.201} {0.552} {0.959} {0.928} {0.759} 
 <2.001>  <1.291> <3.256> <4.876> <3.505> <1.010> <1.063> <1.384>   <2.014>  <1.129> <4.027> <4.981> <1.812> <1.043> <1.077> <1.317> 
CAR(-5,-1) 0.030  0.014 -0.083 0.140 0.012 -0.097 0.109 -0.032   0.036  -0.022 0.100 0.045 -0.130 -0.085 0.122 -0.051 
 [0.008] [0.169] [0.211] [-0.806] [1.117] [0.110] [-1.701] [1.856] [-0.474]   [0.014] [1.159] [-0.364] [0.882] [0.355] [-1.707] [-1.465] [2.070] [-0.782] 
 {1.340} (0.866) (0.833) (0.421) (0.265) (0.912) (0.090) (0.064) (0.636)   {1.620} (0.248) (0.716) (0.378) (0.723) (0.089) (0.144) (0.039) (0.435) 
 (0.231)  {0.775} {0.307} {0.205} {0.285} {0.991} {0.941} {0.722}   (0.129)  {0.886} {0.248} {0.201} {0.552} {0.959} {0.928} {0.759} 
 <2.041>  <1.291> <3.256> <4.876> <3.505> <1.010> <1.063> <1.384>   <2.069>  <1.129> <4.027> <4.981> <1.812> <1.043> <1.077> <1.317> 
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Panel B. Event Day  and Post-event Period 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀 
  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀 
 
R2 
[Adj. R2] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
  
R2 
[Adj. R2] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
SGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAR(-5,0) 0.451  -0.127 0.319 -0.192 -0.044 0.286 0.573 -0.131   0.403  0.023 -0.056 -0.018 0.001 0.277 0.564 0.002 
 [0.439] [2.948] [-2.628] [4.139] [-2.032] [-0.553] [6.656] [13.017] [-2.609]   [0.389] [-0.116] [0.479] [-0.631] [-0.182] [0.009] [6.085] [12.196] [0.034] 
 {36.376} (0.003) (0.009) (0.000) (0.043) (0.581) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010)   {29.050} (0.908) (0.633) (0.528) (0.856) (0.993) (0.000) (0.000) (0.973) 
 (0.000)  {0.775} {0.307} {0.205} {0.285} {0.991} {0.941} {0.722}   (0.000)  {0.886} {0.248} {0.201} {0.552} {0.959} {0.928} {0.759} 
 <1.936>  <1.291> <3.256> <4.876> <3.505> <1.010> <1.063> <1.384>  <1.954>  <1.129> <4.027> <4.981> <1.812> <1.043> <1.077> <1.317> 
CAR(-5,1) 0.451  -0.127 0.320 -0.192 -0.045 0.286 0.573 -0.131   0.403  0.023 -0.058 -0.017 0.001 0.277 0.563 0.002 
 [0.438] [2.940] [-2.616] [4.147] [-2.033] [-0.567] [6.656] [13.012] [-2.611]   [0.389] [-0.112] [0.479] [-0.648] [-0.170] [0.009] [6.083] [12.189] [0.033] 
 {35.350} (0.004) (0.009) (0.000) (0.043) (0.571) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)   {29.030} (0.911) (0.632) (0.517) (0.865) (0.993) (0.000) (0.000) (0.974) 
 (0.000)  {0.775} {0.307} {0.205} {0.285} {0.991} {0.941} {0.722}   (0.000)  {0.886} {0.248} {0.201} {0.552} {0.959} {0.928} {0.759} 
 <1.937>  <1.291> <3.256> <4.876> <3.505> <1.010> <1.063> <1.384>  <1.955>  <1.129> <4.027> <4.981> <1.812> <1.043> <1.077> <1.317> 
CAR(-5,2) 0.451  -0.127 0.319 -0.191 -0.045 0.285 0.573 -0.131   0.403  0.023 -0.058 -0.017 0.000 0.276 0.564 0.001 
 [0.438] [2.944] [-2.618] [4.144] [-2.030] [-0.568] [6.649] [13.010] [-2.614]   [0.389] [-0.106] [0.478] [-0.649] [-0.167] [0.004] [6.077] [12.189] [0.029] 
 {35.328} (0.003) (0.009) (0.000) (0.043) (0.571) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)   {29.013} (0.916) (0.633) (0.517) (0.867) (0.997) (0.000) (0.000) (0.977) 
 (0.000)  {0.775} {0.307} {0.205} {0.285} {0.991} {0.941} {0.722}   (0.000)  {0.886} {0.248} {0.201} {0.552} {0.959} {0.928} {0.759} 
 <1.938>  <1.291> <3.256> <4.876> <3.505> <1.010> <1.063> <1.384>  <1.955>  <1.129> <4.027> <4.981> <1.812> <1.043> <1.077> <1.317> 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀 
 
R2 
[Adj. R2] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
Const 
 
[t-
Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
 
R2 
[Adj. R2] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
SGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAR(-5,3) 0.451  -0.128 0.319 -0.189 -0.044 0.285 0.573 -0.133  0.402  0.021 -0.056 -0.014 -0.004 0.276 0.564 0.000 
 [0.438] [2.965] [-2.641] [4.136] [-2.005] [-0.546] [6.638] [13.007] [-2.650]  [0.388] [-0.078] [0.440] [-0.631] [-0.142] [-0.065] [6.069] [12.194] [0.002] 
 {35.260} (0.003) (0.009) (0.000) (0.046) (0.586) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008)  {28.912} (0.938) (0.660) (0.529) (0.887) (0.948) (0.000) (0.000) (0.999) 
 (0.000)  {0.775} {0.307} {0.205} {0.285} {0.991} {0.941} {0.722}  (0.000)  {0.886} {0.248} {0.201} {0.552} {0.959} {0.928} {0.759} 
 <1.951>  <1.291> <3.256> <4.876> <3.505> <1.010> <1.063> <1.384>  <1.965>  <1.129> <4.027> <4.981> <1.812> <1.043> <1.077> <1.317> 
CAR(-5,4) 0.354  -0.105 0.333 -0.273 0.038 0.301 0.480 -0.178  0.314  0.022 -0.146 0.063 -0.047 0.283 0.468 -0.028 
 [0.339] [2.650] [-1.998] [3.978] [-2.665] [0.438] [6.478] [10.048] [-3.264]  [0.298] [0.554] [0.431] [-1.525] [0.594] [-0.725] [5.809] [9.445] [-0.506] 
 {23.579} (0.008) (0.047) (0.000) (0.008) (0.662) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  {19.644} (0.580) (0.667) (0.128) (0.553) (0.469) (0.000) (0.000) (0.613) 
 (0.000)  {0.775} {0.307} {0.205} {0.285} {0.991} {0.941} {0.722}  (0.000)  {0.886} {0.248} {0.201} {0.552} {0.959} {0.928} {0.759} 
 <1.956>  <1.291> <3.256> <4.876> <3.505> <1.010> <1.063> <1.384>  <1.956>  <1.129> <4.027> <4.981> <1.812> <1.043> <1.077> <1.317> 
CAR(-5,5) 0.328  -0.126 0.348 -0.324 0.081 0.280 0.448 -0.222  0.282  -0.001 -0.175 0.091 -0.090 0.256 0.445 -0.054 
 [0.312] [3.215] [-2.353] [4.082] [-3.108] [0.920] [5.899] [9.202] [-4.001]  [0.265] [1.327] [-0.022] [-1.781] [0.831] [-1.372] [5.137] [8.773] [-0.966] 
 {20.974} (0.001) (0.019) (0.000) (0.002) (0.358) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  {16.869} (0.186) (0.982) (0.076) (0.406) (0.171) (0.000) (0.000) (0.335) 
 (0.000)  {0.775} {0.307} {0.205} {0.285} {0.991} {0.941} {0.722}  (0.000)  {0.886} {0.248} {0.201} {0.552} {0.959} {0.928} {0.759} 
 <1.989>  <1.291> <3.256> <4.876> <3.505> <1.010> <1.063> <1.384>  <1.967>  <1.129> <4.027> <4.981> <1.812> <1.043> <1.077> <1.317> 
Notes: CAR = Daily Market Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns,  CGD (SGD) = Complementary (Supplementary) Good News, CAC (SAC) = 
Complementary (Supplementary) Amounts and Comparison of Current with Past Performance, CRE (SRE) Complementary (Supplementary) = Reasons for 
Performance, CFW (SFW) = Complementary (Supplementary) Forward-looking Attribute, ADY = Average Annual Dividend Yield, IES = Interim Earnings 
per Share, ITA = Firm Size by Interim Logarithmic Total Assets, Single and double underline show significance respectively at 0.05 and 0.01 level, n=309 
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Diagram 10 illustrates relative information content of complementary and supplementary 
narratives based on disclosure depth for the entire event window. 
Diagram 10 Relative Information Content based on Disclosure Depth  
 
In the pre-event period, adjusted R
2
 values do not differ substantially from zero.  In post event-
period, adjusted R
2
 for the complementary narratives model are higher than the values for the 
supplementary narratives model.  Comparing with the pre-event period, both models 
experience an upward shift in the adjusted coefficients of determination in the post-event 
period.  
In addition to the above results, Table 27 shows the significance of the difference in relative 
information content of complementary and supplementary narratives based on disclosure 
depth.   
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Table 27 Relative Information Content based on Disclosure Depth Significance Test 
 R3 
 
R4 
 
Corr. 
(3,4) 
df t Z Critical 
t 
Critical 
Z 
Is change 
significant 
based on  
t? 
Is change 
significant 
based on  
Z? 
CAR(-5,-4) 0.161 0.153 0.403 306 -0.130 -0.130 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,-3) 0.148 0.115 0.122 306 -0.443 -0.441 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,-2) 0.157 0.166 0.677 306 0.199 0.199 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,-1) 0.173 0.190 0.598 306 0.339 0.338 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,0) 0.672 0.635 0.922 306 -2.216 -2.198 1.97 1.96 Yes Yes 
CAR(-5,1) 0.672 0.635 0.922 306 -2.216 -2.198 1.97 1.96 Yes Yes 
CAR(-5,2) 0.672 0.635 0.922 306 -2.216 -2.198 1.97 1.96 Yes Yes 
CAR(-5,3) 0.671 0.634 0.923 306 -2.227 -2.209 1.97 1.96 Yes Yes 
CAR(-5,4) 0.595 0.560 0.884 306 -1.588 -1.580 1.97 1.96 No No 
CAR(-5,5) 0.573 0.531 0.843 306 -1.609 -1.601 1.97 1.96 No No 
Note: R3= R coefficient for Model 3, R4 = R coefficient for Model 4, Corr. (3, 4) = Two-tailed Pearson 
correlation  between the unstandardised predicted values of Model 3 and  Model 4, df = degrees of freedom, t = 
Hotelling‟s t-statistic, Steiger's Z-statistic, Critical t = Two-tailed t-critical for (p<0.05, for df of 306), Critical Z = 
Two-tailed Z-critical for  p<0.05 
The above significance tests (t and Z) concur that the relative information content difference 
for complementary and supplementary narratives based on disclosure depth are significant at 
p<0.05 for post-event days 0 to +3.  For all other event period days, the results of relative 
information content are not significant. 
9.4.2 Discussion 
The main objective of establishing relative information content of complementary and 
supplementary narratives is represented by hypothesis H 1, stating that there is no difference 
in the information content of complementary and supplementary narratives.   
In the pre-event period, the results testing the hypothesis are consistent.  Models based on 
either disclosure variety or disclosure depth show that complementary and supplementary 
narratives have no information content.  The F-ratios for the information content models are 
not significant for all pre-event days.  Secondly, all four models have adjusted R
2
 values that 
do not differ substantially from zero.  These findings suggest that prior to the announcement of 
interim results, complementary and supplementary narratives have no association with returns.  
The lack of information content in the pre-event period is consistent for narratives based on 
both disclosure variety and disclosure depth.  Similarly, Cools and Mirjam van Praag (2007) 
found little evidence of information content of narratives in the pre-event period.  They argued 
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that there was little leakage of the disclosures.  Therefore, the market could price the 
information before its announcement.  In Opong (1995), information content results for the 
interim reports in the pre-event period were not significant.  The finding showed that 
disclosures in UK interim reports are not pre-empted by preceding disclosure mediums. 
In the post-event period, the results of relative information content differ.  When disclosure 
variety is used to measure narratives, supplementary narrative commentaries have relatively 
higher information content than complementary narratives.  The adjusted R
2
 coefficients for 
days 0, +1, +2, +3, +4 and +5 in Model 1 (complementary narratives) are 0.390, 0.390, 0.390, 
0.389, 0.292 and 0.252 respectively.  For supplementary narratives, the respective adjusted R
2
 
values for days 0 to +5 are 0.397, 0.397, 0.397, 0.396, 0.301 and 0.267.  The values suggest 
that for all days, supplementary narratives had higher relative information content than 
complementary narratives but the difference is not significant.  Therefore, this thesis 
concludes that under disclosure variety, although supplementary narratives have higher 
relative information content than complementary narratives, this difference is not substantial.  
There are a number of reasons that may be attributed to this result.  Supplementary 
information items (SII) are closely related to financial statements, hence, their usefulness may 
be construed from the financials they represent.  On the other hand, complementary 
information items (CII) do not have any other form of reference within the interim reports 
unlike supplementary narratives that are based on financial statements.  Secondly, since the 
scores for CII arise from a number of subjects that may be unrelated, the information may be 
ambiguous if further detail is not provided.  The descriptive statistics illustrate this where the 
average score for SII was 22 out of 50, but for CII, the average score was about 40 out of 50.  
It may be argued that the ambiguity increases as the number of information items increase 
when disclosures are measured by disclosure variety.  For example, Jones (1988) found that 
listed firms experienced decreased readability of narratives as sales, a proxy for complexity, 
grew.  Merkl-Davies (2007) too suggested that firm size was the main explanation for 
readability difficulty and Kanto and Schadewitz (2000) also commented that complexity of the 
business makes some disclosure items or themes either useful or irrelevant.  In ASB (2005; 
2006), it was argued that the volume of narratives should reflect the size and complexity of the 
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firm.  Given that the firms used in this study are selected from the largest and medium-sized 
listed companies in the UK, they may disclose on a number of information items in 
complementary narratives.  To this effect, the likelihood that disclosure variety may not 
capture the value in the numerous complementary information items disclosures may arise.   
Relating to the theoretical framework of this study, the result indicates a failure of the 
complementary attribute of number of information items (under disclosure variety) to lessen 
the information asymmetry arising from the agency relationship between investors and 
managers.  Ambiguity in the disclosures, as discussed above, makes the information 
inappropriate for decision-making as it lacks the key attributes that would be illuminative to 
investors.  Under incomplete revelation hypothesis (IRH),  Bloomfield (2002) implicates that 
failure to provide various attributes of disclosures may deter some investors from 
understanding the information thereby not solving the asymmetry problem.  
Another reason for the less usefulness of complementary narratives based on disclosure 
variety, compared to supplementary narratives, is the lack of reference to regulated 
disclosures.  Supplementary narratives are based on interim financial statements that are 
regulated under International Accounting Standards (IAS) 1 and 34.  Complementary 
information items have no reference within the interim reports, presenting a softer target 
through which management may self-promote their effectiveness.  In turn, investors may not 
find the respective information reliable and relevant.  The use of diversity in information items 
to opportunistically mislead investors may relate to Arrow‟s (1963; 1965) notion of the moral 
hazard.  Moral hazard occurs when management exploit the agency relationship and their 
information advantaged position by either concealing information items or disclosing on a 
wide variety of factors in a manner that investors cannot correctly value the firm (Kane 2004).  
Reflecting this, Beattie et al (2008) observe that over the years, the narrative section of UK 
financial reports has turned from a financial performance report to a public relations report, 
which in turn may reduce the usefulness of the reports.  Prior studies (e.g. Kanto and 
Schadewitz 2000; Schadewitz et al. 2002) find  that firms that tend to provide more overview 
information in narratives experience a delayed reaction to their interim reports than firms 
providing more financial analysis information.  The reason they provide is that discussion of 
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financial analysis reduces uncertainty about performance but overview disclosures distract 
investors from useful facts about performance.   These arguments also reflect Akerlof‟s (1970) 
suggestion that in the absence of regulation, sellers (in this case, managers as sellers of 
information) may take advantage of the information asymmetry situation to mislead the buyers 
(in this case, investors as buyers of disclosures).  With complementary narratives under 
disclosure variety, the difficulty in regulating the respective information, as argued by 
Tauringana and Mangena (2006), may be the reason for the lack of information content. 
However, the lack of a significant difference in information content may portray that the 
disclosure measurement technique that uses disclosure variety is not precise or comprehensive 
to capture the intrinsic value of the disclosures.  The disclosure variety method may be 
considered to portray a hazy character of the narratives in the interim reports.  In other words, 
the technique fails to reduce information asymmetry that arises from the agency relationship 
between investors and managers.   Various disclosure extent studies (e.g. Beattie et al. 2004; 
Beattie and Thomson 2007; Hooks et al. 2000; Wallace and Nasser 1995) agree with the 
argument that comprehensiveness in disclosures is revealed through the various attributes 
disclosed.   
When disclosure depth is used to estimate narratives, the post-event results show that 
complementary narratives have higher relative information content than supplementary 
narratives.  The difference is significant for CAR (-5, 0) to CAR (-5, 3).  A number of factors 
may explain this.    
First, in disclosure depth, narratives are measured using a set of attributes (good news, 
amounts and comparison of current with past performance, reasons for performance and 
forward-looking disclosures).  This method of disclosure measurement may capture 
completeness in narratives, thereby reducing ambiguity for both complementary and 
supplementary narratives.  Bloomfield (2002) argues that under IRH, statistical measures and 
qualitative measures together improve preciseness to disclosures.  Having both qualitative and 
statistical information has a greater potential to inform the decision making process, as 
opposed to having either statistics or qualitative information only.  The metrics are definitive 
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in nature and precise while qualitative information enlighten on the metrics.  As ambiguity is 
lessened for both complementary and supplementary narratives, the comparative advantage of 
complementary narratives is then derived from the intrinsic information that complementary 
narratives have over supplementary narratives.  Whilst supplementary disclosures replicate 
disclosures on the face of the financial statements, complementary narratives extend their 
focus to all other topics beyond the financials.  In support of this, Flostrand and Strom (2006) 
argued that investors are inquisitive about non-financial statements value factors affecting 
firms.   They further suggest that the attempt of the balance sheet to include intangible items 
such as goodwill is aimed at capturing the intrinsic value.  However, still the amounts 
inadequately encompass all intrinsic value.  Past studies that have established information 
content of disclosures on topics under complementary narratives exemplify the intrinsic 
information argument.  Examples include Bukh, et al (2005) and Dumay and Tull (2007) 
relating to intellectual capital disclosures and Hammersley, et al (2008) with regard to internal 
controls.  Others complementary subjects that have been found useful to investors include 
management changes (e.g. Collet 2002; Warner et al. 1988) and social responsibility (e.g. 
Milne and Chan 1999). 
Second, literature identifies a number of deficiencies of financial statements that undermine 
the usefulness of the contents there in.  Since supplementary narratives are closely related to 
the financial statements, it may be argued that they are faced with the same problems.  
Examples include the argument that accounting numbers may not reflect economic events in a 
timely manner (Beaver et al. 1980).  The information in the statements relates to the past and 
may be less relevant to share price returns at the time of publication.  Another problem of 
financial statements is that earnings are prone to measurement errors (Hayn 1995).  Related to 
this, Tauringana and Mangena (2006) argued that supplementary narratives might be more 
useful than complementary narratives since supplementary narratives refer to audited financial 
statements.  For UK interim reports, the auditing of financial statements is optional, worse 
still, the audits are merely reviews and not comprehensive.  Therefore, the supplementary 
narratives in UK interim reports may have no comparative advantage to complementary 
narratives as far as reliability or third party authentication is concerned. 
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Third, as argued in chapter 7, Ahmed and Ian (2005) consider that there are regular investor 
briefings in which analysts and institutional investors receive updated information about the 
company.  In these meetings, the information shared is debatably more linked to earnings and 
explanations thereof since studies (e.g. Abarbanell and Lehavy 2000; Barber et al. 2003; 
Bozzolan et al. 2009; Jegadeesh et al. 2004; Orens and Lybaert 2007) suggest that the prime 
use of information by analyst is to forecast earnings.  Therefore, interim report supplementary 
narratives, which expound on earnings, may not be informative, as they would have been 
disclosed in the briefings.  Hence, compared to complementary narratives, the supplementary 
narratives in interim reports are obsolete with respect to reducing information since they might 
have been pre-empted in the briefings.  
Overall, the relative information content findings show that the models used yield returns after 
the announcement of interim reports, suggesting that the information in the reports have 
information content.  This observation is contrary to EMH in the semi-strong form that 
publically available information, such as that in financial reports, cannot yield abnormal 
returns.  Therefore, this affirms the thesis theoretical framework that due to the asymmetry 
that results for the agency relationship between investors and managers, all the three markets 
theorised (capital, information and regulation) operate synergistically to explain the usefulness 
of disclosures.  To this, the relative usefulness of either complementary or supplementary 
narratives, irrespective of whether disclosure variety or depth is used to measure the 
information, is a result of the narrative type‟s better ability to remove information asymmetry 
in the given circumstances. 
From the discussion above, three conclusions for hypothesis H 1 are upheld.  First, in pre-
event period, the null hypothesis for H 1 is accepted that there is no difference in the 
information content of complementary and supplementary narratives.  This is sustained for 
both disclosure variety and disclosure depth techniques of measuring narrative commentaries.  
Second, in the post-event period, null hypothesis H 1 is accepted that there is no difference in 
the information content of complementary and supplementary attributes when disclosure 
variety is used to measure narratives.  Third, when disclosure depth is used to measure 
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information content, H 1 is rejected in the post-event period suggesting that complementary 
narratives have higher relative information content than supplementary narratives.   
Under the main objective of the thesis, the study also intends to establish the relative 
usefulness of complementary and supplementary disclosure depth attributes.  For 
complementary, as well as supplementary narratives, the attributes are four.  To this effect, 
four hypotheses examine the relative information content of the attributes.  The hypotheses 
include H 2 (good news), H 3 (amounts and comparison of current with past performance), H 
4 (reasons for performance) and H 5 (forward-looking). 
9.4.2.1 Good News 
In Model 3, the variable CGD stands for complementary good news and in Model 4, the proxy 
for supplementary good news is SGD.  In the pre-event period, both CGD and SGD had no 
significant t-test on any day.  Therefore, complementary and supplementary good news have 
no information content prior to the announcement of interim report results.  This finding 
concurs with suggestions by Cools and Mirjam van Praag (2007) and Opong (1995) that 
investors are unaware of the disclosures in the financial reports in the pre-announcement 
period, hence, they cannot react based on the results in the reports.   
In the post event period, significant t-statistic values of CGD were -2.628, -2.616, -2.618, -
2.641, -1.998 and -2.353 for days 0, +1, +2, +3, +4 and +5, respectively.  For SGD, there are 
no significant t-statistic values for any post-event day.  The significance of all t-statistics for 
CGD and lack of any significant t-statistic for SGD suggest that complementary good news is 
has more information content than supplementary good news.   
The negative t-test coefficient for CGD indicates that as the amount of complementary good 
news in narratives increases, investors react adversely.  Abrahamson and Amir (1996) argued 
that narrative commentaries are often filled with good news, reflecting that managers attempt 
to “sugar coat” performance or impress investors.  In line with this, Kane (2004) suggests that 
managers tend to escalate the firm‟s value by reducing unfavourable information and 
increasing positive news.  This is evident in the descriptive results of this study where CGD 
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has a mean of 0.889 suggesting that CGD occupies 88.9% of the complementary narratives in 
interim reports.  Emphasising good news over bad news may reflect Akerlof‟s (1970) market 
for lemons (ML) theory, where the seller (in this study, managers) tend to convince buyers 
(investors) to buy the product (shares) through deceptive disclosures.  The negative response 
to complementary good news by investor may therefore show the opinion in Lee, et al (2004) 
that investors prefer bad news as the disclosures portray management‟s openness and 
willingness to take responsibility of controllable events.   Similarly, Abrahamson and Amir 
(1996) found a positive market response to bad news because the bad news attribute were 
considered relevant to firm valuation.  In response to Akerlof‟s (1970) ML theory, Anderson 
(2001) argued that buyers have various sources of information through which they can check 
the reliability of information from management.  Through alternative information sources, the 
perpetual disequilibria that may be caused by the deceptive disclosures are corrected through 
economic market mechanisms.  Economic market mechanisms would therefore require that 
any instance of imperfection creates entrepreneurial opportunities that correct the deficiencies 
in the market place.  To this effect, complementary good news in interim reports may reflect 
impression management, however, the strategy is realised by investors who negatively 
respond to the information. 
The lack of significance in t-statistics of SGD may suggest that the disclosures do not present 
any new information but are a replica of financial statements disclosures.  As argued earlier 
on, replication of financial statement may not result into relevance of the information.  An 
alternative reason for the lack of information content of the supplementary attribute of good 
news may be the nature of investors in FTSE350 firms.  Tauringana and Mangena (2006) 
argued that one advantage of supplementary over complementary disclosures is that 
supplementary narratives help both non-sophisticated and sophisticated investors understand 
the information in the financial statements.  However, there is a large body of literature (e.g. 
Bercel 1994; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Mangena 2004b; Nielsen 2004; Orens and Lybaert 
2007) suggesting that analysts and institutional investors have sufficient technical ability to 
interpret financial statements.   Prior studies (e.g. Belaire-Franch and Opong 2005; Mills and 
Jordanov 2003; Opong et al. 1999; Spyrou et al. 2007) suggest that FTSE350 firms have a large 
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following of analysts and institutional investors.  Gray and Roberts (1989) too found that UK 
managers disclose specifically for analysts and institutional investors.  The sophisticated 
nature of these investors may undermine the relevance of supplementary narrative attribute of 
good news. 
Based on above arguments, there are two conclusions for hypothesis H 2.  In the pre-event 
period, the null hypothesis H 2 is accepted that there is no difference in the information 
content of the complementary and supplementary narrative attribute of good news.  In post-
event period, hypothesis H 2 is rejected, suggesting that the complementary narrative attribute 
of good news has more information content than the supplementary attribute of good news.  
9.4.2.2 Amounts and Comparison of Current with Past Performance 
The discussion in this section is in reference to hypothesis H 3 that is concerned with the 
relative information content of the complementary and supplementary attributes of amounts 
and comparison of current with past performance.  Relative information content is achieved by 
comparing the t-statistics for CAC (complementary amounts and comparison of current with 
past performance) in Model 3 those for SAC (supplementary amounts and comparison of 
current with past performance) in Model 4.     
In the pre-event period, no t-statistic value for CAC and SAC is significant.  Therefore, neither 
CAC nor SAC is relevant to returns in the period.  This aligns with the suggestion in Opong 
(1995) that interim report disclosures are not pre-empted by any prior disclosures.   
After the publication of interim reports, all t-statistics for CAC were positive and significant at 
p<0.01.  However, for SAC, all t-statistics were negative but not significant.  Therefore, 
whereas CAC is a significant predictor to returns, SAC is not. 
Prior studies suggest that quantification and benchmarking in complementary narratives topics 
has information content.  For example, Berry et al (1998) find that high-level operating data 
disclosures about such as amounts for oil and gas reserve valuation in annual reports were 
useful.  Also, Lajili and Zeghal (2006) found information content in quantified human capital 
disclosures.  Amir and Lev (1996) argued that while on standalone basis, financial information 
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(earnings, cash flows and book values) are not relevant to share price returns, but if combined 
with non-financial quantified information, earnings contribute to explanation of the prices.  
Other studies (e.g. Givoly et al. 1999; Hope et al. 2008; Thomas 2000) suggest that the 
information content in segment analysis disclosures arises from the breakdown of sales and 
profitability according to business lines and regions.  Another justification for information 
content of CAC is the argument in Riley et al (2003) that the seasonality effect in business, for 
example peak travel seasons as summer months, thanksgiving and Christmas in the airline 
industry, makes comparisons in narratives relevant to investors.  All these studies agree that 
quantification and benchmarking in information of complementary nature adds precision to 
information of intrinsic nature, therefore making the disclosures relevant to share price returns.       
Other explanations to higher relative information content of complementary compared to 
supplementary, attribute of amounts and comparison of current to past performance may be 
drawn from deficiencies of supplementary narratives.  Earlier on in the chapter, it is discussed 
that supplementary narratives are a replication of financial statements.  Unlike complementary 
narratives, supplementary commentaries may not present new information.  In addition, 
financial statements are susceptible to manipulation.  As SAC is dependent on financial 
statements figures, the likelihood that the attribute suffers the same constraint arises.  Riahi-
Belkaoui (2004) argues that performance comparison in financial statements is subjected to 
numerous accounting techniques and the firms‟ autonomy in selecting or changing 
performance measures. The multiplicity of techniques leads to a moral hazard when some 
techniques are selected to mislead investors about the progress of the firm.  Reflecting this is 
the finding in Guillamon-Saorin (2006) that amounts and benchmarking in press releases 
showed a positive performance trend over time.   
The above observations lead to the acceptance of hypothesis H 3 in the pre-event period.  In 
the post-event period, hypothesis H 3 is rejected with the suggestion that for the attribute of 
amounts and comparison of current with past performance, complementary narratives have 
higher relative information content than supplementary narratives.   
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9.4.2.3 Reasons for Performance 
In Model 3, the complementary reasons for performance attribute is represented by the 
variable CRE.  The variable SRE is the proxy for supplementary reasons for performance 
attribute in Model 4.  Relative information content for CRE and SRE is tested through 
hypothesis H 4. 
Both CRE and SRE are not associated with returns in the pre-event period since their t-statistic 
values are all not significant.  As earlier discussed, the argument in Cools and Mirjam van 
Praag (2007) that disclosures in financial reports are not leaked prior to the announcement of 
the reports may explain this finding.  In the post-event period, the t-test values for CRE are -
2.032, -2.033, -2.030, -2.005, -2.665 and -3.108 for days 0, +1, +2, +3, +4 and 5, respectively.  
The corresponding t-test for SRE are -0.182, -0.170, -0.167, -0.142, 0.594, 0.831.  All CRE t-
test values for days 0 to +3 were significant at p<0.05 and for days +4 and +5, the t-statistic 
coefficients were significant at p<0.01.  On the other hand, no t-test value for SRE was 
significant.  Therefore, unlike SRE, CRE is significantly associated with returns unlike SRE.  
The t-test coefficients for CRE show an increase as the post-event days move further from the 
event day.  In addition, the post-event significance levels for CRE are better for days +4 and 
+5 compared to days 0 to +3.  These trends seem to reflect that investors take time to 
understand the full and true impact of the attribute of reasons for performance in 
complementary narratives.  The uncertain information hypothesis (UIH) by Brown et al (1988) 
may explain this trend.  Under UIH, the initial reaction to disclosures is sometimes a 
misspecified price that may be either an over- or under-reaction.  With time, as investors seek 
for further intrinsic information within the disclosures, the actual impact of the disclosure is 
established.  Another reason for the trends may be the incomplete revelation hypothesis (IRH).  
Bloomfield (2002) explains that under IRH, initial under- and over-reaction to disclosures is a 
result of presence of both ration and irrational investors.  Whilst rational investors will price 
information appropriately, irrational investors will trade on noise.  With time, the rational 
investors use the available information to correct the mispricing caused by the irrational 
investors.   
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The negative t-test sign for the complementary narratives attribute of reasons for performance 
may reflect that investors question the credibility of the disclosures.  Given the establishment 
in prior literature (e.g. Opong 1995; Rippington and Taffler 1995; Wolfe et al. 2009) that 
interim reports influence share price returns, managers may view the reports as an opportunity 
for impression management.   The signalling theory by Spence (1973; 2002) suggests that 
where there is an agency concern, the agents may tend to direct principals to only information 
that shows good performance.  This reflects the argument in Staw et al (1983) that managers 
may use their superior information status to emphasise favourable performance.  Similarly, 
impression management techniques may reflect Akerlof‟s (1970) market for lemons theory 
where managers may, with intent, give less attention to aspects of unfavourable performance 
in interim reports.  An example where managers tend to impress through narratives is the 
suggestion by Clatworthy and Jones (2003) that successes are attributed to internal factors but 
failures to externalities.  Also, Hutton et al (2003) found that firms provide more quantitative 
and verifiable explanations in times of good news but when bad news prevails, broad-based, 
qualitative, and non-verifiable justifications are disclosed.  However, in cases where managers 
either emphasise favourable performance or minimise unfavourable disclosures, investors 
have the capacity to identify the strategies and react negatively to the disclosures.  Anderson 
(2001) argues that managements‟ attempts to misguide investors are in vain because 
shareholders have various sources of information through which they can check the reliability 
of information.       
Another explanation for the negative and significant t-test coefficients for CRE is the 
likelihood that the complementary reasons for performance may not be precise enough to 
assure investors about the viability of the business.  In Kanto and Schadewitz (2000), a 
delayed and negative significant result was established for overview disclosures in interim 
reports of firms listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange.  Such narratives were concerned with 
topics that were not related to financial statements, analysis of financial statements and 
disclosures of finance and investments.  The finding was ascribed to the failure of overview 
disclosures to provide precise guidance to investors about the firm‟s performance.   
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In addition, the negative sign of the t-tests for CRE may be explained by the changing role of 
narratives in UK financial reports and information overload.  Several surveys (e.g. Deloitte 
2006a,  2006b; PwC 2007a), document the growing trend in the size of financial reports of UK 
listed firms which they attribute to growth in narratives.  In Beattie et al (2008), the realisation 
that narratives in annual reports had grown over time was attributed to the changing role of the 
reports from financially motivated disclosures to public relations information.  It may be 
conceived that, through reasons for performance, managers may exploit the diverse topics in 
complementary narratives to promote public relations.  In addition, the regulatory guidelines 
for narrative commentaries in the period of study (e.g. ASB 2006; 2007b; EU 2003) preferred 
a narrative discourse that promotes a voluntary approach by suggesting that disclosures should 
be viewed from the eyes of managers.  Whilst supplementary narratives may not reflect this 
flexibility since they are drawn from amounts on the face of regulated financial statements, 
complementary narratives are largely a result of managements‟ discretion.  The voluntary 
nature of the complementary narratives may compel managers to use the attribute of CRE to 
disclose more public relations information.  Investors in turn react negatively to the 
information because the disclosures may not be credible.   
The lack of information content in SRE probably is a result of confining the supplementary 
disclosures to financial statements.  This limits the extent to which supplementary reasons for 
performance can provide intrinsic information.  In addition, prior studies (e.g. Belaire-Franch 
and Opong 2005; Mills and Jordanov 2003; Opong et al. 1999; Spyrou et al. 2007) recognise that 
investors in FTSE350 firms are sophisticated.  Such investors (analysts and institutional 
investors) may be well equipped in interpreting financial statements and may not need 
supplementary reasons for performance to form their judgements.  In effect, the argument by 
Tauringana and Mangena (2006) that supplementary narratives assists unsophisticated 
investors understand financial statements may not suffice for such large and medium sized 
firms.     
The discussion above leads to the acceptance of hypothesis H 4 in the pre-event period that 
there is no difference between the information content of CRE and SRE.  However, in the 
post-event period, hypothesis H 4 is rejected, holding that, for attribute of reasons for 
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performance, complementary narratives have relatively higher information content than 
narratives. 
9.4.2.4 Forward-looking 
The forward-looking attribute is represented by the variable CFW (complementary forward-
looking disclosures) in Model 3 and SFW (supplementary forward-looking disclosures) in 
Model 4.  The relative information content of CFW and SFW is in reference to hypothesis H 
5. 
The results in this thesis show that in both the pre-event and post-event periods, the attribute of 
forward-looking disclosures in complementary and supplementary narratives was not associated 
with returns.  This finding contravenes theoretical, regulatory and empirical research 
justification for interim reporting.  For example, from a theoretical perspective, the role of 
interim disclosures is to reduce uncertainty about the business‟ direction by providing 
information that shortens the reporting interval, thereby helping to forecast annual financial 
performance (Bollom 1973; Shillinglaw 1961).  Regulatory and standard-setting frameworks 
such as AICPA (1973) and ASB (1997; 2007a) agree that interim report disclosures have the 
ability to predict annual results.  Likewise, empirical literature (e.g. Holmes 1971; Lunt 1982; 
Shaw 1981) confirms that interim reports help investors understand seasonality uncertainties that 
may affect annual performance.  Investors may find interim forward-looking disclosures less 
useful for a number of reasons.   
In the pre-event period, the lack of significant t-test results for CFW and SFW suggests 
interim report disclosures are not pre-empted by earlier disclosure mediums in the UK.  Half-
yearly interim reports are the first financial year disclosures for UK listed companies.  In 
addition, Cools and Mirjam van Praag (2007) and Opong (1995) comment that financial 
reports disclosures contain information that is not pre-empted or leaked by in earlier disclosure 
mediums.    
In the post-event period, lack of information content in both complementary and 
supplementary forward-looking attribute reflects the finding in Schleicher et al. (2007) that 
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usefulness for prospective disclosures in UK firms is dependent on profit performance.  In 
their study, Schleicher et al. (2007) argued that for loss-making firms, forward-looking 
disclosures were the only remedy assuring investors about viability of the business as losses 
showed that past performance was undesirable.  On the other hand, for profit-making firms, 
past profitability was adequate to assure future favourable performance.  Baginski et al (2002) 
reflect a similar observation for US firms.  In periods of profitability, prospective disclosures 
were few and less precise than in periods of loss-making or decreased profitability.  The sample 
for this thesis has two characteristics that suggest the firms had sound past performance, 
thereby undermining the usefulness of prospective disclosures.  First, the descriptive statistics 
show that the control variable of interim earnings per share (IES) was 6.050 at the 25
th
 
percentile, with mean of 22.358.  This means that 75% of the firms had positive IES, 
portraying profit-making firms for three quarters of the sample.  In addition, the positive mean 
value for IES shows that on average, the firms were profit making.  Secondly, the study‟s 
sample is comprised of the top 350 UK listed firms that have sustained the status for three 
successive years.    
Another reason for the lack of usefulness in forward-looking disclosure may be related to 
reputation and litigation risks.  From the descriptive statistics, forward-looking information was 
the least disclosed attribute for both complementary and supplementary narratives.  Managers 
may not prefer to provide precise forward-looking disclosures due to reputation risks and 
litigation.  Therefore, the level of uncertainty reduced by the potentially imprecise prospective 
disclosures may be minimal.  Instances of the influence of reputation and litigation risks to 
disclosure extent, preciseness and reliability of forward-looking disclosures have been discussed 
in prior literature. 
On the issue of reliability, Bozzolan, et al (2009) argued that the usefulness of forward-
looking disclosures may be explained through the incomplete revelation hypothesis (IRH) if 
the disclosures are reliable.  Under IRH, forward-looking disclosures reduce the uncertainty 
about the firm‟s future performance by revealing the firms prospects and direction.  However, 
if that information is not credible, investors may consider it deceptive and may lead to adverse 
selection.  Complementary forward-looking disclosures are not easily reconcilable to any other 
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reference in the interim report, therefore, they may be hard to verify.  Supplementary forward-
looking disclosures may be reconciled with reference to future interim financial statements.  
However, lack of detailed third-party verification of interim financial statements may lead 
investors to question authenticity of supplementary forward-looking disclosures.  This 
argument reflects a concern raised in a prior study (e.g. Opong 1995) that the usefulness of 
disclosures in UK interim reports may be undermined by the absence of full audit reports that 
would have assured the authenticity of the disclosures.  
On the extent of disclosure, reputation risk may deter managers from providing precise and 
detailed forward-looking disclosures because the achievement of current or past prospects can be 
checked in future financial reports.  Bozzolan, et al (2009) argues that the credibility of 
forward-looking disclosures is confirmed ex ante through future disclosures of performance.  
Therefore, there is a likelihood that managers may not be willing to provide exact and 
numerous targets as investors may hold them accountable for underperformance.  To the 
contrary, under uncertain information hypothesis, incomplete revelation hypothesis and 
incomplete contracting, there is an appreciation that investors are always in pursuit of more 
precise disclosures to augment their perception about the business.  If few and imprecise 
disclosures are provided, then usefulness of that information is likely to be compromised.    
Baginski et al (2002) discussed the relationship between litigation, reputation and extent of 
forward-looking disclosures by comparing characteristics of prospective disclosures in a litigious 
environment (US) to a less litigious environment (Canada).  Forward-looking disclosures for US 
firms had few and imprecise disclosures compared to Canadian entities that provided more 
prospective information.  US firms were considered to disclose in a manner that protects the 
reputation of the firm and managers but Canadian firms were motivated by influencing investor 
decisions other than avoidance of litigation.  
Therefore, the provision of less forward-looking disclosures for both complementary and 
supplementary narratives compared to other attributes in this thesis could imply that the 
information is not precise.  This may be argued to result from fear of reputation and litigation 
risks.  A related perspective is the observation in this thesis that while reading interim reports 
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of the sample firms, various companies included a disclaimer note either before or after the 
narrative section protecting companies from litigation arising from investors‟ dependence on 
forward-looking disclosures.  This could explain the lack of association of both CFW and 
SFW with returns.    
Based on the results and discussion above, hypothesis H 5 is accepted that there is no difference 
in the information content of complementary and supplementary attribute of forward-looking 
disclosures, both  in the pre-event and post-event period. 
9.5 Incremental Information Content of Complementary and 
Supplementary Narratives 
9.5.1 Results 
The subsidiary objective of the thesis is to establish incremental information content of 
complementary and supplementary narratives.  This is achieved by comparing results of the 
model combining complementary and supplementary narratives with the models that consider 
complementary and supplementary narratives individually.  The results are organised in two 
parts.  The first part presents incremental information content based on disclosure variety 
where results of Model 5 are compared with those in Model 1 and Model 2.  The second part 
relates to incremental information content based on disclosure depth.  In this case, the outcome 
of Model 6 is compared with that in Model 3 and Model 4. 
9.5.1.1 Incremental Information Content based on Disclosure Variety 
The results for Model 5 are presented in Table 28.  Panel A is concerned with the pre-event 
results while Panel B has results for the post-event period.   
In the pre-event period, the coefficients of the adjusted R
2
 are lowest at -0.004 and highest at 
0.010.  The lowest pre-event F-ratio coefficient in 0.740 and the highest is 1.609 and no F-
ratio value is significant.  In addition, prior to the event day, there is no independent variable 
with significant t-statistics.   
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Table 28 Incremental Information Content based on Disclosure Variety 
Panel A. Pre-event Period 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
R
2
 
[Adj. R
2
]  
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
 <D-W> 
  
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CII 
Std B  
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SII 
Std B  
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B  
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAR(-5,-4) 0.015    -0.079 0.080 -0.052 -0.026 -0.082 
 [-0.001]   [1.823] [-1.130] [1.073] [-0.898] [-0.448] [-1.258] 
 {0.910}   (0.069) (0.259) (0.284) (0.370) (0.654) (0.209) 
 (0.475)    {0.663} {0.583} {0.986} {0.967} {0.770} 
 <1.961>    <1.509> <1.716> <1.014> <1.034> <1.299> 
CAR(-5,-3) 0.012    -0.053 0.128 -0.009 0.046 -0.058 
 [-0.004]   [0.775] [-0.750] [1.715] [-0.148] [0.788] [-0.898] 
 {0.740}   (0.439) (0.454) (0.087) (0.882) (0.432) (0.370) 
 (0.594)    {0.663} {0.583} {0.986} {0.967} {0.770} 
 <2.051>    <1.509> <1.716> <1.014> <1.034> <1.299> 
CAR(-5,-2) 0.020    0.014 0.094 -0.055 0.070 -0.123 
 [0.004]   [0.582] [0.200] [1.260] [-0.957] [1.212] [-1.897] 
 {1.263}   (0.561) (0.841) (0.209) (0.339) (0.226) (0.059) 
 (0.290)    {0.663} {0.583} {0.986} {0.967} {0.770} 
 <2.010>    <1.509> <1.716> <1.014> <1.034> <1.299> 
CAR(-5,-1) 0.026    0.018 0.075 -0.100 0.103 -0.063 
 [0.010]   [0.245] [0.263] [1.004] [-1.757] [1.782] [-0.968] 
 {1.609}   (0.806) (0.792) (0.316) (0.080) (0.076) (0.334) 
 (0.157)    {0.663} {0.583} {0.986} {0.967} {0.770} 
 <2.069>    <1.509> <1.716> <1.014> <1.034> <1.299> 
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Panel B. Event Day and Post-event Period 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
R
2
 
[Adj. R
2
]  
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.)  
<D-W> 
  
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CII 
Std B  
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SII 
Std B  
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B  
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAR(-5,0) 0.408    0.068 -0.130 0.283 0.573 0.004 
 [0.398]   [-0.628] [1.250] [-2.240] [6.364] [12.738] [0.070] 
 {41.729}   (0.531) (0.212) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.945) 
 (0.000)    {0.663} {0.583} {0.986} {0.967} {0.770} 
 <1.955>    <1.509> <1.716> <1.014> <1.034> <1.299> 
CAR(-5,1) 0.408    0.067 -0.130 0.283 0.573 0.003 
 [0.398]   [-0.613] [1.239] [-2.243] [6.365] [12.731] [0.069] 
 {41.696}   (0.540) (0.216) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.945) 
 (0.000)    {0.663} {0.583} {0.986} {0.967} {0.770} 
 <1.956>    <1.509> <1.716> <1.014> <1.034> <1.299> 
CAR(-5,2) 0.407    0.068 -0.130 0.283 0.573 0.003 
 [0.398]   [-0.613] [1.243] [-2.243] [6.359] [12.731] [0.064] 
 {41.674}   (0.540) (0.215) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.949) 
 (0.000)    {0.663} {0.583} {0.986} {0.967} {0.770} 
 <1.957>    <1.509> <1.716> <1.014> <1.034> <1.299> 
CAR(-5,3) 0.407    0.072 -0.132 0.282 0.573 0.002 
 [0.398]   [-0.689] [1.329] [-2.279] [6.342] [12.730] [0.042] 
 {41.648}   (0.491) (0.185) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.966) 
 (0.000)    {0.663} {0.583} {0.986} {0.967} {0.770} 
 <1.964>    <1.509> <1.716> <1.014> <1.034> <1.299> 
CAR(-5,4) 0.318    0.111 -0.170 0.294 0.477 -0.043 
 [0.307]   [-0.663] [1.902] [-2.739] [6.165] [9.891] [-0.789] 
 {28.312}   (0.508) (0.058) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.431) 
 (0.000)    {0.663} {0.583} {0.986} {0.967} {0.770} 
 <1.935>    <1.509> <1.716> <1.014> <1.034> <1.299> 
CAR(-5,5) 0.285    0.110 -0.196 0.272 0.447 -0.068 
 [0.273]   [-0.222] [1.850] [-3.087] [5.570] [9.039] [-1.225] 
 {24.115}   (0.824) (0.065) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.221) 
 (0.000)    {0.663} {0.583} {0.986} {0.967} {0.770} 
 <1.962>    <1.509> <1.716> <1.014> <1.034> <1.299> 
Notes: CAR = Daily Market Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns, CII (SII) = Complementary (Supplementary) 
Number of Information Items [Complementary Disclosure Variety], ADY = Average Annual Dividend Yield, IES = 
Interim Earnings per Share, ITA = Firm Size by Interim Logarithmic Total Assets, Single and double underline show 
significance respectively at 0.05 and 0.01 level, n=309 
 
In the post-event period, the adjusted R
2
 are at 0.398 for CAR (-5, 0) to CAR (-5, 3), 0.307 for 
CAR (-5, 4) and 0.273 for CAR (-5, 5).  The highest F-ratio is for CAR (-5, 0) at 41.729 and 
the lowest is 24.115 for CAR (-5, 5).  All post-event F-ratios are significant at p<0.01.  While 
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SII is significantly but negatively associated with returns throughout the period, CII is not 
significant for any post-event day.  The pattern of the post-event SII t-statistic coefficients 
shows increasing values and significance levels as days disperse from the event.  For the 
financial performance measures, ADY and IES are positively and significantly associated with 
returns at p<0.01 for all days, but ITA has no significant value through the period. 
Both in the pre-event and post-event periods, D-W statistics range within 1.930 and 2.070.  
Given that the values are between 1 and 3, the model is not exposed to high serial correlation.  
The tolerance and VIF values for variables are within the limits that suggest low levels of 
multicollinearity.   
Diagram 11 shows the incremental information content of complementary and supplementary 
narratives when disclosure variety is used to estimate extent of disclosure.   
Diagram 11  Incremental Information Content based on Disclosure Variety 
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The line graph marked complementary narratives based on disclosure variety represents the 
adjusted R
2
 values for Model 1.  The adjusted R
2
 coefficients for Model 2 are is represented by 
the lines graph marked supplementary narratives based on disclosure variety, lastly, the 
adjusted R
2
 values for Model 5 are shown by the line graph marked complementary and 
supplementary narratives based on disclosure variety.  Line graph for the model combining 
complementary and supplementary narratives is closest to that of supplementary narratives.  
The line graph representing complementary narratives based on disclosure variety is visually 
below the other two models. 
In the pre-event period, all three models have adjusted R
2
 values that do not differ 
substantially from zero and all F-ratios are not significant.  All independent variables in Model 
1, Model 2 and Model 5 have no significant t-statistics.   
In the post-event period, the adjusted R
2
 values for Model 1 are 0.390 for CAR (-5, 0) to CAR 
(-5, 2), 0.389 for CAR (-5, 3), 0.292 for CAR (-5, 4) and 0.252 for CAR (-5, 5), while for 
Model 5, the adjusted R
2
 coefficients range from 0.398 to 0.273.  The F-ratios for both Model 
1 and Model 5 are significant at p<0.01 with Model 1 having values from 50.243 to 27.004 
and Model 5 having F-ratio coefficients from 41.729 to 24.115.  In Model 1, annual dividend 
yield (ADY) and interim earnings per share (IES) are the only variables that are associated 
with return and are positively and significantly relevant at p<0.01.  In Model 5, supplementary 
information items (SII) has negative and significant t-statistics (at p<0.05), ADY and IES are 
both positive and significant at p<0.01.   
For Model 2, the adjusted R
2
 values are 0.397 for CAR (-5, 0) to CAR (-5, 2), 0.396 for CAR 
(-5, 3) 0.301 for CAR (-5, 4) and 0.267 for CAR (-5, 5).  For Model 5, the adjusted R
2
 
coefficients range from 0.398 to 0.273.  While, the F-ratio range for Model 2 is from 51.675 to 
29.096, the range for Model 5 is from 41.729 to 24.115.  In both models, ADY and IES are 
positive and significant at p<0.01.  In Model 5, SII is negatively associated with returns for all 
days.  However, significance levels for SII vary with a significance of p<0.05 for CAR (-5, 0) 
to CAR (-5, 3) and significance of p>0.01 for CAR (-5, 4) and CAR (-5, 5).  In Model 2, SII 
was negative and significant at p<0.01 for only CAR (-5, 4) and CAR (-5, 5). 
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To examine the significance of the difference in information content of model combining 
complementary and supplementary narratives compared to that of the models considering 
narrative types as mutually exclusive, the F-statistic for the change in R
2
 of the models is used.  
Table 29 shows the results of the F-statistic tests. 
Table 29 Incremental Information Content based on Disclosure Variety Significance Test 
Panel A:  Model 5 with Model 1 
 R-Sq 5 R-Sq 1 K5 K1 N F df dfε Critical F Is change significant 
based on F? 
CAR(-5,-4) 0.015 0.011 5 4 309 1.230 1 303 3.87 No 
CAR(-5,-3) 0.012 0.002 5 4 309 3.067 1 303 3.87 No 
CAR(-5,-2) 0.020 0.015 5 4 309 1.546 1 303 3.87 No 
CAR(-5,-1) 0.026 0.023 5 4 309 0.933 1 303 3.87 No 
CAR(-5,0) 0.408 0.398 5 4 309 5.118 1 303 3.87 Yes 
CAR(-5,1) 0.408 0.398 5 4 309 5.118 1 303 3.87 Yes 
CAR(-5,2) 0.407 0.398 5 4 309 4.599 1 303 3.87 Yes 
CAR(-5,3) 0.407 0.397 5 4 309 5.110 1 303 3.87 Yes 
CAR(-5,4) 0.318 0.302 5 4 309 7.109 1 303 3.87 Yes 
CAR(-5,5) 0.285 0.262 5 4 309 9.747 1 303 3.87 Yes 
Panel B: Model 5 with Model 2 
 R-Sq 5 R-Sq 2 K5 K2 N F df dfε Critical F Is change significant 
based on F? 
CAR(-5,-4) 0.015 0.011 5 4 309 1.230 1 303 3.87 No 
CAR(-5,-3) 0.012 0.010 5 4 309 0.613 1 303 3.87 No 
CAR(-5,-2) 0.020 0.020 5 4 309 0.000 1 303 3.87 No 
CAR(-5,-1) 0.026 0.026 5 4 309 0.000 1 303 3.87 No 
CAR(-5,0) 0.408 0.405 5 4 309 1.535 1 303 3.87 No 
CAR(-5,1) 0.408 0.405 5 4 309 1.535 1 303 3.87 No 
CAR(-5,2) 0.407 0.404 5 4 309 1.533 1 303 3.87 No 
CAR(-5,3) 0.407 0.404 5 4 309 1.533 1 303 3.87 No 
CAR(-5,4) 0.318 0.310 5 4 309 3.554 1 303 3.87 No 
CAR(-5,5) 0.285 0.277 5 4 309 3.390 1 303 3.87 No 
Note: R-Sq 5 = coefficient of determination for Model 5, R-Sq 1 = coefficient of determination for Model 1, R-
Sq 2 = coefficient of determination for Model 2, K5 = number of predictors in Model 5, K1 = number of 
predictors in Model 1, K2 = number of predictors in Model 2, F = F-statistic, N = number of subjects, df = 
degrees of freedom change, dfε = degrees of freedom error, Critical F  = Critical F-statistic values at p<0.05 
 
Table 29 under panel A shows that incremental information content of the model combining 
complementary and supplementary narratives, compared to the model for complementary 
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narratives, is significant at p<0.05 in the post-event period.  However, in the pre-event period, 
the F-statistic results are not significant.  In panel B, no F-statistic value surpasses the critical 
value.  This suggests that the information content obtained by combining complementary and 
supplementary narratives under disclosure variety is not significantly different from that of 
supplementary narratives based on disclosure variety. 
9.5.1.2 Incremental Information based on Disclosure Depth 
The results for Model 6 are presented in Table 30.  The pre-event and post-event period results 
are under Panel A and Panel B, respectively. 
In the pre-event period, the adjusted R
2
 coefficients range from -0.005 to 0.013.  The F-ratios 
in the period range from 0.858 to 1.379 and are all not significant.  For all pre-event days, no 
t-statistics for the independent variables are significant, except two instances.  On day -4, the 
complementary amounts and comparison of current with past performance (CAC) has a 
significant (p<0.05) t-statistics value of -1.964.  On day -1, interim earnings per share (IES) is 
has a t-test coefficient of 2.112, significant at p<0.05.    
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Table 30 Incremental Information Content based on Disclosure Depth 
Panel A. Pre-event Period 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
R2 
[Adj. R2] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W>  
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAR(-5,-4) 0.044  0.073 -0.217 0.134 0.047 0.036 0.227 -0.098 -0.056 -0.032 -0.017 -0.052 
 [0.009] [-0.786] [1.050] [-1.964] [1.026] [0.409] [0.537] [1.928] [-0.715] [-0.705] [-0.555] [-0.284] [-0.747] 
 {1.241} (0.433) (0.295) (0.050) (0.306) (0.682) (0.592) (0.055) (0.475) (0.481) (0.579) (0.776) (0.456) 
 (0.259)  {0.660} {0.265} {0.188} {0.241} {0.719} {0.231} {0.173} {0.505} {0.947} {0.889} {0.653} 
 <1.986>  <1.516> <3.777> <5.320> <4.155> <1.390> <4.325> <5.792> <1.982> <1.056> <1.124> <1.532> 
CAR(-5,-3) 0.036  0.063 -0.192 0.239 -0.058 -0.051 0.156 -0.016 -0.065 0.004 0.069 -0.032 
 [0.000] [-0.475] [0.892] [-1.731] [1.819] [-0.503] [-0.758] [1.316] [-0.116] [-0.809] [0.067] [1.144] [-0.457] 
 {1.000} (0.635) (0.373) (0.084) (0.070) (0.616) (0.449) (0.189) (0.908) (0.419) (0.947) (0.253) (0.648) 
 (0.447)  {0.660} {0.265} {0.188} {0.241} {0.719} {0.231} {0.173} {0.505} {0.947} {0.889} {0.653} 
 <2.045>  <1.516> <3.777> <5.320> <4.155> <1.390> <4.325> <5.792> <1.982> <1.056> <1.124> <1.532> 
CAR(-5,-2) 0.031  0.033 -0.113 0.136 0.001 0.001 0.157 -0.045 -0.074 -0.036 0.085 -0.093 
 [-0.005] [0.072] [0.469] [-1.015] [1.031] [0.010] [0.017] [1.322] [-0.324] [-0.915] [-0.620] [1.397] [-1.316] 
 {0.858} (0.943) (0.639) (0.311) (0.303) (0.992) (0.986) (0.187) (0.746) (0.361) (0.536) (0.163) (0.189) 
 (0.582)  {0.660} {0.265} {0.188} {0.241} {0.719} {0.231} {0.173} {0.505} {0.947} {0.889} {0.653} 
 <2.012>  <1.516> <3.777> <5.320> <4.155> <1.390> <4.325> <5.792> <1.982> <1.056> <1.124> <1.532> 
CAR(-5,-1) 0.049  0.038 -0.150 0.128 0.038 -0.024 0.118 0.046 -0.150 -0.082 0.127 -0.031 
 [0.013] [-0.087] [0.545] [-1.362] [0.982] [0.328] [-0.365] [1.000] [0.341] [-1.883] [-1.416] [2.112] [-0.436] 
 {1.379} (0.931) (0.586) (0.174) (0.327) (0.743) (0.715) (0.318) (0.734) (0.061) (0.158) (0.036) (0.663) 
 (0.189)  {0.660} {0.265} {0.188} {0.241} {0.719} {0.231} {0.173} {0.505} {0.947} {0.889} {0.653} 
 <2.058>  <1.516> <3.777> <5.320> <4.155> <1.390> <4.325> <5.792> <1.982> <1.056> <1.124> <1.532> 
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Panel B. Event Day and Post-event Period  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐹𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
R2 
[Adj. R2] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
Const 
 
[t-
Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAR(-5,0) 0.479  -0.171 0.415 -0.160 -0.055 0.069 -0.121 -0.108 0.073 0.264 0.559 -0.101 
 [0.460] [3.267] [-3.314] [5.102] [-1.657] [-0.644] [1.397] [-1.393] [-1.073] [1.242] [6.137] [12.580] [-1.956] 
 {24.842} (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.099) (0.520) (0.163) (0.165) (0.284) (0.215) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) 
 (0.000)  {0.660} {0.265} {0.188} {0.241} {0.719} {0.231} {0.173} {0.505} {0.947} {0.889} {0.653} 
 <1.954>  <1.516> <3.777> <5.320> <4.155> <1.390> <4.325> <5.792> <1.982> <1.056> <1.124> <1.532> 
CAR(-5,1) 0.479  -0.170 0.416 -0.160 -0.056 0.069 -0.123 -0.107 0.073 0.264 0.558 -0.101 
 [0.460] [3.258] [-3.300] [5.114] [-1.661] [-0.657] [1.390] [-1.411] [-1.062] [1.244] [6.134] [12.576] [-1.954] 
 {24.830} (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.098) (0.512) (0.166) (0.159) (0.289) (0.215) (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) 
 (0.000)  {0.660} {0.265} {0.188} {0.241} {0.719} {0.231} {0.173} {0.505} {0.947} {0.889} {0.653} 
 <1.954>  <1.516> <3.777> <5.320> <4.155> <1.390> <4.325> <5.792> <1.982> <1.056> <1.124> <1.532> 
CAR(-5,2) 0.479  -0.170 0.416 -0.160 -0.056 0.069 -0.123 -0.107 0.073 0.264 0.559 -0.101 
 [0.460] [3.261] [-3.300] [5.110] [-1.659] [-0.657] [1.388] [-1.411] [-1.058] [1.238] [6.127] [12.575] [-1.957] 
 {24.810} (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.098) (0.512) (0.166) (0.159) (0.291) (0.217) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) 
 (0.000)  {0.660} {0.265} {0.188} {0.241} {0.719} {0.231} {0.173} {0.505} {0.947} {0.889} {0.653} 
 <1.955>  <1.516> <3.777> <5.320> <4.155> <1.390> <4.325> <5.792> <1.982> <1.056> <1.124> <1.532> 
CAR(-5,3) 0.478  -0.170 0.414 -0.159 -0.054 0.067 -0.121 -0.104 0.069 0.264 0.559 -0.103 
 [0.458] [3.269] [-3.300] [5.082] [-1.639] [-0.628] [1.362] [-1.393] [-1.034] [1.160] [6.117] [12.576] [-1.984] 
 {24.689} (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.102) (0.530) (0.174) (0.165) (0.302) (0.247) (0.000) (0.000) (0.048) 
 (0.000)  {0.660} {0.265} {0.188} {0.241} {0.719} {0.231} {0.173} {0.505} {0.947} {0.889} {0.653} 
 <1.966>  <1.516> <3.777> <5.320> <4.155> <1.390> <4.325> <5.792> <1.982> <1.056> <1.124> <1.532> 
CAR(-5,4) 0.394  -0.142 0.445 -0.272 0.056 0.078 -0.243 0.012 0.008 0.273 0.470 -0.122 
 [0.372] [2.743] [-2.546] [5.075] [-2.609] [0.611] [1.456] [-2.592] [0.108] [0.120] [5.882] [9.806] [-2.188] 
 {17.582} (0.006) (0.011) (0.000) (0.010) (0.542) (0.147) (0.010) (0.914) (0.904) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) 
 (0.000)  {0.660} {0.265} {0.188} {0.241} {0.719} {0.231} {0.173} {0.505} {0.947} {0.889} {0.653} 
 <1.963>  <1.516> <3.777> <5.320> <4.155> <1.390> <4.325> <5.792> <1.982> <1.056> <1.124> <1.532> 
CAR(-5,5) 0.376  -0.153 0.468 -0.333 0.107 0.065 -0.285 0.055 -0.040 0.247 0.445 -0.152 
 [0.353] [3.217] [-2.712] [5.253] [-3.153] [1.142] [1.210] [-2.988] [0.501] [-0.623] [5.255] [9.154] [-2.682] 
 {16.273} (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.002) (0.254) (0.227) (0.003) (0.617) (0.534) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
 (0.000)  {0.660} {0.265} {0.188} {0.241} {0.719} {0.231} {0.173} {0.505} {0.947} {0.889} {0.653} 
 <1.980>  <1.516> <3.777> <5.320> <4.155> <1.390> <4.325> <5.792> <1.982> <1.056> <1.124> <1.532> 
Notes: CAR = Daily Market Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns,  CGD (SGD) = Complementary 
(Supplementary) Good News, CAC (SAC) = Complementary (Supplementary) Amounts and Comparison of 
Current with Past Performance, CRE (SRE) Complementary (Supplementary) = Reasons for Performance, CFW 
(SFW) = Complementary (Supplementary) Forward-looking Attribute, ADY = Average Annual Dividend Yield, 
IES = Interim Earnings per Share, ITA = Firm Size by Interim Logarithmic Total Assets, Single and double 
underline show significance respectively at 0.05 and 0.01 level, n=309 
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In the post-event period, adjusted R
2
 values are 0.460 for days 0 to +2, 0.458 for day +3, 0.372 
for day +4 and 0.353 for day +5.  The F-ratios range from 24.842 to 16.273 and are significant 
at p<0.01.  The association between the independent variables and cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) is varied.  Complementary good news (CGD) has negative t-statistics 
throughout period with a significance level of p<0.01 for days 0 to +3 and day 5, but 
significance of the variable on day +4 is p<0.05.  The variable CAC is positively and 
significantly associated with CAR at p<0.01 throughout the period.  Complementary reasons 
for performance (CRE) is only associated with returns for days +4 and +5 with negative t-
statistics that are significant at p<0.01.  The complementary forward-looking variable (CFW) 
is the only complementary attribute that has no association with CAR.  Apart from 
supplementary amounts and comparisons of current with past performance (SAC), other 
supplementary disclosure depth attributes are not associated with returns.  However, even 
SAC is only significant (at p<0.01) for days +4 and +5 with t-test values of -2.592 and -2.988, 
respectively.  Control variables ADY and IES are positively and significantly (at p<0.01) 
associated with returns throughout the period.  The significant t-statistics for the variable of 
interim total assets (ITA) are -1.984 (p<0.05), -2.188 (p<0.05) and -2.682 (p<0.01) for days 
+3, +4 and +5, respectively.  
In both pre- and post-event periods, there is no concern for high serial correlation as D-W 
statistics range within only ±0.060 away from 2.000.  All tolerance values are above 0.1000 
and VIF coefficients are all below 10.000.  Therefore, there is no high multicollinearity too.   
The illustration in Diagram 12 shows incremental information content when complementary 
and supplementary disclosures are measured by disclosure depth. 
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Diagram 12 Incremental Information Content based on Disclosure Depth 
 
The line graph marked complementary narratives based on disclosure depth represents the 
adjusted R
2
 values for Model 3, while the adjusted R
2
 coefficients for Model 4 are shown by 
the line graph named supplementary narratives based on disclosure depth.  The adjusted R
2
 
resulting from Model 6 are denoted with the line graph marked complementary and 
supplementary narratives based on disclosure depth. 
In the pre-event period, adjusted R
2
 for the three models do not differ substantially from zero 
and no F-ratios are significant.  In Model 3 and Model 4, no independent variable is significant 
for any day in the pre-event period.  In Model 6, CAC has a negative and significant t-test for 
CAR (-5, -4) and IES has a positive and significant t-test for CAR (-5, -1). 
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In the post-event period, Diagram 12 shows that all adjusted R
2
 values for Model 6 are above 
those for Model 3 and Model 4.  All three models have significant F-ratios at p<0.01 
throughout the period but with differing coefficients.  For Model 3, the range of F-ratio values 
is from 36.376 to 20.974 and for Model 4, the F-ratio ranges from 29.050 to 16.869.  The F-
ratio values for Model 6 are lowest, ranging from 24.842 to 16.273.  The variables significant 
for all post-event days in Model 3 are CGD, CAC, CRE, ADY, IES and ITA.  In Model 6, the 
significant period throughout the post-event period are CGD, CAC, ADY and IES.  The 
variables CRE and SAC are only significant in Model 6 for days +4 and +5 while ITA is 
significant for days +3 to +5.  In Model 4, the only significant variables are ADY and IES, 
which are associated with returns for all post-event days. 
To add to the discussion above, Table 31 presents the F-statistic significance results of 
incremental information content based on disclosure depth. 
Table 31 Incremental Information Content based on Disclosure Depth Significance Test 
Panel A:  Model 6 with Model 3 
 R-Sq 6 R-Sq 3 K6 K3 N F df dfε Critical F Is change significant 
based on F? 
CAR(-5,-4) 0.044 0.027 11 7 309 1.320 4 297 2.40 No 
CAR(-5,-3) 0.036 0.022 11 7 309 1.078 4 297 2.40 No 
CAR(-5,-2) 0.031 0.021 11 7 309 0.766 4 297 2.40 No 
CAR(-5,-1) 0.049 0.030 11 7 309 1.483 4 297 2.40 No 
CAR(-5,0) 0.479 0.451 11 7 309 3.990 4 297 2.40 Yes 
CAR(-5,1) 0.479 0.451 11 7 309 3.990 4 297 2.40 Yes 
CAR(-5,2) 0.479 0.451 11 7 309 3.990 4 297 2.40 Yes 
CAR(-5,3) 0.478 0.451 11 7 309 3.841 4 297 2.40 Yes 
CAR(-5,4) 0.394 0.354 11 7 309 4.901 4 297 2.40 Yes 
CAR(-5,5) 0.376 0.328 11 7 309 5.712 4 297 2.40 Yes 
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Panel B:  Model 6 with Model 4 
 R-Sq 6 R-Sq 4 K6 K4 N F df dfε Critical F Is change significant 
based on F? 
CAR(-5,-4) 0.044 0.023 11 7 309 1.631 4 297 2.40 No 
CAR(-5,-3) 0.036 0.013 11 7 309 1.772 4 297 2.40 No 
CAR(-5,-2) 0.031 0.022 11 7 309 0.690 4 297 2.40 No 
CAR(-5,-1) 0.049 0.036 11 7 309 1.015 4 297 2.40 No 
CAR(-5,0) 0.479 0.403 11 7 309 10.831 4 297 2.40 Yes 
CAR(-5,1) 0.479 0.403 11 7 309 10.831 4 297 2.40 Yes 
CAR(-5,2) 0.479 0.403 11 7 309 10.831 4 297 2.40 Yes 
CAR(-5,3) 0.478 0.402 11 7 309 10.810 4 297 2.40 Yes 
CAR(-5,4) 0.394 0.314 11 7 309 9.802 4 297 2.40 Yes 
CAR(-5,5) 0.376 0.282 11 7 309 11.185 4 297 2.40 Yes 
Note: R-Sq 6 = coefficient of determination for Model 6, R-Sq 3 = coefficient of determination for Model 3, R-
Sq 4 = coefficient of determination for Model 4, K6 = number of predictors in Model 6, K3 = number of 
predictors in Model 3, K4 = number of predictors in Model 4, F = F-statistic, N = number of subjects, df = 
degrees of freedom change, dfε = degrees of freedom error, Critical F  = Critical F-statistic values at p<0.05 
 
Table 31 under panel A presents the significance test of the difference between the 
information content of the model having both complementary and supplementary narratives 
based on disclosure depth and the model having complementary narratives only. Under panel 
B, the differential in information content of the model combining complementary and 
supplementary narratives, compared to the model having supplementary narratives is 
examined for significance.  For both panels, the pre-event incremental information content is 
not significant.  In the post-event period, incremental information content is significant at 
p<0.05 for all models based on disclosure depth on all days. 
9.5.2 Discussion 
The examination of incremental information content is motivated by the statement in ASB 
(2005; 2006) that complementary and supplementary narratives are used by investors to 
understand financial statements with an aim of investment decision making.  The discourse in 
the statement reflects that investors refer to both complementary and supplementary narratives 
as opposed to utilising complementary or supplementary narratives individually. 
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In the pre-event period, results of Model 5 show that complementary and supplementary 
narratives are not associated with returns, similar to the findings in Model 1 and Model 2.  
Likewise, neither Model 6 nor Model 3 and Model 4 had significant pre-event F-ratios and the 
models‟ adjusted R2 coefficients did not differ substantially from zero.  These results suggest 
that in the pre-event period, all three models have no information content, reflecting the 
suggestion by Opong (1995) that disclosures in UK interim reports are not pre-empted by any 
earlier source of information.  
 In the post-event period, under both disclosure variety and depth, the model combining 
complementary and supplementary narratives has higher information content than the models 
that consider complementary and supplementary narratives individually.  However, the 
difference is significant in all cases except for the comparison between the model combining 
complementary and supplementary narratives based on disclosure variety and the model 
having supplementary narratives based on disclosure variety.  The findings confirms the 
Biddle et al (1995) argument that combining variables in relative information content models 
provides more predictive power.  The result also confirms the suggestion in Tauringana (1997) 
that models having most variables in a study provide the best predictive power.   
Under disclosure variety, Model 2, representing supplementary narratives, had the highest F-
ratio values.  The second highest F-ratio values were for Model 1, representing 
complementary narratives.  The least F-ratio values were for Model 5 that combined both 
complementary and supplementary narratives.  For disclosure depth, the highest F-ratio 
coefficients were for Model 3 (complementary narratives), followed Model 4 (supplementary 
narratives).  The least F-ratio values were for Model 6 (combination of complementary and 
supplementary narratives).  This finding may indicate that whilst combining complementary 
and supplementary narratives provides the best models for predicting returns, the unimportant 
predictors of the models having less relative information content dilute the level of precision 
in the models combining complementary and supplementary narratives.  The results reflects 
the suggestion in prior disclosure extent studies (e.g. Beattie et al. 2004; Beattie and Thomson 
2007; Hooks et al. 2000; Wallace and Nasser 1995) that mere estimation of disclosure extent 
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based on presence or absence of information items does not show the comprehensiveness in 
narratives.   
For both disclosure variety and depth, the higher information content obtained by combining 
complementary and supplementary disclosures in the post-event period may reflect arguments 
in three alternate theories.  The theories include uncertain information hypothesis (UIH), 
incomplete revelation hypothesis (IRH) and incomplete contracting.  Arguments in the three 
theories reflect that completeness in disclosures influences returns due to reduction in 
information asymmetry and enhancement of preciseness. 
Under UIH, Brown et al (1988) argues that due to risk averseness, investors‟ initial reaction to 
news may not be the true price.  However, as investors comprehend the real effect of the 
information, a true price for the news is reached.  Related to this, the overreaction hypothesis 
(ORH) by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) suggests that markets habitually over react to new 
information and persistently revise their original pricing of the news.  To demonstrate these 
arguments, Brown et al (1988) explain that the first reaction to the sudden demise of an 
executive may be a decline in share prices.  However, the true price for this event can only be 
established after the firm announces either a strategy for replacement or profile of the new 
executive.  The example arguably illustrates that the true price of the news depends on the link 
between the news about demise and the replacement of the executive because of completeness 
in information about the event.  Similarly, the synergy between complementary and 
supplementary narratives provides a more complete disclosure profile compared to 
considering either complementary or supplementary narratives separately.  Whilst 
supplementary narratives explain only the amounts on the face of financial statements, 
complementary disclosures extend to information about factors outside the statements but 
influence the financial performance.  For example, supplementary narratives explain the 
aggregate interim sales and profitability figures for the six months.  However, complementary 
narratives break down interim sales and profitability according to time (e.g. monthly or 
quarterly), geographical segments (e.g. by country or continent) or business line (e.g. by 
product or customer type). 
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The IRH by Bloomfield (2002) explains that the revaluation of information is a result of 
having both rational and irrational investors.  The rational investors will price a new piece of 
information accurately but irrational traders will depend on noise.  The mispricing caused by 
irrational investors compels rational investors to seek for more intrinsic value in the 
disclosures for more returns.  The process continues until a true price is reached.  However, in 
order for rational investors to comprehend the actual returns of the information, they require 
both quantified and non-quantified disclosures.  While the statistically based disclosures are 
precise and measurable, non-quantified information provides intrinsic value by explaining 
factors affecting the statistics and/ or cannot be quantified.  Since supplementary narratives 
explain the amounts on the face of financial statements, the disclosures may be inclined to 
explaining statistical elements of performance.  On the other hand, complementary narratives 
consider both the statistical elements that are not expressed in financial statements and other 
information that may be hard to quantify but can affect performance.  Augmenting this 
argument is the recommendation by ASB (2005; 2006) that while complementing and 
supplementing, both quantified and non-quantified aspects of performance ought to be 
considered.  To exemplify this, while supplementary narratives may disclose on staff expenses 
and retirement benefit obligations, complementary narratives provide information about 
changes in staff numbers and personnel policies.  Therefore, the combination of 
complementary and supplementary narratives arguably provides a more complete account on 
personnel aspects of performance unlike in a case where complementary and supplementary 
narratives are considered separately.  Prior studies such as Ball and Brown (1968) and 
Barberis, et al (1998) also argue that although disclosures based on financial statement 
information have information content, other non-statistical disclosures that are disclosed with 
financial statements  are useful to investors.   
Under incomplete contract theory, combining supplementary and complementary disclosures 
gives investors alternative sources of information that may address differences in information 
processing abilities.  Chen (2005) discusses that information asymmetry may arise because 
people have varied information processing capabilities due to unique background knowledge.  
To illustrate this, Chen (2005) suggest that if the same financial report is produced for a 
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variety of investor types, it would be unlikely to attain a perfect correlation for the reaction to 
the information.  In addition, Hart and Moore (1988) consider that the incomplete contract 
hypothesis recognises that people have unlimited forecast and cognition abilities.  Therefore, 
there is possibility that varied abilities will lead to information asymmetry and mispricing of 
information.  However, in circumstance where investors can renegotiate their initial mispriced 
positions, there is an opportunity of ex post returns (Masten 1999).  Similarly, Vahabi (2002) 
and Gonedes (1976) argue that investors use available information to reassess the intrinsic 
value in disclosures continuously until a true price is established.    Therefore, complementing 
and supplementing may provide investors with information that explains performance from 
alternating aspects.  For example, people who are inclined to comprehending nonfinancial 
aspects of performance are likely to concentrate on complementary narratives but those who 
appreciate financial performance may be interested in supplementary disclosures. 
In addition, combining complementary and supplementary narratives may reduce information 
costs since investors may not have to engage resources to analysing information.  Hart and 
Moore (1988) argue that it is costly and impractical to have a complete contract between or 
amongst individuals.   Therefore, incomplete contracting theory that recognises increased 
disclosures are better suited than complete contracting that assumes perfection in the market 
place.  Tauringana and Mangena (2006) reflect this argument by suggesting that 
supplementary disclosures assist both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors in 
understanding financial statements without engaging in further analytical techniques.  
Similarly, firms may provide more disclosures if they view the information reduces the 
resources that investors would have employed to analyse information, thereby reducing 
information asymmetry and enhancing homogeneity in investor beliefs  (Diamond 1985).    
Also observed, the margin of information content between the model combining 
complementary and supplementary disclosures and models that consider complementary and 
supplementary information individually differs under disclosure variety and disclosure depth.  
Under disclosure variety, the adjusted R
2
 coefficients of the combined model and the 
individual models of complementary and supplementary narratives do not differ substantially.  
However, in disclosure depth, the difference between the adjusted R
2
 coefficients of the 
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combined model compared to the individual models is substantial.  This observation may be 
explained by incomplete contract theory.  Arrow and Debreu (1954) argue that complete 
contracting in a market place provides information about attributes of trade such number and 
specifications of commodities traded, the location, price and time of trade.  This type of 
contract assumes that contracting parties are impartially informed.  Therefore, there is no 
motivation for either party to strategically withhold or signal to the other party or even alter 
behaviour to unfairly gain by reducing the joint gains.  In the disclosure variety models, one 
attribute of disclosure, that is, number of information items is used to measure disclosures.  
Under disclosure depth a set of information attributes (good news, amounts and comparison of 
current with past performance, reasons for performance and forward-looking disclosures) is 
used to measure disclosure extent.  Therefore, it is likely that the multiplicity of attributes 
under disclosure depth provides more comprehensive disclosures that reduce information 
asymmetry compared to disclosure variety.  In the same perspective, both the uncertain 
information and incomplete revelation hypotheses agree that a more detailed disclosure profile 
reduces uncertainty and helps investors use alternative attributes to understand and cross-
examine the reliability of information.  For example, under disclosure depth, good news in 
supplementary disclosures may be verified either through reasons or through trends in 
financial statements.  Likewise, precision of complementary reasons for performance can be 
enhanced by reference to complementary amounts and comparison of current with past 
performance.  Under disclosure variety, the extent of attribution is compromised and such 
advantages may be neglected.  In agreement with this observation are prior studies (e.g. 
Beattie et al. 2004; Beattie and Thomson 2007; Wallace and Nasser 1995) that foster the 
argument that disclosure measurement techniques based on various attributions reveal 
comprehensiveness in narratives.  In turn, the attributes identified illuminate the aspects that 
investors may find relevant.  
The conclusion to the subsidiary objective of this thesis is similar for disclosure variety and 
depth in pre-event period that the information content of the model combining complementary 
and supplementary narratives is not different from the models that consider complementary 
and supplementary narratives individually.  In the post-event period, the results are varied 
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based on significance of the difference.  For disclosure variety, the model combining 
complementary and supplementary narratives has higher information content than the models 
that consider complementary and supplementary narratives separately.  However, the results 
are not significant for the comparison with the model for supplementary narratives but 
significant for the comparison with the model for complementary narratives.  For disclosure 
depth, the model combining complementary and supplementary narratives has higher and 
significant incremental information content than the models that consider complementary and 
supplementary narratives separately.  Given that disclosure depth considers a number of 
attributes, that is, (goodness of the news, amounts and comparisons of current with past 
performance, reasons for performance and forward-looking disclosures) as well as volume of 
narratives, the method is arguably better placed to reduce information asymmetry.  Secondly, 
the generally higher incremental content in the models combining complementary and 
supplementary narratives affirms that both narratives types are used jointly reduce information 
asymmetry, as commended by ASB (2005; 2006) and thereby addressing the agency problem.   
9.6 Information Content of Control Variables 
The discussion in this section relates to the hypotheses H 6 (annual dividend yield) H 7 
(interim earnings per share) and H 8 (interim total assets).  As financial variables are included 
in all models, the discussion is based on all models.    
9.6.1 Annual Dividend Yield 
The t-statistics for annual dividend yield (ADY) are not significant in the pre-event period but 
were positively associated with returns in post-event period.  In the pre-event period, investors 
arguably cannot rely on past dividend yield to make decisions as it may not be indicative of 
the future performance.  In Watts (1973), information content of dividends was not realised on 
ground that the proportion of future earnings potential reflected in dividends was minute.    
In the post-event period, a number of factors may explain the significance of ADY.  Merton 
and Modigliani (1961) suggest that a stable or increased dividend pay signals to investors that 
management is confident about the performance outlook or prospects.  The annual dividend 
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yield is a function of interim and final dividend.  Therefore, previous financial year‟s dividend 
yield provides investors‟ interim dividend expectations that are confirmed when the interim 
reports are published.  Prior studies (e.g. Campbell and Shiller 1988; Fama and French 1988; 
Kothari and Shanken 1997) agree that dividend yield is associated with share price returns 
because the ratio is used to predict the firm‟s future earnings and cash flows.  Similarly, Sadka 
(2007) considers that dividend yield is useful to returns since it conveys information about the 
stability of future cash flows.  However, a factor that may deter information content of 
dividend yield is that dividend policy is susceptible to manipulation (Fama and French 1989; 
Sadka 2007).  In such circumstances, the cash flows attached to dividend declaration may not 
be sustainable.  There also are studies (e.g. Fairfield and Yohn 2001; Watts and Zimmerman 
1990) suggesting that dividend yield is manipulated as a result of profits manipulation.   
From the findings of the study, hypothesis H 6 is accepted in the pre-event that annual 
dividend yield is not associated with share price returns.  In the post-event period, hypothesis 
H 6 is rejected to conclude that after the announcement of interim results, there is a significant 
and positive relationship between dividend yield and share price returns. 
9.6.2 Interim Earnings per Share 
The variable representing interim earnings per share in the models used in this study is IES.  In 
the pre-event period, the variable was not associated with returns for most instances.  This 
result may reflect that interim report disclosures in the UK are not pre-empted by any form of 
information prior to the publication of interim reports (Opong 1995).   
In post-event period, IES has the highest t-test values for all models, making it the most 
important predictor of returns in the study.  All values are positive and significant at p<0.01, 
suggesting that IES is responded to positively by investors.  A number of studies that have 
found information content in earnings per share such as Patell (1976) and Foster (1973).  Even 
recent studies (e.g. Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2009; Lennox and Park 2006) do find the 
earnings per share relevant to share price returns.  Ball and Brown (1967; 1968) argue that 
earnings per share relates to macroeconomic factors in the business‟ environment and 
therefore is informative to returns.  Opong (1996; 1997) found a relationship between earnings 
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per share and dividend as both parameters are disclosed together.  Therefore, they mutually 
signal performance to investors.  When both earning per share and dividend increase, investors 
are confident that the firm is performing well, however, higher dividend with reduced earnings 
per share may signal temporal poor earnings per share performance.  To enhance this 
argument, Allen (1992) and Lintner (1956) suggest that management will only increase 
dividends to sustainable levels so as to avoid future investor disappointments.  Another 
explanation to the usefulness of interim EPS is Brown and Kennelly‟s (1972) argument that 
investors may use interim earnings per share to predict the annual earnings performance.   
A key criticism for the usefulness of earning per share is that information in financial 
statements lacks timeliness (Elliott and Jacobson 1991).  This compels investors to other 
disclosures other than financial statements.  However, Francis and Schipper (1999) consider 
that the timeliness deficiency is minimised through the provision of interim disclosures.   
Another argument against the relevance of earnings per share is by Said, et al (2008) who did 
not find information content in earnings per share.  They suggested that investors are 
interested in economic but not accounting performance measures.  To substantiate this 
argument, Collins, et al (2009) suggested that accounting earnings per share was susceptible to 
manipulation arising from restructuring costs, write-downs, asset impairments, costs and gains 
on sale of assets, mergers and acquisitions, goodwill amortisation and research and 
development expenses.     
From the findings of this thesis, hypothesis H 7 is accepted in the pre-event period that there is 
no association between interim earnings per share and returns.  In post-event period, the 
positive sign of the t-test values suggests that IES is positively associated with returns, thereby 
rejecting hypothesis H 7.   
9.6.3 Interim Total Assets 
Interim total assets, denoted as ITA, is a measure of firm size.  For all models, the t-statistics 
for ITA are not significant in the pre-event period.  The result demonstrates that investors 
cannot act on the disclosures, as they are not yet public.  In the UK, interim report disclosures 
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are not pre-empted as the half-year reports are first formal financial reports in the financial 
year (Opong 1995)   
In the post event period, the association between ITA and returns was varied across the 
models.  In Model 2, Model 4 and Model 5, ITA was not associated with returns for any post-
event day.  In Model 1, ITA had a negative and significant (p<0.05) t-statistic for CAR (-5, 5).  
In Model 3, ITA was significant at p<0.01 with negative t-statistics for all post-event days.  
The variable ITA was negatively significant at p<0.05 for CAR (-5, 3) and CAR (-5, 4) and 
significant at p<0.01 for Model 6.   
The cases in which ITA was not associated with returns may be explained by suggestions in 
prior studies.  One explanation may be that financial statements information fails to reflect the 
real value of intangible assets and the changing trends of the business environment such as 
innovation and deregulation (Lev and Zarowin 1999).  In addition, Amir and Lev (1996) 
concluded from their results that on a stand-alone basis, financial statements information such 
as book values is not useful for share valuation.  High-level performance information such as 
such as market growth, customer churn and penetration is highly relevant to share pricing but 
is neglected in financial statements.  Another reason is provided by Elliott and Jacobson 
(1991; 1994) who consider that the usefulness of total assets is compromised by the nature of 
measurement which is historical and cost-based. The valuation method is regarded obsolete in 
an information era where investors depend on current information to value firms.  
The instances where ITA has information content, the negative sign may indicate information 
asymmetry because of firm size and complexity.  In ASB (2005; 2006) it is recommended that 
the amount of disclosures should reflect business complexity and size.  Reflecting this, Cooke 
(1991) argues that large firms are characterised by numerous business lines and geographical 
locations.  Disclosing on all the activities may make disclosures difficult to understand because of 
information overload.  On the other hand, suppressing the disclosures for firms with numerous 
segments may be considered as a strategy to increase information asymmetry.  In either case 
(disclosing on all segments or suppressing disclosures), the disclosures may be regarded as 
unreliable.  Another explanation is by Wallace (1987) suggesting that large firms may avoid 
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disclosing to abate political and litigation costs arising from the information.  The reason for the 
negative association between total assets and returns by Grullon and Michaely (2004) is that 
large firms have lower investment opportunities than small firms.  The few available 
opportunities are competed for aggressively with smaller firms.  As a result, large firms 
accumulate large cash reserves, which may not be reinvestment, compelling investors to 
demand the cash flows through share repurchases and dividends.  Even in instances of 
investment opportunities, for example acquisitions, large firms tend to over pay for the 
investments and this may not be viewed positively by investors (Campbell et al. 2001).  
Similar to the negative significance of ITA, is the finding in Bamber (1986) where total assets 
were inversely associated with trading volume.    
For the above discussion, this study accepts hypothesis H 8 for all models in the pre-event 
period that interim total assets has no association with returns.  Similarly, the thesis accepts 
hypothesis H 8 in the post-event period for Model 2, Model 4 and Model 5.  However, in the 
post-event period, hypothesis H 8 is rejected for Model 1, Model 3 and Model 6, suggesting 
that interim total assets are negatively associated with returns.    
9.7 Sensitivity Testing 
The discussion in this section addresses the robustness of the models for information content 
of complementary and supplementary narratives.  In response to Field (2005; 2009) suggestion 
that the effect of externalities ought to be examined, two factors are examined for their 
influence on the results of the models used to examine information content.  The factors are 
regulation change effect (RGE) and audit review effect (ARE).   
9.7.1 Consideration for Selecting Externalities for Sensitivity Tests 
The list of factors that influence information content is not exhaustive.  Therefore, 
externalities selected are do not provide a comprehensive set of factors but rather illustrative.  
The considerations to select a factor are four.  First, the factor is related to the data used in the 
thesis.  Second, it has a theoretical or prior literature underpinning for its effect on information 
content of narratives.  Third, the factor should be interpretable in statistical terms for profiling 
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it as variable in a multiple regression model.  Fourth, factors that had many classes of 
categorisation were neglected as they could disperse sample cases into numerous strata leading 
to insufficient data for regression analysis.  For example, factors like the number of indices or 
industry classification may result into seven or more classifications thereby leading to 
numerous dummy variables.     
9.7.2 Measurement of Externalities for Sensitivity Tests    
Dichotomously measured dummy variables for the two factors are used to give weights to the 
different classes of the externality factors.  For audit review effect, denoted ARE, where 
absence of an audit review is awarded a zero and presence of an audit review in the interim 
report is awarded a score of one.  The sample cases under ARE=0 were 96 and 213 for 
ARE=1.  For regulation change effect, RCE = 0 represents interim balance sheet date being in 
a period of a voluntary operating and financial review (OFR) and RCE = 1 proxies for interim 
balance sheet date being in a period of a mandatory OFR.  This resulted into 216 cases for 
ARE=0 and 93 cases for ARE=1. 
9.7.3 Correlation between Sensitivity Test Factors and Predictors 
Field (2009) argues that if there is high correlation between the predictors and external factors, 
the regression model is exposed to the externalities.  To this effect, the predictive power of the 
independent variables may be undermined by the external factors.  Through a scanning of the 
correlation matrix in Appendix 15, there is no instance of high correlation, confirming that the 
predictive ability of the predictors is not influenced by the externalities.
15
   
                                                 
15
 The cut-off point for high correlation was ±0.90.  In the correlation matrix, there is no coefficient exceeding 
±0.30. 
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9.7.4 Sensitivity Test Results 
Sensitivity tests were conducted by including the externalities in the six multiple regression 
models for information content of complementary and supplementary narratives.  In Appendix 
16, the sensitivity test results for the event day are presented.
16
 
9.7.4.1 Audit Review Effect 
Under Table 6 in Chapter 2, a number of regulations and standards (e.g. ASB 2007a; EU 2004,  
2007; FSA 2008) recommend but do not mandate audit involvement in UK interim reporting.  
Prior literature (e.g. Opong 1995) has suggested investigation of the effect of inclusion of 
audit review on information content of interim report disclosures.  
The decision to include an audit review in interim reports may indicate that management 
wants to instil confidence in investors about the reliability of disclosures.  Prior studies (e.g. 
Beattie et al. 2004; Merkl-Davies 2007; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007) argue that 
management may adopt disclosure strategies that either mislead investors or show reliability in 
information.  The fact that in the UK the interim audit reviews are neither a full audit nor 
mandatory, previous research (e.g. Atiase et al. 2005; Opong 1995) have queried the reliability 
of the review.  In addition,  Ettredge et al (1994) criticise audit reviews for lack attention to 
detail such as effectiveness of internal control structures.  Furthermore, Alford and Edmonds 
(1981) suggest that audit involvement does not increases the quality of interim reports 
numbers.  Fabozzi and Fonfeder (1983) consider that the costs and delay implications attached 
to interim audit involvement outweigh the usefulness of the reviews.  Also, Alves and Teixeira 
dos Santos (2008) and Cornell and Landsman (1989) argue that interim reviews are exposed 
errors as they are mere reviews.  However, studies (e.g. Manry et al. 2003; Ready and Rock 
2003) established that audit reviews in interim are more value relevant than retrospective audit 
                                                 
16
 The event day is results are selected for presentation in Appendix 16 because it is the first day for all models 
with the highest adjusted R
2
 coefficients, suggesting that the event day is the most significant day.  The 
sensitivity test results for other event window days were carried out and the conclusions drawn from the results 
did not differ from those of the event day results. 
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reports in annual reports.  Manry et al (2003) attribute this to timeliness of the audit review, 
thereby enhancing their reliability and relevancy.     
The results in Appendix 16 show that inclusion of the audit review effect dummy variable in 
the information content models of complementary and supplementary narratives did not 
change the results of this study significantly.  No F-statistic coefficients that compared the 
change in results on inclusion of the dummy variable ARE were greater than the respective 
critical F-statistic.  Therefore, variable ARE was not significant in any model.  This confirms 
the robustness of the results as far as inclusion of an audit review is concerned.  The result 
may reflect arguments in earlier studies (e.g. Atiase et al. 2005; Opong 1995) that relevancy of 
audit reviews in the UK interim reports is compromised by the voluntary and incomprehensive 
nature of audit reviews. 
9.7.4.2 Regulation Change Effect  
In this thesis, two theoretical explanations justify regulation in the markets for capital and 
information.  The theories are the public interest and the capture theories.   
The public interest theory considers that free economic markets are affected by inefficient or 
inequitable transacting and therefore require government intervention to replace self-
monitoring (Posner 1974).  However, the effectiveness of government intervention is not 
attainable since it is impractically to achieve a good result for the entire public (Posner 1974).  
Enrlich and Posner (1974) further criticise the public interest theory of regulation that public 
regulation is costly due to the process of negotiating with various stakeholders with different 
motivations.     
The capture theory postulates that government agencies act in the interest of the special 
interest groups (Levine and Forrence 1990).  For example, ASB (2005; 2006) suggested that 
the need to complement and supplement financial statements was to aid investors understand 
the statements.  Similarly, narratives are intended for investors, as they are the “buying” 
consumers of accounting information (AICPA 1994).  Seligman (1983) supports the capture 
theory because management may employ impression management techniques in disclosures to 
 335 
 
influence investor decisions.  In addition, insider trading, deterioration of public confidence in 
capital markets and the resulting slowdown of economic growth justify the capture theory.  
Posner (1974) however criticised the capture theory because the interaction between the 
regulated firm and the regulating agencies is disregarded.  As result, the regulating agency and 
interest groups influence the outcome with less consideration about the regulated firm.  
Benston (1969) too provided three reasons against the regulation.  First, with or without 
regulatory bodies, evidence of capital market failures has emerged over time.  Secondly, in 
competitive market mechanisms, investors‟ interests are protected through efficient allocation 
of capital to deserving firms.  Third, regulation fails to end the debate regarding the timeliness 
and materiality of accounting information.  Disclosure extent literature (e.g. Beattie et al. 
2004; Botosan and Harris 2000) discusses that voluntary disclosures show management 
willingness to communicate with investors but mandatory disclosures are most times intended 
to avoid litigation risks and therefore may not be relevant to returns.  
In Chapter 2, Table 7 illustrates that a number of regulations standards recommend narrative 
reporting.  These include ASB (1997; 2007a), EU (2004; 2007) and FSA (2008).  In the period 
of study (2005 – 2007), various regulations and standards for narrative commentaries were in 
force.  In 2005, ASB (2005) mandated the provision of the operating and financial review 
(OFR).  In 2006, ASB (2006) repealed the mandatory OFR.  The Business Review, regulated 
by the EU (2003), came into force after the repealing of the mandatory OFR.  However, ASB 
(2006) recommended that the OFR remains an instrument of best practice.  To examine the 
regulation change effect, the sample is divided into two.  Complementing and supplementing 
is considered voluntary for interim reports with balance sheet dates before ASB (2005) was 
effective (before 1
st
 April 2005) and after its repeal (on or after 12
th
 January 2006).  
Mandatory complementing and supplementing is considered to apply for interim reports with 
balance sheet dates falling within the period ASB (2006) was effective (the period from 1
st
 
April 2005 to 11
th
 January 2006).   
The results under Appendix 16 show that regulation change effect (RCE) was not significant 
for any information content model as all respective F-statistic coefficients were lower than the 
critical F-statistic.  Therefore, in the period of either a mandatory or a voluntary OFR, the 
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results of this study are robust.  ASB (2005) stated explicitly that the mandatory OFR was 
applicable to annual reports.  This arguably meant that the enactment or annulment of the 
mandatory OFR might not have affected the motivation or nature of interim report narratives 
for UK listed firms.  Therefore, in both reporting environments (mandatory and voluntary 
OFR), interim report narratives remained a discretion of management.  Also, the lack of 
significance of RCE may indicate the argument in past studies (e.g. Beattie et al. 2004; 
Botosan and Harris 2000) that voluntary disclosures show management‟s willingness to 
reduce information asymmetry and uncertainty.  The findings also reflect the discussion in 
Benston (1969) that in either a voluntary or a mandatory regime, information content is guided 
by investors‟ interpretation of disclosures regarding allocation of resources.   
9.8 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This chapter discusses results of an event study examining the relative information content of 
complementary and supplementary narratives.  In addition, incremental information content of 
the two narrative types is investigated. 
The first section, presenting descriptive results, generally shows the period after the 
publication of the interim report results has higher market adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns than the pre-event period.  The event day has the greatest returns.  The extent 
disclosure is greater for complementary narrative attributes compared to supplementary 
narrative attributes under both disclosure variety and depth techniques of measuring disclosure 
extent.     
In line with the main objective of the study, that is to examine the relative information content 
of complementary and supplementary narratives, the results are varied.  In the pre-event 
period, the disclosures generally have no association with returns suggesting that interim 
report narratives are largely not pre-empted by prior announcements.  In the post-event period, 
when disclosures are measured by disclosure variety supplementary narratives have relatively 
higher information content than complementary narratives but the difference is not significant.  
For disclosure depth, information content of complementary narratives is significantly higher 
than that of supplementary narratives. 
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As an appendage to the main objective, the study also compared the association of the 
disclosure depth attributes in complementary narratives to the counterpart attributes in 
supplementary narratives.  The results the complementary attributes of good news, amounts 
and comparison of current with past performance and reasons for performance had relatively 
higher information compared to their counterparts in supplementary narratives.  No difference 
in information content was realised between the complementary and supplementary forward-
looking disclosures as both attributes had no significant association with returns.   
The subsidiary objective of this thesis was to examine incremental information content of 
complementary and supplementary narratives.  The pre-event period results of the model 
combining complementary and supplementary narratives did not differ from the models 
considering complementary and supplementary narratives individually.  For disclosure variety, 
the results for the post-event period were varied.  The model combining complementary and 
supplementary narratives had more significant information content than the model considering 
complementary individually.  However, the incremental information content for the model 
combining complementary and supplementary narratives was not significant when compared 
with the model having supplementary narratives only.  In the post-event period, there results 
based on disclosure depth were similar.  The model combining complementary and 
supplementary narratives had more significant information content than the models 
considering complementary and supplementary narratives individually.  Another observation 
is that under disclosure variety, the difference between the information content of the model 
combining complementary and supplementary narratives and the models considering 
complementary and supplementary narratives individually is small.  However, under 
disclosure depth, the difference between the information content of the model combining 
complementary and supplementary narratives and the models considering complementary and 
supplementary narratives individually is substantial.  The model based on disclosure depth that 
combined both complementary and supplementary narratives has the highest predictive power 
compared to all models in the study.   
In the pre-event period, the financial performance measures are generally not associated with 
returns.  In all models, a positive and significant relation with returns is realised for annual 
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dividend yield and interim earnings per share.  However, interim total assets had no 
association with returns in Model 2, Model 4 and Model 5.  In Model 1, Model 3 and Model 6, 
the variable of interim total assets is negatively associated with returns.    
The results of all models are robust whether the interim report published with or without an 
audit review.  In addition, the results of all models are robust under either mandatory or 
voluntary regimes for the provision of an operating and financial review.  
The results of relative and incremental information content of complementary and 
supplementary narratives in this chapter portray that the disclosures are useful to investors and 
yield abnormal returns on publications.  Referring to chapters 5 and 6, the empirical evidence 
in this thesis portrays that the strict adherence to the concept of perfectly informed market 
players that underlie the market for capital and efficient market hypothesis is not attained.  
Rather, the results align mostly with joint application of the mainstream and heterodox 
economic market theories where agency relationship between investors and managers 
substantiates the provision of accounting disclosures.  In other words, the narrative disclosures 
reduce information asymmetry, especially when disclosure depth is used to measure 
complementary and supplementary disclosures.  Based on the disclosure level and nature of 
the respective attributes under complementary and supplementary narrative, the investors are 
able to establish whether the information reflects impression management or incremental 
information. 
The events leading to subprime financial crisis of 2007 may be considered to have intensified 
the relevance of the findings in this study.  To recap, the key findings are that complementary 
narratives relative higher information content but both complementary and supplementary 
narratives have incremental information content.  These results are more pronounced when 
disclosure depth (set of various disclosure attributes as well as considering repetitions), other 
than disclosure variety (mere presence of disclosure items without regard to repetitions), is 
used to estimate extent of complementary and supplementary disclosures.  Wagner (2010) and 
Schwarcz (2008) explicitly blamed the 2007 financial crisis to the presence of large 
information asymmetry, complex financial innovations and laxity in regulation.  Given that 
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investors in bank‟s equity and debt securities financed the bank‟s activities in the subprime 
mortgages they ought to have been advised the various aspects of the mortgages.  Such 
attributes would arguably include extent of the contingent liabilities/ assets and the valuation 
thereof, which could be reflected in supplementary narratives.  Other attributes would be of 
complementary nature such as the income clustering of the borrowers and the amount at risk 
for each income group, the regulatory remedy in case of default, the banks hedging activities 
and exposure to other mortgage-backed securities.  Through the attributes of the 
complementary and supplementary disclosure (presence of information items, goodness of the 
disclosures, amounts and comparison of current with past performance, reasons for 
performance and forward-looking information), the investors could have a more precise basis 
for investment decisions with regard to the exposure to the subprime mortgages.  
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10 RESEARCH SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides summary and conclusion of the research.  Additionally, implications of 
results and limitations of the research are discussed.  Lastly, comments concerning the 
direction for future research are given.   
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows.  The next section presents the objectives of the 
research.  This is followed by a summary of the methodology explained.  The results of the thesis 
are then summarised.  The last sections of the chapter are research implications, limitations of the 
research and opportunities for further research.     
10.2 Research Objectives  
The key research objective was to investigate the relative information content of 
complementary and supplementary narrative commentaries in UK interim reports.  As an 
auxiliary to the main objective, the thesis also examined that relative usefulness of 
complementary and the counterpart supplementary narrative information attributes under 
disclosure depth technique of estimating disclosure extent.  The attributes are good news, 
amounts and comparisons of current with past performance, reasons for performance and 
forward-looking disclosures. 
A minor objective of the thesis is to establish incremental information content of 
complementary and supplementary narratives.  Incremental information content is examined 
by inquiring whether combining complementary and supplementary narratives provides better 
information content than considering complementary and supplementary narratives 
individually.   
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10.3 Research Methodology and Methods 
The methodology and method used in the thesis are discussed in Chapter 8.  The perspectives 
considered include the research philosophy, selection of the sample and justification of the 
event study technique as the appropriate method for estimating information content.  Other 
considerations are measurement of cumulative abnormal returns, measurement of the 
independent variables and the models used for examining relative and incremental information 
content.   
The research philosophy is inclined to the positivist approach where quantitative methods of 
data collection are considered favourable for answering the research objectives. 
The sample for the thesis comprises of 103 companies is a random set from a sampling frame 
of 136 firms.  The sampling frame met three conditions.  First, the companies listed on the 
LSE.  Secondly, they were members of the FTSE350 index continuously from 1
st
 January 
2005 to 31
st
 December 2007.  Lastly, they are non-financial services sector firms.  Therefore, 
the study is based on the interim reports of the 103 firms for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, 
leading to 309 firm years.   
Relative and incremental information content was examined for a 10-day event window 
around the announcement day of interim reports.  The dependant variables are the daily 
market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for each day in the event window.  The 
independent variables are disclosure either depth or variety attributes of complementary and/or 
supplementary narratives and financial performance measures.  For relative information 
content, the model for complementary narratives is compared with that for supplementary 
narratives.  For incremental information content, model combining complementary and 
supplementary narratives is compared with the models considering complementary and 
supplementary narratives individually.   
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10.4 Results and Explanation 
The detailed presentation and discussion of results is in Chapter 9.    
10.4.1 Relative Information Content of Complementary and 
Supplementary Narratives 
The main objective is achieved by comparing the adjusted R
2
 coefficients of the models that 
consider complementary and supplementary narrative separately.  The first examination of 
relative information content of complementary and supplementary narratives is based on 
disclosure variety.  The second analysis is based on disclosure depth.  Table 32 summarises 
the results. 
Table 32 Summary of Relative Information Content Results 
Models 
Adjusted R
2
 Range 
Hypothesis Decision 
Narrative 
Type with 
Higher 
Information 
Content 
Complementary 
Narratives Models 
 
Supplementary 
Narratives 
Models 
Disclosure Variety       
Pre-event  -0.011 to 0.010  -0.003 to 0.013 H 1 Accepted None 
Post-event  0.252 to 0.390
 
 0.267 to 0.397 H 1 Accepted None 
Disclosure Depth       
Pre-event  -0.002 to 0.008  0.009 to 0.014 H 1 Accepted None 
Post-event  0.312 to 0.439*  0.265 to 0.389* H 1 Rejected Complementary 
Note: *Range has significant Hottelling‟s t and Steiger‟s Z test values at p<0.05 
 
In the pre-event period, returns are not associated with either complementary or 
supplementary narratives as no adjusted R
2
 value was substantially different from zero and the 
F-ratio coefficients were all not significant.  This finding is similar for disclosure variety and 
disclosure depth estimates of disclosure extent.  Largely, interim report results are not pre-
empted by disclosures prior to the announcement of the interim reports (Opong 1995).   
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The results of the post-event period are mixed.  Under disclosure variety, supplementary 
narratives have higher information content than complementary narratives but the difference is 
not significant.  Supplementary number information items (SII) may be considered reliable 
because they are confined to regulated interim financial statements (Tauringana and Mangena 
2006).  On the hand, complementary number of information items (CII) are diverse and may 
not be related, leading to a situation of ambiguity.  Jones (1988) and Merkl-Davies (2007) 
argue that decreased readability of narratives is prompted by increased disclosures arising 
from firm size and complexity.  The diversity and lack of another reference for CII may lead 
to Arrow‟s (1963; 1965) notion of the moral hazard if managers use complementary narratives 
for impression management.   However, the technique used to measure CII and SII is not 
precise to uncover the intrinsic value in either narrative type.  Mere presence or absence of 
information items does not show the comprehensiveness in disclosures (Beattie et al. 2004; 
Beattie and Thomson 2007; Hooks et al. 2000; Wallace and Nasser 1995). 
Under disclosure depth, complementary narratives have more significant information content 
than supplementary narratives.  The multiplicity in disclosure attributes reduces ambiguity and 
uncertainty for both complementary and supplementary narratives.  While complementary 
narrative attribute reveal intrinsic information about performance, supplementary narrative 
attributes largely replicate financial statements information.  Bloomfield (2002) under 
Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis (IRH) argues that statistical measures and qualitative 
measures synergise to improve disclosure preciseness.  Similarly, Flostrand and Strom (2006) 
suggest that investors pursue value factors that are not in financial statements because the 
balance sheet values fail to capture the true value of intangible items such as goodwill.  Other 
criticisms of financial statements that may extend to supplementary narratives include failure 
of accounting numbers to timely reflect economic events (e.g. Beaver et al. 1980) and 
measurement errors (e.g. Hayn 1995).  Information content of complementary narratives 
topics has been found in studies such as Bukh, et al (2005) and Dumay and Tull (2007) 
concerning intellectual capital, Hammersley, et al (2008) with regard to internal controls.   
These studies content that the topics provide intrinsic information that cannot be disclosed in 
financial statements. 
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An auxiliary objective of relative usefulness of complementary and supplementary narrative 
attributes under disclosure depth, the t-values in the disclosure depth models considering 
complementary and supplementary individually are compared.  The results are summarised in 
Table 33 
The pre-event, neither complementary nor supplementary attributes under disclosure depth are 
associated with returns.  Therefore, in the period, there is no difference in the information 
content complementary narrative disclosure depth attributes compared to the counterpart 
supplementary narrative disclosure depth attributes.  The finding reflects the argument by 
Cools and Mirjam van Praag (2007) that information in financial reports is not leaked to the 
market prior to its publication.   
Table 33 Summary of Relative Information Content Results of Disclosure Attributes 
Disclosure Depth 
Attributes 
Sign of significant t-statistics* 
Hypothesis Decision 
Narrative 
Type with 
Higher 
Information 
Content 
Complementary 
Narratives Model 
 
Supplementary 
Narratives 
Model 
Pre-event        
CGD and 
SGD 
   H 2 Accepted None 
CAC and 
SAC 
   H 3 Accepted None 
CRE and SRE    H 4 Accepted None 
CFW and 
SFW 
   H 5 Accepted None 
Post-event        
CGD and 
SGD  
(-)   H 2 Rejected CGD 
CAC and 
SAC  
(+)   H 3 Rejected CAC 
CRE and SRE  (-)   H 4 Rejected CRE 
CFW and 
SFW  
   H 5 Accepted None 
Note: CGD (SGD) = Complementary (Supplementary) Good News, CAC (SAC) = Complementary 
(Supplementary) Amounts and Comparison of Current with Past Performance, CRE (SRE) Complementary 
(Supplementary) = Reasons for Performance, CFW (SFW) = Complementary (Supplementary) Forward-looking 
Attribute, (+) or (-)  =  t-statistics are positively or negatively  significant at either  0.05 or 0.01 level, 
respectively, *A variable is considered significant if it has at least one instance of significant t-statistic within the 
respective period 
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In the post-event period, all complementary attributes except forward-looking disclosures 
were significantly associated with returns but no supplementary narrative attribute was 
significant.   
The negative t-statistics for complementary good news reflect the argument by Abrahamson 
and Amir (1996) that good news in narratives in most cases is an attempt to impress investors.  
Kane (2004) also suggests that mangers tend to escalate the firm‟s value by reducing 
unfavourable information and increasing positive news.  On the other hand, Lee, et al (2004) 
consider bad news to portray management‟s openness and willingness to take responsibility of 
controllable events.  In Abrahamson and Amir (1996), bad news had a positive market 
response indicating the information is relevant to firm valuation.  The non-significance of 
supplementary good news shows that the disclosures replicate financial statements disclosures, 
therefore, do not provide information beyond financial statements.  In addition, analysts and 
institutional investors who have the skills to analyse financial statements follow FTSE350 
firms.  Therefore, the advantage of supplementary narratives raised in Tauringana and 
Mangena (2006) the information helps unsophisticated investors may not suffice for the 
sample in this study. 
The positive association of complementary amounts and comparisons of current with past 
performance reflects similar findings in past studies that investigated amounts or comparisons 
in disclosures of complementary nature.  For example, Berry et al (1998) regarding mounts of 
oil and gas reserve valuation and Lajili and Zeghal (2006) in relation to quantified human 
capital disclosures.  Other studies (e.g. Givoly et al. 1999; Hope et al. 2008; Thomas 2000) 
find information content in segment analysis disclosures because the figures help investors 
understand the source of revenues and profits.  The suggestion in Riley et al (2003) that the 
seasonality effect in business, for example peak travel seasons as summer months, 
thanksgiving and Christmas in the airline industry may indicate that comparisons in 
complementary narratives are relevant.  The lack of information content in supplementary 
amounts and comparisons of current with past performance may be justified by the argument 
by Amir and Lev (1996) that on standalone basis, financial information (earnings, cash flows 
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and book values) are not relevant to share price returns but when combined with non-financial 
quantified information, earnings contribute to explanation of the prices.   
A number of factors may explain the inverse relationship between returns and complementary 
reasons for performance.  Staw et al (1983) suggests that managers disclosures for impression 
management by emphasising favourable performance.  Clatworthy and Jones (2003), suggest 
that successes are attributed to internal factors but failures to externalities.  Also, Hutton et al 
(2003) found that firms provide precise and verifiable explanations in times of good news but 
when bad news prevails, broad-based and non-verifiable information is provided.  However, 
investors react adversely to this strategy reflecting Anderson‟s (2001) discussion that 
shareholders use various sources of information to verify reliability of management 
disclosures.  In Kanto and Schadewitz (2000), the reaction to overview disclosures was 
inverse, depicting that investors are aware of impression management strategies.  The non-
significance of supplementary reasons for performance may be due to confinement of the 
disclosures to financial statements.  Therefore, the information may lack diversity and detail to 
inform investors adequately.  
The lack of information content in both complementary and supplementary forward-looking 
was mainly attributed to the discussion by Schleicher et al. (2007).  In their study, Schleicher 
et al. (2007) argued the forward-looking attribute is only relevant in situation of loss making 
because, through prospects, managers can assure investors about viability of the business.  In 
time of profit-making, prospects may not be necessary since profitability is sufficient to 
illustrate business viability.  The descriptive statistics of this thesis showed that 75% of sample 
cases had positive interim earnings and the firms under study sustained their listing status as 
FTSE350 companies throughout the study period.  Similarly, Baginski et al (2002) find that in 
periods of profitability, prospective disclosures were few and less precise compared to periods of 
loss-making or decreased profitability.  In addition, the descriptives of this study show that 
forward-looking disclosures were the least disclosed attribute for both complementary and 
supplementary narratives.  The low level of disclosures for the forward-looking attribute also 
results in questioning the reliability of the disclosures.  Under uncertain information hypothesis, 
incomplete revelation hypothesis and incomplete contracting, there is an appreciation that 
 347 
 
investors need detailed and precise disclosures to augment their perception about the business.  
Another reason for the lack of usefulness of forward-looking information is the link between 
litigation, reputation and prospective disclosures.  Baginski et al (2002) established that managers 
provide little and less precise forward-looking information to reduce litigation and reputation 
risks arising from investors‟ reliance on the prospects.   
10.4.2 Incremental Information Content of Complementary and 
Supplementary Narratives 
The subsidiary objective of the thesis was to examine the incremental information content of 
complementary and supplementary narratives.  Incremental information content is established 
by comparing results of the model combining complementary and supplementary narratives 
with the outcome of the model considering complementary and supplementary narratives 
individually.  Table 34 summarises the results for incremental information content. 
In the pre-event period, the adjusted R
2
 values were not substantially different from zero and 
the F-ratios were not significant for all models that either combined or separated 
complementary and supplementary narratives.  Therefore, no incremental information content 
was observed for either disclosure variety or disclosure depth models.  Prior to the 
announcement of financial reports, the information there in is hardly pre-empted (Cools and 
Mirjam Van Praag 2007; Opong 1995).   
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Table 34 Summary for Incremental Information Content Results 
Models 
Adjusted R
2
 Range 
Presence of 
Incremental 
Information Content 
Complementary 
Narratives 
Models 
( A ) 
 
Supplementary 
Narratives Models 
( B ) 
 Models 
Combining 
Complementary 
and 
Supplementary 
Narratives 
( C )  
Disclosure Variety        
Pre-event -0.011 to 0.010   -0.003 to 0.013  -0.004 to 0.010 Not  present 
Post-event 0.252 to 0.390*   0.267 to 0.397  0.273 to 0.398 
Present  for both 
complementary 
and 
supplementary 
narratives  when 
A is compared 
with C but present 
for only 
supplementary 
narratives when B 
is compared with 
C 
Disclosure Depth        
Pre-event -0.002 to 0.008   0.009 to 0.014  -0.005 to 0.013 Not Present 
Post-event 0.312 to 0.439*   0.265 to 0.389*  0.353 to 0.460 
Present for 
complementary 
and 
supplementary 
disclosures for all 
comparison 
Note: A = Models having complementary narratives only, B = Models having supplementary narratives only, C = 
Models having both complementary and supplementary narratives, *Range has significant F-statistics at p<0.05 
for the comparison with the model combining complementary and supplementary narratives  
 
In the post-event period, both disclosure depth and disclosure variety models that combine 
complementary and supplementary narratives have higher information content than their 
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counterpart models that consider complementary and supplementary narratives individually.  
However, the comparison is significant for all other comparisons except with the 
supplementary narratives based on disclosure variety.  Incremental information content 
models will normally have equal or higher predictive power than relative information content 
models (Biddle et al. 1995).  Statistically, models that have more variables tend to have more 
predictive power as they reduce Type II errors that arise from neglecting relevant variables 
(Tauringana 1997).   
A number of theories may explain the incremental information content observed in the models 
combining complementary and supplementary narratives.   
First, the uncertain information hypothesis by Brown et al (1988) and the overreaction 
hypothesis by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) suggest that the first instance of investor reaction to 
information is either an over or under reaction.  However, the positions are corrected as 
investors find the real effect of the information.  A combined model postulated synergy 
between complementary and supplementary narratives provides a more complete disclosure 
profile compared to considering either complementary or supplementary narratives separately.   
Secondly, the incomplete revelation hypothesis by Bloomfield (2002) suggests that 
comprehensiveness and preciseness is enhanced by the provision of quantified and non-
quantified disclosures.  Statistically based disclosures are precise and measurable, non-
quantified information provides intrinsic value by explaining factors affecting the statistics 
and/ or cannot be quantified.  Supplementary narratives concentrate on financial statement 
amounts and complementary narratives extend beyond the financial statements to other 
disclosures that have intrinsic value that may either be quantifiable or non-quantifiable.   
Additionally, combining complementary and supplementary narratives may reduce 
information costs, as investors may not have to engage resources to analysing information.  
Hart and Moore (1988) argue that it is costly and impractical to have a complete contract 
between or amongst individuals.  Therefore, under incomplete contracting theory, increased 
dimensions of disclosure provide investors with options to look at information from various 
perspectives.   
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Another observation from the adjusted R
2
 values in Table 34 is that the margin of information 
content between the model combining complementary and supplementary disclosures and 
models that consider complementary and supplementary narratives individually differs under 
disclosure variety and disclosure depth.  Under disclosure variety, margin for incremental 
information content is small, whereas under disclosure depth, the margin is substantial.  Arrow 
and Debreu (1954)  argues that complete contracting in a market place provides information 
about attributes of trade such number and specifications of commodities traded, the location, 
price and time of trade.  This type of information enhances the completeness of information 
that traders use for decision-making.  In the disclosure variety model, one attribute of 
disclosure is considered, that is, number of information items.  However, under disclosure 
depth a set of information attributes (good news, amounts and comparison of current with past 
performance, reasons for performance and forward-looking disclosures) is used to estimate 
disclosure extent.  Therefore, the numerous attributes in disclosure depth may provide more 
information that reduces information asymmetry compared to disclosure variety.  Prior studies 
(e.g. Beattie et al. 2004; Beattie and Thomson 2007; Wallace and Nasser 1995) discuss that 
disclosure extent measurement techniques taking into account various narrative attributes have 
more potential to reveal preciseness in disclosure than dichotomous techniques.   
10.4.3 Information Content of Control Variables 
For all models used to examine relative and incremental information content, the control 
variables are annual dividend yield (ADY), interim earnings per share (IES) and interim total 
assets as a measure of firm size (ITA).   
The t-statistics for all control variables were not significant almost throughout the pre-event 
period for all models.  For ADY, the result reflects the argument by Watts (1973) that past 
dividends may not help investors‟ forecast earnings.  For IES and ITA, outcome agrees with 
the suggestion that disclosures in UK interim report are not pre-empted by any prior disclosure 
(Opong 1995).   
In the post- event period, there is a positive association of ADY and returns in line with prior 
studies (e.g. Campbell and Shiller 1988; Fama and French 1988; Kothari and Shanken 1997).  
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These studies discuss that dividend yield is used to predict the firm‟s future earnings and cash 
flows.  However, studies (e.g. Fairfield and Yohn 2001; Watts and Zimmerman 1990) suggest 
that dividend yield is exposed to manipulation because of profits manipulation.   
After the announcement of interim reports, IES is the most significant variable for all models.  
The variable is positively associated with returns.  Studies (e.g. Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 
2009; Lennox and Park 2006) find information content in earnings per share (EPS).   Ball and 
Brown (1967; 1968) suggest that the EPS incorporates macroeconomic factors of the business‟ 
environment.  Opong (1996; 1997) established a relationship between EPS and dividend 
because the parameters are announced together with an aim of signalling performance to 
investors.  An increase in both EPS and dividend assures investors about performance but an 
increase in dividend with reduced EPS may indicate temporally bad performance.  Studies in 
which EPS was not relevant include Said, et al (2008) because investors seek for economic 
rather than accounting performance measures.  Collins, Li et al (2009) argued that EPS is 
vulnerable to manipulation.  Elliott and Jacobson (1991; 1994), consider that financial 
statements do not to reflect timeliness, compelling investors to use competing sources of 
information.    
The variable ITA had mixed results in the post-event period.  In some models, the variable had 
no information content and in other models, ITA was negatively associated with returns.  Lack 
of usefulness of ITA may lead to a number of conclusions.  First, asset valuation in financial 
statements may not show the true value of intangible assets and the changing business 
environment (Lev and Zarowin 1999).  Second, Amir and Lev (1996) suggest that financial 
statements information if not accompanied by high-level performance measures may make the 
disclosures less relevant.  Third, Elliott and Jacobson (1991; 1994) argue that asset values in 
financial statements are historical and cost-based, failing to reflect current value of the 
business.   
Similar to this study, Bamber (1986) found negative information content of total assets.  
Cooke (1991) argues that large firms are characterised by numerous business lines and 
geographical locations.  Disclosing on all activities may lead to obscurity yet a decision not to 
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report on all activities may be interpreted as concealment.  In addition, Grullon and Michaely 
(2004) suggest that large firms have low investment opportunities and as a result, they 
accumulate large cash reserves.  Failure to reinvest the cash obliges investors to demand the 
cash through share repurchases and dividends.  In cases of investment opportunities, for 
example acquisitions, large firms may over pay leading investors to view the new investment 
negatively (Campbell et al. 2001).  
10.4.4 Sensitivity Tests 
Two sensitivity tests were conducted to check robustness of the results (1) presence or absence 
of an audit review and (2) interim narrative reporting under a regime of either a mandatory or 
a voluntary operating and financial review.  In both cases, the results of all models were 
robust.    
10.5 Conclusion about Relative and Incremental Information 
Content  
Prior to the announcement of interim reports, the disclosures in the reports are not pre-empted 
by any form of other information medium.  Therefore, complementary and supplementary 
narratives have no association with share price returns under disclosure variety and under 
disclosure depth techniques of measuring disclosures.  This leads to the conclusion that there 
is similar relative information for complementary and supplementary narratives because 
neither complementary nor supplementary have information content.  Also concluded is that 
there is no incremental information content for complementary and supplementary narratives 
because both complementary and supplementary narratives have no association with returns.   
After the announcement of interim report results, there are two conclusions about relative 
information content.  First, when disclosure variety is used to measure disclosure extent, 
supplementary narratives have higher relative information content than complementary 
narratives.  While supplementary information items are verifiable because they confined to 
disclosures in financial statements, complementary information items are ambiguous, and may 
be unrelated.  Therefore, if mere presence of information items is used to measure disclosures, 
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supplementary narratives are more concise and reliable compared to complementary 
narratives.   
Secondly, when disclosure depth is used to measure disclosure extent, complementary 
narratives have higher relative information content than supplementary narratives.  The 
multiplicity of disclosure attributes and regard to repetitions under the disclosure depth 
technique for measuring disclosures uncovers the comprehensiveness in disclosures through 
various qualities of information.  Therefore, ambiguity or vagueness is reduced compared for 
both complementary and supplementary narratives, compared to disclosure variety 
measurement technique.  The higher relative information content in complementary narratives, 
compared to supplementary narratives is explained by the intrinsic value in complementary 
narratives.  While complementary narratives disclose on diverse aspects of the organization, 
quantifiable and non-quantifiable, supplementary narratives are mostly a replication of 
financial statements in an oratory manner. 
The disclosure depth attributes attributions responsible for the higher relative information 
content in complementary narratives are good news, comparison of current with past 
performance and reasons for performance.  In both complementary and supplementary 
narratives, forward-looking disclosures were not relevant to returns.  The past good 
performance of the firms in the sample was a better assurance than forward-looking 
information about the viability of the securities.  About three quarters of the sample cases had 
positive earnings per share and all firms in the sample sustained their listing status as part of 
the FTSE350 throughout the period of study (2005 to 2007).  Secondly, probably because of 
litigation and reputation risks, the forward-looking disclosures were the least disclosed 
attribute.  To reflect this argument, in a number of interim reports, narratives were 
accompanied with a caveat about their usage for investment decisions.  
In the post-event period, both complementary and supplementary narratives have incremental 
information content.  The combination of complementary and supplementary narratives 
provides investors with more comprehensive and synergized information for investment 
decision-making.   The model with the best predictive power was the disclosure depth model 
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combining complementary and supplementary narratives.  The model had the most number of 
disclosure attributes compared to other disclosure depth and disclosure variety information 
content models.  The multiplicity of complementary and supplementary narrative attributes in 
the model shows better preciseness of information in narratives compared to other models 
used in the study. 
Summarily, the post-event results of relative and incremental information content when 
disclosure variety is used to measure complementary and supplementary narratives compared 
to those of disclosure depth reflect that information asymmetry is lower for disclosure depth.  
This is may be explained by the fact that more attributes within the disclosures are more 
informative to investors.  With reference to relative information content, the superiority of 
complementary narratives show that such information discloses more about the performance 
of the business, beyond the financial statement figures.  Still this reflects that information 
asymmetry is lessened when complementary narratives are provided as supplementary 
narratives is mostly a narratory re-write of the financial statements, yet investors in FTSE350 
firms are arguably sophisticated to analyse the statements. More still, these same investors, 
who are mainly institutional or analysts, are in close contact with investor and get briefings 
about financial performance that is mostly represented in supplementary narratives.  The 
incremental information for both complementary and supplementary narratives under 
disclosure depth also shows that information asymmetry arising from agency is reduced by 
providing both types of disclosures.  These finding are contrary to EMH in the semi-strong 
form that publically available information, such as complementary and supplementary 
narratives in interim reports, is spontaneously and accurately reflected in share prices, and so 
cannot yield above market returns.  Rather, the findings concur that the agency relationship is 
the root cause of information asymmetry and financial disclosure, such as complementary and 
supplementary narratives, are relevant for investment-decision making. 
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10.6 Research Implications 
For market-based accounting, this study has three implications.   
First, this thesis was motivated by concerns raised about disclosure proliferation in financial 
reports and the likely negative effect on the usefulness of the information.  To examine the 
claim about the effect of proliferation on usefulness of narratives, reference is made to the 
discussion in ASB (2005; 2006) that extent of narratives ought to be directly proportional to 
firm size and complexity.  In other words, as a business increases its size, more disclosures are 
expected.  To reflect these arguments, all information content models have total assets (ITA) 
as a control variable for firm size.  Secondly, the information content models based on 
disclosure depth, the variables for disclosure extent are all measured with regard to repetitions, 
to capture disclosure volume.  In the results, where ITA was associated with returns, the 
association was negative.  In models and event days where ITA was associated with returns, 
complementary attributes of good news (CGD) and complementary attribute of reasons for 
performance (CRE) were also significantly associated with returns.  The result suggests that 
investors inversely react to firm size.  Furthermore, as extent of CGD   and volume of CRE 
increase, investors react negatively.  The reason attributed to the result for CGD and CRE was 
that management are likely to misuse the unrestricted, less verifiable and diverse nature of 
complementary narratives to foster impression management techniques through CGD and 
CRE.  However, investors consider the disclosures unreliable and suspicious.  In relation to 
the comment in ASB (2005; 2006), there is a likelihood that large firms disclose more volume 
of narratives than small firms do.  The assumption that large firms use CGD and CRE for 
impression management may be supported in the argument by Beattie et al (2008) that 
financial reports have become more of public relation other than financial reporting tools.  In 
addition, large firms may be motivated to adopt the impression management strategy by 
audience for the financial reports resulting from the high analyst and institutional investor 
following.  However, analysts and institutional investors have the skills to rightfully price the 
information (Bercel 1994; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Orens and Lybaert 2007).  The 
implication of the findings in this study is the evidence that voluminous disclosures may 
reflect impression management tendencies to which investors react adversely. 
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Secondly, results of relative and incremental information content of complementary and 
supplementary narratives in this study provide the first evidence of the relevance of the 
narrative types for share pricing.  In addition, the findings about usefulness of the disclosure 
attributes (number of information items, good news, amounts and comparison of current with 
past performance, reasons for performance and forward-looking disclosures) in 
complementary and supplementary narratives may be relevant to investors.  These findings 
may guide policymakers, the finance and accounting professionals and business managers on 
the information that investors require.  The subject of complementing and supplementing in 
financial reports‟ narratives is topical and this study provides the vital evidence on investors‟ 
reaction to complementary and supplementary narratives.  The concept of complementing and 
supplementing in narratives was introduced in the UK reporting environment by ASB (2005; 
2006) for the operating and financial review.  Elsewhere, complementing and supplementing 
has been recommended for the business review and the management commentary by FRC 
(2009) and IASB (2009).   
Third, as Wagner (2010) blamed the subprime financial crisis to information asymmetry and 
laxity in regulation in the market place, the results of this thesis have a topical contribution 
since information asymmetry was largely used to explain information content results.  In 
addition, as the study used a theoretical framework that advocates for the joint application of 
the markets for capital, information and capital, the findings of the study may be crucial in 
addressing the causes of the crisis.  Schwarcz (2008) narrated that the crisis was initiated when 
lenders provided loans to risky borrowers characterised by no jobs, no income and the 
collateral was only the houses that the lenders attached the mortgages.  This model was a 
reflection of government incentive in the US to allow home ownership to the low-income 
groups, therefore, regulation regarding credit risks were relaxed.  The stagnation and/or 
decline in house prices meant that borrowers who relied on refinancing for loan repayments 
could not afford to pay their commitments, hence the start of defaults.  The defaulting pattern 
extended to the financial institutions that used mortgage-backed securities, leading to their 
credit rating down grading and loss of investor confidence and a fall in both debt and equity 
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securities.  Escalating this was the US government refusal to bailout Lehman Brothers, leading 
to its bankruptcy and further mistrust in the markets.  
Schwarcz (2008) summarises that the crises could have been partly avoided by addressing two 
problems, that is, the failure to disclose and the difficulty of the market participants to 
understand the financial condition of their counterparts.  These two issues offer their origin to 
information asymmetry that arises from agency as argued by Wagner (2010).  Hence, the 
disclosure problem could be addressed by the provision of more and better disclosures while 
the difficulty to understand counterparty risk may be addressed by providing information 
within the disclosures that can be used to assess counterparty risk.  These solutions arguably 
are reflected in the discussions justifying information content of complementary and 
supplementary disclosures in chapter 9.  For example, complementary disclosures in financial 
reports may concentrate on the risk characteristics of counterparties such as average incomes 
of the borrowers, average credit rating of the borrowers as well as the types of collateral and 
loans and respective exposure levels.  On other hand, supplementary narratives may 
concentrate on the level of contingent liabilities or assets, trend patterns thereof and 
explanations.  Further, the various attributes within the respective complementary and 
supplementary narratives (such as, information items, goodness of the disclosures, amounts 
and comparisons of current with past performance, reasons for performance and forward-
looking disclosures) would provide a precise discussion about the risks of the counterparties. 
In the research environment, the study has two main implications.   
Firstly, the studies pioneering research about complementing and supplementing in narratives 
were by Tauringana and Mangena (2006; 2007), concerning disclosure extent.   This thesis is 
the first to answer the call by Tauringana and Mangena (2006; 2007) with regard to examining 
usefulness of complementary and supplementary narratives.  The findings may be relevant to 
future finance and accounting research concerning complementary and supplementary 
narratives in financial reports.  
Secondly, disclosure literature (e.g.,  Beattie et al. 2004; Beattie and Thomson 2007) 
recommend that disclosure extent measurement through content analysis ought to be in-depth, 
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considering repetitions, and where possible manual.  This helps to capture the context of 
disclosures and quality attributes such as disclosure variety and depth.  This study adopted the 
recommendations and the outcome was crucial to identifying the useful attributes of 
disclosures and the justifications for the relative and incremental information content of 
complementary and supplementary narratives.  The evidence in the thesis may provide useful 
insights relevant to the direction of future disclosure extent and narrative information content 
research.   
10.7 Limitation of the Research 
There are a number of limitations to the study. 
This research is mainly quantitative based with little regard to qualitative research methods.  
The bias therefore leads to a number of limitations.  
First, the study did not seek from investors, analysts or business managers about their thoughts 
on useful complementary and supplementary information.  The complementary and 
supplementary attributes thereof used to examine usefulness of narratives is only limited to 
those found in interim reports and prior academic research of disclosure extent, perceived 
usefulness and information content.  Therefore, the attributes used in this study may not 
represent the comprehensiveness in complementary and supplementary disclosures.  In 
addition, the justifications of findings in the study concerning usefulness of complementary 
and supplementary literature are based on suggestions in past theoretical and empirical 
research. 
Secondly, the thesis depended on share price returns alone to establish the relevance of 
complementary and supplementary narratives.  Share prices may as well have been influenced 
by other factors.  
Third, the study estimated disclosure extent based on quantitative scores.  This assumes that 
disclosure extent or quality is statistically measurable which may not always be the case.   
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Fourth, also related to disclosure measurement, measures attached to the disclosures are based 
on the researcher‟s decision rules, guided by prior theoretical and empirical literature.  
Therefore, the importance attached to the information items and attributes may not reflect the 
importance investors attach to the disclosures.   
Fifth, quantitative scores used cannot capture all the precision in an information item.  For 
example, one company may justify its expansion in the UK by its market-seeking strategy.  
Another company may justify its expansion in the same country due to flexible labour 
legislation.  In either case, a score of one would be awarded for the attribute of reasons for 
performance.  However, such a score disregard that the same investment decisions is driven by 
different motives that could differently affect investor‟s decision.  As another illustration, 
suppose a company disclosed that in Europe it had 200 employees and in Asia, it had 100 
employees.  For either scenario, a score of one was awarded for the attribute amount, not 
taking into consideration that there is a difference between 200 and 100.  These examples 
demonstrate that the techniques used may not reveal the quality and precision in 
complementary and supplementary narratives.     
Other limitations arise from disregarding alternative quantitative-based research techniques 
that are available to estimate information content of narratives or have ability to check the 
robustness of results but were not used.   
Regarding the dependent variable, used only daily market adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns to measure the value that investors attach disclosures.  Other alternatives may include 
hourly, monthly or annual returns.  Apart from share price returns, information content may 
also be estimated by risk, trading volume.  Related to the limitation that the study uses only 
the market-adjusted model to estimate abnormal returns, the technique considers that beta is 
unitary for all firms, which may not always be the case.  Firms have various characteristics 
and performance levels and may be perceived by investors differently, hence leading to 
variability in their beta estimates (David 2001).  For measurement of abnormal returns, 
alternatives could include the Market Model, Capital Asset Pricing Model, Arbitrage Pricing 
Model and other multifactor models to address variability in beta.  The study also did not 
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adjust the beta estimates for thin trading.  As discussed under chapter 8, although daily returns 
are in certain instances criticised for thin trading (e.g. Scholes and Williams 1977), other 
studies, for example, Jain (1986) find the influence of thin trading on distribution of abnormal 
returns being minimal. 
For the independent variables, although a number of disclosure attributes are considered for 
complementary and supplementary narratives, the study does not consider that the attributes 
used represent a comprehensive estimation for narratives.  In measuring disclosure extent, the 
list of attributes representing information quality is inexhaustible (Beattie et al. 2004; Beattie 
and Thomson 2007; Wallace and Nasser 1995).  
For the control variables, a number of predictors of returns have not been considered in the 
study.  These may include financial performance measures such as turnover, cash flows, 
liquidity ratios and investment ratios.   
In addition, this thesis recognises that although some sensitivity tests were conducted, there is 
a multitude of factors that may influence either narrative disclosure extent or share price 
returns. However, their effect on the results of the study was not examined.  Such include 
status of the economy (depression or boom), industry classification, investibility weight and 
presence of secondary lines of shares.  Others are analyst following, number of geographical 
and product line segments, and auditor type, interim reporting frequency and calendar effects. 
 In the results and analysis chapter, the diagnostics show that the dependent variables and a 
number of independent variables violate the normality assumption of parametric tests.  
Although, linear multiple regression analysis was justified as the best technique to enhance 
robustness of the study, the robustness of results may be compromised if judged on only one 
type of test.  More diagnostic tests to assure reliability of the results could have been 
conducted, which may include various means of transforming or estimating variables, 
increasing the sample size and comparison of both parametric and non-parametric test results. 
Relating to recent events, that is, the financial crisis of 2007, the sample of the study did not 
include financial services firms.  Secondly, the period of study 2005 – 2007 is mostly before 
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the financial crisis.  Therefore, the findings may not reflect post-financial crisis investors‟ use 
of complementary and supplementary narratives.  The impact of the financial crisis on the 
usefulness of complementary and supplementary narratives could arguably be substantial as 
various studies (e.g. Schwarcz 2008; Wagner 2010) suggested that insufficiency in disclosures 
was the main cause of the crisis.  Further, this thesis uses the joint functioning of the markets 
for capital, information and regulation in reducing asymmetry to theorise the usefulness of the 
narrative commentaries.  However, various studies (e.g. Dam 2010; Goodhart 2008) suggest 
that the failure of the same three markets, including that for regulation that could have 
monitored the proper functioning of the markets for capital and information, is the reason for 
the subprime financial crisis.  Therefore, the results of the study could be challenged based on 
the theoretical justification since the markets failed to reduce information asymmetry arising 
from the agency between investors and the banks‟ management.  Lastly, exclusion of financial 
services firms from the sample on the ground that they are prone to more disclosures that arise 
from their regulatory bodies may lead to question the findings of the study as among the key 
issues in the financial crisis were subjected to financial services firms.  Furthermore, 
excluding these firms from the sample because of exposure to more disclosures through 
regulation arguably challenges the theoretical rationale for the market for regulation in the 
thesis, thereby underscores the efficacy of the findings with respect to the role of regulation 
and disclosures in the financial crisis.    
For most of the above limitations, the main causes were time and financial resources 
constraints.  For example, the rigour of the disclosure measurement could not permit 
substantive sample size expansion and all the limitation mentioned above would require much 
time or resources to examine.  However, reference to prior literature for most decisions 
regarding methodology for the study assures a degree of reliability.   
10.8 Further Research 
First, the limitations to the study present areas of further research.  It may be argued that for as 
long as the limitations persist, the question of relative and incremental information content of 
complementary and supplementary narratives in interim reports remains unresolved.  To make 
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the findings in this thesis relevant to the period after the financial crisis of 2007, research may 
be extended to estimate extent of disclosure, perceived usefulness and information content of 
complementary and supplementary narratives of financial reports of financial services firms.  
Keenly, this research may consider complementary and supplementary information arising 
from the financial institutions lines of business such as mortgage financing, structured trade 
finance, bonds and equities, capital asset financing and overdrafts. 
Secondly, disclosure measurement techniques applied in this thesis may be used in future 
studies concerned with disclosure extent and information content narratives in annual reports 
and other news releases.  Recent studies (e.g. Beattie et al. 2004; Beattie and Thomson 2007) 
suggest that disclosure variety and depth ought to be considered to capture attributes in 
disclosures.  In addition, repetitions under disclosure depth capture volume and manual 
content analysis reveals the context of disclosure.  However, most disclosure extent and 
information content research in the past have ignored the efficacy of disclosure variety and 
disclosure depth (Beattie et al. 2004).  The evidence that this study measured disclosures by 
disclosure depth and variety through a manual content analysis that recognised repetitions for 
309 interim reports shows the viability of the technique.     
This study can be replicated for other UK indices, other countries and to the financial services 
sector to examine consistence regarding the relative and incremental information content of 
complementary and supplementary information.  In addition, the study can be replicated using 
various measures returns and/or measuring disclosures.  For example, in the presence of non-
normality of returns on FTSE indices, Hamill et al (2002) recommend a combination of 
techniques for robustness of return estimation.  In their study, they advise use of bootstrapping 
of the market model and Corrado‟s (1989) rank test in computation of mean abnormal returns 
and the ZD test in Coutts et al. (1995) for cumulative abnormal returns.  
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Appendix 1. Sample Size Guide: Expected Effect and Number of Predictors - 
Cohen (1988) 
 
Source: Field (2009, p223) 
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Appendix 2. Sample Size Table by Sekaran (2000) 
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Appendix 3. Sample Constituents, Interim Report and Event Dates 
List of Companies, IC Codes, FTSE100 and FTSE250 Membership, Interim Report Date and 
Interim Report Announcement Date 
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Appendix 3: List of Companies, IC Codes, FTSE100 and FTSE250 Membership, Interim 
Report Date and Interim Report Announcement Date Continued 
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Panel C. Sample Summary Characteristics 
Number of Firms by ICB Membership 
Industry Number 
of 
Firms 
0001: Oil and Gas 5 
1000: Basic Materials 5 
2000: Industrials 29 
3000: Consumer Goods 17 
4000: Health Care 3 
5000: Consumer Services 34 
6000: Telecommunications 1 
7000: Utilities 4 
8000: Financials 0 
9000: Technology 5 
Total 103 
Number of Firms by Membership to FTSE100 and FTSE250 
 2005 2006 2007 
FTSE100 37 37 37 
FTSE250 66 66 66 
Total 103 103 103 
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Appendix 4. LSE Non-Trading Days in England and Wales in 2005 - 2008 
Bank Holiday Date 
Year 2005  
New Year's Day  Monday, January 03, 2005 
Good Friday Friday, March 25, 2005 
Easter Monday Monday, March 28, 2005 
Early May Bank Holiday Monday, May 02, 2005 
Spring Bank Holiday Monday, May 30, 2005 
Summer Bank Holiday Monday, August 29, 2005 
Christmas Day Tuesday, December 27, 2005 
Boxing Day Monday, December 26, 2005 
Year 2006  
New Year's Day  Monday, January 02, 2006 
Good Friday Friday, April 14, 2006 
Easter Monday Monday, April 17, 2006 
Early May Bank Holiday Monday, May 01, 2006 
Spring Bank Holiday Monday, May 29, 2006 
Summer Bank Holiday Monday, August 28, 2006 
Christmas Day Monday, December 25, 2006 
Boxing Day Tuesday, December 26, 2006 
Year 2007  
New Year's Day Monday, January 01, 2007 
Good Friday Friday, April 06, 2007 
Easter Monday Monday, April 09, 2007 
Early May Bank Holiday Monday, May 07, 2007 
Spring Bank Holiday Monday, May 28, 2007 
Summer Bank Holiday Monday, August 27, 2007 
Christmas Day Tuesday, December 25, 2007 
Boxing Day Wednesday, December 26, 2007 
Year 2008  
New Year's Day Tuesday, January 01, 2008 
Good Friday Friday, March 21, 2008 
Easter Monday Monday, March 24, 2008 
Early May Bank Holiday Monday, May 05, 2008 
Spring Bank Holiday Monday, May 26, 2008 
Summer Bank Holiday Monday, August 25, 2008 
Christmas Day Thursday, December 25, 2008 
Boxing Day Friday, December 26, 2008 
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Appendix 5. The Disclosure Indices  
Supplementary information items 
 (Attributes for all information items are: presence, amount, comparison with past, reason for 
change or performance and future trend – increase or decrease)  
Financial statements information 
Income statement items 
  SUP1 Revenue from continuing operations 
  SUP2 Cost of sales from continuing operations 
  SUP3 Gross profit from continuing operations 
  SUP4 Other Income, e.g. profit from sale of plant and equipment 
  SUP5 Operating costs - administrative and selling 
  SUP6 Other Expense - e.g. loss from sale of plant and equipment 
  SUP7 Finance income 
  SUP8 Finance costs 
  SUP9 Taxation 
  SUP10 Profit from continuing operations 
  SUP11 Profit from discontinued operations 
  SUP12 Attribution of profit to equity holders of the parent 
  SUP13 Attribution of profit to minority interest 
  SUP14 Earnings per share - basic and diluted 
  SUP15 Dividend per share 
Statement of Changes in Equity 
  SUP16 Income recognised directly in equity, e.g. foreign currency translations, 
goodwill amortisation, fair value gains and losses on tangible assets and 
financial instruments, etc 
  SUP17 Loss recognised directly in equity, e.g. foreign currency translations, 
goodwill amortisation, fair value gains and losses on tangible assets and 
financial instruments, etc 
  SUP18 Transactions with owners: share issues and redemptions, dividends and the 
purchase of treasury shares 
Balance sheet items 
  SUP19 Property, plant and equipment 
  SUP20 Investment property 
  SUP21 Investments in joint ventures and associates 
  SUP22 Deferred tax assets 
  SUP23 Intangible assets, e.g. goodwill 
  SUP24 Non-current financial assets, e.g. derivatives 
  SUP25 Inventories 
  SUP26 Current financial assets, e.g. derivatives 
  SUP27 Trade and other receivables 
  SUP28 Current tax assets 
  SUP29 Cash and cash equivalents 
  SUP30 Current financial liabilities, e.g. overdraft and derivatives 
  SUP31 Trade and other payables 
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  SUP32 Current tax liabilities 
  SUP33 Non-current financial liabilities, e.g. derivatives, mortgages, vehicle 
financing 
  SUP34 Retirement benefit obligations, e.g. pensions 
  SUP35 Deferred tax liabilities 
 SUP36 Provisions 
  SUP37 Minority interest in equity 
 SUP38 Issued capital 
  SUP39 Share premium 
  SUP40 Other reserves 
  SUP41 Profit and loss 
Cash flow Statement: 
  SUP42 Cash flow from operating activities 
  SUP43 Cash flow from investment activities 
  SUP44 Cash flow from financing activities 
High level operational and performance measures: 
  SUP45 Profitability ratios, e.g. gross profit margin, operating margin and ROCE 
  SUP46 Efficiency and effectiveness ratios, e.g. debtor days, creditor days and 
inventory days 
  SUP47 Cash flow ratios, e.g. cash flow from operations to net income, cash flow 
ratio and cash flow from sales revenue to sales revenue 
  SUP48 Leverage ratios, e.g. debt to equity ratio and interest coverage  
  SUP49 Liquidity ratios, e.g. quick ratio and current ratio 
  SUP50 Investment related ratios, e.g. earnings per share, dividend payout ratio 
 
  
 IX 
 
 Complementary information items 
(Attributes are presented in the parenthesis adjacent to each information item or topic if there 
is no difference within the items of the topic)  
Financial related disclosures: (presence, amount, comparison with past, reason for change or 
performance and future trend – increase or decrease) 
Financial performance measures not in financial statements 
COM1 A description of financing arrangements that are either on or off the balance sheet: 
e.g. overdrafts, mortgages, collaterised, non-collaterised, fixed interest, floating 
interests  
COM2 An account of the management of transactions that are likely to cause financial loss:  
e.g. derivatives, hedging, credit, debtors, transactions with special purpose vehicles 
or affiliates  
COM3 A discussion of external economic monetary, fiscal measures and policies that 
directly affect financial transactions of the business: e.g. interest rates, inflation, 
foreign exchange, tax rates, licensing fees, embargoes, trade and tax economic 
blocks, double tax arrangements, etc 
COM4 Analysis of financial performance using financial ratios that are not fully based on 
financial statements: e.g. book-to-market ratio, market capitalisation  
Segment information 
COM5 A discussion of revenue/ sales by geographical locations of the business  
COM6 A narrative account for profitability by geographical locations of the business  
COM7 A description of corporate capital resources: e.g. human capital, fixed assets, 
working capital and business relations by geographical locations of the business  
COM8 A commentary on revenue/ sales by product and/or activity of the business  
COM9 Discussion of profitability by products and/or activity of the business  
COM10 Analysis of company resources: e.g. human capital, fixed assets, working capital 
and business relations according to product lines or activity of the business  
High level operational data and performance measures used internally by management: 
(presence, amount, comparison with past, reason for change or performance and future trend – 
increase or decrease) 
COM11 Analysis of revenue statistics: e.g. units, prices, products and services 
COM12 Analysis of direct cost parameters: e.g. units produced, prices of material 
COM13 Identification of indirect costs: e.g. number of employees, energy consumption, 
equipment maintenance costs 
COM14 A review on performance of nature-provided intangible resources such as time 
management, weather 
COM15 A narrative discussion of structural capital performance for considered both 
intangible and tangible: e.g. business structures performance, productivity and 
availability of financial, physical and all intangible assets 
COM16 Explanation of human capital performance: e.g. productivity, teamwork, training, 
promotions, turnover levels, attraction of best employees, management performance 
COM17 Discussion of value relevance of relational capital: e.g. measures of effectiveness for 
relations with suppliers, customers, competition, government, trade unions, physical 
environment, business partners, society 
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COM18 An analysis of connectivity capital performance: the extent to which all capital and 
resources are synergised to achieve corporate objectives: e.g. employees and the 
environment, health and safety of the tangible structures 
COM19 A discussion on quality management measures, responsibilities and performance: 
e.g. tasks, performance monitoring, achievements 
COM20 An analysis of achievement for other Key Performance Indicators not mentioned 
above: e.g. overall performance against budget estimates 
Opportunities and risks, including those from key trends: (Opportunities, risks,  amount, 
comparison with past, reason for change or performance and future trend – increase or 
decrease) 
COM21 Discussion of business performance related opportunities and risks based on nature 
of business and/ or uncontrollable: e.g. known key trends, cyclic and seasonality 
effects, climate, etc 
COM22 Explanation of macroeconomic structural related risks and opportunities: e.g. 
changes in technology, national infrastructure such as road network, sea ports 
COM23 Explanation of microeconomic structural related risks and opportunities: e.g. 
changes in technology, internal systems and infrastructure such as machinery, plant, 
licences, brands 
COM24 Discussion of economy-wide human capital risks and opportunities: e.g. 
demographics, national insurance, culture and values, minimum pay, working hours 
and or days 
COM25 An account for microeconomic human capital related risks and opportunities: e.g. 
staff training quality, experience, innovative capacity, motivation 
COM26 Discussion of macroeconomic relational capital risks and opportunities: e.g. 
relationships with trade unions, business partners, competition, government, 
political relations, licensing authorities and communities 
COM27 An explanation of company specific relational capital risks and opportunities: e.g. 
intracompany and intercompany cohesion, management and employee cohesion 
Objectives, strategies and management plans, including critical success factors: (short term, long 
term, amount, comparison with past, reason for change or performance and future trend – 
increase or decrease) 
COM28 Explanation of company objectives and strategies: e.g. penetration into new 
markets, financing structures, etc 
COM29 A discussion on the consistency of objectives and strategies with company vision 
COM30 Consistency of objectives and strategies with business key trends in the micro- and 
macro-economic business environment 
COM31 Management plans and activities to meet broad objectives and strategy: e.g. policy 
and investment in research and development 
COM32 Identification of factors within company necessary to meet the objectives and 
strategies: e.g. assets, people 
COM33 Discussion of factors outside company necessary to meet the objectives and 
strategy: e.g. transport network, weather conditions, etc 
Management and shareholders information 
Identities – Directors and management 
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COM34 Identification of directors and discussion of their backgrounds: i.e. names, 
qualifications, experience: (presence/ names, experience,  professional or academic 
training, recognitions/ convictions, type of directorship – executive/ non executive / 
responsibilities) 
COM35 Identification of key executive management and discussion of their back grounds: 
i.e. names, qualifications, experience: (presence/ names, experience,  professional 
or academic training, recognitions/ convictions, type of directorship – executive/ 
non executive / responsibilities) 
Identities – Shareholders 
COM36 Discussion of shareholding characteristics and/or identities, e.g. names of major 
shareholders, structures and/ or policies for directors' or employees' shareholding 
schemes, shares owned by directors or employees: (major shareholders, director 
shareholders, executive management shareholders, employee shareholding, 
arrangements likely to result into corporate control) 
Corporate control management  
COM37 An analysis of directors' remuneration  (presence, amount, comparison with past, 
reason for change or performance and future trend – increase or decrease) 
COM38 An analysis of executive remuneration: e.g. senior management who may not be 
directors:  (presence, amount, comparison with past, reason for change or 
performance and future trend – increase or decrease) 
COM39 Discussion of related party transactions: e.g. shareholders, directors, suppliers, 
customers, intercompany transactions: (presence, amount, comparison with past, 
reason for change or performance and future trend – increase or decrease) 
COM40 Discussion of any disagreements with directors, independent auditors, bankers, 
corporate secretaries, lawyers, etc:  (presence, amount, comparison with past, 
reason for change or performance and future trend – increase or decrease) 
Board of directors' characteristics  
COM41 Board of directors' characteristics: e.g. committees, independence, internal controls 
and communication with shareholders: (Committees and their functions, 
involvement – number of meetings and/or attendance, independence – disclosure on 
non-executive and executive directors, internal controls,  Communication of present 
results with investors) 
Scope and description of the business and reporting characteristics 
Description of the business and its internal environment 
COM42 A narrative of the company and its internal environment, e.g. its history, 
achievements such as quality assurance certifications like ISO certifications, 
development of the business, corporate vision,  etc: (Historic narration and/ or past 
performance,  General Business Development,  Activities, Locations and Products, 
Company Philosophy or vision Resources: structural, people and relations) 
Description of the business external environment 
COM43 A description of the business' external environment, e.g. key resource providers and 
business partners, market of operation, national and international relations: (Industry 
-  market share, market growth, seasonality, Key resource relations - suppliers, 
customers, trade unions, etc, Government and Regulation, Past effects of external 
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environment, Future effects of external environment) 
Business reporting characteristics 
COM44 A disclosure of the business reporting characteristics or practices: e.g. the current 
period of reporting, any changes in annual or interim reporting dates, basis for 
comparison like last interim against current interim or current interim against last 
full year: (Reporting entity, date and current period of reporting, Basis of 
comparisons - interim with interim or interim with annual, Internal accounting 
policies: e.g. provisions, goodwill, Regulatory and  accounting standards used or to 
be used, Audit related disclosures: e.g. pay, appointment, internal/ external audit) 
Industrial structure information: (presence, amount, comparison with past, reason for change or 
performance and future trend – increase or decrease) 
COM45 An analysis of the industry innovations and their impact on business, e.g. new 
products, new players, new logistics and technology 
COM46 A discussion of bargaining power of resource providers 
COM47 A discussion of the bargaining power of customers, e.g. types of customers and 
market size 
COM48 A review on the intensity of competition, e.g. names and types of competitors, 
rivalry intensity - price and customer service wars, positioning of the business with 
competition, market penetration, ratio of major industry biddings won/lost 
Other disclosures: 
Corporate Social Responsibility  and Research and Development 
COM49 A discussion of corporate social responsibility: e.g. human resources, products, 
consumers, services, business community, local community, environment, energy 
resources:  (Note of thanks to non-shareholding stakeholders, Policy, Comparison 
with Past, Cost and/or Benefit analysis, Future trend - increase or decrease) 
Investor Relations 
COM50 Explanation of the investor relations activities that the business engages in: e.g. 
communication with investors, commitment of the company to investors, etc: (Note 
of thanks to shareholders, Past activities on investor relations, Policy on Investor 
Relations or Corporate commitment to shareholders, Modes of communication with 
shareholders: e.g. investor briefings and internet, Future investor relation 
activities)  
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Appendix 6. Characteristics of disclosure measurement scales 
Type of 
Scale 
Characteristics present 
Exhaustive 
and 
mutually 
exclusive 
Ranking 
Equal 
Intervals 
Absolute 
Zero 
Data Type 
Addition 
and 
Subtraction 
Multiplication 
and division 
Average 
Nominal     
Non-
parametric 
   
Ordinal     
Non-
parametric 
  Mode 
Interval     Parametric   Median 
Ratio     Parametric   Mean 
Source: Jones and Alabaster (1999) 
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Appendix 7. Scoring Technique 
Panel A. Coding of Narratives: Davis Group Interim Report 2006 
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Appendix 7 Panel A: Coding of Narratives: Davis Group Interim Report 2006 Continued 
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Appendix 7 Panel A: Coding of Narratives: Davis Group Interim Report 2006 Continued 
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Panel B. Scoring of Narrative Disclosures:  Davis Group Interim Report 2006 
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Appendix 7 Panel B:  Scoring of Narrative Disclosures:  Davis Group Interim Report 2006 
Continued 
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Panel C. Tallying of Narrative Scores: Davis Group Interim Report 2006 
Part A: Complementary Information 
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Appendix 7 Panel C Part A: Tallying of Narrative Scores (Complementary Information Items): 
Davis Group Interim Report 2006  
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Part B: Supplementary Information 
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Panel D. Tallies of Good News “+” / Bad News “-”: Davis Group Interim Report 2006 
  
 XXIII 
 
Appendix 8. Scores for Narrative Disclosure Attributes 
Panel A. Interim Reports for the Year 2005 
  
 XXIV 
 
Appendix 8  Panel A: Interim Reports for the Year 2005 Continued 
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Panel B. Interim Reports for the Year 2006 
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Appendix 8 Panel B: Interim Reports for the Year 2006 Continued 
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Panel C. Interim Reports for the Year 2007 
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Appendix 8 Panel C: Interim reports for the Year 2007 Continued 
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Appendix 9. Scores for Disclosure Items with Repetitions: Good or Bad News 
Panel A. Scores for Interim Reports for the Years 2005, 2006 and 2007 
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Appendix 9 Panel A Scores for Interim Reports for the Years 2005, 2006 and 2007 Continued 
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Panel B. Summary Descriptive Statistics for Scores for Information Items with 
Repetitions and Classified as Good and Bad News 
 Notes 2005 2006 2007 Pooled 
      
Number of Sample Cases A 103 103 103 309 
      
Total Complementary Good News in 
Sample 
B 120,133 136,670 141,113 397,916 
Total Complementary Bad News in 
Sample 
C 14,824 14,353 17,181 46,358 
Total Complementary Information Items  D = B+C 134,957 151,023 158,294 444,274 
      
Total Supplementary Good News in 
Sample 
E 6,752 7,586 8,234 22,572 
Total Supplementary Bad News in Sample F 3,353 3,250 3,989 10,592 
Total Supplementary Information Items  G = E + F 10,105 10,836 12,223 33,164 
      
Average Complementary Good News 
Items  
B÷A 1,166.3
4 
1,326.8
9 
1,370.0
3 
1,287.7
5 
Average Complementary Bad News Items C÷A 143.92 139.35 166.81 150.03 
Average Total Complementary Items D÷A 1,310.2
6 
1,466.2
4 
1,536.8
3 
1,437.7
8 
      
Average Supplementary Good News Items E÷A 65.55 73.65 79.94 73.05 
Average Supplementary Bad News Items F÷A 32.55 31.55 38.73 34.28 
Average Total Supplementary Items G÷A 98.11 105.20 118.67 107.33 
      
% Good News in Complementary  (B÷D) 89.02% 90.50% 89.15% 89.57% 
%  Good News in Supplementary (E÷G) 66.82% 70.01% 67.36% 68.06% 
%  Good News to Total Information Items [(B+E)÷(D+G
)] 
87.47% 89.12% 87.58% 88.07% 
%  Complementary to Total Information 
Items 
D÷(D+G) 93.03% 93.31% 92.83% 93.05% 
%  Supplementary to Total Information 
Items 
G÷(D+G) 6.97% 6.69% 7.17% 6.95% 
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Appendix 10. Krippendorff’s Alpha Reliability Test Computation Process 
Source: Krippendorff (2007, p. 2) 
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Appendix 11. Reliability Test Results for Scoring Technique 
Panel A. Inter-coder Scoring  for Variables 
 Millennium & 
Copthorne 2006 
Barratt Development 
2005 
Kesa Electricals 2006 
 MC2006A MC2006B BR2005A BR2005A KE2006A KE2006B 
CIIR 1238.00  1258.00  1057.00  1046.00  1843.00  1751.00  
CGD 1155.00  1208.00  965.00  973.00  1764.00  1628.00  
CII 39.00  41.00  38.00  32.00  44.00  32.00  
CAC 645.00  686.00  456.00  415.00  772.00  712.00  
CRE 555.00  535.00  436.00  401.00  755.00  675.00  
CFW 162.00  166.00  179.00  180.00  466.00  454.00  
SIIR 68.00  70.00  33.00  35.00  83.00  80.00  
SGD 62.00  62.00  28.00  29.00  58.00  57.00  
SII 14.00  15.00  14.00  13.00  23.00  21.00  
SAC 80.00  81.00  43.00  39.00  66.00  69.00  
SRE 21.00  19.00  17.00  16.00  36.00  27.00  
SFW 6.00  6.00  12.00  10.00  7.00  7.00  
Definition of Terms: 
CIIR: Sum for number of Complementary Information Items scored, repetitions accounted for  
CGD: Sum for number of Complementary Good News Information Items scored, repetitions 
accounted for 
CII: Sum for number of Complementary Information Items scored, repetitions not accounted 
for 
CAC: Sum for number of Complementary Amounts and Comparisons of Current and With Past 
Performance attributes scored, repetitions accounted for 
CRE: Sum for number of Complementary Reasons for Performance attributes scored, 
repetitions accounted for 
CFW:  Sum for number of Complementary Forward-looking attributes scored, repetitions 
accounted for 
SIIR:  Sum for number of Supplementary Information Items scored, repetitions accounted for  
SGD: Sum for number of Supplementary Good News Information Items scored, repetitions 
accounted for 
SII: Sum for number of Supplementary Information Items scored, repetitions not accounted 
for 
SAC: Sum for number of Supplementary Amounts and Comparisons of Current and With Past 
Performance attributes scored, repetitions accounted for 
 XXXIV 
 
SRE: Sum for number of Supplementary Reasons for Performance attributes scored, 
repetitions accounted for 
SFW:  Sum for number of Supplementary Forward-looking attributes scored, repetitions 
accounted for 
MC2006A/ B: First/ second coder for Millennium Copthorne Interim Report, 2006  
BR2005A/ B:  First/ second coder for Barratt Development Interim Report, 2006  
BR2005A/ B:  First/ second coder for Barratt Development Interim Report, 2006  
KE2006A/ B:  First/ second coder for Kesa Electricals Interim Report, 2006  
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Panel B. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Scoring Reliability Test: Millennium 
and Copthorne Interim Report 2006 
 
Panel C. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Scoring Reliability Test: Barratt 
Developments Interim  Report 2005 
 
Panel D. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Scoring Reliability Test: Kesa 
Electricals Interim Report  2006 
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Appendix 12. Reliability Test Results for Tallying Technique 
Panel A. Inter-coder Tallying Values  for Variables 
 Arriva 2007 Berkeley 2007 
GlaxoSmithKline 
2006 
Findel 2007 
 AR2007A AR2007B BK2007A BK2007B GS2006A GS2006B FD2007A FD2007B 
CIIR 1625.00 1618.00 1847.00 2130.00 2435.00 1873.00 1927.00 1959.00 
CAC 1031.00 975.00 899.00 898.00 884.00 623.00 799.00 836.00 
CRE 666.00 670.00 785.00 789.00 1236.00 786.00 989.00 1023.00 
CFW 658.00 679.00 582.00 614.00 405.00 297.00 682.00 738.00 
SIIR 89.00 88.00 125.00 129.00 79.00 69.00 57.00 64.00 
SAC 65.00 69.00 131.00 127.00 89.00 79.00 46.00 48.00 
SRE 47.00 44.00 65.00 67.00 37.00 27.00 17.00 17.00 
SFW 2.00 2.00 44.00 45.00 18.00 18.00 3.00 3.00 
 
 
Euro Money 
Institutional Investor 
2006 
Euro Money 
Institutional Investor 
2007 
Carpetright 2005 Carillion 2007 
 EM2006A EM2006B EM2007A EM2007B CR2005A CR2005B CL2007A CL2007B 
CIIR 1100.00 1112.00 1902.00 1386.00 1462.00 1176.00 2420.00 2266.00 
CAC 491.00 515.00 752.00 677.00 778.00 818.00 1018.00 976.00 
CRE 226.00 247.00 688.00 517.00 392.00 438.00 857.00 862.00 
CFW 110.00 128.00 406.00 369.00 251.00 292.00 998.00 993.00 
SIIR 112.00 101.00 157.00 142.00 77.00 92.00 190.00 201.00 
SAC 71.00 61.00 96.00 97.00 94.00 91.00 163.00 162.00 
SRE 45.00 37.00 55.00 64.00 47.00 43.00 54.00 54.00 
SFW 18.00 15.00 5.00 7.00 8.00 7.00 28.00 25.00 
 
 SSL 2005 Unilever 2005 Redrow 2005 United Business Media 
2005 
 SL2005A SL2005B UL2005A UL2005B RD2005A RD2005B UB2005A UB2005B 
CIIR 764.00 766.00 2179.00 2273.00 2060.00 2184.00 1878.00 2001.00 
CAC 435.00 408.00 1437.00 1425.00 997.00 946.00 831.00 870.00 
CRE 273.00 275.00 673.00 667.00 1038.00 1139.00 726.00 761.00 
CFW 174.00 178.00 511.00 485.00 846.00 858.00 282.00 354.00 
SIIR 52.00 50.00 184.00 191.00 31.00 31.00 265.00 231.00 
SAC 42.00 55.00 208.00 205.00 43.00 43.00 203.00 195.00 
SRE 19.00 27.00 89.00 87.00 8.00 8.00 84.00 76.00 
SFW 3.00 5.00 6.00 8.00 5.00 5.00 9.00 9.00 
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 United Business Media 2006 Persimmon 2006 Smith and Nephew 2005 
 UB2006A UB2006B UB2006C PM2006A PM2006B SN2005A SN2005B 
CIIR 2285.00 3318.00 3347.00 2783.00 2585.00 1031.00 1117.00 
CAC 1249.00 1242.00 1250.00 688.00 604.00 469.00 469.00 
CRE 1919.00 1884.00 1944.00 802.00 787.00 472.00 452.00 
CFW 335.00 322.00 318.00 503.00 511.00 328.00 321.00 
SIIR 425.00 358.00 357.00 139.00 127.00 103.00 105.00 
SAC 256.00 258.00 253.00 145.00 144.00 84.00 81.00 
SRE 150.00 159.00 167.00 38.00 36.00 53.00 52.00 
SFW 23.00 19.00 22.00 9.00 9.00 15.00 14.00 
Appendix 12 Panel A: Inter-coder Tallying Values for Variables Continued 
Definition of Terms: 
CIIR: Sum for number of Complementary Information Items scored, repetitions accounted for  
CAC: Sum for number of Complementary Amounts and Comparisons of Current and With Past 
Performance attributes scored, repetitions accounted for 
CRE: Sum for number of Complementary Reasons for Performance attributes scored, repetitions 
accounted for 
CFW:  Sum for number of Complementary Forward-looking attributes scored, repetitions accounted 
for 
SIIR:  Sum for number of Supplementary Information Items scored, repetitions accounted for  
SAC: Sum for number of Supplementary Amounts and Comparisons of Current and With Past 
Performance attributes scored, repetitions accounted for 
SRE: Sum for number of Supplementary Reasons for Performance attributes scored, repetitions 
accounted for 
SFW:  Sum for number of Supplementary Forward-looking attributes scored, repetitions accounted 
for 
AR2007A/ B:    First/ second coder for Arriva Interim Report, 2007 
BK2007A/ B:  First/ second coder for Berkeley Interim Report, 2007 
GS2006A/ B:  First/ second coder for GlaxoSmithKline Interim Report, 2006 
FD2007A/ B:  First/ second coder for Findel Interim Report, 2007 
EM2006A/ B:  First/ second coder for Euro Money Institutional Investor Interim Report, 
2006 
EM2007A/ B:  First/ second coder for Euro Money Institutional Investor Interim Report, 
2007 
CR2005A/ B:  First/ second coder for Carpetright Interim Report, 2005 
CL2007A/ B:  First/ second coder for Carillion Interim Report, 2007 
SL2005A/ B:  First/ second coder for SSL Interim Report, 2005 
UL2005A/ B:  First/ second coder for Unilever Interim Report, 2005 
RD2005A/ B:  First/ second coder for Redrow Interim Report, 2005 
UB2005A/ B:  First/ second coder for United Business Media Interim Report, 2005 
UB2006A/ B/C: First/ second/ third coder for United Business Media Interim Report, 2006 
PM2006A/ B:  First/ second coder for Persimmon Interim Report, 2006 
SN2005A/ B:  First/ second coder for Smith and Nephew Interim Report, 2005 
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Panel B. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: Arriva 2007 
 
Panel C. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: Berkeley 2007 
 
Panel D. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: 
GlaxoSmithKline  2006 
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Panel E. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: Findel  2007 
 
Panel F. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: Euro Money 
Institutional Investor  2006 
 
Panel G. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: Euro Money 
Institutional Investor  2007 
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Panel H. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: Carpetright  
2005 
 
Panel I. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: Carillion  
2007 
 
Panel J. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: SSL  2005 
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Panel K. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: Unilever 2005 
 
Panel L. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: Redrow 2005 
 
Panel M. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: United 
Business Media  2005 
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Panel N. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: United 
Business Media  2006 
 
Panel O. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: Persimmon  
2006 
 
Panel P. Krippendorff‟s Alpha SPSS Output for Tallying Reliability Test: Smith and 
Nephew 2005 
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Appendix 13. Relative versus Incremental Information Content by Biddle et al 
(1995) 
 
Source: Biddle et al (1995) 
 
 
X has larger relative 
information content than Y 
Only X is 
incremental 
X Y 
= Panel A 
X, Y X Y 
X and Y have equal relative 
information content  
Neither X nor Y are 
incremental 
Both X and Y are 
incremental 
X Y > Panel B 
X 
Y 
X 
Y 
Both X and Y are 
incremental 
X has larger relative 
information content than Y 
Only X is 
incremental 
Y X < Panel C 
Y 
X 
Y 
X 
Both X and Y are 
incremental 
X has smaller relative 
information content than Y 
Only Y is 
incremental 
Note: The areas covered by circles represent variation in a dependent variable explained by the predictor 
variables X and Y 
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Appendix 14. Plots for Regression Standardised Residual and Predicted Value for 
Day 0 
Model 1: Information Content of Complementary Narratives based on Disclosure Variety 
 
Model 2: Information Content of Supplementary Narratives based on Disclosure Variety 
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Model 3: Information Content of Complementary Narratives based on Disclosure Depth 
 
Model 4: Information Content of Supplementary Narratives based on Disclosure Depth 
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Model 5: Incremental Information Content of Complementary and Supplementary Narratives 
based on Disclosure Variety 
 
Model 6: Incremental Information Content of Complementary and Supplementary Narratives 
based on Disclosure Depth  
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Appendix 15. Pearson Correlation between Sensitivity Test Factors and 
Predictors  
 ARE RCE 
CII 0.216** -0.040 
CGD -0.007 -0.056 
CAC 0.191** -0.041 
CRE 0.148** -0.030 
CFW 0.180** -0.048 
SGD -0.195** -0.027 
SII 0.263** -0.034 
SAC 0.261** -0.051 
SRE 0.255** -0.038 
SFW 0.189** -0.054 
ADY -0.041 0.077 
IES 0.034 -0.042 
ITA 0.248** -0.047 
Note: CII (SII) = Complementary (Supplementary) Number of Information Items, CGD (SGD) = Complementary 
(Supplementary) Good News, CAC (SAC) = Complementary (Supplementary) Amounts and Comparison of 
Current with Past Performance, CRE (SRE) Complementary (Supplementary) Reasons for Performance, CFW 
(SFW) = Complementary (Supplementary) Forward-looking Attribute, ADY = Average Annual Dividend Yield, 
IES = Interim Earnings per Share, ITA = Firm Size by Interim Logarithmic Total Assets, ARE = Audit Review 
Effect, RCE = Regulation Change Effect, **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed), *Correlation is 
significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed), n=309 and missing = 0 
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Appendix 16. Sensitivity Test Results based on Event Day Results 
Relative Information Content of Complementary and Supplementary Narratives Based on Disclosure Variety for CAR (-5, 0) 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 
R2 
[Adj. R2] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CII 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
Dummy 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
 
R2 
[Adj. R2] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
SII 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
Dummy 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
Main Result 0.398  0.005 0.285 0.570 -0.036 n/a  0.405  -0.092 0.288 0.570 0.007 n/a 
 [0.390] [0.187] [0.108] [6.365] [12.607] [-0.766] n/a  [0.397] [0.913] [-1.860] [6.476] [12.678] [0.136] n/a 
 {50.243} (0.852) (0.914) (0.000) (0.000) (0.444) n/a  {51.675} (0.362) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.892) n/a 
 (0.000)  {0.904} {0.987} {0.967} {0.880} n/a  (0.000)  {0.795} {0.992} {0.970} {0.772} n/a 
 <1.926>  <1.106> <1.014> <1.034> <1.137> n/a  <1.974>  <1.259> <1.008> <1.031> <1.295> n/a 
Regulation Change Effect 
Dummy = RCE 0.400  0.004 0.288 0.569 -0.038 -0.040  0.406  -0.093 0.291 0.568 0.005 -0.041 
 [0.390] [0.276] [0.076] [6.414] [12.563] [-0.796] [-0.884]  [0.397] [1.030] [-1.875] [6.528] [12.637] [0.104] [-0.924] 
 {40.322} (0.783) (0.939) (0.000) (0.000) (0.427) (0.377)  {41.491} (0.304) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) (0.917) (0.356) 
 (0.000)  {0.903} {0.980} {0.966} {0.879} {0.989}  (0.000)  {0.794} {0.986} {0.968} {0.771} {0.990} 
 <1.935>  <1.108> <1.021> <1.035> <1.138> <1.011>  <1.985>  <1.259> <1.014> <1.033> <1.296> <1.010> 
                
Audit Review Effect 
Dummy = ARE 0.403  0.017 0.280 0.570 -0.022 -0.071  0.408  -0.082 0.284 0.569 0.016 -0.055 
 [0.393] [0.014] [0.351] [6.243] [12.630] [-0.447] [-1.533]  [0.398] [0.924] [-1.623] [6.383] [12.674] [0.319] [-1.194] 
 {40.843} (0.989) (0.726) (0.000) (0.000) (0.655) (0.126)  {41.683} (0.356) (0.106) (0.000) (0.000) (0.750) (0.233) 
 (0.000)  {0.881} {0.981} {0.967} {0.845} {0.911}  (0.000)  {0.770} {0.988} {0.969} {0.754} {0.906} 
 <1.953>  <1.135> <1.020> <1.034> <1.184> <1.098>  <1.991>  <1.299> <1.012> <1.032> <1.327> <1.104> 
Notes: CAR = Daily Market Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns, CII (SII) = Complementary (Supplementary) Number of Information Items, ADY = 
Average Annual Dividend Yield, IES = Interim Earnings per Share, ITA = Firm Size by Interim Logarithmic Total Assets, RCE = Regulation Change Effect, 
ARE = Audit Review Effect, Single and double underline show significance respectively at 0.05 and 0.01 level, n=309 
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Relative Information Content of Complementary and Supplementary Narratives Based on Disclosure Depth for CAR (-5, 0) 
 Model 3  Model 4 
 
R2 
[Adj. R2] 
{F-
Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
Const 
 
[t-
Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
Dummy 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
 
R2 
[Adj. R2] 
{F-
Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
SGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
Dummy 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
Main Result 0.451  -0.127 0.319 -0.192 -0.044 0.286 0.573 -0.131 n/a  0.403  0.023 -0.056 -0.018 0.001 0.277 0.564 0.002 n/a 
 [0.439] [2.948] [-2.628] [4.139] [-2.032] [-0.553] [6.656] [13.017] [-2.609] n/a  [0.389] [-0.116] [0.479] [-0.631] [-0.182] [0.009] [6.085] [12.196] [0.034] n/a 
 {36.376} (0.003) (0.009) (0.000) (0.043) (0.581) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) n/a  {29.050} (0.908) (0.633) (0.528) (0.856) (0.993) (0.000) (0.000) (0.973) n/a 
 (0.000)  {0.775} {0.307} {0.205} {0.285} {0.991} {0.941} {0.722} n/a  (0.000)  {0.886} {0.248} {0.201} {0.552} {0.959} {0.928} {0.759} n/a 
 <1.936>  <1.291> <3.256> <4.876> <3.505> <1.010> <1.063> <1.384> n/a  <1.954>  <1.129> <4.027> <4.981> <1.812> <1.043> <1.077> <1.317> n/a 
Regulation Change Effect 
Dummy = RCE 0.453  -0.132 0.317 -0.187 -0.047 0.289 0.571 -0.134 -0.047  0.405  0.021 -0.058 -0.016 -0.001 0.280 0.563 0.000 -0.041 
 [0.439] [3.053] [-2.704] [4.110] [-1.985] [-0.587] [6.722] [12.959] [-2.667] [-1.082]  [0.389] [-0.017] [0.453] [-0.653] [-0.163] [-0.023] [6.133] [12.165] [0.006] [-0.905] 
 {31.118} (0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.048) (0.557) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.280)  {25.506} (0.987) (0.651) (0.514) (0.870) (0.982) (0.000) (0.000) (0.995) (0.366) 
 (0.000)  {0.770} {0.307} {0.205} {0.285} {0.984} {0.939} {0.720} {0.982}  (0.000)  {0.885} {0.248} {0.201} {0.551} {0.954} {0.928} {0.759} {0.987} 
 <1.951>  <1.299> <3.259> <4.885> <3.509> <1.016> <1.065> <1.389> <1.018>  <1.964>  <1.130> <4.029> <4.983> <1.814> <1.049> <1.078> <1.318> <1.013> 
Audit Review Effect 
Dummy = ARE 0.456  -0.123 0.326 -0.202 -0.032 0.282 0.574 -0.114 -0.072  0.406  0.015 -0.051 -0.016 0.003 0.274 0.564 0.010 -0.056 
 [0.442] [2.900] [-2.545] [4.236] [-2.148] [-0.400] [6.569] [13.069] [-2.230] [-1.618]  [0.390] [0.056] [0.317] [-0.568] [-0.160] [0.052] [6.022] [12.219] [0.203] [-1.187] 
 {31.447} (0.004) (0.011) (0.000) (0.033) (0.689) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.107)  {25.629} (0.955) (0.752) (0.570) (0.873) (0.958) (0.000) (0.000) (0.839) (0.236) 
 (0.000)  {0.772} {0.306} {0.204} {0.283} {0.987} {0.940} {0.692} {0.913}  (0.000)  {0.870} {0.248} {0.201} {0.551} {0.956} {0.928} {0.744} {0.888} 
 <1.969>  <1.295> <3.267> <4.901> <3.536> <1.013> <1.063> <1.445> <1.096>  <1.973>  <1.149> <4.038> <4.983> <1.814> <1.046> <1.078> <1.344> <1.126> 
Notes: CAR = Daily Market Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns,  CGD (SGD) = Complementary (Supplementary) Good News, CAC (SAC) = 
Complementary (Supplementary) Amounts and Comparison of Current with Past Performance, CRE (SRE) Complementary (Supplementary) = Reasons for 
Performance, CFW (SFW) = Complementary (Supplementary) Forward-looking Attribute, ADY = Average Annual Dividend Yield, IES = Interim Earnings 
per Share, ITA = Firm Size by Interim Logarithmic Total Assets, RCE = Regulation Change Effect, ARE = Audit Review Effect, Single and double underline 
show significance respectively at 0.05 and 0.01 level, n=309 
 L 
 
Incremental Information Content of Complementary and Supplementary Narratives Based on Disclosure Variety for CAR (-5, 0) 
 Model 5 
 
R
2 
[Adj. R
2
] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CII 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SII 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
Dummy 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
Main Result 0.408  0.068 -0.130 0.283 0.573 0.004 n/a 
 [0.398] [-0.628] [1.250] [-2.240] [6.364] [12.738] [0.070] n/a 
 {41.729} (0.531) (0.212) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.945) n/a 
 (0.000)  {0.663} {0.583} {0.986} {0.967} {0.770} n/a 
 <1.955>  <1.509> <1.716> <1.014> <1.034> <1.299> n/a 
Regulation Change Effect 
Dummy = RCE 0.409  0.066 -0.130 0.287 0.571 0.002 -0.039 
 [0.398] [-0.540] [1.221] [-2.238] [6.413] [12.694] [0.040] [-0.886] 
 {34.880} (0.589) (0.223) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.968) (0.376) 
 (0.000)  {0.662} {0.583} {0.980} {0.966} {0.769} {0.989} 
 <1.965>  <1.510> <1.716> <1.021> <1.036> <1.300> <1.011> 
Audit Review Effect 
Dummy = ARE 0.411  0.074 -0.121 0.279 0.572 0.013 -0.061 
 [0.399] [-0.713] [1.353] [-2.085] [6.256] [12.745] [0.265] [-1.302] 
 {35.136} (0.476) (0.177) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.791) (0.194) 
 (0.000)  {0.658} {0.576} {0.981} {0.967} {0.753} {0.900} 
 <1.972>  <1.519> <1.737> <1.020> <1.034> <1.329> <1.112> 
Notes: CAR = Daily Market Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns, CII (SII) = Complementary (Supplementary) Number of Information Items, ADY = 
Average Annual Dividend Yield, IES = Interim Earnings per Share, ITA = Firm Size by Interim Logarithmic Total Assets, RCE = Regulation Change Effect, 
ARE = Audit Review Effect, Single and double underline show significance respectively at 0.05 and 0.01 level, n=309 
  
 LI 
 
Incremental Information Content of Complementary and Supplementary Narratives Based on Disclosure Depth for CAR (-5, 0) 
 Model 6 
 
R2 
[Adj. R2] 
{F-Ratio} 
(Sig.) 
<D-W> 
Const 
 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
CGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
CFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SGD 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SAC 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SRE 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
SFW 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ADY 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
IES 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
ITA 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
Dummy 
Std B 
[t-Stat.] 
(Sig.) 
{Tol.} 
<VIF> 
Main Result 0.479  -0.171 0.415 -0.160 -0.055 0.069 -0.121 -0.108 0.073 0.264 0.559 -0.101 n/a 
 [0.460] [3.267] [-3.314] [5.102] [-1.657] [-0.644] [1.397] [-1.393] [-1.073] [1.242] [6.137] [12.580] [-1.956] n/a 
 {24.842} (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.099) (0.520) (0.163) (0.165) (0.284) (0.215) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) n/a 
 (0.000)  {0.660} {0.265} {0.188} {0.241} {0.719} {0.231} {0.173} {0.505} {0.947} {0.889} {0.653} n/a 
 <1.954>  <1.516> <3.777> <5.320> <4.155> <1.390> <4.325> <5.792> <1.982> <1.056> <1.124> <1.532> n/a 
Regulation Change Effect 
Dummy = RCE 0.481  -0.175 0.413 -0.156 -0.058 0.068 -0.122 -0.107 0.072 0.268 0.557 -0.104 -0.047 
 [0.460] [3.370] [-3.380] [5.079] [-1.612] [-0.677] [1.383] [-1.403] [-1.067] [1.219] [6.204] [12.534] [-2.006] [-1.106] 
 {22.890} (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.108) (0.499) (0.168) (0.162) (0.287) (0.224) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) (0.270) 
 (0.000)  {0.657} {0.265} {0.188} {0.240} {0.719} {0.231} {0.173} {0.504} {0.942} {0.888} {0.651} {0.981} 
 <1.970>  <1.523> <3.779> <5.328> <4.158> <1.391> <4.326> <5.792> <1.983> <1.061> <1.126> <1.535> <1.019> 
               
Audit Review Effect 
Dummy = ARE 0.481  -0.166 0.417 -0.168 -0.050 0.063 -0.119 -0.103 0.073 0.262 0.560 -0.093 -0.041 
 [0.460] [3.225] [-3.190] [5.117] [-1.729] [-0.579] [1.256] [-1.367] [-1.023] [1.246] [6.085] [12.600] [-1.770] [-0.923] 
 {22.831} (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.085) (0.563) (0.210) (0.173) (0.307) (0.214) (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.357) 
 (0.000)  {0.651} {0.265} {0.187} {0.240} {0.706} {0.231} {0.172} {0.505} {0.945} {0.889} {0.634} {0.871} 
 <1.967>  <1.535> <3.778> <5.358> <4.174> <1.417> <4.329> <5.808> <1.982> <1.058> <1.125> <1.578> <1.148> 
Notes: CAR = Daily Market Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns,  CGD (SGD) = Complementary (Supplementary) Good News, CAC (SAC) = 
Complementary (Supplementary) Amounts and Comparison of Current with Past Performance, CRE (SRE) Complementary (Supplementary) = Reasons for 
Performance, CFW (SFW) = Complementary (Supplementary) Forward-looking Attribute, ADY = Average Annual Dividend Yield, IES = Interim Earnings 
per Share, ITA = Firm Size by Interim Logarithmic Total Assets, RCE = Regulation Change Effect, ARE = Audit Review Effect, Single and double underline 
show significance respectively at 0.05 and 0.01 level, n=309 
  
 LII 
 
F- Statistic significance test for Sensitivity Analysis based on Event Day Results 
 Dummy 
Variable 
R-Sq 
Dummy 
R-Sq 
No 
Dummy 
K 
Dummy 
K 
No 
Dummy 
N F df dfε Critical 
F 
Is change significant 
based on  
F-statistic? 
Model 1 RCE 0.400 0.398 5 4 309 1.010 1 303 3.87 No 
 ARE 0.403 0.398 5 4 309 2.538 1 303 3.87 No 
Model 2 RCE 0.406 0.405 5 4 309 0.510 1 303 3.87 No 
 ARE 0.408 0.405 5 4 309 1.535 1 303 3.87 No 
Model 3 RCE 0.453 0.451 8 7 309 1.097 1 300 3.87 No 
 ARE 0.456 0.451 8 7 309 2.757 1 300 3.87 No 
Model 4 RCE 0.405 0.403 8 7 309 1.008 1 300 3.87 No 
 ARE 0.406 0.403 8 7 309 1.515 1 300 3.87 No 
Model 5 RCE 0.409 0.408 6 5 309 0.511 1 302 3.87 No 
 ARE 0.411 0.408 6 5 309 1.538 1 302 3.87 No 
Model 6 RCE 0.481 0.479 12 11 309 1.141 1 296 3.87 No 
 ARE 0.481 0.479 12 11 309 1.141 1 296 3.87 No 
Note: , RCE = Regulation Change Effect, ARE = Audit Review Effect, R-Sq Dummy = coefficient of determination for the model with the dummy variable, 
R-Sq No Dummy = coefficient of determination for the model of the main results, K Dummy = number of predictors in the model having the dummy variable, 
K No Dummy = number of predictors in the model of the main results, F = F-statistic, N = number of subjects, df = degrees of freedom change, dfε = degrees 
of freedom error, Critical F  = Critical F-statistic values at p<0.05 
 
